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‘Wrestling anger: An investigation into Seneca’s approach 
to the management of passion through Stoic philosophy’ 
Abstract 
This thesis asks how passions, in particular anger, can be managed through 
practising Stoic philosophy. I explore the role of the Stoic theory of passions 
in Seneca’s writing and situate him within Stoic theory. I explore how Medea 
and Thyestes reflect his vision of anger communicated in De Ira and De 
Clementia by treating his protagonists as case-studies of individuals with 
extreme anger to assess whether they could be improved by Stoicism.  
Chapter One situates Seneca within the Stoic theory of passions by 
considering how he responds to his predecessors, how he follows orthodox 
doctrines, how he was influenced by later thinkers and where he advances 
philosophical doctrines. Chapter Two analyses anger in De Ira and De 
Clementia and compares Stoic perceptions with those of Aristotle and the 
Epicureans and compares its presentation in Seneca’s prose and dramas. 
Chapter Three considers how to extirpate anger according to the advice 
offered in Seneca’s moral essays. It traces the techniques’ origins, 
considering whether they are philosophical, depend on Stoic doctrines, if 
they are practical solutions or a combination. I critique their feasibility as 
remedies for passions. Chapter Four presents the Stoic elements pertinent 
to passions in the selected plays. It explores the anti-Stoic interpretation of 
Senecan drama, the reasons for philosophy’s prevalence and how his 
drama reflects his moral theory. Chapter Five asks whether Medea and 
Atreus reflect a Stoic perspective and how they would benefit by adopting a 
philosophical outlook. It considers possible audience responses and 
identifies potential ‘cures’ and whether the characters attempt to address 
their anger.  
In conclusion, I accept Seneca’s account of anger and deduce that 
practising Stoic techniques can help remove anger. While the opportunity 
for cures in the characters is not applied, the educative function of Senecan 
drama invites the audience to learn from the protagonists’ failures. 
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Abbreviations 
Abbreviations used are as listed in the Oxford Classical Dictionary 4th 
edition, with the addition of the following: 
Alex. Aphr. Alexander of Aphrodisias 
Beat. De vita beata 
Brev.  De vitae brevitate  
Carm. aur. Golden Verses 
De lib. at. aegr. De libidine et aegritudine 
De nat. hom. De natura hominis 
De Stoic. rep. De Stoicorum repugnantiis 
Dissert. Discourses 
EK Edelstein and Kidd 
Ench. Encheiridion 
Epict. Epictetus 
HO Hercules Oetaeus 
Ir. De Ira 
LS Long and Sedley 
Marc. Ad Marciam 
Nem. Nemesius 
Parad. Stoic. Paradoxa Stoicorum 
Phaed. Phaedra 
Phoen. Phoenissae 
PHP De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis  
Plac. Placita philosophorum 
Poly. Ad Polybium 
Prov.  De Providentia  
Pythag. Pythagoras 
Oct. Octavia 
Oed. Oedipus 
Ot. De Otio 
Thy. Thyestes 
Troad. Troades 
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Translations 
 
I use translations of De Ira by Kaster (2010) and De Clementia by Braund 
(2009). I quote from Medea translated by Boyle (2014), Thyestes by Wilson 
(2010) and the Epistles by Gummere (Volume 1 1917, 1996; Volume 2, 
1920, 1970; Volume 3 1925, 2000).  
Quotations of Cicero Tusculanae disputationes are translated by Graver 
(2002), Galen De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis by De Lacy (1978-84) and 
Philodemus De Ira by Tsouna (2007). Other translations will be referenced 
accordingly.  
 
Unless stated to the contrary, all citations of ancient literature are written by 
Seneca. References denoted numerically in brackets without an 
accompanying title are passages of De Ira. 
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‘Wrestling anger: An investigation into Seneca’s approach 
to the management of passion through Stoic philosophy’ 
 
Introduction 
 
The principal research questions 
The central questions of my research relate to the nature of passions and 
how they can be managed through practising Stoic philosophy, according 
to Seneca’s presentation of the School’s doctrines. The purpose of focusing 
on anger specifically is to apply its presentation in Seneca to advance 
current understanding of the established Stoic theory of the passions. Anger 
is the primary focus because it is the most severe and destructive passion 
and its catastrophic consequences mean that it particularly requires 
attention to prevent it from arising. By examining the worst type of emotional 
problem, it is possible to analyse the usefulness of philosophy against its 
most difficult challenge. With a particular interest in Stoic philosophy, as well 
as being a politician, moral advisor and author, Seneca provides insight into 
Stoicism and other philosophical schools’ views about how to live well, a 
goal he actively strove to achieve, and persuasively encourages his readers 
to do the same.1 I focus on the Stoic elements of Seneca’s arguments 
because these best illustrate how Stoicism offers cures for the problem of 
passions, though reference to his relationship with other thinkers is relevant 
to complete the picture of his beliefs about anger. Seneca is recognised for 
his literary ability across many genres. Through his prolific writing he 
manages to combine his philosophical interests and wish to entertain by 
incorporating subtle moral suggestions in his plays when he includes Stoic 
themes in his dramas. His adaptability enables him to appeal to a larger 
audience than those who read his prose work, including those who observe 
and read his plays. 
                                                          
1 Cf. Veyne (2003) pp. 5-9. 
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Seneca’s De Ira, a prose work dedicated to anger, forms the foundation of 
my research regarding ira’s nature and management and detailed analysis 
of this text is provided in Chapter Two in preparation for further discussion. 
References to this topic found in his other works will help to complete 
Seneca’s picture of anger. I draw on elements of De Clementia because ira 
is an alternative (and inappropriate) response compared to clementia. 
Where appropriate, I reference the Epistles for insights into the nature of 
passions and advice about they can be managed, as well as using Seneca’s 
letters as evidence of Stoic ethical theory. Regarding terminology, Cicero 
admitted to having problems translating the Greek pathē and concluded that 
the most appropriate Latin word is perturbationes (cf. Cic. Tusc. 3.7; Cic. 
Fin. 3.35). Seneca chooses the term passions or adfectus (cf. 1.1.1, 1.1.7, 
1.3.6) as they are something from which people ‘suffer’ and they are a vice 
or vitium (cf. 1.1.5, 1.3.7). I believe that this is captured in the English 
translation of adfectus as ‘passions’ in preference to ‘emotions’.2  
 
My research enquires into the role of the Stoic theory of passions in 
Seneca’s writing and through a detailed investigation of the role played by 
Stoic ideas in the plays Medea and Thyestes, I will explore the extent to 
which the tragedies are illustrations of his presentation of anger 
communicated in De Ira. I examine why and how Seneca uses different 
methods to convey similar philosophical messages in his violent dramas 
and his more considered moral essays and Epistles. Studying these texts 
enables a clearer understanding of the battle with passions and aims to 
consider how their problems can be resolved. I analyse the presence of the 
psychology of passions in the tragedies Medea and Thyestes and have 
chosen these plays because the protagonists display anger in its extreme 
state when they take revenge by murdering their enemies’ children. There 
are other characters in Seneca’s plays which embody similar characteristics 
and attitudes towards anger such as Clytemnestra in Agamemnon, Juno in 
the prologue to Hercules Furens, Achilles and Pyrrhus in the Troades, 
                                                          
2 Translations of ‘pathē/adfectus’ vary amongst scholars between the use of ‘emotion’ and 
‘passions’. For example, ‘emotion’ is used by Brennan (2003, 2006) pp. 257ff. and Konstan 
(2015), whereas Inwood (2005, 2008) and Asmis (2015) choose ‘passions’.  
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Theseus' curse in Phaedra (Phaed. lines 947, 1207), the sibling feud in 
Phoenissae and Oedipus in Oedipus. However, these plays will not be 
included in my discussion because the sustained anger of Medea and 
Atreus and the extreme consequences of their ira best provide appropriate 
case studies for the exploration of this passion. 
 
I question the extent to which Seneca’s tragic characters in Medea and 
Thyestes display Stoic sympathies and how they would benefit from 
adopting a philosophical approach. I analyse Medea and Atreus as if they 
were case studies of real people with severe emotional problems rather than 
fictitious dramatic devices, examining any evidence of potential cognitive 
and behavioural improvement in order to establish whether the characters 
do or should take steps to cure their anger. In this way I can assess whether, 
if the characters behaved in this way in the real world, they could be 
reformed through the application of the techniques recommended by 
Seneca in De Ira, with particular attention to their Stoic elements. This 
methodology, in effect treating Seneca’s characters as exempla, will enable 
the use of Medea and Atreus as instances of how not to behave and how 
their examples could generate reflection in an audience to motivate self-
improvement.3 The purpose of these questions is to assist in improving 
modern understanding about Seneca’s project of educating his audience 
and readers in virtue and vice. The presence of philosophical ideas in the 
plays provides an opportunity to consider the possibility of a Stoic world 
within the tragedies to address the problems which arise when reason is not 
operating at the centre of the human mind. This interpretation of the 
characters indicates that in a Stoic world there would be a better outcome 
for the individuals and the community. The generic and plot constraints of 
tragedy and their purpose of reflecting human psychology could justify why 
the characters are not redeemable.  
 
                                                          
3 For Seneca’s use of exempla, see pp. 22, 43-4, 118-9, 156-7, 168-70, Chapter Five 
passim. 
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The questions I am posing are important areas of research because of the 
significance passions play in human lives and the need for a solution to the 
problems that they cause. In addition, the questions contribute to the debate 
about Seneca’s use of philosophy by analysing the extent to which he 
adopts, modifies or develops early Stoic ways of thinking. By emphasising 
the cognitive elements of passions, as Stoics do, as opposed to seeing them 
as feelings over which the individual has no control, I seek to demonstrate 
how by governing thoughts and choosing reactions appropriately one can 
avoid becoming angry specifically through the application of Seneca’s 
proposed methods. I examine the development of the Stoic theory of 
passions from conception, noting Seneca’s relationship with the orthodox 
views, the debates within the School, as well as identifying the areas of the 
doctrines he advances. This analysis will reveal the extent to which 
Seneca’s advice for managing and curing anger is philosophically 
grounded, based on practical measures and a combination of these, as well 
as considering the potential effectiveness of using different approaches.  
 
Traditionally, scholarly interest in Seneca’s works tends to be divided into 
his style, philosophy or the genre in which he writes. More recently, there 
has been research into ‘seeing Seneca whole’, i.e. consolidating his various 
works to find a more complete picture of this prolific author, drawing ideas 
together about his political and philosophical views and how common 
themes and styles align his thinking.4 I intend to combine the conventional 
elements of research with a close reading of specific prose and dramatic 
texts to demonstrate the parallels in his philosophical lessons and how 
Seneca educates his reader/audience in managing their passions through 
reading and experiencing his different genres. This will also involve the 
applicability of Stoicism to Seneca’s plays by exploring the extent to which 
philosophical ideas are included and evidence of these with regard to the 
protagonists of Medea and Thyestes in particular. The extensive analysis of 
anger as a concept from different philosophical and non-philosophical 
perspectives and presentations will produce a detailed picture of the 
                                                          
4 Cf. Volk and Williams (eds.) (2006); Bartsch and Schiesaro (eds.) (2015). 
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problem which it poses. This intertextual research facilitates a 
comprehensive understanding of Seneca’s philosophical theory of the 
passions, especially anger, from which it will be possible to comprehend his 
guidance on living well and how his advice should be applied to live the best 
possible life.  
 
In this Introduction, I will outline Seneca’s exposure to philosophy, 
explaining his justification for adopting Stoicism as a ‘cure’ for passions, 
highlighting the Stoic doctrines he adopts and rejects, as well as considering 
how he relates to the views of other philosophical schools, such as the 
Aristotelians and Epicureans. I follow with a briefly outline of Seneca’s and 
Stoic attitudes towards poetry in relation to its emotional impact on its 
audience before discussing his purpose in writing through discussing his 
use of philosophy in drama. I consider how he presents his ideas, which 
includes exploring his techniques, his use of rhetoric and declamation, as 
well as briefly considering the more common scholarly subjects of the 
controversies relating to the dating, authorship and performance of 
Seneca’s plays. By exploring these subjects at this point, I will be able to 
establish how my research is placed within previous scholarship. The 
Introduction ends with a summary of the content of the texts to which I will 
refer and an outline of the arguments stated in each chapter.  
 
Senecan philosophy 
Seneca had contact with many philosophers, all of whom shaped his outlook 
in different ways.5 Stoicism is clearly Seneca’s greatest interest as is 
demonstrated by the fact that in his prose works there are over eighty 
references to Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus and the Middle Stoa, Panaetius 
and Posidonius, as well as sixty mentions of the School in general, in 
addition to ten minor Stoics.6 Stoicism was relevant to Seneca’s era 
because it was a time when traditional values were challenged, freedom 
                                                          
5 Seneca’s chief philosophical influence and teacher was Sotion of Alexandria (Ep. 49.2) 
inspired by Quintus Sextius the Elder (cf. Ep. 2.36; 3.36; 59.7-8; 64.2f.; 98.14; 108.17-8). 
Seneca was also taught by Papirius Fabianus (cf. Brev. vit. 10.1; Ep. 58,6; 98.13; QNat. 
3.27.4; Sen. Controv. 2. Pref.) and Attalus (cf. Ep. 108.3, 13). Cf. Pratt (1983) pp. 38-9; 
Sellars (2014).  
6 Cf. Motto (1970) pp. xiii-iv. 
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was precarious because of tyrants’ rule and current social 
acknowledgements of status no longer met people’s needs. Individuals 
responded by redefining the meaning of their life by looking inward, which 
is appropriate preparation for practising Stoicism.7 
 
Stoicism is a practical philosophy which offers guidance for behaviour. The 
School expects individuals to relate the philosophical doctrines to their lives, 
rather than using them solely as abstract academic theory.8 True philosophy 
is not about eloquent or persuasive arguments, but is concerned with self-
improvement because it teaches how to act as opposed to how to talk, in 
that it expects the internalisation and practical application of doctrines rather 
than merely intellectualising theory (Ep. 20.2).9 Stoics seek perfect reason 
(that is identical to God), which is achievable by understanding everything 
and living virtuously in accordance with nature/secundum naturam, that 
being the art of living/techne peri ton bion/ars vivendi, where virtue is 
interpreted as being excellence of character (Sext. Emp. Math. 11.170 (SVF 
3.598)).10  
 
The Stoic understanding of secundum naturam is two-fold.11 Initially, 
individuals must live true to their personal nature, perfect wisdom with a 
                                                          
7 Cf. Segal (2008) pp. 136-7. 
8 Cf. Ep. 16.2-3; 20.2ff.; 75.4; 108.36. 
9 Cited in Hadot (1995, 2003) p. 110 n. 9. 
10 Cf. Cic. Acad. 2.23; Plut. De Stoic. rep. 1034d; Stob. Ecl. 2.7.5b10. 
11 Diogenes Laertius revealed that there was a general consensus among Stoics that the 
good life and virtue depended on following nature by citing Zeno, Cleanthes, Posidonius, 
Hecato, Chrysippus, Diogenes and Archedemus as holding this view (Diog. Laert. 7.87-8). 
Zeno initially proposed that man should ‘live in accordance’ and Cleanthes expanded this 
to include ‘with nature’ referring to ‘common’ nature to which Chrysippus added individual 
nature (cf. Diog. Laert. 7.87-9; Stob. Ecl. 2.7.6a). Posidonius posed a greater challenge to 
the orthodox view by arguing that the existing Stoic definition of the ‘end’ was not 
satisfactory and this affected the viability of the arguments of what it meant to live in 
accordance with nature (Gal. PHP 5.6.6-12). He drew on Platonic theories of virtue and 
telos and went as far as to argue that all ethical philosophy doctrines are connected through 
the knowledge of the soul’s powers which suggests that by understanding these men can 
live well because they will understand how to prevent passions from arising and heal them 
when they do (Gal. PHP 4.7.23-4). Hence why the addition of the irrational part of the soul 
is necessary for Posidonius to explain passions. He believed that once the nature of 
passions is fully comprehended, the errors in defining the end are removed because 
knowing this exposes the ‘distortion’ between what should be sought (or avoided), 
distinguishes the methods of training and clarifies the ‘difficulties about the conation that 
arises from affection’ (Gal. PHP 5.6.14). Seneca agrees with Posidonius with regard to the 
importance of comprehensive understanding of the world and its causes, as well as 
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complete understanding of the workings of the universe and utilising this 
knowledge to inform their actions. This is because Stoic philosophy is: ‘the 
knowledge of things divine and things human — divinorum et humanorum 
scientiam’ (Ep. 89.5).12 This includes knowing the cause of everything (cf. 
Ep. 64.7-8)13 and genuine well-being/summum bonum, depends on this 
knowledge as this is what distinguishes good from evil (Ep. 74.29).14 
Understanding nature facilitates an understanding of God and with 
acceptance of a wholly providential world comes a truer appreciation of 
perfect reason. From a Stoic perspective, men who follow perfect reason 
and live fully according to nature will want to live virtuously (i.e. without 
unnatural passions) because this is what they are designed to do.15 Seneca 
goes as far as to argue that nature provides all the resources needed to live 
well (Ep. 90.38) and philosophy affords true richness (Ep. 17). As a result, 
following nature leads to joy, as well as sustained and genuine happiness, 
and it enables man to fulfil his destined potential.16 Evidently, when 
measured against this criterion for nature, anger cannot be regarded 
natural: as an obstacle to exercising reason, it prevents the acquisition of 
the knowledge necessary to live in accordance with nature.17 
 
Individuals are expected to perform ‘appropriate actions/officia’, that is those 
which are carried out in the right way for the right reasons in accordance 
with individual and universal nature and those which are directed by 
reason.18 Satisfaction accompanies focusing on doing a few things well and 
how to respond properly to situations. Perfected reason involves all actions 
                                                          
knowing personal strengths and weakness to achieve tranquillitas (cf. Gal. PHP 4.4.38, 
5.6.23) but does not appear to have believed that this depends on accepting an irrational 
part of the soul as Posidonius did. Rather, he adopts the more developed orthodox view 
that living in accordance should be that of both nature in general and nature to men as 
individuals. Cf. Schofield (2003, 2006) pp. 242-6; Veyne (2003) pp. 41-6. 
12 Cf. Ep. 68.2; 90.3; Cic. Off. 2.25; Inwood (2005, 2008) pp. 167-8; Setaioli (2007) p. 334.  
13 Cf. Cic. Tusc. 4.57. 
14 Cf. Ep. 31.6; 88.28; QNat. 6.4.2; Ot. 5.6. 
15 I will refer to man and men collectively representing humankind, acknowledging that 
Stoicism welcomes both sexes, including slaves and although Seneca’s works are largely 
addressed to men, he has expectations that women should follow philosophical ideals too 
cf. Ep. 44.2; 73.12-73.15; Helv. 17.3ff; Veyne (2003) pp. 137ff. 
16 Cf. Beat. 3.3-4, 4.2; Ep. 23.4; 59.16; Sext. Emp. Math. 11.30. 
17 For the question of the naturalness of anger, see pp. 102-7.  
18 Cf. Diog. Laert. 7.107ff.; Stob. Ecl. 2.7ff., 2.11ff.; Gass (2000) p. 22; Veyne (2003) pp. 
92-4. 
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being chosen on the basis of what is honourable (Ep. 76.18). Consequently, 
the individual should successfully carry out roles which fulfil their abilities 
and avoid tasks which highlight personal weaknesses, which is possible 
when he truly ‘knows’ himself. Problems arise when self is rigidly defined by 
socio-political roles because nature is an ever-changing process which 
requires appropriate adaption.  
 
The second part of secundum naturam involves man’s relationship with the 
universe, which is essentially rational (cf. Cic. Fin. 3.22). The highest good 
is conforming to nature’s will by applying correct reason (cf. Ep. 66.39; Ot. 
5.1) and following virtue (cf. Beat. 8.2). The greater good of mankind must 
be prioritised over personal gain, not only because this is the right thing to 
do, but also because it offers personal security and is an imitation of the 
gods.19 A Stoic does not begrudge personal sacrifices because he does not 
view such expectations as anything but correct and necessary to fulfil duties 
towards his fellowmen (2.5.2):20 doing good is reward enough.21 These 
positive measures are not possible in anger in particular, which reinforces 
why, passions are unnatural and therefore must be extirpated. 
 
As well as demonstrating virtue, having perfect reason offers protection 
against being governed by passions and their accompanying fluctuations of 
mind which thus enables appropriate selections of externals based on 
correct judgements about something’s value.22 This knowledge facilitates a 
state of concord of the soul/animi concordia, the key to summum bonum, 
                                                          
19 Cf. Clem. 1.19.9; Ep. 48.11. 
20 Cf. Ep. 3.2; Stob. Ecl. 2.11f. 
21 Cf. Ben. 4.1.3; Ep. 81.19; 113.31. 
22 Zeno divided ‘things’ as ‘good’, ‘bad’ and ‘indifferent’ with the latter relating to life/death, 
reputation/ill-repute, pleasure/exertion, wealth/poverty, health/sickness (Stob. Ecl. 2.5a-o. 
Cf. Cic. Fin. 3.50-7; Diog. Laert. 7.94-105, 160; Stob. Ecl. 2.79.18-80.13; 82.20-1; 2.83.10-
84.2 (SVF 3.124)). ‘Indifferents’ are further divided: those deemed valuable were 
‘preferred’, those without value were ‘dispreferred’; thus, life and health should be preferred 
and sought, even though they are not ‘good’ in themselves (Diog. Laert. 7.102. Cf. Plut. De 
Stoic. rep. 1048A; Sext. Emp. Math. 11.59-67; Stob. Ecl. 2.7.7a-b, 2.84.18-85.11 (SVF 
3.128). Indifferents are void of moral value but ‘preferred indifferents’ can have a physical 
value (food and good health are necessary to meet basic needs) or have emotional value 
(such as friendships and romantic connections) or intellectual value such as books and 
conversation (cf. Ep. 66.36ff.; 74.17ff.; 82.10ff.; 109.12-3). Cf. Schofield (2003, 2006) pp. 
239-41; Veyne (2003) pp. 81-4. 
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which is synonymous with happiness and virtue because opinion, desire 
and action are in accord producing consistency of mind (cf. Beat. 8.5-6).23 
Hence, the most important thing is having the correct mental attitude so that 
once principles have been internalised, they can be practised.24 Seneca and 
other Stoic sources use the traditional division of virtue into four cardinal 
virtues, wisdom, courage, justice and temperance.25 To be wise is to have 
moral insight to examine each decision carefully, courage is to face 
adversity with the knowledge of dangers i.e. what is good and bad (cf. Ben. 
2.34.3; Ep. 85.28), justice is to abide by and impose law, and temperance 
involves the ability to control oneself, an action which is within one’s 
power.26 Virtue as a whole is a ‘harmonious disposition, choice-worthy for 
its own sake’ rather than being born from either hope or fear of external 
influences and happiness arises from it because it is a state of mind that 
makes life harmonious (Chrysippus as reported in Diog. Laert. 7.89. Cf. Cic. 
Tusc. 4.34). Seneca agrees with his predecessor when he explains that 
virtue alone is ‘sublime and exalted/sublimis et excelsa’ and such great 
things are at peace (1.21.4). Everything else is irrelevant to the good life.  
 
Stoics believe in the unity of virtue in the sense that it is impossible to have 
one of the virtues without having all the others (cf. Ep. 86.2; 90.3)27 and they 
hold that all evils are equal (Stob. Ecl. 2.11).28 This reciprocal implication of 
the virtues can be explained by considering the cardinal virtues as being 
different forms and words for knowledge which encompasses right reason 
and is synonymous with virtue itself. Seneca explains that there are many 
aspects of virtue which are revealed at different points of life and by different 
                                                          
23 Cf. Veyne (2003) pp. 33ff. 
24 Cf. Diog. Laert. 7.126; Stob. Ecl. 2.7.11k. 
25 Cf. Diog. Laert. 7.93; Sext. Math. 9.153; Stob. Ecl. 2.7.5b1-2. Cf. Gass (2000); 
Wildberger (2014). These characteristics were traditional in Greek thought from Plato 
onwards, who defines virtue as incorporating ‘temperance/sophrosyne’, 
‘prudence/phronēsis’, ‘courage/andreia’ and ‘justice/dikaiosyne’ (Pl. Resp. 427eff.). Cf. 
Penner (1973). 
26 Cf. Ep. 67.41; 85.2; 88.29ff.; 95.55ff. 
27 Cf. Cic. Tusc. 3.26; Diog. Laert. 7.126; Stob. Ecl. 2.7.5, 2.63.6-24, 2.65.1-4; Plut. De 
Stoic. rep. 1046E-F. 
28 Cleanthes believed that virtue cannot be lost because it depends on knowledge which 
cannot be overruled: Chrysippus argued it can be lost because of intoxication or depression 
(Diog. Laert. 7.127-8). Cf. Diog. Laert. 7.105.  
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actions, but virtue itself never becomes lesser or greater because it cannot 
diminish or retrograde: it transforms into different qualities according to its 
required role (Ep. 66.7). The Stoic concept of virtue does not mean moral 
righteousness but having the psychological strengths or qualities of an ideal 
man, the Sage (cf. Diog. Laert. 7.121-5).29 The Sage was as rare as a 
phoenix of Ethiopia (Ep. 42.1) and Chrysippus stated he never knew such 
a man (Plut. De Stoic. rep. 1048e).30 While Seneca proposes that Cato was 
a Sage not even the greatest Stoics considered themselves to be so (cf. 
Constant. 2.2-2.3, 7.1). The rarity of the Sage reflects the difficulties of 
achieving this state but attempting to acquire such characteristics enables 
consistently correct action, thus the fulfilment of man’s natural function and 
for this reason the dedication to the end goal is worthwhile.31 
 
To place Stoic doctrines about passions in their theoretical context, it is 
necessary to consider their place in the structure of the School’s theory. 
Traditionally, there are three branches of Stoic philosophy: logic, physics 
and ethics, which are not mutually exclusive but are intertwined (cf. Ep. 
89.1-3).32 For example, Chrysippus’ approach to the Stoic doctrine of 
passions is placed in the wider context of man’s correct goal and his place 
as a rational animal in a rational universe.33 The Roman Stoa is 
predominantly centred on ethics, which involves the use of logic and physics 
and how these relate to practical life, to provide an understanding of the true 
definition of nature, a comprehension of the doctrine of the good and 
indifferents, and learning about the concept of fair justice.34 During the 
Roman Imperial period, the study of passions is discussed in greater detail, 
not only by Seneca but also by authors such as Musonius Rufus, Epictetus 
and Marcus Aurelius. This is because the contemporary ethical interest 
                                                          
29 For the Sage’s qualities, cf. Cic. Fin. 3.26, 75; Cic. Parad. Stoic. 33-52; Cic. Rep. 1.28; 
Cic. Tusc. 3.10-21; Stob. Ecl. 2.7.5-12. 
30 Cf. Alex. Aphr. Fat. 28.199.14-22 (SVF 3.658, part); Sext. Emp. Math. 9.133; Donini and 
Inwood (1999) p. 722; Veyne (2003) pp. 68-71; Graver (2007) p. 174.  
31 Cf. Setaioli (2014b) pp. 243-4. 
32 Cf. Diog. Laert. 7.39ff.; Sext. Emp. Math. 7.19. Cleanthes further divided logic and 
physics to produce six parts where logic was divided into dialectic and rhetoric, ethics into 
ethics proper and politics, physics into physics proper and theology (Diog. Laert. 7.41). Cf. 
Annas (2007) esp. pp. 58-63.  
33 As correctly observed by Inwood (1985) p. 155.  
34 Cf. Gill (2003, 2006) pp. 40-4; Reydams-Schils (2005) esp. pp. 3, 53-82. 
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expanded the earlier Greek emphasis on the goal of virtue. This involved 
extending the concept of virtue to include the attainment of 
‘tranquillity/tranquillitas’, that is, peace of mind with the ability to enjoy 
constantiae, be brave, wise, just and disciplined and replacing all negative 
passions with positive feelings (constantiae).35  
 
Agreeing with a Stoic goal, Seneca seeks tranquillitas because endurance 
results in the ‘great prize/tantum praemium’ of ‘the undisturbed tranquillity 
of a joyful mind — felicis animi inmota tranquillitas’ (2.12.6).36 With 
tranquillitas comes the freedom from the disturbance of adfectus, including 
anger and its accompanying ills (madness, ferocity, cruelty and rage) and 
the ability to respond appropriately to all challenges (2.12.6). When the mind 
is perfectly calm, it crushes everything that creates anger, it is controlled, 
commands respect and is correctly ordered (3.6.1). Seneca seeks to help 
man to achieve this state because this is what he should strive for and 
acquiring it fulfils his human potential of becoming wholly rational. These 
developments can be regarded as attempts to make the philosophical 
doctrines more widely appealing, even to those who did not consider 
themselves to be philosophers. Seneca discusses relevant topics in a 
convincing and accessible way, such as through the use of exempla of 
which his Roman contemporaries would be familiar, especially from their 
declamatory training and he employs rhetorical questions to provoke 
thinking in his readers.37  
 
Seneca’s decision to adopt Stoic principles 
Seneca continues the process of humanising Stoicism, focusing 
predominantly on the ethical strand. His ill-health, as well as his exile, 
makes Seneca particularly sympathetic to the human cause and aware of 
the need to make the best of all circumstances.38 His interest was a 
                                                          
35 For constantiae, see pp. 84-5.  
36 Cf. Ep. 75.17-8; Cic. Tusc. 3.25. 
37 Cf. Roller (2004); Mayer (2008); Seal (2015) pp. 221-2. For Seneca’s rhetorical 
techniques, see pp. 22, 41-7, 118-9, 156-7, 168-70. 
38 Seneca’s ill-health led him to spend his early years in the warmer climate of Egypt under 
the guardianship of his aunt. Cf. Ep. 78.1-4; Helv. 19.2; Griffin (1976, 1992) p. 42; Wilson 
(2014) pp. 61-3; Braund (2015) p. 25; Gunderson (2015) pp. 100-3. For Seneca’s views 
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consequence of his environment and social trends, as he experienced the 
problems of passions in emperors and those with political power on their 
citizens, slaves and neighbours.39 He believes that these vices are the root 
of human problems on account of the fact that they disrupt man’s ability to 
act according to reason (which should be the governing principle) and by 
understanding passions men are in a stronger position to prevent them.40 In 
this respect, he follows Posidonius who stated that examining good, evil, 
ends and virtues depends on examining affections (Posidonius On the 
Affections 1 apud Gal. PHP 5.6.2) and that the most healthy and sound 
movements in the mind follow judgment (3.35.2).41 Recognising the 
problems of human error, Seneca wishes men to live virtuously and he is 
hopeful that the obstacles to living this way can be met by moderating 
attitudes and behaviours.42 He presents himself as turning to Stoicism 
because the School holds that few vices are beyond cure, anger can be 
excised (excidi) because sicknesses can be cured ‘sanabilibus aegrotamus 
malis’ (2.13.1) and these can be replaced with virtue because discipline can 
tame even the wildest vices, such as anger (2.12.3).43  
 
                                                          
about ill-health and the endurance of suffering, see Ep. 67. Seneca was first exiled to 
barren Corsica in 41AD by the angered Emperor Claudius on the instigation of his third 
wife Messalina on a charge of adultery with Caligula’s sister Julia Livilla. He was recalled 
to Rome in 49AD at the request of Claudius’ fourth wife Agrippina the Younger to tutor her 
son Nero. After the death of Burrus in 62AD Seneca retired outside Rome where he spent 
his final three years devoted to study (cf. Tac. Ann. 14.56). Cf. Kamp (1934) pp. 101-8; 
Gahan (1985) pp. 145-7; Wilson (2014) pp. 82ff. 
39 Konstan (2015) correctly notes how the socio-political situation in Seneca’s lifetime 
inspired him to write De Clementia to advise Emperor Nero about the importance of 
clemency (p. 174).  
40 Cf. 2.7.1-3, 2.8.1-3, 2.9.1-4, 2.10.1-5, 2.31.8, 2.36.4, 3.26.3-5; Beat. 1.4; Ben. 1.10.1-4, 
7.26.3-5, 7.27.1-3; Brev. 2.3, 12.8; Ep. 7.1-7; 32.2; 75.15; 94.53-54; 95.23-24, 29, 33-34; 
97.1-11; 99.13; Clem. 1.6.3, 1.26.1-4; Poly. 13.1; QNat. 1.17.10, 5.15.2, 7.31.2-3, 7.32.1-
3, 4. Prol. 2; Tarrant (2006) pp. 5-8. 
41 I accept the argument that Posidonius’ discovery of the ‘root’ of bad in mankind inspired 
his work and that he situates it at the heart of the theory of passions and at the centre of 
ethics (Fillion-Lahille (1984) p. 154). For the influence of Posidonius on Seneca, see pp. 
60-1, 74-7, 105-6, 137. 
42 Cf. 1.28, 1.31.5, 3.26.3; Cooper (2004) pp. 309-34. 
43 Pratt (1983) recognises the importance of Stoicism for Seneca’s therapy: ‘Seneca’s Neo-
Stoicism shows the mind and heart of a man who despairs about the moral problems of 
human life in general and of his time in particular, including his own. But his energy and 
vehemence// are too characteristic of him to be only negative. The depth of his distress is 
matched by the height of his aspiration to such an extent that he stretches his chosen 
philosophy to a new dimension of religious feeling’ (pp. 71-2).  
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Seneca claims that humans are blessed by the power of discernment to 
overcome vice and that passions, such as ira, are removable (2.12.1ff. Cf. 
3.8.7). What he presents as a personal opinion has a Stoic flavour in the 
optimism it has for the use of innate reason for humans to conquer the 
difficulties which arise from passions, including anger and the expectation 
that humans would want to persist in doing this, not only for personal benefit 
but because it is the right thing to do because it accords with nature.44 The 
human intellect is powerful enough to conquer anything through persistent 
study (adsidua meditatio) and the will to want to change because humans 
are intrinsically rational beings, it is within their capabilities to change the 
way they think and act and passions are not so wild or independent (sui 
iuris) that discipline cannot conquer and tame them (vincat, perdomentur) 
(2.12.3). The mind obtains what it commands of itself (quodcumque sibi 
imperavit animus obtinuit) demonstrating the strength of the anima to control 
action and thus man’s responsibility to care for it properly (2.12.4. Cf. 
2.13.1). Seneca uses the metaphor of straightening spear shafts with fire, 
to show how physical pain to the body and mental distress may be applied 
to reform those whose natures are distorted by vice (1.6.1).  
 
Seneca voices a Stoic view that moral progress is possible even among 
those who practise the worst vices (1.6.1).45 Character transformation is 
possible through appropriate re-education, where lessons are internalised 
and applied, not merely intellectualised, to benefit from philosophy and to 
be able to live well.46 Changes can occur when the difference between good 
and bad things is assimilated and correct judgements are consequently 
made in relation to appropriate selection and avoidance of externals.47 
Remembering that ‘badness’ is due to ignorance about the true value of 
‘things’ and the misunderstanding of what will be of benefit rather than 
                                                          
44 For secundum naturam, see pp. 12-4. 
45 Cf. Ben. 7.19.5; Ep. 123.16; Cic. Tusc. 4.80. See Motto (1973) p. 50. Braund (2009) 
asserts that Seneca’s philosophical treatises ‘tackle the individual’s relationship with the 
world from a Stoic perspective’ (p. 21). 
46 Cf. Ep. 16.2-3; 20.2ff.; 75.4; 108.36. 
47 For Zeno’s division of ‘Things’, see Stob. Ecl. 2.5f. on p. 14 n. 22. 
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harmful intent, contributes to understanding other people’s behaviour. In this 
respect, Stoicism’s wide accessibility aids the removal of social injustice. 
Acquiring virtue is demanding and is a life-long journey of progression (cf. 
Ep. 27.4) and an individual in this state is termed the one who is advancing, 
progressor/prokoptōn/proficiens (cf. Plut. Comm. not. 1063a (SVF 3.539)). 
The state of mind of a student progressing who is well-established in his 
perfecting reason was often discussed by Posidonius.48 Seneca clarifies the 
nature of progression by dividing it into three stages, defined according to 
an individual’s susceptibility to passions (cf. Ep. 75).49 In the initial stage, he 
can avoid most, but not all, of the passions. He is shielded from the worst 
vices but will still experience some adfectus (Ep. 75.14).50 During the middle 
stage, the proficiens is released from the most serious diseases and can 
reject the greatest evils but is not entirely free from passions because he 
may relapse into experiencing them (Ep. 75.13-4). Seneca explains how, at 
the highest level (where the progressor is closest to the Sage defined by his 
cognitive and moral perfection), he is no longer controlled by bad habits. 
This is because he has overcome the influence of adfectus but is not always 
able to withstand them and therefore has not yet achieved complete virtue. 
At this stage, the individual is protected from the ‘disease/morbus’ of 
passions though he still feels them (cf. Ep. 75.12).51  
 
Becoming virtuous requires both commitment and guidance through 
doctrines, precepts/praecepta and consolations presented in lectures, 
discussions, texts, letters and drama (Ep. 95.34. Cf. Ep. 94). Many Stoics 
believe that virtue can be taught, consequently, written texts are an 
important part of Stoic education (Diog. Laert. 7.91).52 Seneca takes the role 
of an author as a moral advisor seriously and uses his writing, including his 
                                                          
48 Cf. Gal. PHP 4.5.28, 7.6, 5.2.29, 6.28. 
49 Cf. Veyne (2003) pp. 109-10. 
50 Cf. Ep. 71.30ff.; 72.6ff.; 109.15. Currie (1972) argues that Seneca’s idea of the proficiens 
and stages of progression replaced the idea that being imperfect was the equivalent to 
moral depravity: ‘…where the early Stoics had laid down absolute moral imperatives, 
Seneca shows a more human and understanding spirit’ (p. 33). Cf. Wray (2015) pp. 202-
6.  
51 Cicero noted how great thinkers who are not yet wise remain afflicted by evils but do not 
grieve over this (Cic. Tusc. 3.68). 
52 Cf. Ep. 2; 33; 39; 45.1; 84; 89.48; Setaioli (2014b) pp. 253-5. 
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tragedies, to inform his readers and audience about virtue and vice.53 In De 
Ira, he offers reassurance that it is easy to live the best human life (2.13.2) 
and he encourages his brother, Novatus, to pursue it with the backing of 
good auspices and assistance from the gods (2.13.2). Life without virtue is 
harder particularly because nothing is more relaxed than clementia and 
busier than cruelty (2.13.2). Seneca assumes that everyone would 
automatically want to practise Stoicism as he has personally reaped the 
benefits of its ‘transformation/transfigurari’ because, now that he is aware of 
his faults, he is in a stronger position to correct them (Ep. 6.1).54 Seneca’s 
presentation of the problems which passions cause, inspires self-
improvement in his reader/audience in those who wish to live a better life. 
 
To avoid pursuing desires and being subject to other passions, which may 
cause a distraction from overall good, Seneca advises following 
doctrines/decreta or moral principles based on true ‘good’ (Ep. 94.9ff.).55 
These offer guidance in selecting ‘things’ correctly according to their true 
value and what should be pursued or avoided. Taking this approach will 
minimise the risk of the decline into passions because it involves 
understanding how externals really impact upon an individual’s well-being. 
These fundamental principles should be kept at the forefront of the mind, or 
at hand/procheiron/statim… praesto so that they can easily be recalled and 
appropriately applied when the need arises so that reason governs rather 
than being diverted by passions.56 Man is influenced by laws and precepts 
for advice about his behaviour.57 The former motivates by fear of committing 
crime: the latter are rules and recommendations on behaviour relevant to 
individuals, or a group of people in the form of injunction and prohibitions. 
Cleanthes is reported to have believed that precepts are useful only when 
they are used alongside knowledge of the dogmas (Ep. 94.3). They correct 
                                                          
53 Cf. Seal (2015) pp. 216-21. 
54 See Hadot (1995, 2003) who argues that: ‘It raises the individual from an inauthentic 
condition of life, darkened by unconsciousness and harassed by worry, to an authentic 
state of life, in which he attains self-consciousness, an exact vision of the world, inner 
peace, and freedom’ (p. 83). Cf. Motto (1956) pp. 275-8; Edwards (2008). 
55 Cf. Kidd (1978) pp. 251-5; Mitsis (1986) and (1993) pp. 285-312; Inwood (1988). 
56 Cf. Ben. 7.2.1; Ep. 24.26; Xen. Mem. 1.21. 
57 Cf. Inwood (2005, 2008) pp. 95-131. 
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men by ‘pleading/exorant’ and assist learning good from evil, judgements 
about which are reinforced by fulfilling duties because they organise good 
conduct relating to moral obligation (Ep. 94.34). Seneca advises that souls 
are granted the tranquillity provided by constant meditation on wholesome 
instruction, by noble deeds and a mind focused solely on seeking what is 
honourable (3.41.1) and by doing so the mind would be trained to move 
away from being drawn into passions. By taking these simple steps and 
integrating them into his life, man is assured of a sustained and genuine life 
of happiness, free from the binds of passions.  
 
Seneca is dedicated to removing his faults and living a complete life (Ep. 
61.1). By adopting a Stoic perspective and taking practical measures to 
implement philosophical doctrines, Seneca is concerned with replacing 
human vices, such as anger, by focusing on the philosophical goal of 
perfecting reason and achieving tranquillitas. He presents himself as 
making good progress towards perfecting reason.58 This demonstrates how, 
through dedication to self-improvement, everyone can work towards 
becoming virtuous.59 He humbly asserts that he is not a Stoic Sage but a 
proficiens trying to improve himself and his fellow struggler/patient.60 
Seneca sees himself as a guide to lost travellers (Ep. 8.3). He recognises 
the need for a moral escort to help people acquire virtue.61 This is because 
of the difficulties of obtaining it without assistance compared with vice which 
is learnt without guidance (QNat. 3.30.8). He identifies two types of guide 
(Ep. 52.7-8): previous thinkers who assist through their texts (cf. Brev. 14) 
and recent Roman thinkers, such as lecturers and wise men, for instance, 
Cato, Laelius and Tubero (Ep. 104.21-2).62  
                                                          
58 Cf. Beat. 17.3-4; Ep. 6.1, 3; 8.1-2; 27.1; 45.4; 57.3; 68.8-9; 71.30-3, 36-7; 87.4-5. 
59 Bartsch (2015) sensibly recognises that in Seneca: ‘We see an intellectual agent 
engaged in a constant struggle for self-amelioration; a self that practices a series of 
exercises, meditations, and second-order self-examinations in a constant and unabated 
effort toward a perfect serenity that we never see it gaining in any permanent way – even 
if Seneca speaks of individual wise decisions or knows theoretically what must be done’ (p. 
188).  
60 Cf. Ep. 27.1-3; Helv. 5.2. 
61 Cf. Beat. 1.2; Ben. 5.25.5-6; Ep. 52.2; 94.50-6. 
62 Cf. Ep. 95.72; QNat. 6.5.2-3; Hine (2006) pp. 57-8. For the good examples of Fabricius, 
Tubero and Sextius the elder (Ep. 98.13). Seneca also respects the opinions of Marcus 
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Seneca is not a professional teacher but is an important source about what 
philosophical education involves which is particularly important when he is 
encouraging his readers and audience to overcome passions. He writes 
about the application of Stoicism, not just technically or as contributing to 
theoretical debate, and presents the theory and praecepta as directions 
about how to act, which is how his writing seeks to educate in living well 
(Ep. 16.3). He explicitly states that God gave man life, with the capacity to 
acquire knowledge and ‘living well is the gift of philosophy — munus 
…philosophiae quod bene vivimus’ (Ep. 90.1).63 He recognises the benefits 
that derive from intimate letter-writing but promotes discussions inspired by 
lectures (Ep. 38.1. Cf. Ep. 6.5), demonstrating how Stoicism is not a solitary 
experience (1.5.2).64 Philosophy requires close interaction with suitable 
people who have the shared concern for self-improvement to achieve 
complete success in pursuing Stoic goals such as virtuous living.  
 
In a continuation of the theme of guidance in moral pursuit, Seneca 
elsewhere describes himself as a doctor, which is reminiscent of 
Chrysippus’ argument that the philosopher is a physician of the soul (Gal. 
PHP 5.2.22-8). Seneca believes that: ‘I’ve been recruited to heal the 
community — ciuitati curandae adhibitus sum’ (1.16.4) because he 
promotes healthy attitudes to replace vices.65 He has dedicated himself to 
this task to assist his contemporaries and future generations (Ep. 8.2). This 
may justify why he does not always follow the orthodox opinions of early 
Stoics but selects elements from the School’s doctrines and contributes to 
the development of philosophical theory by introducing modifications to 
traditional perspectives and incorporating innovations: he is successful in 
this goal as his writings still capture modern interest.66 
 
                                                          
Cato, the Elder and the Younger, Laelius the Wise, Socrates and Plato, Zeno and 
Cleanthes (Ep. 64.10).  
63 Indeed, philosophy alone corrects error (Ep. 53.8) and is mutually dependent on virtue 
(Ep. 89.8). 
64 Cf. Clem. 2.5; Ep. 48.2-3; 95.52; Cic. Fin. 3.62-70. 
65 Motto (1955b). 
66 Cf. Helv. 1.2, 2.1f.; Marc. 1.8. For Seneca’s orthodoxy, see Chapter One passim. 
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Seneca was criticised in his time, and often by modern scholars, for his 
perceived hypocrisy: he promotes simple living at the same time as holding 
an authoritative position of high status with financial security.67 It is well-
documented that Seneca was an extremely wealthy man.68 However, 
Tacitus reported Seneca’s simplicity, particularly his diet later in his life, and 
his will requested a simple funeral (cf. Tac. Ann. 15.45, 63, 64). Seneca 
makes it very clear that wealth is not only unnecessary for a virtuous life: 
instead, it can cause unhappiness when it is craved for (cf. Ep. 2.6; 14.18; 
80.4ff.) because it is only temporary (cf. Beat. 17.2). The proper limit to 
wealth is: ‘to have what is necessary… and what is enough — habere quod 
necesse est… quod sat est’ (Ep. 2.6). Humans only need what is sufficient 
to meet their basic requirements of food and shelter (cf. Ep. 4.10-1), even 
though this conflicts with what people conventionally desire and preparation 
for misfortune prevents (mistaken) feelings of suffering.69 Seneca never 
boasts about being wise nor does he claim to be a Sage. His choice to 
dedicate his life to philosophy and to live by its principles surely absolves 
Seneca from accusations of hypocrisy. He is proving that whatever an 
individual’s financial situation, he remains able to improve himself and that 
this is necessary regardless of his status. Seneca is not complacent about 
his lot but is accepting of the fact that his current good fortune can and will 
change (as was proved by his exile). This knowledge has prepared him to 
deal with all eventualities without becoming distressed.  
 
Seneca the philosopher of many schools 
Establishing Seneca’s orthodoxy is necessary when considering the extent 
to which he can be considered a Stoic, an innovator, or eclectic.70 This 
impacts on how his attitudes towards and contribution to the theory of 
passions affects how he believes adfectus should be tackled. It is necessary 
to establish his beliefs, and where possible their origins, when considering 
his selection of theories and the effectiveness of the approaches he 
                                                          
67 Cf. Motto (1984) pp. 230-1; Griffin (1974, repr. 2008) pp. 54-8 (page references to 2008 
edition). 
68 Cf. Dio Cass. 61.10, 62.2, 25; Juv. Sat. 10, 16; Suet. Ner. 35; Tac. Ann. 13.42, 14.52-
53, 56, 15.64; Wedeck (1955); Wilson (2014) pp. 127-41. 
69 Cf. Ep. 5.2, 5.6; 115.11. 
70 Cf. Gill (2003, 2006) pp. 45-50. 
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proposes to manage anger. Analysis of Seneca’s place within Stoic thought 
is constrained to a certain degree by the comparatively limited extant 
writings of the early Stoa, particularly in their original forms, and allowances 
must be made for the intentions and bias of the authors who report them.71 
I will identify where Seneca agrees with the early Stoic doctrines with a view 
to establishing his place in the Stoic tradition, considering how he was 
influenced by thinkers such as Posidonius and the features of his thought 
that come from other philosophical schools such as Epicureanism and 
middle Platonism. This will assist in determining the extent to which he can 
be considered to be Stoic and to demonstrate areas of development and 
innovation in philosophical doctrines. This discussion will continue in 
Chapter One.  
 
Seneca is orthodox in his belief that the summum bonum consists in virtue 
in the sense of following nature and her laws, not depending on fate or 
externals, making correct selections and deselections of things nor being 
saddened when they are lost.72 Seneca confirms that ‘the Stoic also can 
carry his goods unimpaired through cities that have been burned to ashes; 
for he is self-sufficient. Such are the bounds which he sets to his own 
happiness. — Aeque et hic intacta bona per concrematas urbes fert. Se 
enim ipso contentus est. Hoc felicitatem suam fine designat’ (Ep. 9.19). This 
is significant when considering his attitudes towards a cause of anger which 
arises from the desire for or loss of objects and people as well as underlying 
his belief that humans should strive to seek tranquillitas, thinking which has 
Stoic origins. He remains concerned with the distinctions between good and 
evil and virtue and vice and many of his works centre on this subject: indeed, 
Quintilian praised him for his interest in the subject (Quint. Inst. 10.1.129). 
Seneca recognises the importance of contemplation73 and promotes the 
balance between public and private life with the focus on improving self and 
other people74 and the fact the Sage is involved in politics unless something 
                                                          
71 Cf. Graver (2014) pp. 257-8.  
72 Cf. Beat. 3.3, 4.2, 8.2, 21.2, 23.4, 26.3. For Seneca’s advice on externals, see pp. 141-
3, 158-9.  
73 Cf. Ep. 94.45, Ot. 6.2; Cic. Fin. 2.41. 
74 Cf. Ep. 8.2; Ot. 3.5, 4.2, 6.5; Tranq. 1.10, 3.1, 3.3, 4.1, 4.8, 13.1, 17.3. 
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prevents him (cf. Ot. 3.2).75 When opposing the Peripatetic and Epicurean 
views of passions, for instance in relation to the naturalness, moderation 
and usefulness of passions, Seneca adopts a Stoic position.76 By Seneca’s 
era, there was a shift in the School’s focus and one that he embraces, which 
demonstrates how he still respected the old Stoa but agreed with the need 
to change its doctrines to accord with contemporary requirements. For 
instance, while man’s end/telos/finis remains seeking the summum bonum 
through attaining virtue, there was increasing focus on the importance of 
seeking tranquillitas, which Seneca repeatedly affirms (cf. 2.12.6, 3.6.1).77 
 
Seneca openly censures Stoicism when he disagrees with its principles.78 
His greatest criticism is of Stoic logic, which he argues is not helpful if it is 
too abstract because it does not help self-improvement.79 He also rejects 
Zeno’s Stoic syllogisms because he believes that reflection is more 
important that just rote learning as well as criticising Stoic epistemology.80 
Seneca’s attitude may have been influenced by his Sextii tutors whose 
school similarly disapproved of these disciplines. He recalls Fabianus’ 
advice to fight passions with main force as opposed to cunning devices and 
sophistry (‘contra adfectus impetu non subtilitate pugnandum’) because 
                                                          
75 Cf. Diog. Laert. 7.121; Cic. Off. 1.15-7. Abstention from public life to focus on spiritual 
improvement is often found in the philosophical recommendations of Epicureanism (cf. 
Lucr. 3.995-1002) and the Cynics (cf. Diog. Laert. 6.29).  
76 For debates about the naturalness of passions, see pp. 102-7, for the moderation of 
passions, see pp. 107-8 and for their usefulness, see pp. 112-20. 
77 Cf. Cic. Tusc. 3.25. 
78 Cf. Ep. 71.6; 87; 102.5; 102.20; Asmis (2015) p. 226.  
79 Cf. Brev.13; Ep. 45.4; 48.4-12; 49.6-12; 82.9, 19; 83.9-17; 85.1-2, 24, 50; 88.32-45; 106; 
109.17-8; 111; 113; 117; Nussbaum (1994) pp. 350-1. Seneca often disagrees with Stoics’ 
physical doctrines, to the point he dismisses some of their ideas as being ‘foolish’, cf. 
QNat. 1.8.4, 4B5-4B6, 7.22.1; Asmis (2015) p. 227 n. 15, n. 16, n. 17. 
80 Cf. Ep. 111; 82.20-2; 83.9ff.; 85; 87.11. Williams (2015) argues that: ‘In this energized 
spirit, the Senecan persona frequently disparages the drier subtleties of Stoic dialectical 
argumentation on the one hand (e.g., Ep. 45.8-13, 48.4-12, 71.6, etc.), the rhetorical 
indulgence of words for words’ sake on the other (e.g., Ep. 40.13, 75.7, 100.2, etc.): through 
such gestures Seneca continually reaffirms the need for philosophy to dig deep, to engage 
with substance (res) rather than just words (verba), to form rather than merely inform’ (p. 
136). Cf. Hadot (1995, 2003) p. 64. Cicero similarly criticised the ineffectiveness of Stoic 
syllogisms which affected people as ‘mere pinpricks/quasi aculeis’ without changing their 
minds (Cic. Fin. 4.7) cf. Cic. Tusc. 3.22; Manning (1987) p. 20; Cooper (2004) p. 314-20. 
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their nature was such that it required being crushed not nipped (‘nam 
contundi debere, non vellicari’ Brev. 10.1).81  
 
To illustrate and justify his selectivity of Stoic theory, Seneca employs ruler 
metaphors to show man’s independence of opinion (Ep. 113.23).82 He 
claims that Stoics choose freedom from a king in their thinking (Ep. 33.4). 
He encourages taking a personal path (Ep. 80.1 Cf. Ot. 1.5) and not blindly 
following one man or the inflexible rules of Zeno and Chrysippus (Ot. 3.1. 
Cf. Beat. 3.2-3).83 Seneca will be guided by his predecessors but will not tie 
himself to a particular Stoic, claiming to have no particular master (Ep. 45.4) 
but will exercise his ‘right to form his own opinion/censendi ius’ (Beat. 3.2). 
The assurance of freedom of thought, while promoting a School’s doctrines, 
makes Seneca’s philosophy appealing because choosing which parts of the 
theory to adopt enables individuals to tailor their influences to their specific 
needs. He is empowering the individual to rigorously reason their way 
through the ethical tangles in front of them, thus meaning that even if 
Seneca does not say what Zeno said, he is still a good Stoic if he has 
reached his position according to Stoic principles. Seneca is also innovative 
in his contribution to Stoic theory and is seeking to improve the philosophical 
tradition, by making it ‘greater/ampliora’ (Ep. 64.7. Cf. Ep. 79.6).84 He is 
receptive to developments in theory and welcomes new ideas, claiming that 
revisions need to be made to orthodox Stoicism (Ep. 64.7-9), with fresh 
ideas being introduced (Ep. 84.5), particularly because they are always new 
things to learn.85 He recognises that if earlier views are accepted without 
being questioned, progress is not made in thinking because investigation 
would have ceased (Ep. 33.10).  
 
Seneca likens the mission of developing existing theories and learning from 
other people to making honey, where bees carefully have to collect the right 
                                                          
81 Translated by Basore (1932, 1951) p. 317. Manning (1987) claims that the Sextii ‘had no 
time for the linguistic quibbling and verbal logic chopping most notably associated with the 
Stoics’ (p. 19). 
82 Cf. Brev. 14.2, 5; Ep. 64.10. 
83 Cf. Ep. 21.9; 45.4; Ot. 3.1; Cic. Tusc. 4.7. 
84 Cf. Motto (1984). 
85 Cf. QNat. 6.5.3, 7.25.3-5, 30.5. 
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materials, digest them and make them their own (Ep. 84.3-7).86 Using a 
travelling metaphor, Seneca reveals that he will seek shorter, smoother new 
routes if they prove better and believes that his predecessors are guides as 
opposed to masters, that truths are available to everyone and such 
discoveries are an infinite task (Ep. 33.11).87 Seneca’s attitudes towards 
progressing thinking shows how he sees himself as a thinker working within 
a flexible and receptive tradition that allows for development and growth 
rather than simply repetitive criticisms against a fixed set of doctrines. 
Arguably Seneca’s greatest advancement of Stoic theory is found in his 
views about the formation of passions, which will be discussed in Chapter 
One.  
 
My research focuses on Seneca’s presentation of Stoicism and allusions to 
other philosophical schools are restricted to their references to anger 
management and comparison with Stoic psychological ideals. However, I 
acknowledge that other philosophers play an important role in moulding 
Seneca’s views as is demonstrated by his diverse advice about how to 
pursue knowledge and truth, it is these varied influences that make him 
universally appealing to a wider audience. He fuses Epicureanism with his 
interest in Stoicism,88 at the same time as refuting those philosophers with 
whom he disagrees.89 By discussing alternative philosophical views, he 
shows his awareness of and openness to them as well as using them to 
place his arguments within the philosophical environment. Seneca’s 
selection of philosophical ideas from his reading are used to promote his 
personal interests and goals: he is a ‘scout/explorator’, not a 
                                                          
86 Cf. Asmis (2015) p. 228.  
87 For Seneca’s encouragement of freedom in thinking, see Ep. 33.7ff. where maxims 
should be created by the individual and the purpose of philosophical texts is to support 
independent thought, not to automatically accept other people’s views. Cf. Currie (1972) p. 
33.  
88 Cf. Beat. 3.2; Constant. 3.1; Ep. 21.9; 45.4. 
89 Cf. Motto and Clark (1968) pp. 37-42; Motto (1970) pp. x- xxiii; Inwood (2005, 2008) pp. 
14-8; Schiesaro (2015) pp. 239-51. As Tsouna (2011) recognises: ‘The philosophical 
production of these centuries is characterized by eclecticism (i.e., a willingness to draw 
selectively from various traditions whatever elements seem best suited to one’s purposes) 
and by syncretism (i.e., a tendency towards the fusion of diverse elements into new, distinct 
philosophical systems). Both syncretism and eclecticism are arguably to be found in 
Philodemus’ Epicureanism, Seneca’s Stoicism and Plutarch’s various endeavours, 
Platonic and otherwise’ (p. 183).  
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‘deserter/transfuga’, who ‘crosses into the enemy’s camp/in aliena castra 
transire’ when he believes this to be beneficial for furthering thinking (Ep. 
2.5-6). Seneca believes that considering the views of other thinkers leads 
to more questions, which is what constitutes a good life.90 Challenging 
existing views is part of furthering knowledge and practising virtue/reason. 
This may explain his interest in Stoicism as a developing School which 
historically had individuals contributing to the theory, such as Panaetius and 
Posidonius who proposed amendments to Zeno and Chrysippus’ doctrines. 
 
Seneca, Stoicism and poetry 
Some Stoics believe poetry can serve moral purposes when it satisfies the 
intellectual curiosity of the well-educated and instructs the upper-class in 
political involvement.91 Horace explained how poets seek to provide 
pleasure as well as offering precepts for life (Hor. Ars P. lines 333-44). 
Seneca follows this idea in his aim to educate his audience in virtue and 
vice to facilitate revisions in their world view, thus making drama as much 
an instance of ethical instruction as epic works (cf. Ep. 88.5-8; 108).92 He 
believes in the superiority of verse over prose for philosophical messages 
and quotes Cleanthes, who claimed that breath is louder through a trumpet 
which widens at the end in the same way that: ‘“the fettering rules of poetry 
clarify our meaning —sensus nostros clariores carminis arta necessitas 
efficit”’ (Ep. 108.10. Cf. Ep. 108.7-11).93  
 
Seneca criticises poetry when its subject matter does not communicate a 
philosophical or moral purpose which infers the importance of having sound 
teachers who understand the importance of balancing education in literature 
                                                          
90 Cf. Brev. 3.2; Ep. 5.4; 45.4; 80.1. 
91 Cf. Strabo 1.2.8 where pleasant mythos leads to an impulse amongst the audience to 
good behaviour. However, there are reservations among Stoics about the dangers poetry 
can cause in producing pleasure from the harmonious sounds of the words ‘… a passion 
that has to be accounted for, justified and contained…’ and that the reader might adopt 
‘morally objectionable ideas’ (Schiesaro (2003) p. 229). Plutarch also expressed concern 
about sympathetic passions and the moral ideas which poetry can present (Plut. Mor. 16D-
E. Cf. Schiesaro (2003) p. 230). Seneca is critical of poetry which promotes the value of 
wealth as the only credit and glory for man (Ep. 115.12ff.). He would not want tragedies to 
inspire the strong emotional responses which Aristotle insists they do in his definition of the 
genre (Arist. Poet. 1449b24-8). Cf. Pl. Resp. 376e-403c, 595a-612b. 
92 Cf. De Lacy (1948) pp. 264-6; Pratt (1983) p. 73; Henry and Henry (1985) p. 96. 
93 Cf. Staley (2010) pp. 89-92; Gunderson (2015) pp. 22-3. 
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with learning controlled responses.94 For example, Seneca attacks Vergil 
because of his unscientific poetry such as his poor physics relating to the 
wind (QNat. 6.18.4-5. Cf. Ver. Aen 1.53-4) – or when verse encourages 
incorrect or irresponsible opinions, such as when other poets blame the 
gods for human problems (Brev. 16.5) and he rejects the romanticism and 
inaccuracy of the underworld (Marc. 19.4).95 Seneca offers an alternative 
view in which man takes control without reliance on divinities other than the 
inherent part of God in man. This view is both therapeutic and empowering 
for his contemporary audience who lived in a violent and challenging era 
where autonomy was compromised by the need to abide by aggressive 
emperors’ whims.96 It also commands greater accountability which depends 
on following reason not passion. This is true of his tragedies as the theatre 
facilitates detached consideration of human conduct because it arouses 
judgements and reflections on views and behaviours. Seneca explains that 
poetry and other arts create pre-passions, not adfectus, as people feel 
physiological responses to what they see and read (2.2.3-3.1) which 
provokes ‘confession of truth/confessionem veritatis’ about the self (Ep. 
108.8).97 These considerations are relevant when considering the extent to 
which feelings can be controlled to prevent them from developing into full-
blown passions and illustrate the importance of identifying pre-passions 
when they first arise.  
 
Seneca’s use of philosophy in drama 
Seneca does not use drama in the same way as his prose solely to promote 
Stoicism, as some scholars argue.98 Instead, the inclusion of philosophy is 
                                                          
94 Cf. Batinski (1993); Schiesaro (1997) pp. 100-1. 
95 Cf. Maguinness (1956) pp. 87-8; Nussbaum (1994) p. 352. For Seneca’s ambivalence 
to poetry, see Beat. 2.2, 26.6; Ben.1.3.10, 1.4.5; Tranq. 17.11; Schiesaro (2003) pp. 24-5.  
96 Pratt (1983) argues that: ‘Senecan drama is a contemporary form for it fuses Stoic 
psychology and ethics with Roman pathos and the preparedness for death characteristic 
of Seneca’s century’ (p. 78). For further discussion about Stoicism as a saviour from 
helplessness due to social and political constraints, see Calder III (1976) p. 9; Henry and 
Henry (1985) p. 73; Staley (2010) pp. 124-5.  
97 For Seneca’s advancement of pre-passions, see pp. 60-2. Cf. Sorabji (2007a) pp. 169-
70. 
98 Cf. Marti (1945); Davis (1993) pp. 125-6; Staley (2010) pp. 26-9; Chaumartin (2014) pp. 
657-69. Curley (1986) believes that Seneca’s nine tragedies were a ‘desire’ to inculcate 
Stoic precepts (p. 19); Rosenmeyer (1989) argues that Seneca had Stoic goals in the play 
(p. x). 
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for stylistic and dramatic purposes, with moral lessons to encourage self-
improvement as a secondary, yet significant objective and one on which I 
will focus. Seneca uses philosophy in his dramas to make compelling 
statements about the world in which he lived and about the general human 
condition relating to determinism, cyclical evil, the fragility of institutions, 
failure of reason, the moral contraction of perceived civilisation and 
suffering.99 There are, however, important similarities in the moralising 
prose and dramatic works, with both focusing on the individual’s personal 
nature and struggle with challenging situations usually because of 
passions.100 He states clearly that De Ira’s intention is to advise Novatus 
how to soothe (1.1.1), remove or curb anger (3.1.1) and De Clementia’s 
primary focus is to advise the new emperor Nero how he should rule (cf. 
Clem. 1.1.1, 1.5.7, 1.14) by comparing a good ruler and the tyrant and in 
doing so reveals Seneca’s attitudes towards anger.101 In the dramas, 
Seneca holds up admonitory characters governed by passions against 
hortatory characters which illustrate Stoic exempla.102 
 
Instead of offering gentle guidance in a conversational tone found in the 
Epistles, to encourage his reader to choose the rational life, Seneca’s 
tragedies violently expose the necessity of reason and virtue compared with 
the evil displayed in the insane and perilous behaviour on stage.103 
Combined with his explicit advice in De Ira about how to deal with other 
people, the tragedies and the prose works, when read concurrently, provide 
comprehensive reasons why the way in which life is viewed should be 
                                                          
99 Boyle (2006) also identifies the ideas of ‘man as appetite, as beast, as existential victim; 
power, impotence, delusion, self-deception; the futility of compassion; the freedom, 
desirability and value-paradox of death; man, god, nature, guilt, unmerited suffering; the 
certainty of human pain; the terror of experienced evil; the inexorable, paradoxical – even 
morally perverse – order of things; the triumph of evil…’ (pp. 197-8). For analysis of 
philosophical themes in Medea and Thyestes and the need for the management of anger, 
see Chapters Four and Five passim. 
100 Cf. Rosenmeyer (1989) p. 39; Trinacty (2015) p. 36. 
101 Cf. Griffin (1984) and (2003). 
102 Cf. Curley (1986) p. 15.  
103 From the educative role of the Epistles, see Schafer (2011) pp. 32-52. Curley (1986) 
captures this sentiment when he notes that ‘In sum, both the apotreptic use of drama as a 
mirror of the passions and its protreptic use of “exempla” make up an implied Senecan 
theory of the theatre as an educational device’ (p.13). I argue that Seneca uses his dramas 
for educational purposes when exploring how they reveal his opinions about anger. For 
use of exempla, see pp. 22, 43-4, 118-9, 156-7, 168-70, Chapter Five passim. 
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changed. The presentations of the protagonists of Medea and Thyestes in 
particular can be interpreted as demonstrating the consequences of 
neglecting Stoic values and the need to modify reactions to protect oneself 
and others, to enable virtuous living. Seneca’s writing is thought-provoking 
and forces active audience participation, not only to gain a true 
understanding of his topics, but also to envisage how the ideas in the plays 
can be applied to real life. They invite self-reflection about how behaviour, 
if unchecked, may result in similar scenarios.104  
 
The tragedies demonstrate Seneca’s literary ability by following the Graeco-
Roman dramatic practice to incorporate philosophical material into Choral 
Odes, but not to make expounding philosophy the goal of their songs.105 He 
incorporates Stoic sentiments in his plays by exploring common 
philosophical themes to challenge attitudes towards the world such as 
human agency versus fate. This is accompanied by his dramatic purpose of 
presenting traditional myths in a new dramatic form, such as the onstage 
killing of Medea’s sons and her departure to heaven not to Athens as in 
Euripides (Eur. Med. lines 1384-5) and leaving her sons’ bodies behind 
(Sen. Med. line 1024).106 While the Roman audience was more accustomed 
to displays of violence (for instance, at gladiatorial contests), Seneca’s 
extreme onstage violence may not have been met with such satisfaction.107 
Horace’s literary criticism of Greek dramatic convention discussed how, 
while it is pleasing to witness an event rather than hear reports, some events 
should not be made visible because of the distress they cause in an 
audience: instead, they should be communicated by an eloquent 
messenger (Hor. Ars P. lines 179ff.). Of such scenes, Horace included the 
murders of the children in Medea and Thyestes neither of which should be 
shown, and he declared that he would turn away in disgust from such sights 
                                                          
104 Cf. Chapter Five passim.  
105 Cf. Davis (1993) p. 126.  
106 Cf. Costa (1973) p. 8; Nardo (2011). 
107 Cf. Ohlander (1989). For the question about whether Seneca’s plays were performed, 
see pp. 35-41.  
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(Hor. Ars P. lines 185-8). Seneca’s onstage slaughter of Medea’s children 
is not only unconventional, but also shocking in its innovation.  
 
It has been argued that during Nero’s reign the distinction between theatre 
and public reality was blurred so that Rome became a ‘theatrical world’.108 
Nero himself was a musician, actor and competed in athletic games (Tac. 
Ann. 13.3, 14.14-5).109 This environment created a space for Seneca to 
create an exaggerated dramatic world reflecting the problems in reality, both 
caused by tyranny, and more importantly, the consequences of people who 
are unable to control their passions, particularly anger and the need for this 
problem to be addressed.110 Seneca himself reflects the state of the city in 
his comments in his prose when he describes human life as a ‘mime’, 
assigning roles to play badly (‘hic humanae vitae mimus, qui nobis patres 
quas male agamus adsignat’ Ep. 80.7).111 In part, this was because of the 
multiple ‘roles’ upper class men were expected to play, socially and 
politically under close observation of peers.112 This required a considerable 
awareness of how one behaves, for instance, Seneca advises Lucilius to 
behave ‘as if before a spectator/tamquam spectet aliquis’ (Ep. 25.5. Cf. Ep. 
11.8ff.). Philosophy can address the social problems as can be seen from a 
Stoic recommendation of consistency/constantia in character and action 
and the difficulties to achieve this in a complicated world, advice which 
Seneca repeats in his letters to Lucilius (Ep. 120.22).113 From this 
perspective, the inclusion of philosophy is well-placed in Senecan drama in 
that the School’s doctrines expect certain characteristics to be on display 
                                                          
108 Cf. Boyle (2006) pp. 180-1. Curley (1986) similarly argues that the political changes 
from Republic to imperialism impacted on how men interacted, i.e. with the need for a mask 
and audience (p. 18). This was because changes in values of civic life were required as 
the existing set were no longer applicable to imperial power. This need justified Seneca’s 
writing of Thyestes, a play where crime that challenges traditional values and blurs the 
distinction between man and animal, kin and foe (p. 153). For a discussion of where 
Seneca’s play reflects the contemporary situation in Rome, see Thy. lines 459-67, 607-8, 
659-662 which have been interpreted as attacks against Roman imperialism cf. Curley 
(1986) pp. 182-3. For society as theatre and metatheatricality in Seneca, see Curley (1986) 
pp. 211ff. 
109 Cf. Romm (2014) pp. 120-1. 
110 Cf. Motto and Clark (1982) p. 134. 
111 Cf. Boyle (2006) p. 181. 
112 Cf. Boyle (2006) p. 182. 
113 Cf. Ep. 35.4; 77; 109.6; Ker (2009a) pp. 115-9. 
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and the anti-exempla found in abundance in his dramas provide ideal case-
studies for education in virtue and vice.114 
 
Senecan Tragedy  
To contextualise Seneca’s philosophical outlook, it is necessary to consider 
the forms of writing his ideas take and the methods in which he 
communicates. He is believed to have written eight tragedies: Hercules 
Furens, Troades, Phoenissae, Phaedra, Thyestes, Agamemnon, Oedipus 
and Medea. He may also have written a ninth, Hercules Oetaeus.115 Studies 
of Senecan tragedies range from questions concerning dating, authorship, 
performance, reception, imitatio and originality to stylistic devices, 
particularly declamatory effects.116 The dating of the plays is problematic 
due to the absence of satisfactory references to confirm the date of 
composition.117 Regardless of the position which one takes on dating, the 
underlying nature of the tragedies and their relationship to Stoicism remains 
unchanged.  
 
The authorship of the plays is also debated. Historically, a common 
challenge was Seneca’s lack of reference to his dramas in his prose works, 
moral essays and Epistles, and that there is minimal reference to the plays 
by other authors compared with his prose.118 In line with recent scholarship, 
                                                          
114 Cf. Boyle (2006) ‘Stoicism as a philosophy abounds in theatrical tropes, as both Greek 
Stoic writings and Seneca’s own Epistles to Lucilius testify, demanding from its heroes a 
capacity for dramatic display and exemplary performance. And Stoicism was the 
philosophy of prime choice for the Neronian elite’ (p. 182). 
115 Any suggestion that he wrote Octavia has been discredited cf. Tarrant (1978) pp. 214-
5 n. 7; Boyle (2006) pp. 221-3. 
116 For the issue of authorship, see Fisher (1945); Canter (1925); Bishop (1985); Kohn 
(2003). For questions concerning performance, see Hadas (1939) pp. 221-5; Marti (1945) 
pp. 219-20; Zwierlein (1966); Herington (1982) p. 520; Fitch (2000); Boyle (2006) p. 192; 
Costa (1974) pp. 100-1; Calder III (1976) pp. 4-6; Pratt (1983) pp. 16-21; Hollingsworth 
(2001); Erasmo (2005) pp. 135-7; Trinacty (2015) pp. 32-6. For stylistic devices, see Canter 
(1925) p. 80, 173-5, 177-9; Haywood (1943) p. 246; Braden (1970); Calder III (1976) pp. 
7-9; Mayer (1990); Boyle (1997) pp. 15-31; Hollingsworth (2001); Wilson (2007); Buckley 
(2013) p. 208ff. For a general analysis of stylistic devices, see Pratt (1983) pp. 30-3, for 
declamation, see pp. 132-49 and for rhetorical drama, see pp. 150-63. All these issues are 
discussed by Boyle (2006) p. 189ff. 
117 Cf. Griffin (1976, 1992) p. 395ff.; Fitch (1981); Nisbet (2008).  
118 Kohn (2003) notes intertextual references could have been made: for instance, many of 
Medea's statements (e.g. Med. lines 203-51) demonstrate the negative effects of anger 
propounded in De Ira (p. 274 n. 23). Dio Cass. (61.3) reported Seneca’s work in exile (Poly.) 
and Tacitus mentioned various speeches written by Seneca, many of which were for Nero 
(Tac. Ann. 13.3) (p. 276). However, Quintilian quoted Seneca’s Medea ‘what lands do you 
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I dismiss the suggestion that the lack of intertextual references is because 
the works were written by two different men, a conclusion which is 
supported by the absence of satisfactory historical evidence for another 
Seneca.119 Seneca’s disdain for gladiatorial combat (Ep. 7), does not mean 
that he was too meek or unwilling to enhance his drama through grotesque 
displays on stage, such as Medea visually killing her sons.120 I also reject 
the suggestion that Seneca is so well-versed in poetry he would not need 
to rely on other people’s works for ideas for a play because this conclusion 
overlooks the tradition for authors to competitively adapt predecessors’ 
works to demonstrate their ability (imitatio).121 For the purpose of my 
research and its focus on the presentation of passions in the selected texts, 
balancing these arguments, and from identifying the similarities of themes 
and consistencies in presentation of his ideas in Seneca’s prose works and 
tragedies, I will accept that Seneca wrote these plays. 
 
Whether Seneca’s plays were performed is relevant to a discussion about 
Seneca’s aim of inspiring self-improvement and resolving the problems of 
passions because how the audience or reader respond to what they see, 
hear or read may affect the degree of self-reflection and philosophical 
interest which Seneca provokes. Seneca’s use of rhetorical devices has led 
some scholars to argue that the tragedies were not performed and were not 
intended to be performed.122 Those who believe the tragedies were 
                                                          
bid me seek? — quas peti terras iubes’ (Med. line 453) when he discussed different types 
of questions (cf. Quint. Inst. 9.2.9) (p. 276 n. 41). In the same paper, Kohn identifies 
citations of Seneca’s plays in later authors, Probus 4.224.22 and 246.19; Tertullian De 
anim. 42.2, De Resurrectione carnis 1; the commentator on Stat. Theb. 4.530; Terentianus 
Maurus (6 p. 404) and Prisc. (2 p. 253.7) (p. 276 n. 40). 
119 The fifth-century poet Sidonius Apollinaris seems to have believed that Seneca tragicus 
and Seneca philosophus were two different men and he speaks of the sons of Corduba 
(Sid. Apoll. Car. 9.232-8) cf. Kohn (2003) p. 278. In addition, I identify from Seneca’s 
boldness, for instance in De Clementia to control Nero (cf. Tac. Ann. 13.2.1), a challenge 
to the suggestion that he did not compose the plays because of fear of the emperor’s wrath. 
This is reinforced by the fact that earlier in his life, he remained undeterred in his writing, 
despite Caligula’s apparent jealousy of Seneca’s oratorical skills (cf. Dio Cass. 59.19).  
120 This argument against good taste was used by Albrecht (1938) to suggest it was a 
different Seneca who wrote the plays, as discussed by Fisher (1945) p. 110. Cf. Herrmann 
(1924) pp. 58-62 discussed in Kohn (2003) p. 275. For Seneca’s response to the 
gladiatorial tradition in Rome, see Barton (1989) pp. 1-36; Cagniart (2000) pp. 607-18. 
121 As argued by Fisher (1945) p. 109. For imitatio in Seneca, see Cleasby (1907), Goldberg 
(2014).  
122 Leo (1878) declares that: ‘These are not really tragedies… but declamations patterned 
after tragedy and divided into acts’ (p. 158) translated by Goldberg (1996) p. 275. 
36 
 
intended for performance have considered three possibilities: (i) recitation, 
(ii) performance, and they were performed, or (iii) produced for performance 
which did not occur in antiquity.123 If the plays were performed, it would most 
likely have been on temporary stages erected in private homes using slaves 
as actors (cf. Cic. Fin. 2.23), which may explain why there is sparse 
reference to the plays by other authors.124  
 
It was common practice in the first-century AD for there to be public and 
private readings (by the author or a freedman) of literary material as a 
means of publication and opportunity for feedback and editing (cf. Juv. Sat. 
1.1-6; Plin. Ep. 3.18.4). Consequently, ‘recitational drama’ became a 
popular genre, which is why many people assume Seneca wrote in this 
genre. Indeed, some scholars use Seneca’s detailed descriptive passages, 
such as Med. lines 380-430, as evidence for recitatio.125 Quintilian’s claim 
to have heard debates between Seneca and Pomponius Secundus about 
diction appropriate to tragedy has led some scholars to believe that because 
Secundus wrote both staged and recitational plays, Seneca may have done 
the same (cf. Tac. Dial. 3).126 These various attempts by scholars to prove 
that Seneca was not writing for performance should be met with caution. I 
support the view that he is a momentous dramatist considering his wide 
influence on drama.127 By accepting that these plays may have been 
                                                          
123 Cf. Calder III (1976) p. 4.  
124 Cf. Boyle (2006) p. 13 n. 37.  
125 For example, Costa (1973) argues that the ‘vivid account of Medea's movements points 
firmly to recitation of the tragedies because the nurse describes what would have been 
visible’ (p. 108 commentary on Med. lines 380-430. Comment made by Hollingsworth 
(2001) p. 139). Yet Hollingsworth (2001) notes the context, that she is describing facial 
expressions that would not be seen from the one mask, that the nurse’s speech is an 
implicit stage direction and this is a common technique even found in other playwrights 
such as Plautus, and concludes that instead of being a substitute, it complements the 
staged event (Hollingsworth (2001) p. 139). Hollingsworth diplomatically concludes that it 
was accepted that Seneca may have recited his plays, but the controversy lies in his 
intention in writing: ‘Since recitational poetry does not appear to resemble Senecan tragedy 
any more than it resembles the other genres that were read, its popularity and content 
should not lead us to the conclusion that Seneca wrote for the recital hall. Instead, the lack 
of similarity should move us closer to recognizing the plays as drama for the theater’ (p. 
144). 
126 Cf. Hollingsworth (2001) p. 144. 
127 Boyle (2006) correctly recognises Seneca to be ‘…one of the great tragedians of the 
European tradition’ and continues to list the dramatic features of Seneca’s plays that 
influenced Renaissance drama (p. 189). Most relevant to the consideration of passions is 
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performed, I will view the audience reaction in terms of what was seen on 
stage and will relate this to possible responses to the presentation of anger 
and how this contributes to education in virtue and vice and to prompting 
self-reflection during and after the performance. In Chapter Five, I will focus 
on how a modern audience may react with a degree of awareness of 
Stoicism as opposed to making assumptions about Seneca’s ancient 
audience for which there is minimal evidence. 
 
Features of pantomime have been identified in Seneca’s tragedies, which 
suggest that his plays were performed in antiquity.128 He was aware of 
pantomime’s popularity, particularly with Nero (cf. Suet. Ner. 6.3, 21.3), 
which may explain Seneca’s choice to incorporate its stylistic features so 
that he can appeal to contemporary taste as well as establishing an 
innovative approach to theatre.129 Ancient pantomime integrated tragic and 
mythological themes with particular interest in expressing the emotional 
conflict of those experiencing extreme passions and centred on violence 
and death.130 Topics include the fickleness of fortune, madness, obsession 
by grief, furor of love, anger resulting from divine possession and lust for 
revenge.131 The plots regularly incorporated onstage dismemberment, 
tecnophagy (cf. Lucian Salt. 80; Sid. Apoll. Car. 23.277-99), self-mutilation 
and killing of family members (cf. Lucian Salt. 41), all of which underpin 
Seneca’s Medea and Thyestes.132 Pantomime contains elements of rhetoric 
and its inclusion in Seneca’s plays would allow for performance (cf. Lucian 
                                                          
the psychological insight into human nature which Seneca’s tragedies offer, as will be 
explored in Chapters Four and Five passim. 
128 Cf. Zanobi (2014). Zimmermann (1990) identifies three pantomime scenes in Seneca’s 
tragedies, which are present in Medea, (i) ‘actual pantomime’ where the chorus describes 
the action of the character (lines 849-78); (ii) an actor describes the action of another 
character (lines 380-396) and (iii) ‘short pantomimic commentaries’ where the Chorus or 
actor announces the entrance/exit of another character while describing their movements 
(lines 186) (pp. 161-7). Arguments outlined in Zanobi (2014) p. 92. 
129 Seneca’s interest in and praise of pantomime is evidenced in his Epistles: ‘We are apt 
to wonder at skilled dancers because their gestures are perfectly adapted to the meaning 
of the piece and its accompanying emotions, and their movements match the speed of the 
dialogue — Mirari solemus saltandi peritos, quod in omnem significationem rerum et 
adfectuum parata illorum est manus, et verborum velocitatem gestus adsequitur’ (Ep. 
121.6). 
130 Cf. Zanobi (2014) p. 1.  
131 Cf. Zanobi (2014) pp. 12-3.  
132 Cf. Zanobi (2014) p. 13. 
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Salt. 35; 65). Typically, ‘pantomimic scenes’ have been identified in Medea 
where the Chorus describes the protagonist’s movements (Med. lines 
849ff.) and where she describes her actions (lines 382-90) to demonstrate 
her derangement.133 The inclusion of such elements is a way in which 
Seneca innovatively adapts tragedy to meet Neronian taste and the 
contemporary popularity of pantomime (cf. QNat. 7.32.3).134  
 
Ancient Roman tragedy served to provide popular entertainment (cf. Cic. 
Fam. 7.1).135 Primary passions shown on masks were painted in a more 
exaggerated way in Roman than in Greek theatre because emotional 
expression through poetry, rhetoric and elaborate stagecraft was very 
important for the Romans.136 This may explain Seneca’s display of extreme 
characters and their passions in his plays. The Imperial milieu changed the 
meaning of tragedy in two main ways: (1) it demonstrated the closeness of 
theatrical performance to everyday life, rather than religious scenes and 
occasions and (2) it presented ordinary life in Rome on a grandiose scale, 
through the vastness of imperial buildings, processional shows and military 
displays.137 Roman dramatic presentations differed from their Greek 
counterparts because the latter were religious performances, designed to 
stimulate the audience intellectually through a simple stage to avoid 
distraction from the plays’ lessons.138 By contrast, in Roman drama, the 
plays aim to entertain on the same scale as gladiatorial combat, hence the 
melodrama, declamatory dialogue to appeal to the audiences’ appreciation 
of rhetoric and the occurrence of horrific events on stage.139  
                                                          
133 Cf. Zimmermann (2008).  
134 Cf. Zimmermann (2008) p. 224.  
135 Cf. Henry and Henry (1985) p. 2.  
136 Cf. Henry and Henry (1985) p. 3.  
137 Cf. Henry and Henry (1985) p. 3.  
138 Cf. Curley (1986) pp. 208-10.  
139 Cf. Hadas (1939) pp. 222-4; Goldberg (1996) p. 267. Despite the theatrical differences 
in Greek and Roman theatres, Seneca’s plays include features taken from Greek tragedy. 
These include the epigrammatic style, plots advancing through monologues, set speeches 
or ‘dramatized suasoriae’ or debating, the latter taking the form of stichomythia (dialogue 
in alternating lines. Cf. Med. lines 150-176) and antilabe (division of lines between two 
speakers). Cf. Costa (1974) pp. 104-5. The rapid-fire dialogue between characters hastens 
the pace of Seneca’s drama and demonstrates the quick-wittedness and linguistic dexterity 
of the characters. Citing Med. lines 168-71 as an example, Braden (1970) reports how 
‘Characters bounce off each other like billiard balls’ (p. 19) and Buckley (2013) argues that 
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In keeping with the dramatic tradition and the common practice of imitatio in 
ancient dramatists, Seneca’s protagonists are not humble men but from 
royal or semi-divine origin because ‘great’ men are particularly interesting 
(cf. Arist. Poet. Chapter 15). Aristotle believes that characters are 
increasingly fascinating when their change in fortune from prosperity to 
poverty or from proud elation to profound misery is observed (Arist. Poet. 
Chapter 13). As well as being of high status, such men’s emotional intensity 
captures audience interest and holds their attention. Seneca’s Choruses 
meet many of the expectations laid out by Horace who defined the role of 
this identifiable group (usually comprised of citizens), with varied dramatic 
and structural functions. In Greek drama, Horace argued that the Chorus 
only sing what is appropriate to the plot; demonstrate loyalty to the good 
character to whom they offer friendly advice; control those of bad temper; 
approve of those who are not anxious towards transgressors; commend 
moderation; respect confidences; pray to the gods to reverse ill fortune to 
the wretched and desert the proud (Hor. Ars P. lines 193-201). Seneca 
follows the Greek model of having the Chorus break the action by providing 
interludes, to achieve dramatic effect and to contextualise the play by 
responding to its words and actions, thus contributing to the large issues of 
the tragedy.140 Seneca’s Choruses also address topics which are relevant 
to everyday life illustrating how philosophy is helpful to overcome personal 
difficulties and that it involves a life-long journey to facilitate tranquillitas.141 
 
Seneca seeks to make the traditional mythological stories and Greek 
tragedies relevant and interesting to his peers and to use these stories to 
form a basis for provoking thought in his audience and readers.142 He 
follows the genre’s tradition of reflecting and questioning its current world, 
particularly with his focus on the problems of tyrannical rule.143 Thus, the 
plays require suitable images for the audiences, for example, contemporary 
                                                          
Med. lines 157-67 ‘is not so much conversation as verbal duel…’ (p. 209). Cf. Littlewood 
(2004) pp. 40-7. 
140 Seneca does differ in that his choruses do not end the play and it is not assumed that 
they remain on stage throughout the play. Cf. Tarrant (1978) pp. 221-8. 
141 For a definition of tranquillitas, see pp. 17, 22, 25. 
142 Cf. Mayer (1990); Trinacty (2015) p. 31.  
143 Cf. Trinacty (2015) p. 30.  
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social realities, religious ceremonies, institutions, laws and customs.144 For 
Seneca, these include religious formulas where the children’s murders are 
ritualised (for instance, in Med. lines 562ff., 905, 967ff., 976; Thy. lines 
767ff.). In addition to being influenced by his predecessors, Seneca took 
advantage of the interest in his own time in adaptations of traditional Greek 
writing. He knew that using titles of famous Greek plays such as Medea 
would attract attention from a wider audience than just the elite educated 
Romans who were preoccupied with his prose.145  
 
His deviation from traditional models, variations in plot and violent 
presentation undoubtedly provoked discussion at the time and this 
continues among modern scholars. When placed in its literary context, 
Senecan drama has been considered to be inspired less by Attic tragedy 
(despite the imitatio of mythic plots) and more by the later Greek dramatic 
form, that of New Comedy (such as those by Plautus and Terence) and by 
Latin writers of the Augustan era, even though extant evidence of these later 
writers is limited.146 This argument is drawn, in particular, from Seneca’s 
division of plays usually into five acts, separated by four choral odes and 
the independence of individual scenes.147  
 
Analysis of some distinctive features of Senecan drama, in particular his use 
of entrance monologues and asides, reveals material which is particularly 
relevant to the discussion of characters’ states of mind when governed by 
                                                          
144 Cf. Steele (1922b) pp. 1-31; Hadas (1939) pp. 220-1; Henry and Henry (1985) p. 157; 
Tarrant (1995) pp. 225-7; Littlewood (2004) pp. 188-91. Buckley (2013) highlights 
examples of the ‘clear Romanizing intent of the tragedies’ including references to the 
Roman gods of the home/lares (Med. line 224). She claims that the armies ‘look, behave, 
and fight like the Roman army’ (Thy. lines 184-185), that the Chorus, though based in 
Greece, identify themselves as Romans/Quirites (Thy. line 396) and Seneca presents the 
world from ‘the Roman geopolitical perspective’ (cf. Thy. lines 369-79; Med. lines 364-79) 
(p. 217). Trinacty (2015) observes that ‘His [Seneca’s] tragedies provide a lens through 
which one can observe actions and speeches that resonate with his historical period, even 
if one should not assume that behind the characters such as Atreus or Eteocles lurk a 
veiled allusion to Nero…’ (p. 30). 
145 Cf. Tarrant (1978) and (1995). 
146 Cf. Tarrant (1978); Littlewood (2004) pp. 183-5. 
147 For this structure in Menander, see Tarrant (1978) pp. 221-2. For the independence of 
individual scenes which is proposed to reflect that of the postclassical period, see Tarrant 
(1978) pp. 228-31. For the influence of and deviation from Augustan and Republican 
Roman tragedy on Seneca, see Tarrant (1978) pp. 255-61. 
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passions such as fear and anger. Seneca is said to have developed the 
convention of the suspension of dramatic time through entrance 
monologues by characters which ignore the presence of others on the 
stage; this leads to interruption to stage action and reference to the other 
characters on stage in the third person.148 For instance, Medea announces 
the creaking door signifying Creon’s arrival (Med. lines 177-8), while Creon 
launches into a tirade about her (lines 177-86) before she approaches, 
forcing him to acknowledge her presence (line 186).149 Similarly, Jason 
justifies his desertion of Medea, blaming fate, and is wary of her ferocity ‘etsi 
ferox est corde nec patiens iugi’ before she engages with him in 
conversation (lines 431ff.). It is possible in Medea, that the protagonists’ 
constant presence on the stage forces interrupted asides. However, this 
technique is also present in Thyestes when Atreus witnesses Thyestes 
speaking with his son, yet continues to discuss his plans of assault in terms 
of an Umbrian hound (Thy. lines 491ff.). These speeches are intended not 
to be overheard either because the speakers do not wish their feelings to 
be publicly known or because they involve plotting the ruination of other 
characters: from the ensuing interactions it appears that neither Medea or 
Thyestes have heard the comments. Seneca’s inclusion of such speeches 
is necessary to explain the progress of the plot to the audience and to 
demonstrate the isolation which developing passions cause their sufferer in 
the sense that the fluctuating thought processes make it harder to engage 
with the outside world.  
 
It can be concluded that Seneca’s tragedies violently show the catastrophic 
consequences of extreme passions in order to illustrate the differences 
between virtue and vice. The plays also incorporate a range of Stoic 
themes, such as religion, mortality and destiny which prove relevant to the 
                                                          
148 For similar isolated entrance monologues in New Comedy due to the absence of 
Choruses, see Tarrant (1978) pp. 237-41. 
149 For its limited presence in Attic drama and the postclassical influence on Seneca of 
communicating details of stage business, such as Medea hearing the creaking door, see 
Tarrant (1978) pp. 246-7.  
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theory of passions when they are considered in terms of how attitudes 
influence decision-making.150  
 
How does Seneca communicate his ideas? 
Seneca’s arguments are largely based on his personal experience, on 
which he regularly draws, particularly in his Epistles, to illustrate his point as 
well as to make his ideas more accessible. Seneca’s style ranges from a 
lively but forceful conversational tone, particularly in the Epistles, to a more 
didactic approach when dealing with more serious subjects in his prose. He 
presents larger than life personalities in the dramas to show the worst 
aspects of human nature in a similar way to how he uses specific exempla 
in his prose. In this thesis, these personalities will be treated as, so to speak, 
case studies to assess whether Stoicism would be helpful in curing the 
passions of those people who are worst affected by them. Seneca’s essays 
follow the established tradition of philosophical treatises, as well as finding 
opportunities for originality. Seneca’s works are accessible to a wide 
audience because in his prose he chooses interesting and relevant topics, 
something which he also achieves in his tragedies through his plots and 
dynamic characterisation. His recommendations for self-improvement 
depend on generic constraints, though common techniques can be found 
across the works, all of which are designed to hold attention. These include 
clear, detailed definitions which are typically Stoic, second-person address, 
direct speech and dialogue. Other techniques include the use of exempla, 
interlocutors, rhetorical questions, various figures of speech as well as 
poetic and philosophical references. 
 
Seneca employs declamatory style and rhetoric in his prose, in keeping with 
the stylistic expectations of his writing in an era where oratory was in 
abundance. As the third stage of Roman formal education, Seneca and 
many of his contemporary audience would have experienced training in 
rhetoric, making it an appropriate means for communicating his 
                                                          
150 Cf. Chapter Four passim. 
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messages.151 Rhetoric structures Seneca’s plays to create dramatic tension 
and to develop articulate characters, all of which keep his audience 
engrossed.152 The use of declamatory style is part of Seneca’s innovative 
contribution to the tragic genre as his plays focus on the use of language 
rather than elaborate visual displays, lessening the importance of action 
which exposes him to the overly-harsh criticism of producing largely static 
plays.153 He deploys common declamation themes such as kingship154 and 
enhances dramatic scenes with his eloquent characters, for example 
through Medea’s magic (Med. lines 670-739).155  
 
Stemming from his own schooling, a prevalent stylistic feature of Seneca’s 
writing which is of particular importance for this thesis is the use of exempla. 
He praises the importance of this technique for moral lessons, to illustrate 
his arguments and to help his reader understand his views by providing 
something to which they can relate and choose to emulate or avoid.156 
Seneca employs this Stoic method of education to inspire reflection 
demonstrating personal responsibility for self-improvement.157 These 
examples of behaviour take positive forms to emulate or negative ones 
(exempla mala) to avoid.158 His exempla range from philosophers to 
emperors to members of the plebs and are well-known Greek and Roman 
individuals, both ancient and contemporary. In De Ira, Seneca explains that 
from these exempla, Novatus and the readers will learn (i) the extent of evil 
in anger when it controls extremely powerful men and (ii) how it can impose 
                                                          
151 Cf. Canter (1925); Haywood (1943) p. 256; Costa (1974) pp. 100ff.; Pratt (1983) pp. 30-
1; Boyle (2006) pp. 193-7; Buckley (2013) pp. 208-9; Williams (2015) pp.137ff. 
152 Cf. Curley (1986) pp. 189-91. 
153 Cf. Sutton (1986) p. 1; Segal (2008) p. 141.  
154 Cf. Tarrant (1995) pp. 228-9.  
155 Seneca has been accused of excessive use of mythological references by his Choruses 
but modern scholarship is appropriately sympathetic to these, interpreting them as 
thematically relevant rather than ‘rhetorical decoration’ (Davis (1993) p. 64). This is true of 
the retelling of the Argonaut expedition (cf. Med. lines 301f., 579f.) and the Tantalus myth 
(Thy. lines 136f.) because they place the tragedies in their current context, offer 
explanations to the events which occur during the plays and give past events current 
interest.  
156 Cf. Ep. 11.9; 95.66-7; Tranq. 1.12; Turpin (2008) p. 365.  
157 As ‘vehicles for moral reflection’ (Turpin (2008) p. 365), exempla encourage ‘active 
engagement with ethical issues’ and, rather than posing as ‘easy, simple lessons’, they act 
as an ‘intellectual goad’ (Gloyn (2017) p. 130).  
158 Cf. Roller (2004) pp. 4-5; Tarrant (2006) pp. 8-11; Turpin (2008) pp. 367-8; Gloyn (2017) 
pp. 142-3. 
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great control on itself when controlled by the stronger influence of fear 
(3.13.7. Cf. 3.22.1). Anecdotes are also used to show appropriate behaviour 
in response to anger, such as Socrates,159 Plato,160 Cato161 and Diogenes 
of Babylon,162 all of whom are famed for their self-control and enlightened 
views which became influential centuries after their deaths. Seneca also 
recalls stories of people practising cures for anger, including Hieronymus of 
Rhodes (1.19.3), Heraclitus of Ephesus and Democritus of Abdera (2.10.5. 
Cf. 3.6.3), the athletic trainer Pyrrhus (2.14.3), Quintus Sextius (cf. 2.36.1, 
3.36.1) and Pythagoras (3.9.2) which will be discussed in Chapter Three. 
Chapters Four and Five discuss how the characters in Medea and Thyestes 
provide extensive negative examples to avoid. I use their failings as an 
opportunity to explore reformation and treatment of passions using the 
techniques which Seneca recommends in De Ira and Stoicism in general.  
 
Seneca introduces interlocutors (imaginary or historical) in his prose works 
to pose leading questions in a philosophical debate which allows him to 
reinforce his point of view in his response.163 Similarly in the tragedies, 
characters engage with each other to either justify their behaviour or to 
object to the approaches taken by other people. In De Ira, the unnamed 
interlocutor, who is introduced by ‘inquit’, may or may not be the addressee, 
though I will assume him to be Novatus because his brother has appealed 
to Seneca for advice. Novatus is eager to learn about the subject of anger 
and how to cure it.164 However, he is sceptical of his ability to remove it 
(2.12.3. Cf. 3.39.3). The questions asked by the interlocutor can be 
interpreted as representing many of the reader’s anxieties and the issues 
which disturb good Roman men. He takes either the common views about 
anger or those of philosophical rivals, all of which Seneca seeks to refute, 
and also allows Seneca to refute objections he may see coming in advance, 
replicating the nature of a real dialogue.  
                                                          
159 Cf. 1.15.3, 2.7.1, 3.11.2, 3.13.3-4. 
160 Cf. 2.21.10, 3.12.5-7. 
161 Cf. 2.32.2-3, 3.38.2. 
162 Cf. 3.38.1. 
163 Cf. Braund (2009) p. 53; Roller (2015) pp. 60-2. 
164 Cf. 1.1, 2.2.1, 2.31.2, 3.3.1, 3.5.1. 
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Sometimes philosophers appear as interlocutors, often to undermine the 
opposing schools’ beliefs about anger, for example, Aristotle165 and his 
successor, Theophrastus of Eresos,166 details of which will be discussed in 
the first chapter. Elsewhere, Seneca refers to Stoics to strengthen his 
arguments, for instance, using Zeno’s view that even after the wound is 
healed, a scar remains in the Sage’s mind, so that he feels the 
‘shadows/umbra’ of passion but not passion itself (1.16.7).167 In addition, 
rhetorical questions are frequently found in De Ira. These are largely used 
to convince Novatus that anger is to be avoided and removed, but are also 
used to form a means to show the alternatives to angry responses. This 
device is used to discredit opposition viewpoints, for instance those of 
Aristotle and his followers.168 Seneca’s commitment to an engagement with 
opposing schools illustrates how he frames his ideas within the context of 
existing philosophical debates in an attempt to establish his philosophical 
identity. 
 
Seneca’s texts also contain sententiae, short pithy statements, with moral 
undertones, which are simple enough to be internalised and remembered, 
which is particularly beneficial for ethical learning (cf. Ep. 94.43; 108.8-9, 
11). This rhetorical technique was common in the ancient world to keep 
important philosophical principles in mind in an initially oral tradition. Horace 
alludes to this technique when he advises poets to be succinct in their 
precepts so that they are easily understood and memorable (Hor. Ars P. 
lines 335-6). These memorable phrases can be found in Medea during her 
lively debate with the Nurse: ‘The time can never be wrong for virtue — 
Numquam potest non esse virtuti locus’ (Med. line 161); ‘Who can hope for 
nothing should despair of nothing — Qui nil potest sperare, desperet nihil’ 
(line 163) and ‘Treat as guiltless one who’s guilty for you — tibi innocens sit 
quisquis est pro te nocens’ (line 503).169 In addition, Seneca’s works are 
                                                          
165 Cf. 1.9.2, 1.17.1. 
166 Cf.1.12.3, 1.14.1. 
167 Although it is debated whether this statement was actually made, its presence shows 
that Seneca is turning to a higher authority to legitimate his claims Cf. Cooper and Procopé 
(1995) p. 35 n. 40. 
168 Cf. 1.9.2, 1.17.1, 2.13.1, 3.3.1, 3.3.5. For Seneca’s refutation of Aristotle, see pp. 99ff.  
169 Cf. Ep. 94.43. 
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alive with colourful metaphors to enhance his descriptions of his characters’ 
actions, appearances, thoughts and beliefs. He discusses the significance 
of using appropriate metaphors and similes because he recognises the 
importance of imagery to persuade (cf. Ep. 59.6-7).170 He draws upon 
images from the human and the natural world, refers to the vice of passions 
in military terms and employs medical metaphors to show how anger is a 
sickness of the mind.171 These stylistic features and the many themes which 
recur in Senecan prose and drama, (most commonly those of power, exile, 
family, fate, god, nature, magic and supernatural powers and madness), will 
be discussed at relevant times in Chapters Four and Five to show the 
consistencies in Seneca’s arguments across the genres in which he writes 
and the level of philosophical ideas communicated in his plays. In addition 
to unifying his work, these topics are significant to his drama as much as to 
everyday life, making his plays both topical and comprehensive. 
 
To add gravitas to his arguments, Seneca regularly quotes various 
philosophers, poets, historians and playwrights in his prose.172 On 
occasions where sources are not acknowledged, these references have 
been identified by modern scholars.173 Seneca also expands upon 
traditional metaphors, such as the idea that there are two paths to virtue and 
vice and the mistaken belief that the former is steeper (2.13.1).174 These 
                                                          
170 Cf. Larson (1992) pp. 51, 54.  
171 For the comparison of anger with beasts, see pp. 92, 108-9, 127, 207-9. For Seneca’s 
use of military metaphors in his war against passion, see pp. 88-9. For applying philosophy 
as medicine for the soul, see pp. 81-4. 
172 For allusions to Homer, see 1.12.5 (Hom. Il. 18.309) and 1.8.20 (Hom. Il. 23.724). For 
allusions to Ovid, see 1.3.5 (Ov. Met. 7.545-6) and 2.9.2 (Ov. Met. 1.144-8). Seneca uses 
an anonymous epigram at 2.15.5 (FLP Anonymous fr. 24; Ep. 40.4; 94.51). He later 
paraphrases Vergil at 2.35.6 (Ver. Aen. 8.702 and 8.703). For the presence of Ovidian and 
Vergilian references in Seneca’s works, see Maguinness (1956) especially pp. 92ff. For 
further discussion about examples where Plato is quoted in De Ira, for instance at 1.6.5 (cf. 
Pl. Resp. 1.335D); 1.19.7 (cf. Pl. Leg. 11.934A6-B2) and 2.20.2 (cf. Pl. Leg. 2.666A2-6), 
see pp. 116-7. For historians, see 1.20.6 (cf. Livy fr. 66 Weissenborn-Müller). 1.20.4 cites 
the dramatist Accius, fr. 168. cf. Clem. 1.12.4, 2.2.2. At 2.11.3, Seneca quotes the 
Republican Knight and author of mimes, Laberius, (fr. 126 Ribbeck). Cf. Tarrant (2006) pp. 
1-5. 
173 See its origin in Hes. Op. 287-92. The idea that personal vices are hidden but men are 
quick to recognise those in others at 2.28.8 is also present in Catull. (22.20-1).  
174 Basore (1928, 1958) directs attention to the beginning of Arist. Hymn to virtue (Bergk, 
Poet. Lyr. Graec.ii p.360) for a similar argument (p. 194). Cooper and Procopé (1995) note 
that the C5thBC Greek sophist Prodicus wrote about the ‘choice offered to Heracles’ (cf. 
Xen. Mem. 2.1.21-34) (pp. 53-4 n. 23) cf. Kaster (2010) p. 113 n. 166.  
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references show Seneca’s erudition and provide an opportunity for other 
authors to reinforce his ideas or to show the alternative stance with which 
Seneca may or may not be inviting his reader or audience to agree. His well-
educated audience is likely to have been able to recognise these allusions, 
which is helpful for their engagement with the texts, increasing the likelihood 
of subsequent self-reflection which will assist in the process of removing 
passions. Seneca’s references to other writers show his appeal to the 
intellect, as well as seeking additional authorities to strengthen his 
arguments. 
 
The texts 
In preparation for detailed analysis of these texts, I will summarise the 
content of De Ira, De Clementia, Medea and Thyestes. The two prose texts 
can be read concurrently as ira and clementia are alternative responses to 
provocative situations. Not only are there structural and methodological 
parallels in these books but the nature of anger and its catastrophic 
consequences are discussed in a similar fashion.175 De Ira challenges the 
traditional views about anger by showing that it is entirely unfavourable and 
must be removed to allow man to live the best life. Seneca aims to dispel 
common arguments about anger and the philosophical views of Aristotle, 
his followers the Peripatetics, and the Epicureans.176 De Clementia revises 
the Latin concept of clementia to involve mildness in nature and anger to be 
absent from it, that it is a virtue to aspire to, connected with humanitas 
(appropriate concern for other people) and the goodness of the soul, claims 
which Seneca was the first Roman to make (cf. 1.20.1).177  
 
                                                          
175 Cf. Braund (2009) pp. 70-3; Kaster (2010) p. 135. 
176 For the Aristotelian concepts about passions, including anger, see Fortenbaugh (1975); 
Leighton (1982) and (2002); Roberts (1989); Kemp and Strongman (1995) pp. 398-401; 
Sihvola (1996); Stocker and Hegeman (1996); Cooper (1999); Konstan (2003); Kalimtzis 
(2012) pp. 73-102. For Epicurean views about the subject see, Long (1986) pp. 49-69; 
Nussbaum (1986); Annas (1989); Procopé (1998) pp. 171-96; Tsouna (2007b); Armstrong 
(2008) pp. 81-8; Asmis (2011); Tsouna (2011). 
177 Cf. Clem. 1.5.3-5, 20.3; Constant. 2.32.2, 3.5.7, 32.3; Korfmacher (1946); Griffin (2003); 
Braund (2009) pp. 30-44; Hruşcӑ (2012); Malaspina (2014) pp. 178-80. 
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De Ira is addressed to Seneca’s Roman senator brother, Lucius Annaeus 
Novatus.178 In the tradition of polite letters, Seneca responds to Novatus’ 
request to write about the common ancient topos: ‘You’ve pressed me, 
Novatus, to prescribe a way of soothing anger — Exegisti a me, Novate, ut 
scriberem quemadmodum posset ira leniri’ (1.1.1). Novatus has ‘longed 
for/maxime desiderasti’ guidance about how to remove or at least rein in 
and curb anger (3.1.1). Seneca is challenging the fundamental Roman 
socio-political beliefs and the value system on which the Romans 
depended. For instance, Novatus as an ambitious Roman politician, would 
probably consider anger to be important to manage public criminality and to 
maintain military motivation.179 Seneca has the task of removing these 
deeply seated internal beliefs with logical reasoning as this is a way of 
persuading his peers to change their attitudes and behaviours. Although it 
is addressed to his brother, De Ira is relevant and accessible to anyone and 
could be directed at the emperor as guidance for his conduct in the same 
way as De Clementia was to Nero.180 Thus, the main purpose of De Ira is 
to provide a detailed account of anger in advance of offering solutions to 
cure it, with a view to preventing it from arising to protect the individual and 
society. Seneca’s definition of anger will be predominately drawn from this 
text and his attitudes towards potential cures will be analysed accordingly. 
 
De Clementia offers a detailed explanation to Nero of how he should rule, 
his power and responsibility to his subjects (cf. Clem. 1.1.2, 4-5, 7, 1.14.1-
2) and which virtues he should practise, comparing a good ruler and the 
tyrant.181 My reading of the text concentrates on the arguments that relate 
                                                          
178 It has been suggested De Ira was written between 41-52AD possibly during Seneca’s 
exile in Corsica. For details about the possibilities of dating this work, see Braund (2009) 
pp. 16-7; Kaster (2010) p. 97 n. 1. 
179 Cf. van Hoof (2007) pp. 66-9. 
180 Cf. Romm (2014) pp. 90-2. 
181 Seneca states that Nero is eighteen years old (his birthday was 15th December 55AD) 
suggesting De Clementia was written at some point during that year. However, dating of 
this work has caused controversy because Seneca claims that Nero has not killed anyone 
(Clem. 1.1.2; 1.1.5) leaving some scholars to date the work earlier than 55-56AD because 
in 55AD Nero had already arranged the secret poisoning of Britannicus, his step-brother 
by adoption (Dio Cass. 61.7.4; Suet. Ner. 33.2-3; Tac. Ann. 13.15-7). I accept the original 
dating because, while Seneca would not have been ignorant of the murder, the emperor’s 
role may not have been widely known. For the difficulties in dating Clem., see Griffin (1976, 
1992) pp. 407-11; Braund (2009) pp. 16-7.  
49 
 
to anger and its management as well as its emphasis that ira is a quality 
unbecoming for an emperor king. While the work is dedicated to advising 
Nero how to rule, it is also useful in offering a positive alternative to ira and 
will be considered to be so. Furthermore, De Ira and De Clementia are 
important philosophical works for the inspiration of better conduct and the 
revision of values and attitudes. Despite their differences, when exploring 
anger, these texts complement each other and there is great value in 
studying them alongside one another because they consolidate the nature 
of passions and offer alternative ways to behave.  
 
The famous myth provides the background for Seneca’s tragedy Medea. 
Following Jason’s acquisition of the Golden Fleece (after completing 
seemingly impossible tasks with assistance from Princess Medea’s magic), 
the couple flee from Colchis with her younger brother Absyrtus. To distract 
her father, Aeëtes, who was pursuing them, Medea butchers her brother 
and scatters his limbs across the sea. Pelias’ son banishes Jason and 
Medea following their exile from Iolcus after rejuvenating Jason’s father, 
Aeson and then killing Pelias. The couple escape to Corinth where Medea 
bears two sons and Jason later abandons her to marry the Corinthian 
princess, Creusa. Seneca’s play Medea is set on Jason’s wedding day and 
tells the story of Medea’s angry revenge on Jason for his abandonment. 
She retaliates by killing the new bride with a poisoned robe and crown which 
burns Creusa’s flesh and King Creon dies in the fire while trying to save his 
daughter. Medea’s vengeance continues with the murder of her sons and 
she escapes on her Sun God grandfather’s chariot which is drawn by 
winged dragons. My study focuses on the nature and consequences of 
Medea’s anger, exploring the possibility of whether, if she understood the 
nature of the passion and with guidance, she may not have reacted as she 
did. 
 
The play Thyestes relates to the myth of the House of Pelops in Argos, 
renowned for generations of violence including that of the son of Zeus, 
Tantalus, who serves up his son Pelops at a divine banquet. According to 
mythology, revived by Zeus, Pelops marries a princess (after defeating her 
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father in a chariot race by sabotaging his competitor’s chariot), and 
becomes king. He causes conflict between his sons, Atreus and Thyestes, 
and on his death, the initial plans for joint kingship (or alternate rule) are 
regularly broken with the brothers enduring cycles of prosperity and exile. 
For example, at one point when Atreus is king, Thyestes seduces his 
brother’s wife, Aerope, and steals the golden ram, which is the symbol of 
power. This drives Atreus into exile and starts a civil war as a result of which 
he regains power and expels Thyestes from the kingdom. Seneca’s play 
opens with Atreus in power, preparing for entrapment of his brother through 
feigned desire for reconciliation and joint kingship. In reality, Atreus is 
seeking vengeance for Thyestes’ treachery. Thyestes returns from exile to 
become a victim of crimes which far surpass his original slight, as he is 
served his sons in a banquet. Atreus’ personality and attitudes are analysed 
in the context of his anger, with a view to establishing how there may have 
been an alternative outcome had he been able to manage his feelings. 
 
Summary of chapters and their arguments 
Chapter One establishes Seneca’s place within the Stoic theory of passions 
by considering the extent to which he can be perceived to be following 
orthodox doctrines and how he was influenced by later thinkers, such as 
Posidonius. It begins by presenting the commonly accepted definition of 
passions according to Stoicism, presents understandings of assent, causes, 
impulses, beliefs and judgements and considers the effect of adfectus on 
the mind. This requires consideration of the views about passions, 
particularly the role of judgements, held by the School’s founder Zeno, his 
successor Chrysippus and the perceived deviations by Posidonius. The 
chapter addresses how Seneca responds to his predecessors’ views and 
synthesises existing work by considering the way in which he advances 
philosophical doctrines, particularly those relating to the formation of 
passions. 
 
Chapter Two present Seneca’s definition of anger in De Ira and De 
Clementia to provide a comprehensive overview of the subject which forms 
the central focus of my research and themes which will be referred to in later 
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chapters. These works provide opportunity for Seneca to revise traditional 
understandings of ira and clementia, with the conclusion that the former is 
unacceptable and must be expelled and the latter involves mildness 
connected with humanitas and goodness of soul. This chapter outlines the 
Stoic definition of passions with particular focus on anger, summarising its 
stages, causes, physical presentation, characteristics and consequences. 
Stoic perceptions of anger are compared with those of Aristotle and the 
Epicurean approach in general. The chapter affirms that Seneca follows a 
Stoic view that anger is uncontrollable and is an instance of insanity and 
refutes other philosophical views of anger as being useful and present in a 
good soul. Alongside this, I outline the presentation of anger in the tragedies 
Medea and Thyestes in relation to how ira is defined in Seneca’s prose 
works.  
 
Chapter Three asks how anger’s extirpation can be achieved, according to 
the advice Seneca offers in his moral essays which provide techniques to 
do this. I draw on the suggestions in De Ira about how to prevent anger from 
arising by examining the role of education, ‘spiritual exercises’ (in the form 
of ‘preparation for adversity/praemeditatio malorum’, acting ‘fate 
permitting/deo volente’, ‘self-reflection/recognitio’, and taking the ‘view from 
above’) and changing habits, values, behaviours and attitudes towards 
other people. 182 I also outline practical approaches, such as not inviting 
anger, resisting it at its first stages and delaying responses, as well as 
considering the social responsibility to cure other people. Throughout the 
discussion of the cures, I will consider whether they have philosophical 
origins, whether they depend on adopting Stoic doctrines or if they are 
practical, non-philosophical solutions or if they are a combination of both by 
                                                          
182 Praemeditatio malorum is used by Cicero not Seneca (who only uses ‘praemeditor’ in 
Ep. 107.4) but will be used as an apt Latin phrase for the technique of rehearsing the future. 
These practices of self-reflection to increase self-awareness have been termed ‘spiritual 
exercises’ by modern theorists. For example, Hadot (1995, 2003) argues that: ‘Thus, all 
spiritual exercises are, fundamentally, a return to the self, in which the self is liberated from 
the state of alienation into which it has been plunged by worries, passions, and desires. 
The ‘self’ liberated in this way is no longer merely our egoistic, passionate individuality: it 
is our moral person, open to universality and objectivity, and participating in universal 
nature or thought’ (p. 103). I adopt this term to refer to the mental exercises advocated by 
Seneca and his predecessors because they refer to the care of the soul which involves 
understanding and practicing philosophical tenets. 
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critiquing their feasibility and likelihood of success as remedies for passions. 
The chapter concludes that the subjectivity of anger means that there is no 
universal method for curing it, but that, with commitment, it is still possible 
to select appropriate techniques for the circumstances and individual 
character to help overcome passions. These conclusions will be borne in 
mind during the consideration of Medea and Thyestes’ likelihood of 
reformation through philosophy in Chapter Five. 
 
Chapter Four presents the Stoic elements pertinent to passions and those 
which reveal the characters’ attitudes in Seneca’s tragedies Medea and 
Thyestes to establish the extent to which philosophy is present in the plays. 
It explores the anti-Stoic interpretation of Seneca’s plays at the same time 
as considering why philosophy is so prevalent in Seneca’s plays and how 
his dramatic terminology reflects his moral theory. I outline the Stoic attitude 
towards poetry and consider themes such as power in terms of kingship and 
tyranny, exile, death, the role of fate, the old order of the gods and the Stoic 
God in human affairs and the perceived perversion of nature compared with 
a Stoic perspective. By considering philosophical ideas beyond the scope 
of anger, I will be able to examine how the socio-political environment in 
which the protagonists live is shaped by their world-views. The discussion 
about Stoic themes in the tragedies serves to demonstrate how Seneca’s 
attitudes towards passions are communicated through his use of 
established Stoic topics and how the characters’ views of how their world 
works is impacted by their dominance by adfectus.  
 
Chapter Five asks whether Medea and Atreus reflect a Stoic perspective 
and how they would benefit by adopting a philosophical outlook. This 
problem is answered by considering possible audience responses to what 
has been seen or read, considering the importance of playing ‘roles’ for the 
characters, as well as highlighting how their personalities impact on the 
action and contribute to the philosophical themes of the plays to reinforce 
the view that Stoic techniques are beneficial to extirpate anger. I proceed to 
explore the presence of the techniques proposed to cure anger in De Ira 
within the plays and whether the characters do or should take steps to cure 
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their anger. The chapter concludes that any perceived Stoicism in the 
characters is temporary, that philosophical attitudes are adopted for 
personal gain and the constraints of the dramatic genre prevent the tragic 
characters from curing their anger. I recognise that despite the benefits of 
philosophy, the dramas by definition would not allow any improvement in 
the characters’ attitudes and behaviours. However, by interpreting the 
characters as exempla, an audience can learn about the need to address 
their failings to prevent a decline into further vices. 
 
To conclude, I will summarise the findings of my principal research 
questions, establishing Seneca’s place in the Stoic tradition and the extent 
to which anger’s management depends on Stoic theory. When considering 
the role of Stoicism in Seneca’s writing, I will consider how useful the texts 
I have selected are in educating his reader and audience about passions. I 
end with the argument that practising Stoic techniques can help remove the 
negative impact of adfectus, and with the correct application of philosophy, 
men can enjoy tranquillitas. 
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Chapter One 
Seneca and the Stoic psychology of passions 
 
The aim in this chapter is to consider how Seneca’s writing responds to the 
views of his predecessors and for that reason I am considering the 
commonly accepted definition of passions according to many Stoics, the 
conflicting views about the role of judgements, and the views of Posidonius. 
Passions are considered in terms of sicknesses of the mind, whether they 
can be stopped by identifying pre-passions, whether feelings are ever 
acceptable and how they can be replaced with acceptable alternatives. 
Throughout this discussion, I seek to place Seneca’s views of passion in 
relation to those of Stoics within the framework of Early and Middle Stoa 
doctrines and consider his responses to these in order to determine the 
extent to which his thinking is independent from the main Stoic doctrine. 
This is achieved by examining Seneca’s orthodoxy on the relationship 
between passion and reason. The chapter concludes that Seneca adopts a 
largely orthodox view, with modifications and innovations to develop the 
doctrines.  
 
Stoic passions/adfectus 
Traditionally, Stoics considered the mind to be unified (unlike Plato and 
Aristotle’s views of rational and irrational parts). Zeno is reported to differ 
from the ‘ancients’ by dismissing a tripartite soul because he believed that 
mental processes are the result of physical changes within the central 
commanding faculty (hegemonikon/principale animi) and not movements 
within the appetitive or desiderative parts of the soul (Cic. Acad. 1.39).183 
Later, Posidonius reverted to a Platonic style view of the soul divided into 
parts, as will be discussed below when I consider the extent to which 
Posidonius was heterodox.184 According to many Stoics, the soul is 
                                                          
183 Cf. Plut. Mor. 446F-7A. 
184 Galen suggested that in On the Soul/Peri Psuches Chrysippus took a Platonic view but 
later dismissed this thought (Gal. PHP 4.1.5-17). I will accept the view of a unified soul 
which Chrysippus predominately advocated elsewhere, such as in his On Affections/Peri 
Pathon (Gal. PHP 4.1.14).  
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corporeal and is obedient to the laws of physics (Cleanthes apud Nem. De 
Nat. hom. 21).185 It is comprised of the pneuma/anima, a hot, breath-like 
substance (cf. Cic. Tusc. 1.42; Diog. Laert. 7.157), which permeates every 
part of the human body, to the extent that it interacts with the body and 
responds to its suffering (Cleanthes apud Nemesius De Nat. hom. 21.6-
9).186 Chrysippus defined the soul as ‘the pneuma connate with us, 
extending as a continuum through the whole body as long as the free-
flowing breath of life is present in the body’ (Gal. PHP 3.1.10).187 The way 
in which the substance of the soul relates to the ethical strand of Stoicism 
is because how the anima is cared for and the level of awareness of the 
causes of changes affects the extent to which feelings can be controlled and 
mental well-being maintained.  
 
As anima is identical to God, who is omnipresent, man has a part of God 
within him which requires appropriate care and attention or worship, through 
perfecting one’s reason and extirpating passions and other obstacles which 
evoke irrational thinking and behaviours (Diog. Laert. 7.137-8). Anima also 
constitutes an individual’s psychic qualities: he is virtuous when his soul is 
in a certain state of correct tension.188 When healthy, the soul is in this state 
of correct tension, whereas a passion, such as pleasure, is an unreasonable 
‘swelling’ at something that seems to be choice-worthy (Diog. Laert. 7.114). 
By describing passions as ‘movements’ in the soul, a Stoic perspective 
captures the essence of a psychophysical relationship between the physical 
and mental aspects of man, as well as acknowledging the fact that humans 
‘feel’ and are pained by passions indicating that these causes of pain should 
be addressed and removed (cf. 1.1.3-5).  
 
A common Stoic view of passions is presented as follows:  
They [the Stoics] say that passion is impulse which is    
                                                          
185 Cf. Long (1982) and (2005) pp. 560-72. 
186 Cf. SVF 2.444; SVF 2.448; Tert. De anim. 5. 
187 Cf. Cf. Diog. Laert. 7.156; Gould (1970) pp. 126-37. 
188 Cf. Gal. PHP 4.6.1-6. Cf. Diog. Laert. 7.158; Plut. De Stoic. rep. 1034D; Stob. Ecl. 
2.7.5b4; SVF 2.451; SVF 3.473. 
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excessive and disobedient to the dictates of reason or a 
movement of soul which is irrational and contrary to nature;  
and that all passions belong to the soul’s commanding 
faculty. Therefore every fluttering is also a passion, and 
likewise, every passion is a fluttering. Since passion is of 
this kind, one must suppose that some passions are primary 
and dominant, while others have these as their reference. 
The generically primary ones are these four: appetite, fear, 
distress, pleasure. Appetite and fear come first, the former 
in relation to what appears good, and the latter in relation to 
what appears bad. Pleasure and distress result from these: 
pleasure, whenever we get the objects of our appetite or 
avoid the objects of our fear; distress, whenever we fail to 
get the objects of our appetite or experience the objects of 
our fear.189  
                                  (Stob. Ecl. 2.88.8-89.3 (SVF 3.378)). 
The four primary adfectūs are appetite or desire, fear, distress or pain, and 
pleasure or delight. Pleasure and pain are considered to be subordinate 
passions which arise as a result of the (mistaken) seeking or avoidance of 
good and bad as directed by appetite and fear: they are not associated with 
bodily sensations. Passions are further divided into subcategories, 
according to which anger is part of desire because it involves a desire for 
revenge.190 The unpredictable and periodic nature of passions is reflected 
by the common description of them being a ‘fluttering/ptoia’ in which the 
stirring up or ‘ruffling’ of the soul that produces oscillations of the mind which 
are too rapid to notice, is likened to the movement of a bird.191 Flutterings 
are the ‘ease with which the capacity for emotion is activated — To 
eukineton tou pathetikou’ (Stob. Ecl. 2.7.1 (SVF 1.206))192 and Chrysippus 
explained how they move people ‘by chance’ through trivial causes (Gal. 
PHP 4.5.6).  
                                                          
189 Translated by LS (1987) 65A pp. 410-1. Cf. Price (1994) pp. 146-9.  
190 Cf. Cic. Tusc. 3.11; Stob. Ecl. 2.90.19-91.9 (SVF 3.394, part). 
191 Cf. Zeno (SVF 1.206); Chrysippus (Gal. PHP 4.5.6); Stob. Ecl. 2.7.10. 
192 Translated by Graver (2007) p. 118. 
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In Peri Pathon, Chrysippus defined passions in relation to reason, compared 
with Zeno who considered them to be without reason and judgement, which 
he considered to be man’s natural guide (Gal. PHP 4.2.10).193 Passions 
involve reason because they are formed by mental activities which originate 
from the commanding faculty, but they are not rational themselves because 
they conquer reasonable judgements. Chrysippus explained how passions 
are ‘excessive impulses/pleonazousai hormai’ (cf. Diog. Laert. 7.110).194 A 
man can be ‘pushed too much’ in ‘disobedience to reason’ (Chrysippus Peri 
Psuches apud Gal. PHP 4.2.11), where excess relates to ‘having deviated 
too far from the consistency of nature — qui longius discesserit a naturae 
constantia’ i.e. going beyond the limits of reason’s control and thus what is 
natural (Cic. Tusc. 4.11).195 Chrysippus defined irrationality as being 
‘disobedient to reason and rejecting it’ and distinguished it from error, which 
he considered to be a rational ‘misapprehension’ (Gal. PHP 4.2.12).196 
Instead, errors are ‘faulty judgements and reason that has been mistaken 
about the truth and has erred’ (Gal. PHP 4.2.24).197  
 
Assent 
For beliefs to form and actions to be carried out, a sense 
impression/phantasia/species must be presented to the mind in the form of 
a proposition. It must then be acknowledged to be real by evaluating or 
giving assent/sunkatathesis/assensio to the proposition (an internal 
cause).198 Zeno explained passions, and by extension the Stoic theory of 
action, as a combination of four modifications of the governing part of the 
soul: impressions, assent, cognition and knowledge (reported by Cic. Acad. 
1.40-1).199 Seneca explains the process as a temporal sequence of 
becoming stirred by an external impression, followed by an impulse which 
                                                          
193 For Zeno’s view see Gal. PHP 4.2.6, 5.1.4. 
194 Cf. Gould (1970) pp. 181-96. 
195 Cf. Gal. PHP 4.4.32-4, 4.5.13-5. 
196 Cf. Gal. PHP 4.4.16-7, 21-9, 4.5.17-8. 
197 Cf. Gal. PHP 4.2.24-7, 5.4.14; Cic. Off. 1.136; Hankinson (1993) pp. 189, 192ff. 
198 Cf. Arthur (1983) pp. 69-78. 
199 Zeno offers a visual presentation of these mental processes in terms of a closing fist to 
communicate how mental states have corporeal origin (Cic. Acad. 2.145). Cf. Ioppolo 
(1990) pp. 435-6; Gill (2005) p. 453; Long (2005) pp. 572-80. 
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is confirmed by assent and describes this with the example of walking.200 
Types of assent depend on the individual’s moral character and the ‘health’ 
of his soul.201 Only the epitome of moral perfection, the Stoic Sage, knows 
true impressions and, through ‘strong’ assent, converts these into 
‘knowledge’ that cannot be overruled by rational challenges.202 This is 
because his thoughts arise from kataleptic impressions which are infallible 
because they come from what is and they are stamped, sealed and moulded 
like a wax tablet.203 
 
A Sage will delay his response and withhold assent, acting with reservation 
to ensure that the impulses he follows are consistent with correct reason 
and natural/divine law.204 He makes the decision to act ‘fate permitting/deo 
volente’ accepting fate’s powers, avoiding disappointment and remaining 
unperturbed if his success is thwarted by it, which Seneca discusses using 
the example of considering whether to sail or seek political positions (Tranq. 
13.2-3).205 Everyone else is a ‘fool’ and classified as ‘mad’ by Stoics (Ben. 
2.35.2)206 as they do not have true knowledge because they assent to non-
grasping impressions which cause ‘opinions’ (cf. Ep. 71.24).207 This ‘weak’ 
assent involves assent without proper justification and is hasty and 
precipitate (SVF 3.172).208  
 
Causes and impulses 
Once the impression has been approved, the individual is motivated by 
impulse/horme/impetus. This type of impulse is more sophisticated than an 
animalistic instinct because its existence depends on the rational activity of 
                                                          
200 For the possibility of Seneca’s deviation from Chrysippus’ theory of action as a state of 
the hegemonikon, see Rist (1989) pp. 1999-2003. Cf. SVF 3.169. 
201 Cf. Gal. PHP 4.6.5-6; Gell. NA 7.2.6-13 (SVF 2.1000). 
202 Cf. Ep. 71.32; Cic. Acad. 2.57; Diog. Laert. 7.45-6, 7.121; Stob. Ecl. 2.7.5l, 2.73.19-23. 
203 Cf. Cic. Acad. 2.77; Sext. Emp. Math. 7.228-30, 7.373; Annas (1980); Ioppolo (1990) p. 
433; Brennan (2005) pp. 53, 64-79. 
204 Cf. Wildberger (2006) pp. 79-80. The Sage’s qualities are widely discussed in ancient 
literature cf. Cic. Fin. 3.29; Cic. Tusc. 4.37-8; Diog. Laert. 7.117-25; Stob. Ecl. 2.7.11g, 
2.7.11m.  
205 Cf. Stob. Ecl. 2.155.5f. (SVF 3.564). For acting ‘fate permitting’ as a therapy for 
passions, see pp. 143-4. 
206 Cf. Cic. Tusc. 3.10, 4.54. 
207 Cf. Tranq. 12.5; Diog. Laert. 7.124; Sext. Emp. Math. 7.151-2. 
208 Cf. Graver (2007) p. 65.  
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assent (and therefore it is a rational impulse) and because of how it ‘moves’ 
the soul towards elation or contraction, which commands action (Plut. De 
Stoic. rep. 1037F).209 These ‘alterations’ in the governing part of the soul 
are the result of external impressions and how sense-organs interpret and 
respond to them (cf. Stob. Ecl. 2.79 (86W)).210 Chrysippus argued that two 
causes are responsible for action: ‘some causes are perfect and principal, 
others are auxiliary and proximate — aliae sunt perfectae et principales, 
aliae adiuvantes et proximae’ (Cic. Fat. 41).211 The principal cause is the 
individual’s mental character, i.e., his beliefs. From this Cicero concluded 
that Chrysippus too believed that assent occurs only as a result of a 
response to an impression (Cic. Fat. 42).212 Seneca agrees that action can 
only be carried out with an impulse and therefore only living things 
experience this (Ep. 113.2). He follows his predecessor when he declares 
that anger only occurs after the mind approves because it requires the 
impression of injury and the desire to avenge it for it to arise (2.1.4). 
 
Seneca presents the early Stoic views about the problem of propositions 
and how the mind assents to sensations perceived by the body in his 
example of the process involved in identifying a man and horse moving (Ep. 
117.13).213 From this he seeks to demonstrate how assent and the 
movements of the soul occur across two stages, cognitive then linguistic, 
and it is in this way that thoughts and responses to impressions are formed. 
It is the language element of this process which distinguishes these mental 
                                                          
209 Cf. Andron. SVF 3.391; Price (2005) p. 472.  
210 These swellings and contractions have aptly been termed ‘embodiments of intentions’ 
which reinforces the physical impact of human thought (Price (2005) p. 474). 
211 Translated by Rackham (1942) p. 237. The state of affairs was aptly described by 
Chrysippus’ cylinder analogy in which he stated there are two forces at work when the 
cylinder rolls down the hill. Firstly, the external cause, a push (one of the ‘adiuvantes et 
proximae’ causes) sets the cylinder in motion which is followed by the internal cause, the 
property of roundness (one of the ‘perfectae et principales’ causes), which keeps it rolling 
(cf. Gell. NA 7.2.7-11; Plut. De Stoic. rep. 1056b-57c). In man, the decision to act in 
response to an impression is the result of an auxiliary and proximate cause while the 
agent’s psychological character and his soul’s disposition is the perfect and principal cause 
which is where the main responsibility lies (Sedley (1993) pp. 322). Cf. Sedley (1993) pp. 
322-4; Sellars (2003, 2009) p. 83. For Posidonius’ dissatisfaction with other Stoics, in 
particular Chrysippus’ incomplete account of the causes of passions, see Gal. PHP 4.7.19-
23; Strabo 2.3.8; SVF 2.937; Kidd (1971) pp. 204, 206, 210-1. For further details about 
Stoic views of fate, see pp. 178, 197-8. 
212 Cf. Plut. De Stoic. rep. 1057A (SVF 3.177, part). 
213 Cf. Ioppolo (1990) pp. 445-6. 
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processes in humans from animals, and by extension explains why beasts 
do not experience passions. Seneca agrees with Chrysippus that the 
intellectual component of passions exempts animals from having them as 
they are not affected by or feel injustice at slights in the way humans do, nor 
do they have a concept of morality (1.3.4).214 Beasts’ fierce expressions, 
such as wild boars foaming at the mouth, bulls tossing their horns and 
pawing the ground, lions roaring, snakes puffing up their necks and mad 
dogs having a sullen look (1.1.6) are merely impulses sparked by attempts 
at self-preservation rather than the desire for vengeance following injury 
which is indicative of anger (1.3.6). Seneca’s example of a man and horse 
moving also demonstrates how the Stoic theory of action and psychology 
encompasses all three branches of their theory as opposed to being 
focused solely on ethics. The relation between impulses and language 
represents their logic and the movements in the soul their physics 
doctrine.215 To emphasise the distinction between man and beast, Seneca 
frequently compares angry people with animals to show the baseness of the 
passion.216 
 
Pre-passions 
Chrysippus explained that man has an ‘inner awareness of the affections of 
the mind happening to them’ through a feeling in the heart (Gal. PHP 3.1.25. 
Cf. Gal. PHP 2.2.7-9). He believed that distress is accompanied by pain felt 
in the heart and fear with palpitations, neither of which are affections in 
themselves (Gal. PHP 2.8.4, 18, 3.5.37-41).217 Cicero adopted these terms 
when he describes the effect of distress as ‘a kind of biting pain/quasi 
morsum’ (Cic. Tusc. 4.15). He referred to how ‘poverty bites/paupertas 
momordit’ and ‘disgrace stings/ignominia pupugit’ (Cic. Tusc. 3.82) and how 
even for the Sage, in whom passions do not arise, he will still feel a 
‘bite/morsus’ and a ‘slight contraction/contractiuncula’ in the mind both of 
which are natural experiences (Cic. Tusc. 3.83). Posidonius offered a 
                                                          
214 Cf. 1.3.7-8; 3.27.2; Ep. 124; Marc. 5.1; Cic. Tusc. 4.31; Gal. PHP 4.5.4, 5.1.10, 5.6.37. 
215 Cf. Gill (2005) pp. 444-55. For the interconnectedness of the branches of Stoic 
philosophy, see pp. 16-7.  
216 For discussions about the bestiality of anger, see pp. 92, 108-9, 127, 207. 
217 Cf. Price (2005) p. 475.  
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variant account of these sensations.218 His understanding of ‘bitings’ was to 
be ‘physical with mental effects’ (Plut. De lib. et aegr. 4-6 (fr. 154 EK).219 
They are distinguished from mental events, i.e., judgments and passion, 
and from physical manifestations of passions, such as trembling and the 
like. He called these affective movements of excitement or feelings before 
an impulse ‘emotive tugs/pathētikai holkai’ which are involuntary, do not 
necessarily progress into passions and are controllable by preventing them 
from arising (through diet and music) and by recognising them so that 
reason is allowed to prevail.220  
 
The terms biting and pangs found in Chrysippus and the idea that passions 
can be stopped from arising by appropriately responding to sensations, 
were developed by Seneca into the concept of ‘pre-passions’ or ‘first 
movements’ (propatheiai/principia proludentia adfectibus), which are the 
prompting of the mind to respond.221 They are immediate physical 
responses which happen before judgements are formed about the 
impression and are uncontrollable and unavoidable. To Seneca, these are 
‘blows’ or ‘initial mental jolts/primus ille ictus animi’ (2.2.2) of which he gives 
a series of examples including shivering, hair standing on end, blushing and 
dizziness from heights (2.2.1. Cf. 2.3.1-3).222 Seneca refers to ‘inevitable 
pangs/necessarius morsus’ of grief (Marc. 7.1. Cf. Ep. 63.1), saying that this 
is a ‘mere sting/morsus’ which only becomes pain when it is thought to be 
                                                          
218 Cf. Sorabji (2007a) pp. 167ff. 
219 Translated by Kidd (1999) p. 207.  
220 Cf. Gal. PHP 4.7.7, 28, 5.1.5, 5.21, 26, 29-35, 6.19-20; Cooper (1998) pp. 87-90; Gill 
(1998) pp. 125-9; Armstrong (2008) pp. 83, 88-9, 102. 
221 Holler (1934) observes how, because propatheiai is not found in Galen it may not have 
been in Posidonius at all or not in his On the Passions. The other possible explanations for 
this include Posidonius’ occasional use of the term in a comparison of the ‘emotive tug’ 
with illness but not yet as an independent psychological term or that it was used in a 
psychological sense but not yet as a definite term or that it was already used by Posidonius 
in the same way as in the Church Fathers. Holler is correct in excluding the first and last 
possibilities and alerting attention to the fact that propatheia is not used by the medical 
writers. He identifies that the oldest instances of the term are psychological, and Stoic, 
found in Philo, frag. Gen. IV.26 and the use of the related verb propaschein in Cleanthes 
frag. 36. His conclusion that it was the followers of Sextius who developed propatheia into 
a technical term supports my view that Seneca was the first to fully develop the idea of the 
concept in relation to the formation of passions (pp. 68-70). Cf. Cooper (1998) pp. 85-6; 
Sorabji (1998) pp. 149-50 and (2000) esp. pp. 66-75; Veyne (2003) pp. 102-6; Sorabji 
(2007a) pp. 167-70; Wilson (2014) p. 95. 
222 Cf. Ep. 11; 57.3-6; 71.29; 99.15ff. 
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so (Ep. 99.13) and that life without a ‘mental pang/morsus animi’ is 
ignorance of half of nature (Prov. 4.1), all demonstrating how these are 
involuntary and natural.223  
 
Seneca agrees that pre-passions cannot be stopped by reason from arising 
(2.2.1) and as a consequence they have no moral culpability. He introduces 
the idea that they are submissive to reason once in existence (cf. 2.4.2). 
This means that there is the opportunity to avoid the disastrous 
consequences of succumbing to a passion (2.3.4). In the case of anger, the 
primary disturbance of the mind is excited by the impression of injury and 
the impression of injury itself is not anger (2.3.1. Cf. 2.1.4). By choosing to 
assent to it, the individual becomes overwhelmed by ira, feels the 
physiological disturbance it causes his body (1.1.3-5) and loses rational 
control over thoughts and actions, like a man thrown from the rocks who 
has no control over his limbs or the speed at which he falls (1.7.4). This is 
why Seneca encourages stopping pre-passions such as the ‘initial prickings 
of anger/primum inritamentum irae’ and ‘fight it at its first sparks/ipsisque 
repugnare seminibus’ when they are first experienced and not succumbing 
to assent (1.8.1).  
 
Beliefs 
Beliefs are thoughts in the immediate present and are events, which, 
depending on the authenticity of the impression, are true or false. The old 
Stoics define the passions relating to the present in terms of ‘fresh 
opinion/prosphatos doxa/recens opinio’ because it relates to the judgement 
which is perceived to be correct about the circumstances, i.e., that they are 
good or bad (cf. Gal. PHP 4.2.1-2; Cic. Tusc. 4.14). Freshness of a belief 
forms a significant part of Zeno’s understanding of passions, not only 
referring to a recent occurrence but for as long as it impacts upon the 
individual (Cic. Tusc. 3.75). Arius Didymus explained ‘fresh’ in physical 
terms, relating it to the effect of passions on the body when he claimed that 
                                                          
223 Seneca also notes Stoics and Epicureans differ over their view of ‘bites’ – for the 
Epicureans they are genuine passions; for Stoics, they are preliminary feelings to passions, 
an ‘initial mental shock/ictus animi’ (2.2.2). Cf. Tsouna (2007a) pp. 44-51 and (2011) pp. 
199-200.  
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it is ‘the stimulus of an irrational contraction or expansion’ (Stob. Ecl. 
2.88.22-89.3 (SVF 3.378)).224  
 
For many Stoics, passions involve two distinct value judgements. The first 
is based on whether something is thought to be good/beneficial or 
bad/harmful in terms of an individual’s flourishing/eudaimonia/summum 
bonum (cf. Ep. 31.8; Sext. Emp. Math. 11.30).225 This is genuine happiness, 
a stable, enduring contentment, not fleeting happiness at temporary positive 
experience, according to what appears to be good or bad in the present and 
future (cf. Ep. 113.18).226 In the case of ira, it would be the judgement that 
someone has done something harmful or caused injury. The second 
judgement concerns whether it is ‘appropriate for me/kathēkei 
moi/oportere/rectum est/ad officium pertinet’ to act in such a way according 
to individual evaluations.227 The nature of anger is such that this second 
judgement involves the belief that it is not only appropriate to respond but 
necessary to do so. Adfectus are personal because they involve the 
attachment of subjective value to an item or person and are flawed 
evaluations which lead man to pursue vices, not genuine ‘goods’, which are 
synonymous with virtue and are necessary for a good life. Anger is 
counterproductive: it disturbs reason to such an extent that it produces 
irrational behaviour, preventing the angry person from functioning 
constructively (even when he may wrongly believe that his responses are 
necessary). 
 
Assent has ethical significance because it is the acceptance of propositions 
as being true that causes action and this is determined by the individual’s 
moral character, existing beliefs and values, his upbringing, life experience 
and schooling (cf. Cic. Fat. 39-43). Assent is voluntary and that which is ‘up 
to us’ or ‘within our power/eph’ hêmin’, which Cicero translated as ‘in nostra 
                                                          
224 Translated by LS (1987) 65C p. 411. Cf. Graver (2002) pp. 117-9. By contrast, 
Posidonius refuted Chrysippus’ references to temporal beliefs and believed ‘fresh opinion’ 
should be removed from the definition, proposing instead that distress is an opinion of the 
presence of great, intolerable and unbearable evil (Gal. PHP 4.7.1-5). 
225 Cf. Gass (2000). 
226 Cf. Cic. Tusc. 3.24-5, 4.16-22; Diog. Laert. 7.110; Stob. Ecl. 2.7.10b. 
227 Cf. Cic. Tusc. 3.61, 3.74, 3.76, 3.79; Stob. Ecl. 2.7.9; Kidd (1978) pp. 247-50. Sorabji 
(2000) p. 30.  
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potestate’ (Cic. Tusc. 4.4) and Seneca conveys through ‘voluntate et iudicio’ 
(2.3.5).228 Humans only have control over their mental activities (their 
judgements, perceptions, memory, imagination, attitudes, beliefs, thoughts, 
knowledge, desires, choices and value system, words and tone of voice and 
intentions such as desires and aversions) and their actions. Everything else 
(such as body, material possessions, reputation and status, the past and 
the future) is ‘indifferent’ in that it is beyond man’s control and it does not 
impact on either well-being or the pursuit of virtue (cf. Epict. Ench. 1.1). This 
explains why, from a Stoic perspective, externals have no value to human 
well-being, particularly because they can be affected by events outside of 
man’s control. It is for this reason that emphasis is placed on ensuring that 
assent is appropriate and reason is followed, not passions, when 
considering what is choice-worthy, so that the correct selection/deselection 
of ‘things’ are made (cf. Stob. Ecl. 2.76.9-15). 
 
Consequently, it is in assent that moral responsibility (and accountability) 
lie.229 An impression can be responded to in one of three ways; it can be 
rejected, or be indifferent to, or accepted and assented to.230 Assent is the 
basis of human autonomy which distinguishes a virtuous and an unvirtuous 
man (cf. Stob. Ecl. 2.7.11g, k, 2.9f.). Cleanthes described the nature of the 
good as being ‘Well-ordered, just, holy, pious, self-controlled, useful, 
honourable, due, austere, candid, always useful, fearless, undistressed, 
profitable, unpained, beneficial, contented, secure, friendly, precious… 
consistent, fair-famed, unpretentious, caring, gentle, keen, faultless, 
permanent’ (Clem. Al. Protr. 1.54.18-55.4 (SVF 1.557)).231 A virtuous man 
is conscientious in his pursuit of reason and perseveres even in challenging 
situations. He enjoys a detached appreciation of the moment and remains 
calm under pressure. He does not become angry or succumb to other 
passions because he is governed by reason. He overcomes basic instincts 
                                                          
228 Cf. Strange (2004, 2010). Man’s relationship with fate and his degree of control is aptly 
captured in the observation made by Inwood (1985) that: ‘Man is a rational animal, by fate. 
Thus, fate acts in man through his reason. The way reason controls or causes action is 
through assent’ (p. 67). 
229 Cf. Graver (2002) for the argument that assent is the ‘locus of responsibility’ (p. 86).  
230 Cf. Nussbaum (1987) pp. 146-8. 
231 Translated by LS (1987) 60Q p. 373. 
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and desires, so that he consistently performs actions correctly, does what 
is necessary regardless of popularity or ease and thus he flourishes in all 
projects. Being consistent is a part of being focused and not being distracted 
by passions or making ill-informed decisions or following poor advice.232 His 
wisdom and self-sufficiency secure him against adversity. He lives in 
harmony with himself, society and the universe so that he promotes the well-
being of other people and contributes to society despite enduring any 
hardship or persecution.  
 
In contrast, the negative characteristics of man largely focus on poor 
interpersonal skills with the promotion of self-interest. Such lack of virtue 
prevents appropriate social participation and produces an inability to fulfil 
one’s role in society. An unvirtuous man is dishonest, selfish, self-obsessed, 
lacks compassion and is invariably envious and greedy, with a cruel temper 
combined with arrogance, prejudice and spitefulness (cf. Stob. Ecl. 
2.7.11g). This is because he is driven by passions as opposed to reason 
and lacks the rationality which is being able to correct mistaken beliefs. 
Whether the Stoic definition of virtue is accepted or not, the intrinsic qualities 
from which they believe virtue to be composed are admirable. Most people 
would agree that being angry and being in the presence of angry people is 
unpleasant and should be avoided (cf. 3.9.3, 3.37.1).233 Just, wise, brave 
and calm people are not only preferable company but the type of person 
that should be preferred to be. 
 
There are three ways in which passions are mistakes: (i) they are errors in 
reasoning, (ii) errors in the incorrect ascription of value and (iii) can spark 
further passions with their specific dangers.234 The presence of passions 
prevents correctly responding to impressions and following right reason, 
which, according to Chrysippus, among others, is identical to divine reason 
(Diog. Laert. 7.88). It is this that humans have been designed by nature to 
follow and obey and in doing so, become the ideal person (Diog. Laert. 7.88-
                                                          
232 For the importance of consistency in character, see pp. 33, 224ff. 
233 Cf. Ep. 5.2-3; 7; 25.7; 123.6-9. 
234 As defined by Sellars (2006) p. 118.  
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9).235 Putting aside the issue of a divided soul, which will be discussed 
below, when Posidonius defined passions in terms of the relation to 
following right (or divine) reason, rejecting inconsistent opinions and being 
guided by the inner daimon, his views reflected those of early Stoics who 
believed that problems are encountered when god’s wishes and divine 
law/reason are not adhered to. Posidonius explained how with passions, 
man is ‘sometimes turning aside with the worst and beastlike [parts of 
themselves] and being swept along.’ Those who experience passions fail to 
recognise the importance of ‘consistency’ and that ‘the primary thing is to 
be led in no respect by what is both irrational and unhappy and godless in 
the soul’ (Gal. PHP 5.6.4-5).236 
 
Judgements in passions  
As I have demonstrated, the orthodox ‘cognitive’ Stoic view condemned 
adfectus as irrational, harmful disturbances of the soul, motions of the 
reasoning, governing part of the mind that are based on false judgment 
(Diog. Laert. 110ff.). However, even among the early Stoics, there was 
debate about the relationship between passions and judgement.237 Zeno 
believed passions to be: ‘A movement of the mind contrary to nature and 
turned away from right reason — aversa a recta ratione contra naturam 
animi commotio’ (Cic. Tusc. 4.11).238 They are ‘disobedient/apeithes/non 
obtemperans’ to one’s own right reason.239 Zeno considered passions to be 
voluntary (with consequent moral responsibility) and people consciously 
and deliberately reject reason because passions are: ‘experienced owing to 
a judgement of opinion – opinionis iudicio suscipi’ (Cic. Acad. 1.39).240 
Adfectus are the product of judgements in that they ‘supervene 
                                                          
235 Cf. Beat. 15.4-5; Ep. 66.39; 71.16; 76.23; 96.2; QNat. 1 pr.6-17; Inwood (1985) pp. 139, 
156-65. 
236 Cf. Kidd (1971). 
237 Cf. Cic. Acad. 1.39; Diog. Laert. 7.111; Gal. PHP 5.1.4; Sorabji (1998); Price (2005); 
Sellars (2003, 2009) p. 157 n. 51; Tieleman (2003). 
238 Cf. Cic. Tusc. 4.47; Diog. Laert. 7.110; Stob. Ecl. 2.7.10. 
239 Cf. Cic. Off. 1.136; Stob. Ecl. 2.88.8. 
240 Translated by Rackham (1933, 1956) p. 447. Cf. 1.8, 2.2.2; Cic. Tusc. 3.64, 3.83, 4.65, 
4.76, 4.82, 4.83. 
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on/epigignesthai’ judgements.241 Cleanthes generally adhered to the 
founder’s tenets (Diog. Laert. 7.168, 170).242  
 
In comparison, Chrysippus saw passions as judgements themselves i.e. 
assent to impressions in which ‘mistaken’ judgements are made about an 
indifferent’s value and in having these an individual is simultaneously 
‘turning away’ from reason (Diog. Laert. 7.111).243 He used the analogy of 
a man running and another walking down a hill to illustrate the impact of 
passions. The walker can stop immediately, whereas the runner, like the 
man in the throes of passion who is being ‘carried away’ and therefore 
unable to stop what he is feeling and experiencing, cannot halt.244 Zeno and 
Chrysippus agreed with the key principles in Stoic psychology that passions 
are a form of impulse, that they are irrational, that they involve evaluations 
and accompanying feelings from the unnatural psychophysical movements 
of the unified soul and are not experienced by the wise man.245 
 
The alternative Stoic understanding of passions is ‘non-cognitive’ and held 
by Diogenes of Babylon and Posidonius. According to Galen, Posidonius 
rejected the idea that the passions supervene on judgements or that they 
are judgements themselves (Gal. PHP 4.3.3, 5.1.5).246 He believed 
                                                          
241 Cf. Diog. Laert. 7.111; Gal. PHP 4.1.17, 4.3.2, 5.1.4, 5.6.42. 
242 While they agreed that a presentation of proof was ‘an impression on the regent part’, 
Cleanthes and Chrysippus held different views about what constitutes an impression: the 
former believed them to be involving ‘depression and eminence’ and the latter thought them 
to be a ‘synonym for alteration’ (Sext. Emp. Math. 8. 400-2). Translated by Bury (1989) p. 
449.  
243 Cf. Gal. PHP 4.2.9-12; 4.3.1-2, 24-6, 5.1.4. 
244 Cited in Gal. PHP 4.2.8; 4.4.14-18, 4.2.28, 43-44, 4.4.24-25, 4.4.30-32; 4.5.13-17, 
4.6.354. Cf. 1.7.4, 2.35.2; Ep. 40.7. 
245 Cf. Zeno in Stob. Ecl. 2.7.2 p. 44, 4 (SVF 1.205); Chrysippus in Gal. PHP 4.2.8, 5.2.1; 
Plut. Mor. 441C. For differences between Zeno and Chrysippus, cf. Gal. PHP 4.2.5-6, 5.1.4; 
Sorabji (2000) pp. 34-6, 55-61. For there being little difference between the philosophers, 
cf. Inwood (1985) pp. 130-1; Inwood and Donini (1999) p. 699. It is worth noting that Galen 
complains that ‘the most celebrated of the Stoics today’ offer different and changing 
opinions about the cause of passions: ‘sometimes they say that mistaken reasoning and 
false opinion cause the motions attendant on the affections, but at another time… they 
retreat from this position and posit certain uncaused motions… After making reason and 
opinion the cause of the affections, they change to the position that when the soul moves 
in a certain way without a cause it falls into the affection; and again from this random and 
uncaused motion they return to the view that the movements of the affections are rational’ 
(Gal. PHP 4.5.1). 
246 Cf. Sorabji (2000) pp. 104-5 and (2007a) pp. 163-4.  
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passions to be movements of spatially separate irrational faculties or 
capacities of the soul, those of spirited and desiderative powers. For 
Posidonius, passion is a conviction developed wrongly. In summary, he 
argued that the first responsibility is to the logistikon – if it is strong enough 
there is no passion; if it is not strong enough pathetikon wins. In this respect, 
the origin of perversion is due to irrational impulses, when reason is disabled 
and incapable of imposing itself.247 These powers cannot be modified by 
revising judgements because man’s capacity to think is separate from that 
of desire (Gal. PHP 5.7.3).248 Instead, the non-rational requires balancing 
and harmonising so that there is an understanding of the workings of the 
faculties through comprehending the soul’s powers, habituation of good 
practices to improve character.249 These problems can be resolved through 
education which relies on logistikon winning against pathetikon: difficulties 
in applying such knowledge depend on the strength of the forces within an 
individual. 
 
Posidonius cited Cleanthes’ dialogue between anger and reason as 
evidence that the soul is divided (Gal. PHP 5.6.34-7) but in doing so, he 
overlooked the use of poetry as a rhetorical technique not necessarily to be 
taken literally. Described as a man reared in geometry (Gal. PHP 4.4.38) 
and the most scientific Stoic in terms of his knowledge of the natural physical 
workings of the world (Gal. PHP 8.1.14), Posidonius was particularly 
interested in demonstrative proofs (Gal. PHP 4.4.38) and causes (Gal. PHP 
5.6.23).250 He argued that passions are caused by two forms of mistakes: 
the theoretical, born of ignorance, and the practical, as a result of mistaken 
assumptions or ‘emotive tugs/pathētikai holkai’ which cause assent (cf. Gal. 
PHP 5.6.16-8). He also believed that imagination played a role in causing 
passions. For example, in the case of fear, one needs a visualisation 
                                                          
247 I agree with Fillion-Lahille’s (1984) interpretation of Posidonius’ view of passions to be 
that outlined above (p. 157). 
248 Cf. Gal. PHP 5.4.3, 6.10. I concur that it is correct to believe that Posidonius did not 
consider the irrational part of the soul to be inherently ‘bad’, more that man has a ‘less 
noble part’ and one that is shared with animals (Fillion-Lahille (1984) p. 155).  
249 Cf. Gal. PHP 4.7.24, 41, 5.1.5-6, 4.3, 29, 35. For Posidonius’ proposed cures for 
passions, see pp. 12 n. 11, 136-7, 152-4, 170-1; Veyne (2003) pp. 63-4. 
250 Cf. Tieleman (2003) p. 207. 
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‘phantasia, anazographesis’ of the evil, rather than to be persuaded by 
reason to evoke the passion (Gal. PHP 5.6.23-6). Posidonius rejected the 
notion that passions involve judgement because this does not explain 
arousals by wordless music which themselves are not rational, and 
therefore people must be aroused by the irrational, emotional element of the 
soul (Gal. PHP 5.6.21-2).251  
 
More significantly, Posidonius rejected the role of judgements in passions 
because this does not account for their abatement, where judgements can 
still be present.252 As a result, he queried Chrysippus’ runner analogy 
because he believed it cannot explain the cause of the excessive conation 
(Gal. PHP 4.3.4-5) in the same way that Galen challenged its plausibility by 
suggesting that ‘there is a power other than reason, irrational by nature’ 
(Gal. PHP 4.2.32) which is responsible for passions in the same way as 
weight impacts on a runner’s motion. He proposed that if passions are 
caused by reason they can be stopped by will or when the passion ceases 
but not if they are caused by an irrational power and reason (Gal. PHP 
4.2.30-8. Cf. Gal. PHP 4.5.12).253 He explained the abatement in terms of a 
horse analogy in which the running animal is sated by satisfaction from 
achieving its goal or by exhaustion in the same way that the soul has fulfilled 
its appetite or has been exhausted by prolonged movements at which point 
the rider and reason are able to regain control.254 Posidonius could not 
accept the orthodox view that a Sage was unmoved by that which he holds 
to be true good i.e. honourable things, particularly when it is these things he 
seeks, because other men believe it proper and appropriate to be moved 
affectively by apparent good/evil which they seek/avoid when they are 
present or approaching them (Gal. PHP 4.5.26-7).  
 
                                                          
251 Cf. Sorabji (2007a) pp. 165-6. 
252 Cf. Gal. PHP 4.7.7-11, 25, 28, 32-4; Sorabji (2007a) pp. 164-5. 
253 For further instances where Posidonius challenged Chrysippus, see Diog. Laert. 7.102; 
Gal. PHP 4.5.26-44; Sorabji (2000) pp. 58-9, 107. 
254 Cf. Gal. PHP 3.2.4-6, 3.15, 4.7.41, 5.6.31-3; Pl. Phdr. 246a-57b; Sorabji (2000) pp. 112-
3.  
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Whichever view that is taken about their formation, passions are 
indisputably problematic and should be avoided. Seneca declares that 
nature demands the extirpation of passions as humans are born pure 
without them (2.10.3).255 Such views are prevalent in Stoicism and are 
regularly communicated through ‘seed’ or ‘spark/igniculus’ metaphors (cf. 
Aët. Plac. 1.7.33 (SVF 2.1027); Cic. Fin. 5.18, 5.43). Cleanthes believed 
that ‘all men have natural tendencies to virtue’ (Stob. Ecl. 2.65.8 (SVF 1.566 
part))256 and Cicero explained how humans are born with seeds of virtue, 
which, on maturity, would naturally result in perfect happiness (Cic. Tusc. 
3.2. Cf. Cic. Nat. D. 2.39). Individuals become corrupted by the intrusion of 
false beliefs from the influence of those around them, social corruption in 
the form of seeking glory through popular acclaim as well as the immaturity 
of reason when people are unable to distinguish impressions correctly and 
are swayed by the persuasiveness of externals.257 The obsession with 
externals rather than appreciating ‘god’s universal law’ is human 
‘witlessness’ and is not inherent evil, just longing for what appears to be 
good (cf. Cleanthes Hymn to Zeus 23-9 (SVF 1.537)). In this respect, a Stoic 
believes that man is not inherently evil but that moral error stems from poor 
guidance and from unperfected wisdom. 
 
Is Posidonius heterodox? 
The extent to which Posidonius can be accused of taking a heterodox 
position is a complex and substantial debate. My research focuses on the 
impact of Posidonius’ views on Seneca and his advancement of Stoic 
theory. The issue is complicated by the fact that the primary source for 
Posidonius’ work is provided by Galen who is biased towards Posidonius in 
his emphasis on the philosopher’s objections to Chrysippus and by 
extension the orthodox Stoic views.258 It is possible to argue that one reason 
                                                          
255 Cf. Ep. 22.15; 94.55-6; Cic. Nat. D. 2.34; Diog. Laert. 7.89; Stob. Ecl. 2.7.5b3. 
256 Translated by LS (1987) 61L p. 381. Cf. Stob. Ecl. 2.7.5b8. 
257 Cf. Ep. 81.29; 94.54-5; 115.11-2; Cic. Tusc. 3.2-3; Diog. Laert. 7.89; Gal. PHP 5.5.14; 
Veyne (2003) pp. 60-2. 
258 There are scholars who believe that Posidonius differed less from the orthodox theory 
than usually assumed. Fillion-Lahille (1984) proposes that Posidonius’ views are 
compatible with Chrysippus because both locate the soul/irrational part in the chest, rather 
than the lower body as Plato does (pp. 160f.). However, Inwood correctly notes that she 
overlooks the issue that it is not in location rather whether parts exist (Inwood (2005, 2008) 
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for Posidonius’ views is that his ideas developed because Chrysippus 
struggled to comprehensively explain the lessening of passions, in terms of 
how they come and go, particularly the instance of crying.259 Posidonius 
sought to resolve this by proposing that the affective movements are of such 
great force that they are not sustainable and the cessation of passions 
happens over time when the irrational power becomes sated of the things it 
previously desired (cf. Gal. PHP 4.7.37, 41, 5.6.31).260  
 
The implication from Galen’s report is that the failings Posidonius saw in 
Chrysippus’ arguments prompted his progression of the School’s 
psychological theories to better explain the causes of human action 
(including passions).261 Posidonius is reported to have aligned himself and 
Zeno with Platonists and accused other Stoics who follow Chrysippus of 
consenting to errors not truths because of the faults in his predecessor’s 
arguments (Gal. PHP 4.4.38). Galen thought it was ‘reasonable’ for 
Posidonius to ‘censure and refute’ Chrysippus for not stating the origin of 
vice or discovering why children err (Gal. PHP 5.4.9). He supported 
Posidonius’ efforts to ‘correct’ Chrysippus and believed it was appropriate 
to address the latter’s errors and contradictions and ‘change to the better 
view, as Posidonius did; he was “ashamed” to defend the doctrine, 
obviously false, of the other Stoics’ (Gal. PHP 5.1.10).  
 
In his On Affections, Posidonius asked Chrysippus what the cause of 
excessive conation was, because reason cannot by definition exceed its 
own acts and measures, therefore, some other irrational power must exist 
to cause conation to exceed the measures established by reason (Gal. PHP 
                                                          
p. 30 n. 11). For further discussion about Fillion-Lahille’s views, see Inwood (2005, 2008) 
pp. 28-30. 
259 Cf. Gill (1998) pp. 121-5. 
260 Seneca acknowledges crying to be a natural and uncontrollable response which he 
permits in grief, arguing that the physical release of feelings is in fact soothing to the soul, 
so their tears should be allowed to fall without commanding them to do so and even the 
wise man would cry at a funeral (Ep. 99.15-8). Indeed, showing no reaction to the loss of a 
loved one would be inhumane cf. Marc. 4.1; Poly. 18.5; Reydams-Schils (2005) p. 140; 
Gloyn (2017) p. 59-60. 
261 Cf. Cooper (1998) p. 82.  
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4.3.4-5).262 I agree with the view that Posidonius incorporated the idea of 
the division of the soul into three faculties to fill a gap in the teaching of 
orthodox Stoicism and to explain the profound root of the passion 
phenomenon.263 This interpretation would suggest that Posidonius’ 
contribution to Stoic theory is supplementary and supportive theorising 
rather than critique or disagreement. I do not accept that this was an 
essential step, because the orthodox view towards the role of judgements 
in the creation of passions is reasonable.  
 
Seeming to agree with Plato and Aristotle, Posidonius appears to consider 
a clear overlap of the notions of anger and desire which thus are not two 
distinct categories of passion. Each faculty has its own association – the 
rational faculty is associated with virtue; the desirous faculty is associated 
with pleasure and the angry (irascible) faculty is associated with the 
aspiration of victory and power. Posidonius has been interpreted to have 
claimed that anger is both a manifestation of the angry (irascible) faculty 
and at the same time a form of desire thus deviating from the previous view 
because of his division of the soul.264 The perceived changes to orthodox 
theory which Posidonius appears to be proposing may also be in response 
to the problems with his predecessors’ views that animals and children 
could not experience passions (cf. Gal. PHP 5.1.10). Although he denied 
them reason, Posidonius granted animals (and children) passions (of a sort) 
because they originate from the spirited powers which both possess and for 
this reason there was a natural element to passions.265  
 
In Posidonius’ defence, his changes to orthodox theory may have been a 
by-product of his era when philosophical commentary on early texts was 
commonplace. This suggestion allows for the possibility that instead of over-
turning orthodox theory, Posidonius was attempting to ‘translate’ and 
integrate Platonic ideas which he critiqued into theories which would be 
                                                          
262 Cf. Kidd (1971) pp. 203-4. 
263 Cf. Fillion-Lahille (1984) p. 175.  
264 Cf. Fillion-Lahille (1984) p.175.  
265 Cf. Gal. PHP 4.7.33-5, 5.1.10-11, 21, 6.38, 6.37-8. For Posidonius’ alternative view of 
virtue, see Gal. PHP 5.7.10-1, 7.1.9; Kidd (1971) p. 208.  
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accepted into Stoicism.266 Posidonius’ success may have been based on 
his safeguarding the originality and strengths of Stoic thought by combining 
it with an acknowledgement of the irrational, low and animal part of man 
which, although he despised it, was one which he identified in humans to 
the extent that it could not be ignored.267 Galen refers to Posidonius’ listing 
of the four fundamental passions, in the manner of previous Stoics, which 
has led to the conclusion that his views about passions are the same as 
Chrysippus’.268 The alternatives which Posidonius posited can be seen as 
less of a ‘rebellion’ when the similarities between the philosophers are 
acknowledged. Even Galen admitted that ‘Posidonius was careful not to be 
caught disagreeing with Chrysippus at every point’ (Gal. PHP 5.3.10).  
 
Furthermore, Seneca often includes Posidonius in a list of Stoics without 
separating him from the School’s founders which may suggest that there 
was sufficient similarity in the respective philosophers’ views for the issue 
of the division of the soul not to have caused too much friction within the 
School and that Seneca valued Posidonius’ views sufficiently for them to 
influence his theories about passions (cf. Ep. 33.4, 108.38).269 Ultimately 
Zeno, Chrysippus and Posidonius ‘All agree’ affections are the result of a 
sickness of soul, but the question of how the soul has moved and what 
motion it causes remains unanswered by orthodox Stoicism (Gal. PHP 
4.5.30). There is consistency in the philosophers’ recognition that there is a 
problem with passions and these need to be overcome in order to restore 
reason as the dominating force of man’s action.  
 
Seneca’s orthodoxy on the relationship between passion and reason 
The Introduction presented how Seneca critiques previous thought and 
contributes his own ideas without attempting to revolutionise or overturn 
fundamental Stoic doctrines.270 He will not oppose but will follow Zeno and 
                                                          
266 Cf. Gill (2005) p. 463 and (2006) p. 214. 
267 Cf. Fillion-Lahille (1984) p.163. 
268 Cf. Fillion-Lahille (1984) p.175.  
269 Cf. Fillion-Lahille (1984) notes that, apart from Galen, other ancient authors writing about 
passions do not suggest that Posidonius abandons the earlier Stoic views (pp. 122-3). Cf. 
Cooper (1998) p. 100 n. 5. 
270 Cf, Vogt (2006) pp. 59-60.  
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Chrysippus’ doctrines because facts ‘permit/patitur’ this (Ot. 3.1) and when 
they do not, he will offer alternatives.271 The degree to which Seneca can 
be considered orthodox or eclectic can be drawn from his divergence from 
early Stoic views and his rigidity in adhering to the School’s doctrines.272 
The impact of this on an understanding of passions and anger is that 
Seneca presents a clearer and more comprehensive description of how 
passions are formed because he has selected the most convincing and 
least contentious arguments from his predecessors which may reflect the 
understanding of the mind for Seneca’s contemporaries. It has been argued 
that Seneca provides innovations to the theory of the formation of passions, 
in particular, the introduction of the role of ‘voluntas’. These additions have 
sparked debates about how his revisions to the conception of the soul 
provide indications of eclecticism, promoting dualism and being influenced 
by Posidonius.273  
 
In De Ira, certain scholars have divided Seneca’s work into where he 
appears to be agreeing with Chrysippus (book one) and where he seems to 
adopt a more Posidonian view (books two and three).274 Having analysed 
Seneca’s use of orthodox material above, I will focus here on some of the 
associations with Posidonius, a subject which will be discussed in greater 
detail in the third chapter which addresses therapies for passions. The 
therapeutic passages are most often cited in arguments to defend 
Posidonius’ influence, suggesting many views of De Ira 2.5 are founded on 
a Posidonian principle of therapy which largely centres on education, 
                                                          
271 For Seneca’s belief about the importance of freedom of thinking, see pp. 26-9. 
272 Cf. Inwood (2005, 2008) p. 26. For Seneca’s eclecticism, see Holler (1934). 
273 Cf. Inwood (2005, 2008) pp. 42-3. 
274 The division of De Ira according to Seneca’s influences is proposed by Fillion-Lahille 
(1984) and the influence of Posidonius on Seneca is argued by Holler (1934) The passages 
which Holler identifies in De Ira and the Epistles as being influenced by Posidonius will be 
discussed in detail below (Holler (1934) p. 73). These authors discuss further debates 
concerning the extent to which, and where, Posidonius influences Seneca. For instance, 
Fillion-Lahille (1984) provides an overview of how Rabbow (1914) thinks the influence is 
clear throughout the second book of Ir. whereas others think his influence is much less. For 
Müller (1912), as for Pohlenz (1898), it did not extend beyond Ir. 2.21; for Reinhardt (1921) 
it was limited to Ir. 2.19-20 (p. 182). Holler (1934) believes that Rabbow was incorrect to 
claim that Seneca rejects Posidonius’ view in Ir 1, thus contradicting himself in the second 
book: he believes that De Ira is unified, drawing on Posidonius throughout (p. 23).  
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supervision and medication.275 For instance, Posidonius argued that 
children can be shaped in the womb through rearing and training so that the 
affective part of the soul is amenable to the rule of the reasoning part when 
it develops (Gal. PHP 5.5.33-4). Seneca develops the idea of good 
behavioural habits in which small children must act against spontaneous 
reflexes of anger to prepare them for adulthood where they should exercise 
reason to prevent the passion (Ir. 2.21).276 Seneca and Posidonius also 
agree about how the elements involved in man’s makeup affect his 
character and tendency towards passions, as does the environment (cf. 
2.15.1-2, 5, 19.1-3; Gal. PHP 5.2.3, 5.23).277  
 
Other similarities can be identified, such as the distinction between anger 
itself and an instinctive movement which leads to the development of 
Seneca’s extended discussion about pre-passions (2.4).278 If Lactantius’ 
evidence for a missing passage of Seneca’s De Ira is accepted, there is 
indisputable evidence of Posidonius’ presence. When refuting the Stoic 
definition of anger, Lactantius refers to Seneca’s quotation of Posidonius: 
‘Anger is the desire to take vengeance for a wrong or, as Posidonius says, 
the desire to punish the person by whom you reckon you were unjustly 
harmed — ‘Ira est, inquit, cupiditas ulciscendae iniuriae aut, ut ait 
Posidonius, cupiditas puniendi eius a quo te inique putes laesum’ (1.2.3 
apud Lanctant. De ira dei 17.13). Even if this is an accurate quotation of 
Seneca’s text, it is reasonable to suggest that, because Seneca draws on 
the definitions of anger offered by a series of different schools, including 
Aristotle, it cannot be reasonably concluded that Posidonius was the sole or 
main influence on De Ira. Rather that he was a source of evidence on the 
subject from which Seneca may have drawn some of his concepts and his 
influence should not be overemphasised.279  
                                                          
275 Cf. Fillion-Lahille (1984) pp. 180-99.  
276 Cf. Fillion-Lahille pp. 182-4.  
277 Cf. Ep. 94.13. For a discussion of these passages, see pp. 105-7. Other philosophers 
identified a similar link to the environmental impact on character, for instance, Chrysippus 
revealing how Seneca’s interest in the subject arose from many sources cf. Cic. Fat. 7; Cic. 
Nat. D. 2.17, 42-3. 
278 Cf. Fillion-Lahille (1984) p. 180.  
279 It is important to draw associations with other authors for their contribution to Seneca’s 
thinking, but erroneous to make certain assumptions that similarities in writings 
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Although Posidonius’ influence has been ascribed to several passages in 
De Ira, even here there can be disagreement over the extent to which 
Seneca is predisposed to a single point of view.280 There is some ‘evidence’ 
of the link between the philosophers which I interpret to have a more 
orthodox flavour, such as where Zenonian and Chrysippean theory appear 
more prevalent (cf. 1.16.7). A case of Seneca’s acceptance of orthodox 
Stoic views can be found in his examples that echo those found in 
Chrysippus who listed examples of enraged people throwing objects, biting 
keys, beating doors and throwing stones while cursing as they are ‘blinded’ 
by anger (Gal. PHP 4.6.44-5). Seneca notes that neither inanimate objects 
nor dumb animals can cause injury because this requires will from which 
they are exempt due to their inability to reason and therefore they should 
not be considered a cause for anger (2.26.4). 
 
There are other passages which refer to controversies across the School, 
such as the issue over whether animals have passions or something similar 
which I do not believe to be particularly Posidonian in origin even though 
these are subjects he tackles.281 When Seneca addresses the question of 
whether anger arises from choice, of its own accord or from impulse and 
whether it arises without knowledge (2.1-4), he associates his views with 
those of orthodox Stoics through his use of ‘nobis/us’. To cite this passage 
as having Posidonian influence ignores some of the disparities in the 
School’s thinking. The phraseology used to describe the makeup of the 
body (2.1.2) may echo Posidonius’ description of Stoicism in terms of bones 
                                                          
automatically mean that Seneca follows Posidonius’ beliefs. Fillion-Lahille (1984) claims 
that because Seneca also quotes the historical example of Marius (about whom Posidonius 
composed a historical work) when explaining the idea that a simple utterance can arouse 
an impulse not to be confused with passion, this is also a Posidonian idea (p. 167). It is 
also extending the association too far to assume that because Posidonius thought so highly 
of Aristotle that he cited an example found in the latter (i.e. Alexander reaching for a sword 
with a maniacal laugh as soon as he hears Xenophante sing), Seneca is indebted to 
Posidonius for his theories (as is inferred by Fillion-Lahille (1984) p. 167). Chapter Three’s 
discussion of ‘cures’ for passions will outline other philosophical influences on Seneca, 
including that of Sotion. 
280 Holler (1934) identifies a series of passages which he cites as evidence of Posidonius’ 
influence on Seneca: Ir. 1.3.7, 1.8, 1.16.7, 2.1-4, 2.30.2, 3.10 (p. 73).  
281 Cf. 1.3.7, 1.8; Gal. PHP 4.5.4, 5.1.10-11, 21, 6.37-8. These could be used instead to 
illustrate how Seneca allies with orthodox Stoics, such as the agreement that man is 
distinguished from animals by his capacity for reason (cf. Gal. PHP 5.6.38). 
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and sinews (logic), flesh (ethics) and the soul (physics) (frs. 87, 88). 
However, the rest of the section has philosophical undertones which are not 
confined to one philosopher.282 
 
In general, as I will demonstrate when definitions of anger are discussed in 
detail in Chapter Two, philosophers from Stoic, Peripatetic and Epicurean 
schools recognise a connection between anger and injury (Ir. 2.1.3) and the 
orthodox Stoic view of anger’s origin is relayed in terms of assent and 
ensuing thought processes (2.1.3-5, 3.1, 3.4-5). The physiological 
sensations associated with the stirring of feelings can be traced back to 
Chrysippus (Gal. PHP 2.2.7-9, 8.4, 18, 3.1.25, 5.37-41), a variation of which 
is found in Posidonius (Plut. De lib. et aegr. 4-6 (fr. 154 EK)) and is 
developed more precisely by Seneca (cf. 2.2, 2.3.2-3). Seneca explains the 
stages of passions in a clearer way than his predecessors, having 
assimilated various schools’ views, and presents the process in his own 
form (cf. 2.4). This confirms that while he is aware of other thinkers’ points 
of view, he is equally capable of formulating his own ideas and presenting 
them in a new way.283 Alongside advising men not to become angry with 
beasts, objects or God, Seneca issues the reminder that the wrongdoer is 
self-punished (2.30.2) conveying the Platonic idea that it is worse to do 
wrong than to suffer it which infiltrates Stoicism generally rather than being 
a new idea introduced by Posidonius, even though he may share it.284 The 
use of a medical analogy to explain the ‘sickness’ of passions is 
commonplace among Stoics and is certainly not restricted to this School: to 
ascribe Posidonian thought to De Ira 3.10 would be to overlook many other 
elements which make up the analogy as is detailed below.285 
 
                                                          
282 In the Epistles, Seneca explicitly references Posidonius to reinforce his arguments about 
the nature of man whose ‘primary art is virtue itself — prima ars… ipsa virtus’ is joined to 
‘useless and fleeting flesh — inutilis caro et fluida’ which is only suited to receiving food ‘as 
Posidonius remarks — ut ait Posidonius’ (Ep. 92.10. Cf. Ep. 102.25) cf. Fillion-Lahille 
(1984) p. 164. Holler (1934) draws attention to the following letters which he claims have 
Posidonian traits: Ep. 11; 71.27; 74.31; 90.44ff.; 99.18; 113.18; 116; 121.12 (p. 73). 
283 Cf. Inwood (2005, 2008) pp. 11ff. 
284 Cf. Pl. Grg. 473a and Resp. 2.358e-359a. 
285 Cf. Holler (1934) p. 73. 
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It has been argued that Seneca shows slight uncertainty over the 
relationship between passion and reason and that he considers the division 
of the mind where he mentions ‘subservient parts/partes ministras’ (Ep. 
92.1. Cf. Ep. 92.8).286 I agree that these comments can be interpreted as a 
dialectical move to open up the subject of dualism in conversation, without 
committing him to taking this stance and that he is merely presenting 
Platonic ideas to show his awareness of them and their relevance in his 
philosophical environment.287 This interpretation would reconcile the fact 
that elsewhere in his works, he follows the orthodox Stoic theory about the 
unity of the soul in which he argues that reason and passion relate to the 
mind’s transformation for better or worse (1.8.3).288 He is clear that ‘the mind 
itself turns into the passion — in adfectum ipse mutatur’ (1.8.2) which 
echoes Plutarch’s report of the views of ‘Zeno, Chrysippus and the other 
Stoics’ (Plut. Mor. 441C-D).289 Seneca’s use of figures of speech has also 
raised the issue of whether he takes a dualistic view of the soul, particularly 
when the personification of passions suggests an independent life and force 
against reason, for example in Epistles 34.290 I would argue that Seneca 
retains a monistic view of the soul and uses imagery for different purposes. 
For instance, images are the natural consequence of his rhetorical 
education, and imagery is used to illustrate his arguments in order to make 
the subject easier to relate to and assimilate, a justification found in his letter 
to Lucilius (Ep. 59.6). Seneca’s sparse allusions to dualism demonstrate an 
awareness of the developments within Stoicism but these references are 
insufficient to conclude that he held the beliefs himself. I will accept that he 
took a monist view because there is greater evidence for this in his work. 
 
In De Ira, Seneca addresses the issue of passions from a standpoint 
primarily concerned with anger. He outlines the stages of anger and its 
causes because he is particularly concerned with whether it arises from 
choice, of its own accord, from impulse or whether it arises without 
                                                          
286 Cf. Inwood (2005, 2008) pp. 38-41; Gill (2006) p. 215.  
287 As is appropriately argued by Inwood (2005, 2008) pp. 38-40.  
288 Cf. Asmis (2015) pp. 228-30.  
289 Cf. Graver (2014) p. 269.  
290 Cf. Ep. 34.4-5, 8; 37.4-5; Inwood (2005, 2008) pp. 32-8.  
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knowledge (2.1.1). As well as being necessary to establishing its definition, 
understanding the origin of anger will impact on how it can be managed, 
hence the need for Seneca to address this issue. He has chosen this 
particular passion on which to focus because of his interest in: ‘how the 
passions begin or grow or get carried away — quemadmodum incipiant 
adfectus aut crescant aut efferantur’ (2.4.1). He explains that adfectus 
begins as something involuntary: ‘a preparation for passion, as it were, and 
a kind of threatening signal — quasi praeparatio adfectus et quaedam 
comminatio’ (2.4.1). Then the preparation is combined with an act of volition, 
the confirmation that vengeance is appropriate (2.1.4) based on the belief 
that the individual has been unjustly wronged (2.3.5. Cf. 2.31.1). However, 
even in this stage there is the possibility of not falling into anger because of 
the oscillation of judgements (2.4.2. Cf. 2.3.4). The final stage is ‘beyond 
our control/impotens’ – there is the wish to take vengeance even if it is not 
right to do so and is void of reason (2.4.1).  
 
By breaking down the formation of passions into stages, Seneca has been 
interpreted as reconciling the differences between Zeno and Chrysippus’ 
views. For instance, the second stage reflects Chrysippus’ turning away 
from reason through following a ‘mistaken’ judgement and being carried 
away to the point of rejecting what is appropriate (Gal. PHP 4.4.24): the final 
stage expresses Zeno’s ‘rejection’ of reason in the absence of judgement.291 
According to this sensible view, Seneca is achieving what he set out to do 
by following his predecessors when facts ‘permit/patitur’ this (Ot. 3.1) and 
introducing his own interpretation by exerting his right of freedom of thought 
to show how theory progresses over time.292 
 
Seneca’s greatest progression of Stoic theory relates to his opinions about 
the formation of passions. In De Ira, Seneca expands this to incorporate the 
notion of ‘will/voluntas’, through which the individual chooses or wishes to 
act in a particular way.293 This introduces the suggestion of an active and 
                                                          
291 Cf. Sorabji (2000) pp. 61-3. Cf. Gill (2005) p. 448.  
292 For the importance of progressing existing thought, see pp. 27-8.  
293 Cf. Asmis (2015) pp. 230-2.  
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passive part of the principale animi, the former being assenting, the latter 
experiencing pre-passions.294 Seneca describes anger as being an impulse 
which only occurs with assent based on the thought that an injury has 
occurred and that in response, the individual ‘wanted/voluit’ to take revenge 
(2.3.4). He emphasises the role of voluntariness in the formation of anger 
which cannot arise without will, i.e., wish for revenge, a view that is a 
development in orthodox theories of the psychology of action (2.1.4).295 One 
of the ways in which Seneca defines virtue is its relation to this volition when 
he says that right volition arises in those with a virtuous disposition i.e. those 
with perfect knowledge and therefore virtue (Ep. 95.56).296  
 
In his description of the three stages of anger (2.4.1), Seneca continues the 
idea of two types of willing, the first occurring at the time of the impression, 
which has been termed ‘conditional willing’ and then ‘fixed willing’ which is 
the consequence of the assent and constitutes the passion.297 Seneca’s 
amendments to the Stoic theory of passions are important because his 
comprehensive description of the growth of adfectus provides clear signals 
which can be identified to stop passions from arising. This is particularly 
important to Seneca because of his interest in therapies for passions and 
emphasises man’s moral responsibility, that is, it creates a space for the 
individual to identify the signs of passions arising and thus also the implicit 
obligation to attempt to do so. The cognitive element of anger shows that 
angry people are not victims but have chosen to act emotionally and this 
conclusion is indicative of Seneca’s contribution to the Stoic theory of 
passions. It allows any erroneous belief that causes anger to be challenged 
and altered so that people can act in a rational and controlled manner thus 
                                                          
294 Cf. Rist (1989) p. 2001.  
295 Holler (1934) argues that Seneca’s use of ‘per se’ when describing that anger ventures 
nothing by itself indicates an Aristotelian view of the thymos. He concludes from this that 
Seneca’s view is ‘something new, half old, half Peripatetic’ and questions whether this 
synthesis is Seneca’s own or drawn from Posidonius’ work On Anger (p. 21). I hold the 
view that Seneca has consolidated his awareness of his predecessors’ varied ideas to 
create something new and is not led by a single master. 
296 Cf. Wildberger (2014) p. 310.  
297 Cf. Asmis (2015) p. 231.  
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introducing the possibility that passions can be eradicated and lays the 
foundations for Seneca to present how this can be done.298 
 
Seneca’s addition of pre-passions, though he believes these to be 
involuntary, still relates to the Stoic doctrines of psychology by virtue of the 
fact that they relate to reason (or rather lack of it) and the question of 
voluntariness is a contribution to the theory of action and sphere of control 
as opposed to an attempt to overthrow traditional concepts. Seneca uses 
established philosophical concepts from a range of schools to place his 
ideas in a known philosophical context and by alluding to details from 
established philosophers, such as Plato, Aristotle, Chrysippus and 
Posidonius, of whom his audience are aware, he adds gravitas to his 
thinking as a philosopher. He has drawn on the ideas from his predecessors 
which best suit his needs and from this has developed his own arguments 
about passions. 
 
The sickness of passions 
Although individuals are responsible for their passions, because they 
choose to assent to them and thus adfectus are voluntary, passions are not 
mental states that can easily be controlled and moderated because they are 
perversions of reason and harmful disturbances of the soul (cf. 2.1.3-5, 
2.2.2). Humans are slaves to passions because they trap people into 
believing that they must ‘have’ certain things which are often unobtainable 
and because they are unable to acquire them (due to them being external 
things beyond man’s control), men become unhappy (cf. Cic. Tusc. 5.40-
1).299 Stoic materialism means that disturbances of the soul are regarded 
as a form of ‘sickness/nosema/morbus’ and they are ‘more destructive and 
more numerous – perniciosiores pluresque’ than bodily afflictions (Cic. 
Tusc. 3.5. Cf. Diog. Laert. 7.115). This is communicated through medical 
metaphors to refer to the disease of passions and to promote philosophy as 
                                                          
298 Cf. Chapter Three passim. 
299 Cf. Hadot (1995, 2003) p. 102.  
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a treatment for the mind (animi medicina), as medicine is for the body (cf. 
1.5.6ff. 1.6.1-2, 4, 2.10.7-8).300  
 
This medical metaphor is not as might be expected. The doctor does not 
heal the patient: the patient (admittedly following guidance) must heal 
himself (cf. 1.6.1, 1.16.2, 1.16.4, 3.27.1).301 Indeed, the mind is capable of 
doing this itself (Cic. Tusc. 4.58), when it is willing to be healed (Cic. Tusc. 
3.5) because it was capable of inventing medical science to heal the body. 
It is man’s responsibility to care for his mind to prevent its sickness and be 
responsible physicians for ourselves (Cic. Tusc. 3.6). This is possible 
through understanding the cause and nature of passions which is 
achievable through philosophy (cf. Ep. 16.3; Cic. Tusc. 3.23). Wisdom is 
having a ‘healthy soul/animae sanitas’ (Cic. Tusc. 3.10) which is why Stoic 
thinkers emphasise the importance of understanding the workings of the 
universe, the reason for their commitment to the psychology of passions 
and why the conception of the soul (and disagreements regarding this 
matter) are of such significance.  
 
Chrysippus insisted that a sick mind can be treated like the body and that 
the medicines are of equal value (Gal. PHP 5.2.22. Cf. Gal. PHP 5.2.22-
33).302 The perfection of the Sage shows that cures are available and nature 
would not be so cruel as to permit bodily cures without the equivalent for the 
mind (Cic. Tusc. 4.58). The rarity of the Sage shows the difficulty of this 
task, but the ideal indicates that it is possible to retain mental health.303 
Chrysippus explained how the soul is analogous to a fever-prone body or 
one which is disposed to diarrhoea, suggesting that, as a result of personal 
weaknesses, entrenched value systems cause passions (Gal. PHP 5.2.3) 
                                                          
300 Cf. Clem. 1.9.6, 1.17.1, 1.18.1-2; Constant. 13.1-2; Ep. 7.1; 15.1-2; Cic. Tusc. 3.6-7; 
Stob. Ecl. 2.10f. Cf. Nussbaum (1994) pp. 13-4, 316-7, 328-9; Setaioli (2014b) pp. 240-1. 
For a discussion about the Greek origins of this metaphor, see Wright (1974) pp. 65-6 n. 
9; Nussbaum (1994) pp. 48-53. The Epicureans also use medical analogies to describe the 
physiological effect of anger, for example, Philodemus refers to it as a state of fever (Phld. 
Ir. 8.20-7), cf. Nussbaum (1994) pp. 115-39. 
301 Cf. Ep. 8.2; Helv. 1.2, 2.1ff.; Marc. 1.8.  
302 Cf. Gill (2007) pp. 113-7. 
303 For the rarity of the Sage, see p. 16. 
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and these happen ‘irregularly and disorderly’ (Gal. PHP 5.2.14). He 
concluded that: ‘The diseases and affections of the soul arise when 
judgements are in mutual disagreement’ (Gal. PHP 5.4.14). This metaphor 
can also be found in Stobaeus who claimed that ‘proneness to sickness is 
a tendency towards passion’ and that this included inappropriate appetites 
and weaknesses or ‘ailments’ (Stob. Ecl. 2.91.1-93.13 (SVF 3.421)).  
 
However, while both philosophers agreed that ill-health in the soul did not 
occur in the Sage (Gal. PHP 5.2.2), Posidonius rejected Chrysippus’ mind-
body analogy. He did not accept that the souls of ‘inferior men’ should be 
compared with sick bodies but with healthy ones instead, particularly since 
even a Sage is subject to bodily ailments (Gal. PHP 5.2.4-12. Cf. Cic. Tusc. 
4.23). Instead, Posidonius proposed that the sick mind is equated with a 
healthy body which is prone to illness or one that is currently suffering from 
the disease itself (Gal. PHP 5.2.7-9), a view which Cicero appeared to be 
sympathetic towards when he stated that a mental proclivity is similar to 
being prone to a specific bodily illness while being in otherwise good health 
(Cic. Tusc. 4.81). Seneca, on the other hand, appears to take a Chrysippean 
approach by equating passions to illness, for example, he compares anger 
with a sick body covered in sores that groans at a gentle touch, describing 
ira as a: ‘mark of a lethargic and sterile mind, aware of its own feebleness, 
given to chronic distress — ueternosi et infelicis animi, inbecillitatis sibi 
conscii, saepe indolescere’ (1.20.3). 
 
Nevertheless, Seneca makes a distinction between ‘diseases/morbi’ of the 
mind and passions, suggesting that it is possible to address, treat and 
remove adfectus. The former are ‘hardened and chronic vices/inveterata 
vitia et dura’ which have become so ingrained in the mind that they have 
become ‘permanent vices/perpetua mala’. They are ‘a persistent perversion 
of the judgment/iudicium in pravo pertinax’ relating to misapplication of 
value to the pursuit/avoidance of externals (Ep. 75.11). Passions on the 
other hand, are ‘objectionable impulses of the spirit, sudden and vehement 
— motus animi inprobabiles, subiti et concitati’ which when they occur 
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regularly and are not paid attention to, cause a state of disease similar to 
catarrh which on its own produces a cough but untreated leads to 
‘consumption/phthisis’ which is harder to treat (Ep. 75.12). In this example, 
Seneca agrees with Cicero that regularly occurring passions which become 
habitual can cause permanent changes to thinking and belief systems and, 
by extension, personalities (Cic. Tusc. 4.24). Nonetheless, adfectus are 
mental disorders which can be cured by (a) preventing them arising and (b) 
stopping them when they arise. Following Chrysippus, Cicero insisted on 
the necessity of curing a sick soul in order to live well, to fulfil the human 
end and emphasised the necessity of wanting to be healed for philosophy 
to work as a treatment (Cic. Tusc. 3.13).  
 
This is also what Seneca aims to demonstrate in his texts. For example, 
anger is a sickness of the mind involving a (mis)judgement relating to a 
sense of injury and the (wrong) belief that it is right to avenge it. He uses a 
medical metaphor to explain how even in cases where vices have proved 
indirectly useful, the usefulness still does not make the passion a good 
thing. For example, a fever may have relieved other sickness but it is still 
better to have no fever at all; for good health to depend on disease is 
abhorrent (1.12.6). Seneca believes that philosophy is more useful than 
drugs to prevent the spreading of illnesses and he has benefited from this 
(Ep. 8.2. Cf. Ep. 53.5). These analogies demonstrate how Stoicism should 
be taken seriously as a treatment, as well as an alternative way of life 
ordered by reason, not just an intellectual pastime of contemplation about 
abstract concepts.304 After all, no one would choose sickness over health 
(cf. Cic. Fin. 2.43; Sext. Emp. Math. 11.66). 
 
Good feelings/Constantiae  
Contrary to common misconception, Stoics do not advocate abolition of all 
feelings. They aim to be in a state without passion (apatheia/impatientia) so 
that they control their lives by rational, measured responses to things 
without being psychologically manipulated. Men who have perfected reason 
                                                          
304 Cf. Nussbaum (1987) p. 130; Nussbaum (1994) pp. 316ff.  
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experience good feelings or good affective responses/eupatheiai/ 
constantiae.305 These feelings are based on rational considerations and 
correct choices, reflecting genuine goodness and echoing a stable internal 
state of affairs unaffected by fortune (cf. Diog. Laert. 7.116).306 The 
constantiae are joy/chara/laetitia (the correct expansion of the soul aroused 
by rational elation, a counterpart to the passion of pleasure); 
caution/eulabeia/cautio (rational avoidance, which is the alternative to 
irrational fear)307 and wishing/boulêsis/voluntas (knowledge that some 
future thing is of a sort that should be sought, as opposed to irrational 
desire).308 Seneca subscribes to these views about the existence of and 
need for constantiae, believing that men can experience a wide range of 
positive, appropriate feelings based on true beliefs (cf. Ep. 23.4-6). He 
argues that such feelings are necessary to living well: ‘The very soul must 
be energetic and confident, lifted above every circumstance — Animus esse 
debet alacer et fidens et super omnia erectus’ (Ep. 23.3).309 Seneca is clear 
that impatientia is not a ‘lack of feeling’ but a soul that cannot be harmed, or 
‘a soul entirely beyond the realm of suffering — invulnerabilem animum … 
aut anirmum extra omnem patientiam positum’ (Ep. 9.2). The wise man may 
feel troubles (‘incommodum’) but conquers them (‘vincit’) without 
responding angrily or in an impassioned way (Ep. 9.3). By perfecting caution 
and by the absence of distress from his constantiae, a man would not suffer 
from fear and associated threats which may provoke anger and his wishing 
would be restricted to things of true benefit as opposed to vengeance 
desired in anger.  
 
*** 
I will interpret Seneca to be following Zeno and Chrysippus in believing that 
the soul is unified and the central governing function is rational. He also 
                                                          
305 Cf. Plut. Mor. 449A-C; Gill (2006) pp. 224-5. While constantiae is a Ciceronian term, in 
the absence of an equivalent word for eupatheiai in Seneca, it will be used here as the 
Latin phrase for ‘good feelings’.  
306 Cf. Reydams-Schils (2005) pp. 49-52. 
307 Cf. Cic. Tusc. 4.13; Diog. Laert. 7.116; Plut. De Stoic. rep. 1038b. 
308 Cf. Cic. Tusc. 4.12; Diog. Laert. 7.116. 
309 Seneca discusses caution (Ep. 85.26) and joy (cf. 1.6.2, 2.6.2; Beat. 4.4-5; Const. 9.3; 
Ep. 23.3-6; 27.3, 59.1-2).  
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continues the traditional view that within the soul there is a piece of God 
which provides humans with the potential to perfect reason. The 
modification of the soul which causes actions is a temporal sequence for 
Seneca which incorporates Zeno’s stages of impressions, assent, cognition 
and knowledge. Seneca follows Chrysippus in believing that passions arise 
from errors in evaluative judgement about whether something is beneficial 
or harmful and whether it is appropriate to act because false impressions 
are assented to in the misbelief that they are true. The problems resulting 
from adfectus can be mitigated by reassessing evaluations so that 
impressions are accurately and rationally assessed. Seneca shares the 
belief that adfectus are difficult to control, despite the fact it is an individual’s 
decision to assent to them, because they are disobedient to reason (Ep. 
85.8). They cause irrational movements in the soul which are contrary to 
nature, hence the equation of them with a sickness of the mind which is 
commonly accepted across the School.  
 
In these respects, I conclude that Seneca is largely following the orthodox 
theory of passions but is receptive to other influences which help formulate 
his philosophical views. He does, however, offer innovations to the theory 
of passions by introducing the role of voluntas and arguing that the 
identification of pre-passions can prevent passions arising. To contextualise 
Seneca’s views about passions, I progress in Chapter Two to the analysis 
of his presentation of a specific passion, anger.  
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Chapter Two 
Seneca on the nature of anger 
 
To understand Seneca’s task of removing passions, it is necessary to 
establish the full nature of the problem of anger. This is possible through a 
detailed discussion of anger, as revealed by Seneca in De Ira and De 
Clementia, considering its stages and causes, its physical manifestations, 
characteristics and consequences and how this understanding of ira is 
echoed in the Senecan tragedies Medea and Thyestes. Full comprehension 
of the beliefs relating to this passion requires consideration of the attitudes 
towards anger according to Seneca, Stoics, Aristotle and the Epicureans as 
propounded by Philodemus of Gadara in his De Ira.310 I compare and 
contrast the different philosophical schools’ opinions about the naturalness, 
usefulness and power of anger. I conclude by summarising the 
understanding of anger according to Seneca in preparation for discussions 
about how it may be addressed in subsequent chapters.  
 
What is anger?  
Chrysippus’ division of anger into types was widely reported311 and Cicero 
identified these forms of anger as divisions of desire (Cic. Tusc. 4.16, 21). 
Although the Greeks have many terms for anger, because these terms have 
no direct corresponding word in Latin, Seneca states that he will not deal 
with the Greek words for different species of anger: instead, he draws 
attention to Latin terms that describe some of the varieties, such as 
‘bitter/amarus’, ‘harsh/acerbus’, ‘testy/stomachosus’, ‘frenzied/rabiosus’, 
‘ranting/clamosus’, ‘difficult/difficilis’, ‘prickly/asper’ and ‘peevish/morosus’ 
(1.4.2).312 He distinguishes ira from the characteristic of 
                                                          
310 Philodemus’ writing does not appear to have had a direct influence on Seneca in that 
he is not mentioned by name (cf. Tsouna (2011) p. 209). However, he is a source of 
information for modern readers regarding Epicurean philosophy. Tsouna (2007a) claims 
that from a cultural point of view De Ira ‘reflects a widespread ancient preoccupation with 
the nature, use, and control of anger from Homer onwards’ and from a philosophical point 
of view ‘it is a major contribution to the relevant Epicurean literature, and occupies an 
important place in the on-going debate about the emotions’ (p.195). 
311 Cf. Andron. SVF 3.97; Diog. Laert. 7.113; Stob. Ecl. 2.91.10 (SVF 3.395). 
312 Cf. Vogt (2006) p. 62. 
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‘wrathfulness/iracundia’ whereby anger is regarded as an episode of the 
passion whereas wrathfulness is a disposition inclined to anger (1.4.1. Cf. 
Cic. Tusc. 4.27-8).313 Then he proceeds to present other kinds of anger 
involving shouting, physical and verbal abuse, complaints, sulking and 
those which are turned on the self (1.4.3). He concludes that: ‘there are a 
thousand other varieties of this polymorphous evil — mille aliae species sunt 
mali multiplicis’ (1.4.3). Seneca presents anger’s manifestation in explosive 
speech, impatience and competitiveness, rather than considering its 
components, such as hostility, suspicion, rage, hatred, resentment and 
indignation. In this respect, Seneca is following the tradition of focusing on 
the behavioural manifestations of anger typical of ancient discussion. In 
doing so, he makes the subject easier to assimilate because it provides 
concrete evidence of the passion with which his reader would be familiar 
and looking at anger in this way is a more helpful and practical approach for 
its management and removal. 
 
I Anger in De Ira and De Clementia 
Seneca opens De Ira with a description of anger as the most foul and 
frenzied of all the passions (1.1.1) and as the greatest of evils, surpassing 
all vices (2.36.6).314 By describing his understanding of anger from the 
outset, Seneca enables his reader to comprehend its nature and extent as 
it unfolds across the three books. Seneca places it in relation to other 
passions, which allow a degree of calm. Anger:  
… consists entirely in aroused assault. Raging with an inhuman  
desire to inflict pain in combat and shed blood in punishment,  
it cares nothing for itself provided it can harm the other:  
it throws itself on the very weapons raised against it, hungry  
for a vengeance that will bring down the avenger too —  
                                                          
313 Philodemus also regards anger as a disposition of irascibility, or an individual outburst 
of anger, and explains angry episodes by reference to disposition cf. Tsouna (2007a) p. 
210.  
314 I do not interpret the comment that anger is the greatest of evils to mean that Seneca is 
deviating from orthodox Stoicism by proposing that there are degrees of vice and in doing 
so would be agreeing with Posidonius, as has been proposed by Fillion-Lahille (1984) p. 
185. Anger’s greatness here refers to the speed at which it arises and how it dominates 
other passions. 
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hic totus concitatus et in impetu est, doloris armorum,  
sanguinis suppliciorum minime humana furens cupiditate,  
dum alteri noceat sui neglegens, in ipsa inruens tela et  
ultionis secum ultorem tracturae auidus.                 (1.1.1). 
Seneca uses military metaphors throughout his discussion of anger. He 
uses this language to emphasise not only the extent of the internal struggle 
against the power of the passion and its dangerous consequences but the 
necessary force and endeavour which is required to overcome ira and the 
appealing victory of achieving extirpation.315  
 
In his war against anger, these military metaphors are not only appropriate 
but vital to illustrate the scale of his task. The figurative language makes 
Seneca’s arguments more accessible and convincing even to non-
philosophers because he uses terms drawn from traditional Roman value 
systems where being victorious over evil is admirable. This would make his 
arguments, that ira has no positive value, that it is an obstacle to success 
and achieving virtue and so must be expelled, persuasive to his 
contemporaries.316 The metaphors show how to control anger by resisting 
incitement. The enemy must be stopped immediately before it overrules: 
similarly, once the mind is captured by passion it is unable to defend itself 
(1.8.2). Elsewhere, Seneca presents philosophy as a warrior capable of 
deflecting weapons (Ep. 53.12) and that it provides an ‘impregnable 
wall/inexpugnabilis murus’ (Ep. 82.5) offering protection from all enemies.317 
This varied use of military themes demonstrates in the first instance the 
extent of the problem of anger, but that philosophy is victorious over its 
enemies and for this reason, as a rational being, man should subscribe to 
it. 
 
An alternative response to ira is clementia which holds such significance to 
Seneca as to prompt a treatise on the subject where he applies innovative 
                                                          
315 Cf. 1.1.1, 1.8.2, 1.10.1, 1.11, 2.10.4, 2.35.1; Herington (1966) pp. 434-5; Star (2012) p. 
27. 
316 Cf. Star (2012) pp. 27-8. 
317 Cf. Star (2012) p. 25. 
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ideas to the concept to progress traditional and existing Stoic opinions.318 It 
is important to his theory of passions because it offers an alternative 
response to anger. Clementia is defined as restraint in revenge (Clem. 
2.3.1), leniency in prescribing penalties and when exacting punishment 
(ibid. 2.3.1), remission of a deserved punishment (ibid. 2.3.2. Cf. ibid. 
1.15.7, 1.22.1; Ir. 1.6.3-5) and receding from what could deservedly be 
imposed (Clem. 2.3.2. Cf. ibid. 1.14.1, 2.6.3). It involves freedom of decision 
to judge according to what is right (ibid. 2.7.3) and requires good reason, 
mental calm and clarity (ibid. 1.5.5. Cf. ibid. 1.7.2, 1.13.4). It is neither pity, 
a misjudgement about the value of other people’s apparent misfortunes 
(ibid. 2.4.4, 2.5.4, 2.6.4), nor is it pardon (ibid. 2.7.1).319  
 
For Seneca, clemency was not an emotional impulse involving forgiveness 
in cases of punishment. Many Stoics perceived this as leniency in the penal 
system and this would conflict with the law which is in accordance with 
nature and therefore would make clemency an unacceptable, even 
inexcusable, vice.320 Seneca’s revised definition proposes that clemency 
was a disposition, not a passion, and he redirects the focus onto humanitas, 
which is not only acceptable, but encouraged by Stoicism (ibid. 2.5.3).321 
This begins in Seneca’s defence against Stoic critics (and indirectly against 
Stoics’ criticism of his encouragement of clementia) where he challenges 
the common charges of the alleged harshness of their doctrine and 
accusations that the Sage shows neither pity nor forgiveness. He defends 
Stoicism as being the kindest and most lenient, philanthropic School 
concerned with the common good (ibid. 2.5.2-3. Cf. Ir. 1.5.2) and argues 
that Stoics, as a group, share knowledge to improve society (cf. Ep. 6.4).  
 
                                                          
318 Cf. Dowling (2006) pp. 194-203; Braund (2009) pp. 30-44. 
319 Cf. Konstan (2015) pp. 179-81. 
320 Cf. Diog. Laert. 7.123; Stob. Ecl. 2.95.24-96.9 (SVF 3.640); Griffin (1976, 1992) pp. 158-
9; Schofield (2015) pp. 75-7; Konstan (2015) pp. 180-1. 
321 In a similar vein, Nussbaum (1993a) notes that De Ira ends with the proposal that men 
should ‘cultivate humanity/colamus humanitatem’ (3.43.5) and ‘forgive the human 
species/uniuersis ignoscendum est’ (2.10.2) (pp. 101-2). Cf. Stob. Ecl. 2.11. Humanitas 
was an important consideration for Seneca for it involves being gentle and not overbearing 
(cf. Ep. 88.30) and is not crying for other people’s losses (Tranq. 15.5). Cf. Griffin (1976, 
1992) p. 170; Motto (1984) p. 230; Balbo (2012) pp. 69-81; Wilson (2014) p. 124. 
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Responding to contentious situations with clementia as opposed to ira is 
particularly relevant to rulers, who, by setting good examples, can lead their 
subjects into productive behaviour and social cohesion, a key responsibility 
in Stoicism for improved and appropriate relations with other people. While 
clementia is potentially present in everyone (Clem. 1.5.2), it is more suited 
to those in positions of power because it is displayed by a superior toward 
an inferior (ibid. 1.3.3, 1.5.4). These definitions cover the overall quality of 
mind which the owner of the virtue enjoys, that is moderation and mildness, 
taking into account the action of punishing/seeking revenge. Seneca 
continues to argue that: ‘Savage, implacable anger/saeua… inexorabilis ira’ 
is unsuited to a king because it prevents superiority (ibid. 1.5.6. Cf. Ir. 
2.34.1) and concludes that a true ruler should adopt the ‘spirit of the 
gods/deorum animum’ instead (Clem. 1.5.7). To be likened to the gods is 
appealing in itself to the emperor but also reassuring to his subjects. De Ira 
deals with clementia in the private man, where it is emphasised that cruelty 
corrupts the mind making it increasingly less rational.322 ‘Cruelty/crudelitas’ 
is a topic widely discussed in De Ira where the focus lies on the role of anger 
in punishment, as will be discussed below. Seneca contrasts a king’s and a 
tyrant’s attitude towards executions, citing Dionysius of Syracuse as a 
positive example (1.12ff.) and Sulla as a negative one (1.12.2-3). 
 
Physical manifestations of anger 
To expose the vileness of anger in contrast with the composure and 
countenance of the virtue, Seneca paints a disturbing picture of angry men 
that is physically repulsive, with blazing eyes, a red face, quivering lips, 
ground teeth, bristly hair, heaving breathing, cracking joints, who groan and 
bellow and speak incoherently while clapping their hands and stamping the 
ground: ‘as they “act out anger’s massive menace”, they have the repellent 
and terrifying features of people who are deformed and bloated — 
“magnasque irae minas agens,” foeda uisu et horrenda facies deprauantium 
se atque intumescentium’ (1.1.4).323 The hideousness of anger is re-
                                                          
322 Cf. Dowling (2006) pp. 203-7. 
323 Cf. Plut. Mor. 455E-F; van Hoof (2007) pp. 72-4. Philodemus recounted a similar 
physical caricature of the angry man, cf. Phld. Ir. fr. 6.3-12, 6.12-20, 8.31-9.21, 9.29-33, 
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emphasised in the second book where Seneca states that its features are 
more disturbed than other passions (2.35.3).324 Seneca acknowledges the 
fact that anger is a sufficiently unpleasant vice to undermine even the 
greatest physical beauty and he could be interpreted as playing on man’s 
vanity as a deterrent for anger when he notes that it turns the most beautiful 
faces ugly by making the most peaceful countenance fierce. All grace 
departs from the angry person. A man who is usually well-kempt and 
fashionable will, in anger, allow his clothing to trail and cease to take pride 
in his appearance; for example, stylish hair becomes bristled reflecting his 
state of mind (2.35.3).  
 
The physiological effects of anger are equally concerning and include 
swollen veins, panting, distended neck from screaming, frantic speech, 
trembling limbs and restless hands: ‘the whole body is buffeted as if by 
waves — totius corporis fluctuatio’ (2.35.3. Cf. 2.35.5, 3.4.1). These 
consequences all illustrate the ungovernable nature of the passion once it 
is allowed to take root. Anger also produces clashing teeth, as if in 
preparation for biting, which Seneca equates with the noise of a wild boar 
sharpening his tusks by rubbing (3.4.2). The comparison of the angry man 
with wild beasts, who lack the capacity for reason, emphasises the 
baseness of anger. Indeed, for a Stoic this is particularly horrifying – to 
become like an animal is to lose reason, which defines humans. The 
metaphors show that even at their most grotesque, such as when tortured 
by hunger or pierced by a spear or half dead as they charge at their hunter, 
beasts are less hideous in appearance than a man inflamed by anger 
(3.4.3).325  
 
Considering the horrors of the external presentation of anger, Seneca 
invites Novatus to consider its internal expression. If the soul were visible, 
its appearance in anger would shock, because it would be black, mottled, 
                                                          
10.28-2. Harris (2001, 2004) notes how the Greeks equated physical excellence with moral 
excellence and that the appearance of an angry man would be particularly hideous (p. 103).  
324 Cf. Cic. Tusc. 4.52; Plut. Mor. 458D. 
325 Cf. 1.1.6, 1.3.4-8, 1.17.6, 2.5.3, 2.31.6, 3.4.2-3. 
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distorted and swollen, a viler sight than its physical manifestation (2.36.2). 
Seneca’s description of a dark soul means that man is no longer pure as at 
birth, but is tarnished by the negativity of passions (2.10.3).326 This comment 
is more than a metaphor; it reflects Stoic materialism in which thoughts have 
corporal origins and that the body reflects the state of mind depending on 
the degree of tension of the anima.327 In this respect, an angry man is 
aesthetically unpleasant, both internally and externally, thus mirroring the 
ethical failures of giving in to the passion, a view which Philodemus also 
acknowledged when he stated that the black bile to which angry men are 
susceptible turns their hearts black (Phld. Ir. 9.37-41). 
 
The characteristics of anger 
Seneca elaborates his descriptions of anger by discussing its 
characteristics. He believes that it is uncontrollable, comparable with 
insanity and has catastrophic consequences, all of which will be discussed 
in turn. Starting with the fact that anger is uncontrollable, Seneca argues 
that while other ills come gradually, anger is sudden and subjugates all other 
passions (2.36.6). It is an active impulse which is aroused and rushes 
forward: ‘that leaps clear of reason, that snatches reason up and carries it 
along — quae rationem transilit, quae secum rapit’ (2.3.4). A man may start 
angry with one man, then another, with slaves then freedmen, with parents, 
then children and with acquaintances, then with strangers (3.28.1). Indeed, 
ira is ‘unbridled and untamed/effrenatam indomitamque’ (1.9.3) and ‘it’s 
unwilling to be controlled/non uult regi’ (1.19.1). Ira lasts longer than the 
initial hurt (3.27.1). Those who have succumbed to anger are not able to 
return to reason, for instance, the frenzy of anger drove Ajax to suicide 
(2.36.5).328 To explain the apparent contradiction of Seneca claiming that 
anger is uncontrollable and yet curable with reason, I assume that he means 
that an angry man is uncontrollable, yet it is possible to stop anger from 
                                                          
326 Cf. Ep. 22.15; 94.55-6. 
327 A similar description of an ugly soul is found in the eschatological myth in Plato, where 
it is used metaphorically (Pl. Gorg. 523a-527e). Here, the soul is distorted and ugly because 
of ‘license and luxury, arrogance and incontinence in its actions’ (Pl. Gorg. 525a). 
Translated by Zeyl (1997) p. 867. For Stoic materialism and the tension of the soul, see pp. 
55-6. 
328 Cf. Cic. Tusc. 4.52-3. 
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arising and that it is only possible to regain control when anger has subsided 
(1.8.6).  
 
Anger as insanity 
Passions can result in a permanent state of disturbance of mind either 
through a predisposition to behave in such a way or by causing a disease 
of the mind as they disrupt rational thought and responses (1.7.3. Cf. 
1.16.3).329 Ira’s extensive disruption to mental states has led it to be seen 
as insanity because those who are angry are carried away by excessive 
feelings and are no longer under the control of intelligence. In this respect, 
man’s lack of rationality aligns him with animals, a state which many Stoic 
thinkers would consider to be unacceptable because it is humans’ capacity 
for reason, which distinguishes them from beasts. Chrysippus explained 
how people relate to those in anger as they would to those who are ‘out of 
their mind’, ‘have taken leave of their senses, and are not in their right minds 
or in possession of their faculties’ (Gal. PHP 4.6.24).330 He communicated 
this problem when he described how the angry man throws a piece of wool 
or a sponge without accomplishing anything from doing so because, in 
anger: ‘We take such leave of ourselves and get so far outside ourselves 
and are so completely blinded in our frustrations…’ (Gal. PHP 4.6.44). 
Cicero echoes this when he notes the lengths anger and madness go to and 
that the angry person is ‘out of control/impotens’ in the sense they are ‘out 
of intent, their reason, their conscious thought — de consilio, de ratione, de 
mente’, things which ordinarily control the mind (Cic. Tusc. 4.77).331  
 
There are instances where the individual is conscious that he is being 
disobedient to reason, but continues to be governed by passions, still 
believing that his mistaken belief is correct, despite the partial realisation 
that this is irrational. Chrysippus cited the case of Medea, who states that: 
‘I understand the evils I am going to do,// but anger prevails over my 
                                                          
329 Cf. Cic. Tusc. 3.8. 
330 Cf. Gal. PHP 4.6.27, 31-2, 34-5. 
331 Cf. 2.4.1; Cic. Tusc. 4.22; Gal. PHP 4.4.24. 
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counsels’ (Eur. Med. lines 1078-9 apud Gal. PHP 3.3.13-8, 4.2.27).332 He 
used this to illustrate how what is in an individual’s best interests can be 
overturned by passions through the vacillating judgements which they 
invoke and false judgements as opposed to the true ones can motivate 
action (cf. Plut. Mor. 446F-7A).333  
 
Seneca communicates the relationship between ira and insanity by 
comparing the physical appearance of an angry person and a madman both 
of whom wear threatening expressions, frown, move quickly with restless 
hands, have changes in complexion and sigh forcefully (1.1.3. Cf. 1.1.4). 
The physiological references associated with anger in Seneca reflect the 
Stoic view of the physical effect of passions on the soul in causing 
‘movements’ making man unsettled in his thoughts which is reflected in his 
behaviour which at times appears erratic and insane. Anger is understood 
to be a ‘brief madness/brevis insania’ because it is temporary, but just as 
severe as ordinary insanity:  
[Anger is] no less lacking in self-control, forgetful of decency, 
unmindful of personal ties, unrelentingly intent on its goal, shut off 
from rational deliberation, stirred for no substantial reason, unsuited 
to discerning what’s fair and true, just like a collapsing building that’s 
reduced to rubble even as it crushes what it falls upon —                
aeque inpotens sui est, decoris oblita, necessitudinum immemor,       
in quod coepit pertinax et intenta, rationi consiliisque praeclusa, 
uanis agitata causis, ad dispectum aequi uerique inhabilis, ruinis 
simillima quae super id quod oppressere franguntur.             (1.1.2).334 
Seneca’s presentation of anger may also contain echoes of Epicurean 
views about this passion’s impact. Philodemus too saw anger as irrational, 
occurring in ‘slavish’ souls (Phld. Ir. 21.5-6). It halts reason and is 
comparable to madness,335 to the extent that it is voluntary destruction 
                                                          
332 Cf. Dillon (1997); Gill (1983), (1998) pp. 116-21 and (2006) pp. 255-60; Price (1994) pp. 
160-1; Staley (2010) p. 33. 
333 Cf. Sorabji (2000) pp. 56-7; Graver (2007) pp. 70-1. For Medea’s vacillations and 
hesitation, see pp. 220-1. 
334 Cf. 1.7.4; Ep. 18.15. 
335 Cf. Phld. Ir. 10.19-26, 12.20-2, 16.34-40. 
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(Phld. Ir. 23.25). These philosophers appear to be in agreement that forms 
of loss of reason, such as in cases of anger, have as adverse effects on the 
way a man thinks as insanity does, in that he loses the control that reason 
provides and which is essential to living well in terms of making correct 
decisions in thinking and behaviour. The comparison reflects Seneca’s 
receptiveness towards assimilating other philosophical ideas while 
capturing a general understanding of anger. 
 
Seneca claims that no one would consider the man sane who, like one being 
hurled along by a hurricane, was a ‘slave to a frenzied evil/furenti malo 
seruit’, who exacts his own revenge and is bloodthirsty in purpose and deed, 
murders those closest to him and destroys everything for which he would 
cry (3.3.3). The madness of anger is evidenced in the fact it causes self-
harm, physically (2.35.1) and/or mentally (3.4.4). Anger makes men fearful 
(cf. 2.10.3-4, 2.11.3-4), proving that it harms the angry man as much as it 
does the object of anger (cf. 1.1.1, 2.36.4-5, 3.27-8). To view anger as 
insanity may arouse more sympathy and tolerance because illness detracts 
from the individual’s capacity to assess a situation accurately and respond 
appropriately – if you are ill you cannot ‘help’ the way you are. However, the 
medical analogy has a different purpose for Seneca and many Stoics.336 It 
suggests there is a ‘cure’ and the focus of the metaphor is on the possibility 
of recovery. While this enables a Stoic to have compassion towards the 
angry man, he is not vindicated. He errs and requires reformation, even 
through punishment as its purpose is not to harm, ‘but heal under the guise 
of harming/sed medetur specie nocendi’ (1.6.1) but punishment must be 
issued as a form of remedy (1.16.2). Seneca’s descriptions are in line with 
the commonly accepted view of justice, which as a social construct involves 
fairness, equality and benevolence towards people. This echoes Seneca’s 
comments in De Clementia, where he defines the law of punishment as 
having three aims: to reform the punished, to improve other people by 
punishing the criminal, or to keep people safe from him by removing him 
(Clem. 1.22.1). Seneca uses his work on the subject of anger to address 
                                                          
336 For use of the medical metaphor in Stoic thinking, see pp. 81-4.  
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the social issues surrounding its consequences to persuade his reader of 
the benefits of and need for alternative responses. 
 
Anger, society and God  
The struggle with passions is personal but in the case of anger is also a 
social issue, as its consequences are far-reaching. Anger takes many 
different forms and habitually ruins society (1.4.2-3. Cf. 2.36.5). In a 
discussion about human criminality resulting from anger, Seneca details 
crimes within the household (2.9.2),337 those across the state (2.9.3. Cf. 
3.2.2ff.) and international atrocities (2.9.4. Cf. 3.2.5-6). The destruction 
anger causes is worse than any plague. It is responsible for bloodshed and 
poisoning, dishonourable defendants bringing counter-charges of 
baseness, the fall of cities and nations, producing illegal slavery and houses 
being torched (1.2.1-3). To avoid such atrocities, alternative ways of viewing 
relations with other people need to be considered, as does man’s 
relationship with the universe.  
 
Stoic thinkers are generally materialists and monists, believing that the 
world consists of matter and God (cf. Diog. Laert. 7.134ff.).338 Their God 
forms the governing part of each human soul which is a fragment of the 
divine logos giving man an innate capacity to develop reason (Helv. 8.3).339 
According to Zeno the cosmos is one (Diog. Laert. 7.143) and Chrysippus 
stated that: ‘our individual natures are parts of the nature of the whole 
universe’ (Diog. Laert. 7.87).340 This makes people citizens of the universe, 
rather than simply members of an individual tribe or nationality and with this 
view comes a degree of duty of care for other people.341 Taking this world-
                                                          
337 Seneca quotes Ov. Met. 1.144-8. Philodemus was also aware of the social 
consequences of anger. Tsouna (2007a) claims that he was one of the first philosophers 
to criticise private rage and fault anger against children (p. 214). Cf. Phld. Ir. 17.8-9; 22.29-
31; 23.36-40; 24.1-4; 34.17-36; fr. 13.23-6.  
338 Cf. Algra (2003, 2006); Setaioli (2014c). 
339 Cf. Ep. 31.11; 41; 65.24; 66.12; 71.6; 73.16; 79.12; 92.30, 92.34; 110.2; 117.6; 120.14; 
Ep. 92.10; Ot. 5.5; QNat. 1 pr.11, 2.45.1, 6.16.1; Cic. Nat. D. 2.5, 12, 33-6, 167; Diog. Laert. 
7.88; Gal. PHP 5.6.4; Sext. Emp. Math. 9.61-9.71. For Seneca’s concept of the Stoic God, 
see Burton (1909); Motto (1955c); Setaioli (2007).  
340 Cf. Setaioli (2007) p. 337. 
341 Cf. Beat. 20.5; Ben. 1.15.2; Ep. 5.4; 28.4; 95.52; 102.21; Helv. 8.5-6; Ot. 4.1; Cic. Fin. 
3.62-8; Cic. Off. 1.12, 1.50-3, 3.21, 3.50-7; Cic. Nat. D. 2.78; Pratt (1983) p. 69; Schofield 
(1991) p. 93; Veyne (2003) p. 143.  
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view alerts attention to responsibility, not only for self, but to other people: 
having appropriate care for other people is a marked part of Stoic 
instruction. 
 
In a School where the greatest good for man and the universe is central, 
clementia is a critical virtue for Stoics to possess, thus proving itself to be 
the appropriate alternative to ira which is wholly destructive. Seneca uses 
an organic image to suggest how, when living in accordance with nature as 
humans should, other people are loved like parts of the body and people 
work together for mutual protection (2.31.7). The good king and his subjects 
are in harmony, like mind and body (Clem. 1.3.5. Cf. ibid. 1.5.1) and father 
and child (ibid. 1.14.1-3).342 There is a reciprocal concern and bond of fides 
(ibid. 1.3.3-5).343 Consequently, it is a crime to injure one's country and 
fellow-citizen, as he is part of the country and greater commonwealth (cf. 
Plut. Mor. 1065E-F). In this respect, clementia facilitates reciprocity and 
future protection which produces the creation and continuation of a society 
working towards the common good.344  
 
Establishing one’s relationship with the universe requires understanding of 
the forces within it and taking responsibility for one’s actions. This is 
particularly important when considering the impact of passions which can 
be better understood by considering Stoic theology. By understanding the 
nature of a divine and providential world, Seneca educates his readers in 
the futility of becoming angry with God. Seneca considers gods to be agents 
who are free from passions and not responsible for human actions, so 
cannot be blamed for intervention, thus men should not become angry with 
them (2.28.4. Cf. 2.27ff.).345 The Stoic God is synonymous with 
providence,346 fate,347 nature348 and reason,349 all of which create and 
                                                          
342 Cf. Veyne (2003) pp. 17-8. 
343 Cf. Clem. 1.4, 1.5.1, 1.13.4-5, 1.14.1-3, 1.19.6ff., 2.31.7. 
344 Cf. Clem. 1.5.4, 2.5.3, 2.6.3. 
345 Cf. Clem. 1.8.2, 5; Diog. Laert. 7.147. 
346 Cf. Prov. 1.1; QNat. 2.45; Cic. Nat. D. 2.73-5. 
347 Cf. 2.27.2. 
348 Cf. Ben. 4.7.1, 4.8.2. 
349 Cf. Ep. 65.12, 23; Prov. 1.2-3. 
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maintain the moral order of the world (SVF 1.537). Consequently, to 
correctly follow nature, it is man’s duty to believe in God (Ep. 95.50) and in 
doing so He unites mankind (Ep. 117.6). He is concerned with human affairs 
as a creator of nature and protector of mankind.350 The absolutism of 
Stoicism is such that good and evil cannot co-exist and by extension God 
will cause humans no injury and therefore, men should not become angered 
at Him when events are not favourable.  
 
II Attitudes to anger in Seneca, Stoics, Aristotle and the Epicureans 
Seneca’s response to Aristotelian and Epicurean views of anger 
Seneca seeks to establish his views about ira as against those of his 
predecessors by tackling the common attitudes towards anger, to dispel the 
myths surrounding its naturalness, usefulness and that it only requires 
moderation. This is done to reinforce his belief that the only resolution for 
anger is its removal. Seneca responds directly to Aristotle but only implicitly 
to the Epicureans. I will first consider Seneca’s view of anger in relation to 
Aristotelian and Epicurean views in a general way and then proceed to 
address specific issues about whether anger is natural, moderate, powerful, 
and present in a Sage, as well as its usefulness in warfare, punishment and 
virtue. The common view of anger is that its aim is to regain control, status 
or self-worth by punishing the wrongdoer for the injury they have caused. 
While there may be some short-term satisfaction from seeing the person 
responsible for causing an injury experience the same pain, this fails to 
provide a permanent solution: instead it perpetuates the problem. Some 
people are satisfied by an apology and recognition of ill-conduct through 
remorse, which is better acquired through calm and reasoned conversation 
than through angry behaviour. Never to let other people’s negative actions 
impact on one’s status or wellbeing removes any requirement to re-establish 
it. In this way, a Stoic accepts responsibility for securing his own success 
                                                          
350 The Stoic God is powerful, just and omnipresent (cf. Ep. 31.10, 19ff.; Tert. Apol. 10). He 
is the creator, the ‘maker/artifex’ (cf. Ben. 4.7.1; Ep. 65.19; 98.26; QNat. 2.45.1; Cic. Nat. 
D. 2.57-8; SVF 1.534) and the ‘founder/conditor’ (cf. Ep. 119.15). He is ‘ruler/rector’ (cf. 
Beat. 8.4; Ep. 65.23; Cic. Nat. D. 2.77) and the universe (cf. Ep. 71.12; 92.30; Cic. Nat. D. 
1.37). He is benevolent (cf. 2.27.1; Ben. 2.29.6, 4.5.1; Clem. 1.19.9; Ep. 95.47), acts as a 
father/guardian to the universe (cf. Ben. 2.29.4; Ep. 58.27-8; 73.15; Prov. 1.5, 2.6, 2.7, 4.7; 
Cic. Nat. D. 2.60, 164; Plut. Mor. 1065E-F).  
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and the good example which a virtuous man provides is how to command 
truly unwavering respect. 
 
Nonetheless, there is common agreement among Stoics, Peripatetics and 
Epicureans that anger involves a sense of undeserved injury (cf. 2.31.1-3). 
Chrysippus characterised anger as ‘the desire to take vengeance against 
one who is believed to have committed a wrong contrary to one’s deserts’ 
(Stob. Ecl. 2.91.10 (SVF 3.395). Cf. Diog. Laert. 7.113). 351 For Aristotle, 
anger is defined as an impulse with pain for revenge to correct a slight either 
to a man or his friends and must be directed at an individual (Arist. Rh. 
1378a31ff.). Seneca agrees with Aristotle’s definition of anger involving 
slight, pain to self or those with whom a man is intimate and the desire for 
revenge or payback, ‘auida poenae est’ (1.5.3). He admits that there is little 
difference between the Schools’ belief that ‘anger is the strong desire to 
return pain to pain — iram esse cupiditatem doloris reponendi’ (1.3.3). 
Similarly, the Epicureans believe that a reasonable motive for anger is being 
intentionally harmed or the perception that this has been the case (Phld. Ir. 
40.32-5) and that it can be caused by feelings of alienation and hatred (cf. 
Phld. Ir. 41.40-42.3).352  
 
Seneca recognises that anger is born from an error in judgement 
surrounding injury, often from minor incidents, for instance, personal insults, 
physical assault, prevention from goal attainment, damage to belongings, 
teasing or nagging, blame, unfairness, neglect, condescension and 
incompetence, leading to more serious attacks.353 Anger is the belief that 
having been wronged, it is right to respond in an aggressive way (2.1.3). In 
some instances, ira is prompted by feelings of potential harm (1.3.1. Cf. 
2.26.1): at other times, by others failing to meet expectations of them (3.6.4). 
In both instances, anger is the result of someone, or something, 
disappointing expectations and causing emotional frustration. Where the 
schools disagree is over how to respond to slights. In short, the Peripatetics 
                                                          
351 Translated by Konstan (2015) p. 176. 
352 Cf. Asmis (2011). 
353 Cf. 1.12.4, 2.2.2, 2.25.1, 2.26.2, 3.33.1-4, 3.34.1, 3.37.4. 
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insist that any injury to an individual or another person should be responded 
to for the sake of personal honour and self-respect. The Epicureans agree 
with the Peripatetics that an angry response is necessary for self-
preservation and they allow even their wise men to have this reaction.354 
They recognise that while the passion itself is evil because it is painful, with 
certain dispositions when it is the result of an insight into the nature of 
something and it is without misjudgements, anger can be good (Phld. Ir. 
38.18-22, 33ff.). A Stoic does not allow anger under any circumstances and 
would see any perceived ‘attack’ upon him as ‘indifferent’ because it does 
not impact on his pursuit of virtue (Constant. 2.3-3.4). He believes that the 
best practical response is to ‘turn a blind eye’ and protects himself from 
future attacks by not allowing other people’s actions to disturb him. This is 
the lesson which Seneca communicates in De Ira and De Clementia. 
 
When acknowledging different philosophical outlooks, Seneca will not 
outline the differences between Aristotle and himself but notes a criticism 
that may be levied against both philosophers that animals’ anger is not the 
result of injury, nor is it seeking punishment, because they are not capable 
of this rationale (1.3.3).355 Other references in De Ira show the areas in 
which Seneca disagrees with Aristotle and reinforce his attempts to distance 
himself from the Peripatetic views of passions, which, over time, were 
becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish from those of the Stoa.356 For 
example, Seneca was particularly concerned about the Peripatetics’ 
association of pleasure with anger, its relation with virtue and its usefulness. 
In his definition, Aristotle referred to the pleasure which comes from anger 
after seeking vengeance (Arist. Rh. 1378b. Cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. 1117a6ff.). 
                                                          
354 This view is founded on Epicurus’ claim that the Sage is more susceptible than others 
to passions without impeding his wisdom (Diog. Laert. 10.117). Later Epicureans debated 
whether the Sage was susceptible to all forms of anger (see Phld. Ir. 40.30-40). Cf. Phld. 
Ir. 36.13-5, 38.1-6, 39.7, 40.26ff., 41.17-25, 42.2-11, 43.18-24, 45.5-15, 47.27-39; Asmis 
(2011) p. 152. 
355 Aristotle insisted that in the absence of the capacity to think, animals are unable to 
distinguish between good and evil and justice and injustice. Consequently, they do not 
experience passions, only bodily sensations relating to pleasure and pain cf. De an. 
414b18-9, 415a7-9; 427b6-14, 427b8-14, 428a18-24, 434a5-11. Cf. Fortenbaugh (1975) 
p. 67; Sandbach (1985). For whether animals suffer passions, see pp. 59-60. 
356 Boal (1972) notes the difficulties which Seneca faces in distinguishing himself from 
Aristotle and his followers because of ‘the problem of justifying his opposition to a 
philosopher whose reputation was considerable’ (pp. 65-6). 
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Epicureans also believe there is pleasure in ‘empty anger’. The irascible 
man may experience pleasure from vengeance, but the correct ‘natural 
anger’ of the Epicurean Sage does not incorporate pleasure in punishment 
and the lust for vengeance is appropriately absent (Phld. Ir. 44.15-22). For 
Seneca, anger and pleasure are distinct passions, with the former bearing 
no relation to virtue and having no use (1.9.1) and the pleasure that comes 
from anger is transformed into cruelty (2.5). Seneca agrees with the 
commonly held Stoic view that passions are harmful and does not accept 
that they involve pleasure, particularly as anger is so destructive, and 
agrees that good and evil cannot co-exist (cf. 1.8.3).357  
 
Is anger natural? 
When considering the appropriateness of anger, it is necessary for Seneca 
to consider the relationship between ira and nature to justify the need for its 
removal (1.5.1f.). The role of nature in human lives is significant in ancient 
ethical theories, particularly for Stoicism, which based the idea of living well 
and virtuously on living in accordance with individual and universal nature – 
‘secundum naturam’ – which is synonymous with reason.358 To defend the 
necessity of removing ira, Seneca promises Novatus that he will address 
the questions of whether anger is in accordance with nature, and whether it 
is expedient or necessary in certain conditions (1.5.1). This is an important 
concern as Cicero inquired how something can be regarded as being in 
accordance with nature when it objects to reason (Cic. Tusc. 4.79). It is 
necessary for Seneca to address this issue in order to establish his views 
in relation to the philosophers he wishes to refute. Seneca agrees with the 
view that the Stoic Sage, the sort of person which everyone should strive to 
be, is not moved by passions and therefore anger cannot be natural.  
 
When considering how Seneca understands what constitutes nature, it is 
helpful to consider other philosophical schools’ perspectives on the subject, 
particularly those of the Epicureans and Aristotelians and how they differ. 
                                                          
357 Cf. 1.4.9, 1.9.1, 1.10.1, 1.13.4-5, 1.20.2ff., 1.21.3, 2.6.1-2, 2.12.2. 
358 Cf. Cic. Fin. 3.26, 3.30; Diog. Laert. 7.87ff.; Stob. Ecl. 2.7.6e. For secundum naturam, 
see pp. 12-4.  
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While the relation of anger to nature remains an important consideration for 
the Epicureans, they view it differently to Stoic philosophers. They 
distinguish two different forms of anger which are bad and good accordingly. 
‘Empty anger’ is based on false beliefs, it is evil and destructive, whereas 
‘natural anger’, which affects all men, including the Epicurean Sage,359 
involves the proper assessment of the injury and is both necessary and 
good (cf. Phld. Ir. 37.20ff., 40.7, 40.10).360 Anger is considered to be natural 
in four ways in reference to the biological and cognitive components. Firstly, 
anger is advantageous, its absence is harmful and therefore unnatural 
(Phld. Ir. 39.26-38). Secondly, it derives from and accords with the correct 
understanding of things and the accurate appraisal of factors involved in 
anger-provoking situations (Phld. Ir. 37.20-38.9). Thirdly, it is a ‘sound, 
unperfected reaction to intentional offence.’361 Finally, it is unavoidable like 
pain and death (Phld. Ir. 40.17-22).  
 
From an Epicurean perspective, in the case of ‘natural anger’, it is evil not 
to be susceptible to it: without it, there is no protection or self-defence, both 
of which are considered to be goods according to the Epicureans. A man 
with a good disposition does not have wrong opinions about losses and 
punishment.362 Indeed, for great men, some forms of anger are unavoidable 
and all humans are vulnerable to anger, as they are to pain and death. By 
contrast, the anger of an irascible man is not natural because it is caused 
by false beliefs: about the offender, the magnitude of the offence and 
appropriate revenge (Phld. Ir. 6.14-5). These errors in thinking are 
responsible for long term, repeated and hereditary anger (Phld. Ir. 30.13-
24), especially anger that is violent and intense (Phld. Ir. 44.5-10). When 
anger takes this form, a man does not listen to the offender’s defence, partly 
because of false beliefs about the situation (Phld. Ir. 23.20-4). Such a man 
is advised against political participation because he is unable to keep 
                                                          
359 Cf. Phld. Ir. 40.17ff., 40.26-41.8, 41.17-25. 
360 Cf. Armstrong (2008) pp. 100-4. 
361 Cf. Tsouna (2007a) p. 225.  
362 Asmis (2011) recognises that the emphasis on losses (in reference to the self and 
others) in relation to anger ‘is not found in other analyses of anger’ (p.164). 
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secrets and may involve himself in conspiracies (Phld. Ir. 25.15-21).363 The 
irascible man is incapable of forming even superficial relationships or 
sustaining ordinary interaction (Phld. Ir. 21.20-40) and his anti-social 
behaviour leads to theft of his belongings (Phld. Ir. 22.24ff.) and a life of 
intense loneliness (Phld. Ir. 22.27-8). Anger from irascibility is a ‘merciless, 
savage, and harsh disposition… to which the emotion is conjoined’ (Phld. 
Ir. 27.19-23). These views of anger are in line with Seneca’s insistence that 
ira is not compatible with a harmonious community. 
 
In comparison, Aristotle was less concerned with the division of anger into 
types. Instead, in a general sense, contrary to the opinions of Seneca, he 
believed not only that anger was good, but that, in certain forms, it was 
necessary for virtue. He argued that the excess of anger is ‘a kind of 
irascibility’ (Arist. Eth. Nic. 1125b29), the deficiency is ‘a kind of inirascibility’ 
(Arist. Eth. Nic. 1126a4) and the mean – the virtue – is ‘good temper’ or 
‘mildness’ (Arist. Eth. Nic. 1108a5-9).364 Good temper involves a stable 
disposition which has the ability to display anger, for its own sake, 
recognising that it is correct to do so on a particular occasion: (Arist. Eth. 
Nic. 1125b32). Such moderation is considered an ethical virtue necessary 
for eudaimonia: those who are not angry when they should be are 
considered fools (Arist. Eth. Nic. 1126a5). In this respect, Aristotle’s good 
man must, by definition, be capable of anger as acceptance of or 
overlooking insults to oneself, family or friends is ‘slavish’ (Arist. Eth. Nic. 
1126a9). This is because achieving vengeance is considered to be a way of 
redressing the balance and re-establishing one’s power and status in light 
of an inappropriate slight. Good temper is ruled by reason which directs 
passions appropriately and, in the case of anger, most significantly without 
being vengeful: a good man is only angered by those who ought to show 
him respect and do not.  
 
                                                          
363 Cf. Phld. Ir. 14.29-33, 26.14-25. 
364 Vernezze (2007) describes Aristotelian anger as lying between ‘uncontrolled rage and 
imperturbable equanimity’ (p.6). 
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Having established the different philosophical perspectives about anger, I 
return to Seneca’s understanding of its naturalness. He compares the ideal 
of human nature with the reality of anger. He contrasts anger with the natural 
state of man who is calm, loving, and helpful, to conclude that as anger is 
its opposite it cannot be in accordance with nature because humans are 
born to give and receive assistance whereas anger serves to destroy 
(1.5.2).365 In contrast, anger is focused on punishment (1.5.3) but lacks 
fairness and justice in the ways it is carried out. While other base passions 
only affect the worst man, anger comes to even those who are most 
enlightened and otherwise sane (3.5.1). An individual’s disposition and their 
environment also affect whether and how they become angry. Specific 
personality types and groups of people prove an important philosophical 
concern when understanding the nature of passions because by focusing 
on anger’s manifestation, it is possible to gain a greater understanding of its 
nature, which is necessary when considering if and how it can be avoided. 
There are certain people who are more prone to anger such as the 
inherently brave and sturdy, for instance the Germans and Scythians, 
before they become softened by discipline (2.15.1-2). This echoes 
Chrysippus’ belief that some people are more prone to disease, including 
sickness of mind (Gal. PHP 5.2.3. Cf. Ep. 94.13; Cic. Tusc. 4.28).  
 
Chrysippus believed that the atmospheric conditions of where individuals 
live impact on their character, for instance the Athenians are intelligent 
because of the rarified air and Thebans are overweight because of the air’s 
density (Cic. Fat. 7).366 Posidonius too was interested in the atmospheric 
effect on people’s mental states arguing that the mixture of elements affects 
individual’s characters (Gal. PHP 5.5.23). Seneca adopts these views when 
he emphasises the environmental impact on men and shows how anger 
affects people differently and describes how, typically, nations who have 
empires are from milder climates and those who live in the North have 
savage tempers (2.15.5). The physical effects of anger are discussed in the 
                                                          
365 Cf. 2.10.8, 2.31.7, 3.5.6; Clem. 1.3.2, 1.25, 2.5.3, 6.3; Cic. Fin. 3.62ff.; Cic. Off. 1.11-12, 
158, 2.73.  
366 Cf. Cic. Nat. D. 2.17, 42-3. 
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other philosophical disciplines which influence their understanding of ira. 
Notably, Aristotle offered an important ‘scientific’ understanding of the 
causes of anger and its definition as: ‘the boiling of the blood and hot stuff 
round the heart’ (De an. 403a30).367 These views influenced later 
understandings of anger. For instance, some Stoics, such as Chrysippus 
and Posidonius, argued anger is aroused in the breast by blood boiling 
around the heart (which is the warmest part of the body) because it is here 
where Stoics located mental activity, including passions (Ir. 2.19.3).368 
Seneca adopts this understanding of natural phenomena when he 
introduces a physics element in his psychological discussion. He explains 
that the four elements (fire, water, air and earth) have matching properties 
(hot, cold, dry and moist) and the mingling of these create certain characters 
(2.19.1-3). Characters are determined by the dominant element, for 
instance, ardent minds are naturally vulnerable to wrathfulness (2.19.1) and 
fiery constitutions create wrathful men because ‘fire is active and 
stubborn/actuosus et pertinax ignis’ (2.19.2).  
 
The dominating element and natural tendency towards ira varies according 
to age and condition. For instance, old men are testy and querulous, as are 
invalids and convalescents and people whose heat has been drained either 
by exhaustion or by loss of blood (2.19.4). This is an extension of Aristotle’s 
belief that certain bodily conditions lead to a predisposition to anger (Arist. 
De an. 403a21-404). He argued that the pain or frame of mind one is in prior 
to anger is a decisive factor as to whether anger will erupt (cf. Arist. Rh. 
1379a10ff.).369 For example, people who are ill, distressed or frustrated are 
likelier to lose their tempers (Arist. Rh. 1379a16-8). External factors which 
affect the state of the body include alcohol, sickness or injury, exhaustion, 
anxiety and love affairs (2.19.5-20.1). There is the additional problem of the 
prevalence of vice in humans (2.9.1). People are, to various degrees, 
inconsiderate, unthinking, untrustworthy, discontented, ambitious, wicked 
and intolerant of faults in other people that are shared (3.26.4). Even in 
                                                          
367 Translated by Ackrill (1987) p. 163. 
368 Cf. Gal. PHP 2.2.8, 2.7.10-11, 3.2.7, 3.5.27-8, 5.1.1-3. 
369 Cf. Stocker and Hegeman (1996) p. 279.  
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institutions designed for justice, evils are present: the courthouses at the 
forum are full of debased acts, criminals and base lawyers (2.7.3). There 
are as many vices in public places such as the forum, polling-places and 
the Circus as there are people (2.8.1. Cf. 2.10.4; Ep. 7).  
 
Can anger be moderate? 
Seneca rebukes the argument that passion is useful when moderate and 
states that: ‘a moderate passion is simply a moderate evil — modicus 
adfectus nihil aliud quam malum modicum est’ (1.10.4. Cf. Ep. 85.9-10).370 
He disagrees with the Peripatetics who believe passions can be moderated 
(1.7.1. Cf. Ep.116.1) and with Posidonius who also entertained the idea of 
degrees of vice and passions (Gal. PHP 4.5.31-5). Cicero outlined the 
Peripatetic idea that there is a ‘limit’ beyond which people should not 
proceed, but describes this view as being ‘feeble and unmanly/mollis et 
enervata’. This is because, by definition, there should and cannot be a limit 
to a fault (Cic. Tusc. 4.38).371 In addition, when in the throes of passion, it is 
not possible to stop any more than it is to halt when running down a hill 
(2.35.2. Cf. Ep. 40.7).372 Instead, Seneca argues in absolute terms that all 
anger should be banished because it is not profitable (2.13.3).373 The 
absence of anger makes it easier to remove crimes, punish the wicked and 
guide them on the straight path, all in a more just manner. The Sage can 
accomplish his duties without evil and does not associate himself with 
anything which requires cautious care (2.13.3). This sentiment is later 
repeated when Seneca demands that anger is entirely extirpated from the 
roots to prevent it from returning (3.42.1). A sensible public man would not 
become angry if insulted, because to do so would be an offence to one’s 
dignity.374 Seneca insists that anger should be abolished for two particular 
reasons. Firstly, it is easier to remove than rule passions (1.7.2. Cf. 1.8.1ff.) 
                                                          
370 However, Seneca implies that grief can be moderated cf. Ep. 63.1; Marc. 7.1-2; Poly. 
4.3, 18.5-6. Cf. Manning (1974) p. 71. 
371 Cf. Cic. Tusc. 3.22, 4.39-42; Plut. Mor. 443C. 
372 Cf. Cic. Tusc. 4.41-2. For Chrysippus’ analogy of a runner unable to stop, see p. 67. 
373 Cf. Cic. Tusc. 3.13, 4.43, 4.57. 
374 Cf. Harris (2001, 2004) p. 221.  
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and secondly, reason only maintains control when it is separated from 
passions (1.7.3). 
 
Is anger powerful? 
Seneca seeks to refute the belief that anger is powerful. An unnamed 
interlocutor argues that anger is beneficial because it offers protection from 
being despised and intimidates wicked people (2.11.1). However, Seneca 
argues in the same passage that if the power of anger is equal to its threats, 
it is to be hated as much as it is terrible because it is more dangerous to be 
feared than scorned. But if anger is powerless, it is more likely to arouse 
contempt and ridicule. Nothing is sillier and feebler than anger ‘huffing and 
puffing/tumultuante’ (2.11.1) and despite the powerful effect anger has over 
its victims, it is not itself powerful (1.17.4). Seneca compares ira with natural 
elements and claims that like the wind, which appears powerful, anger is 
only short-lived in its strength (1.17.4. Cf. QNat. 5.8). While anger starts 
forcefully, it ceases in exhaustion so that by the time one comes to avenge, 
it is weak (cf. 1.17.5-1.17.6) making it a feminine and childish vice (1.20.3. 
Cf. Plut. Mor. 458D). Anger may be universally destructive, cause dramatic 
personality changes and loss of control, but it is not powerful in the abstract. 
It is given power by the agent and thus its ‘power’ can also be removed or 
never granted in the first place, which is exactly what Stoics achieve by 
stopping anger arising at the point of pre-passions.  
 
Anger first explicitly appears in De Clementia with reference to women and 
to add emphasis to the second-class status of females he compares them 
to wild beasts (Clem. 1.5.5).375 As ‘everything weak is by nature given to 
complaint — inualidum omne natura querulum est’ (1.13.5), it produces 
inconsistent behaviour (3.35.1ff.). Again, Seneca uses animal metaphors to 
explain the nature of anger comparing it with the venom of the snake which 
starts charged but is drained after several bites (1.17.6. Cf. 2.5.3). Anger 
lacks a solid foundation and is liable to fall as it is based on nothing stable 
or lasting: it is empty and puffed up (1.20.2. Cf. 1.17.2). Consequently, 
                                                          
375 Cf. Harris (2003) pp. 130ff. 
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anger achieves little and leads men to behave in a foolish, undignified 
manner (2.26.2), whether it is manifested in the kicking of chairs or 
becoming angered at inanimate objects (1.19.4) or the gods (2.27.1) or the 
weather (2.27.2) or animals (Clem. 1.17.1).376 This reinforces the madness 
of anger and the fact that it robs men of common sense and the responses 
provided by reason (2.26.3).377  
 
Anger and the Sage  
The qualities of a good man and the Sage illustrate the alternatives to anger, 
presenting a man who neither harms himself nor other people (cf. Cic. Tusc. 
3.19; Diog. Laert. 7.123). Such a man experiences no pity: he chastises and 
punishes where necessary because he is just (Diog. Laert. 7.123). A good 
man, by definition, will always act appropriately in a calm, deliberated 
manner. He will avenge the murder of family members, not through grief, 
but because it is the right thing to do (1.12.1-2. Cf. 1.12.5). He will not hate 
an angry man because he recognises that the latter is acting out of error. 
The good man’s regular self-reflection has made him realise that he too errs 
and that it is right to judge others by the same standards (1.14.2). Seneca 
concludes that it is more humane to recognise individuals’ weaknesses and 
be compassionate to others who err by responding with kindness and 
fatherly love (1.14.3).  
 
Epicureans take a different view. While their Sage never experiences bad 
‘empty anger’, he does experience ‘natural anger’, which is compatible with 
moral perfection.378 Their Sage resorts to anger to forestall the aggressor or 
to save a friend from being harmed or harming himself.379 He never 
becomes very angry, as he is never very hurt, because he does not attach 
value to externals.380 The Sage differs from the ordinary man as he does 
                                                          
376 Despite the value Aristotle attached to anger, even he recognised that there can be 
errors arising because of it cf. Arist. Eth. Eud. 1149a24-31, 1223b18-25, 1125b26-
1126b10; Arist. Pol. 1312b26-8. 
377 Vivid examples of similar behaviour of the enraged man can be found throughout Phld. 
Ir. 10.19-26, 12.22-5, 12.33-40, 13.3-11, 26.4-27 cf. Tsouna (2007a) pp. 213-4.  
378 Cf. Phld. Ir. 36.13-5, 38.1-6, 39.7, 45.5-15; Tsouna (2011) pp. 195-6. 
379 Cf. Phld. Ir. 40.26-41.8, 41.17-25. 
380 Cf. Phld. Ir. 42.2-11, 43.18-24, 47.27-39. 
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not suffer their mental disturbance and remains tranquil when angry.381 In 
contrast to the Epicurean ideal, the Stoic Sage avoids anger because it 
would never cease as its sources are abundant (2.6.3. Cf. 2.7-9). He 
understands the injustice and danger of becoming angry at universal 
sinners (2.10.4) and acknowledges that prior to perfection he was a sinner, 
making the common errors of youthfulness (3.25.2. Cf. 2.10.6; Clem. 1.6.4). 
An example of such moral progression is illustrated by Augustus, who in his 
youth was: ‘hot-headed, he blazed with anger/caluit, arsit ira’ and regretted 
his conduct when he was older (Clem. 1.11.1). Augustus illustrates the 
possibility of character reformation, such as in his leniency towards Lucius 
Cinna who had plotted his assassination (ibid. 1.9) and he became more 
angry with himself for stirring up irrational emotional responses than with 
the subject (ibid. 1.9.5). This example illustrates how Seneca is 
demonstrating that anger can be managed, and this is the correct approach 
to take towards passions.382 
 
Nonetheless, the Stoic Sage is still slightly moved physically by wrong-doers 
because he experiences pre-passions which leave scars on his mind (cf. 
Ep. 74.31; Plut. Mor. 449A). His skin may be grazed by an external event, 
and he may be moved, like a light breath of wind, but this will not affect his 
excellence (Ep. 72.5) which is like the other side of the moon that is always 
calm (Ep. 59.16). He will experience the ‘shadows/umbras’ of passion but 
not passion itself, proving it is possible not to advance from the first stages 
of adfectus (1.16.7. Cf. 2.4.2). The Sage does not become angry because 
he does not attach value to externals (cf. Ep. 85; Constant. 5.5). The Sage 
will apply force, not anger, to situations that require strong measures. This 
could be interpreted as Seneca’s contribution to a necessary revision of his 
contemporary penal system in terms of how justice and punishment were 
played out.383 However, these views conflict with those of the Peripatetic, 
Theophrastus of Eresos, who appears as an interlocutor claiming that good 
                                                          
381 Cf. Phld. Ir. 40.3-4. 
382 Cf. Chapter Three passim. 
383 Cf. Harris (2001, 2004) pp. 220-3. 
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men are angered when their beloved are injured (1.12.3).384 Seneca 
suggests that this implies people believe their actions when influenced by 
passions are correct, which is contrary to his personal stance on the subject. 
Later in the dialogue, Theophrastus comments that good man must be 
angry with bad men, suggesting that the better someone is, the angrier they 
would be. Seneca says it is the opposite. The perfect man is the most 
peaceful, most free from passion and least prone to hatred (1.14.1).385 Like 
the Sage, men can become invulnerable and above all suffering.386 Then 
they would not be injured nor become angry. By pursuing the ideal of the 
Sage and specifically, controlling one’s feelings and preventing passions 
such as anger from arising, people too could benefit from the Sage’s way of 
thinking and behaving and thus achieve tranquillitas.  
 
There is a Stoic paradox that only the Sage is a king because only he 
possesses the art of ruling (SVF 3.694-700).387 Chrysippus argues that the 
absolute rule of kingship should be the responsibility of Sages alone (cf. 
Diog. Laert. 7.122);388 a view which Seneca confirms when he quotes 
Posidonius’ view of sovereignty in the Golden Age (cf. Ep. 90.5ff.). It is 
natural for a Sage to be a ruler, particularly because he never becomes 
angry (ibid. 2.6.3). He does not respond to provocation or attach value to 
externals and experiences constantiae not adfectus.389 In De Clementia, 
Seneca discusses exactly how the Sage would rule. He considers whether 
the Sage pardons (Clem. 2.7.1), discusses the distinction between pardon 
                                                          
384 Theophrastus’ recorded interests ranged widely from botany to biology and physics to 
ethics and metaphysics. Most relevant to Seneca are his views on ethics where he 
conflicted most with Stoicism. He insists that happiness depends on external influences as 
well as on virtue and claimed in the Callisthenes that ‘life is ruled by fortune, not wisdom’ a 
stance repelled by Stoics. While Seneca may have been using him as a representative of 
Aristotle’s views, he did differ fundamentally from his tutor, for example, in his definitions of 
pleasure (cf. Diog. Laert. 5.40-41, 44).  
385 While Cooper and Procopé (1995) question the accuracy of the quotations because they 
are not found in Theophrastus’ extant texts (p. 30 n. 29). However it is expressed, Seneca 
insists that the Peripatetic view conflicts with Stoicism and is incorrect (1.12.3).  
386 Cf. Clem. 2.5.4; Ep. 9.2-4; 22.15; 66.18ff.; 72.4. 
387 Cf. Young (1935). 
388 Cf. Stob. Ecl. 2.7 108, 26 (SVF 3.617). 
389 Frede (1986) describes the Sage’s relationship with feelings: ‘Thus the Stoic sage does 
not gain his equanimity by shedding human concerns, but by coming to realise what these 
concerns are meant to be, and hence what they ought to be, namely the means by which 
nature maintains its natural, rational order’ (p. 110). 
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and clemency (ibid. 2.7.3), shows the practicality of Stoic advice to a ruler 
and explains how the Sage shows no pity (ibid. 2.5.4. Cf. ibid. 2.6.2). 
Instead, he will assist others as he was: ‘born to benefit the community and 
for the common good — in commune auxilium natus ac bonum publicum’ 
(ibid. 2.6.3). The Stoic Sage is not vengeful, angry or distressed by an 
attack: he knows that it is the attitude towards the event that is significant, 
not whether the attack actually occurs. This example teaches how by 
changing one’s opinion about a situation, anger can be avoided.  
 
The question of the usefulness of anger 
Anger’s use in warfare 
The most prevalent argument in favour of anger is that it is useful. This is 
held by Aristotle and his followers and shared in part by the Epicureans. 
Aristotle believes that anger is useful and necessary in warfare as a 
motivation for action (1.7.1).390 Seneca paraphrases Aristotle’s argument 
that anger is necessary for victory and it must dominate the mind and urge 
the spirit (1.9.2. Cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. 1116b23-1117a9).391 Aristotle promoted 
the corrective value of anger and considers that it is necessary for justice. 
He believed that appropriate anger is protective because it enables defence 
of self, friends and family from being treated as worthless and from having 
their goals hindered and that this is a good thing (Eth. Nic. 1125b27-
1126a32).392 Stoics, on the other hand, believe that justice and protection 
can be achieved without this vice and virtue is necessary to secure these.  
 
Aristotle is ascribed the view that certain passions can be used as weapons, 
whereas Seneca argues that this cannot be the case. This is because, by 
definition, passions cannot be controlled and put aside on demand (1.17.1). 
They can only be prevented from arising. Later, Aristotle is described by 
Seneca as a defender and preserver of anger, claiming that without it the 
mind will become defenceless, sluggish and indifferent to ambition (3.3.1). 
Similarly, while trying to reassure his brother Novatus that criticism of anger 
                                                          
390 Cf. Cic. Tusc. 4.43, 4.48-52; Phld. Ir. 31.24-34.6. 
391 Cooper and Procopé (1995) p. 27, n. 24. 
392 Cf. Eth. Nic. 1117a6ff.; Arist. Rh. 1378b, 1379a. 
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is an important subject, Seneca mentions a ‘distinguished 
philosopher/aliquis et quidem de inlustribus philosophis’ which is universally 
accepted to be Aristotle, ascribing to anger a function in the state because 
it is useful and motivating for war or for that which requires eagerness 
(3.3.5). Seneca uses the example of one of Aristotle’s pupils, Alexander the 
Great, as a negative portrayal of anger to demonstrate how the king does 
not manage his passions. For instance, when in c328BC Alexander stabbed 
his closest oldest friend, Clitus, in the middle of a banquet and threw his 
bodyguard Lysimachus to a lion (3.17.1). This is possibly to suggest a 
connection between the philosopher’s unsound views of anger and the 
king’s behaviour as well as illustrating, through a known exemplum, why it 
is important to fully comprehend the true nature of ira and the methods 
through which it can be managed.  
 
For Seneca, anger is never acceptable and even when people need to be 
roused, for example, in the law courts and in oratory, only feigned anger 
should be used because it is important not to have disruptive anger in these 
contexts where reason is so important to facilitate appropriate judgements 
where justice is demanded (2.14.1. Cf. 2.17.1).393 This might be interpreted 
to suggest that righteous anger has a place to achieve goals, and is 
therefore useful, for example to persuade someone of the correct way to 
think and behave when they are otherwise being unreasonable. However, 
although such an approach is a possibility for other philosophers, the usual 
Stoic view is that anger is not a helpful passion and that it is possible to 
achieve better results without it. Seneca notes that men respect level-
headedness (3.41.2 Cf. 1.12.5). The interlocutor shares Peripatetic beliefs 
that a mind devoid of anger is inert (2.17.2). However, Seneca refutes such 
a claim. Virtue is self-sufficient, ‘the supreme good calls for no practical aids 
from outside — Summum bonum extrinsecus instrumenta non quaerit’ (Ep. 
9.15) and nature provides everything humans require (Ep. 90.16). When 
there is need for violence the mind can provide the necessary motivation 
                                                          
393 Cf. Cic. Tusc. 4.55. In a similar vein, Philodemus noted that it is possible to have the 
appearance of irascibility without being an irascible person (Phld. Ir. 34.16, 34.30-6, 34.39-
35.5). This is the case of a Sage when rebuking pupils for their improvement (Phld. Ir. 
35.17-40).  
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without passion but using reason instead which is impossible in anger 
(1.9.1. Cf. 1.17.2).394  
 
Anger does not make men more warlike: if that were true it would be the 
same for drunkenness and madness, which make men bold and powerful 
in the same way (1.13.3). Indeed, anger hinders the success of fighting 
because, although it is the most eager for vengeance of the passions, it is 
‘too hasty and witless/praerapida et amens’ and creates destruction from 
calm (1.12.5). As a passion, anger causes rash, disordered thinking which 
distorts rational assessments and strategic planning rather than a reasoned, 
pragmatic approach necessary for successful assault, as is evidenced by 
the failures in angry barbarians and gladiators (1.11.1. Cf. 1.11.8). Seneca 
insists that, to ensure no one mistakenly believes that anger at a certain 
time and place is profitable: ‘its unbridled, lunatic frenzy must be made plain 
— ostendenda est rabies eius effrenata’ (3.3.6). Cicero makes a similar 
point when he rhetorically asked whether insanity can be useful (Cic. Tusc. 
4.79). The question arises as to whether in emotive situations, anger is an 
important motivator to prompt change, to counteract a grievance, to instil 
order among barbarians or to protect one’s country. If anger is not 
necessary or appropriate, an alternative must exist. For Stoics, these are 
‘good feelings’ or constantiae which are grounded in reason and reflect the 
true good, including joy, caution and wishing, all of which are appropriate 
feelings based on true beliefs (cf. Ep. 23.4-6). Action depends on 
experiencing some feeling or want to respond to a situation to create 
improvement of the current state of affairs, be it in the personal or public 
realm. In principle, the Stoic love of mankind and their goal to encourage 
rational behaviour is sufficient motivation for all action.  
 
Seneca’s disagreement with Aristotelians over the usefulness of anger is 
also echoed by the Epicureans, and Philodemus attacks Aristotelians for 
encouraging anger (Phld. Ir. 31.24-34.6). Philodemus believed that it is 
possible to fight bravely and defeat an enemy without anger (Phld. Ir. 32.36) 
                                                          
394 Cf. Cic. Tusc. 4.49-50; van Hoof (2007) pp. 67-8. 
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and that someone is more likely to suffer injury if fighting in anger (Phld. Ir. 
32.39). He continued to argue that angry soldiers are incautious and 
therefore weakened (Phld. Ir. 32.39-33.7), are more likely to disobey their 
general (Phld. Ir. 33.25-8), cause damage and be reckless (Phld. Ir. 33.28-
34). Indeed, empty anger makes vengeance and punishment difficult to 
carry out (Phld. Ir. 33.18-20). In addition, anger hinders philosophical 
development (Phld. Ir. 18.35-40). The irascible student is hypersensitive to 
any criticism, even when it is constructive (Phld. Ir. 19.17-25) and becomes 
so obsessed with vengeance that he is unable to concentrate on his studies 
or improve his character (Phld. Ir. 19.1-8). He becomes engulfed by 
suspicion (Phld. Ir. 21-5) and cannot participate in the common intellectual 
and moral life demanded by the philosophical School (Phld. Ir. 19.25-22.2). 
Similarly, it is not possible to be irascible and a good teacher (Phld. Ir. 20.18-
27). These challenges to the Peripatetic view and the negative 
consequences of anger on which they are based reinforce the importance 
of identifying anger’s limitations on functionality as rational beings, thus 
reinforcing the need for their removal. 
 
Anger’s use in punishment 
In the same way anger is unhelpful in warfare, it has no proper place in just 
punishment and therefore serves no use. The focus of anger is the 
punishment of the offender to avenge apparent injury. Not only is the 
judgement erroneous, so too is carrying out punishment in anger. The 
Epicureans insist that punishment should not be used for revenge or to gain 
pleasure: the Sage punishes to remedy himself for losses inflicted upon 
him.395 Seneca disagrees: anger is never honourable. Whereas kindness 
warrants kindness in return, this is not the case with injuries. Although 
vengeance is inhumane but is commonly accepted as legitimate, Seneca 
argues that taking revenge is still wrong even when it is less severe than 
the original injury (2.32.1). Agreeing with Plato (Leg. 11.934A), Seneca 
proposes that the purpose of punishment is to improve or remove the 
                                                          
395 Men imitate the heroes of myth and gods in anger, even without realising it, when 
seeking revenge for the sake of honour (Phld. Ir. 14.1-6; Cf. Zeus, Phld. Ir. 16.12, 43.3; 
Dionysus, Phld. Ir. 16.24; Apollo and Artemis, Phld. Ir. 16.19-24). For anger in the 
Epicurean Sage, see Tsouna (2007a) pp. 228-30; Asmis (2011) p. 165. 
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wicked because punishment should take forward-looking measures to 
improve future conduct.396 This view is based on the assumption that people 
may very well intend to commit crime, but the penal system operates on the 
assumption that they can be reformed (2.31.8). The good man would only 
publicly kill someone to make them an example to deter others or as a last 
resort if they were unsaveable, while in other circumstances they may be 
exiled (1.19.7. Cf. 1.16.3, 2.31.8). This is the goal for a Sage (Stoic or 
Epicurean) when exacting punishment. Consequently, the punisher 
requires reason and good judgement, neither of which is present in anger, 
which is a ‘failure of the mind/delictum animi’ (1.16.1). Ira has no place in a 
fair judicial system because it perverts the correct assessment of individual 
cases and hinders just sentencing and punishment. People should act like 
a doctor (who never becomes angry with his patient (1.15.1)), a message 
Seneca conveys in De Clementia where he argues that the need for a good 
doctor to cure mental failings can be extended to the need for a good ruler 
(Clem. 1.17.1).  
 
In the final book of De Ira, Seneca recalls Plato’s response to his anger 
towards his slave to demonstrate that it is possible to control behaviour and 
that this is necessary considering how anger hinders prescribing justice, 
indicating that it is not useful (3.12.5ff.). When angered by his slave, Plato 
was determined to beat him and ordered him to remove his shirt. As soon 
as he realised he was angry, Plato stopped, leaving his hand with a whip 
floating in the air. When later asked by a friend what he was doing, he 
claimed to be punishing an angry man (3.12.5). The story continues that 
Plato forgot about the slave because he was so angry with himself that he 
was more anxious to punish himself. He relinquished his power over his 
household and when he was angry in the future, Plato asked Speusippus 
(his philosopher nephew) to beat the slave (3.12.6).397 Seneca concludes 
that Plato did not strike as he was angry because, although this is the reason 
for others to use violence, the philosopher believed that in anger he would 
                                                          
396 Cf. Harris (2001, 2004) pp. 317-31. 
397 For alternative versions of the story, see Diog. Laert. 3.38-9; Plut. Mor. 1108A; Val. Max. 
4.1. (ext.) 2a. 
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do more than he should, with great satisfaction, and the slave should not 
have a master who cannot control himself (3.12.7). Using Plato as an 
example, Seneca argues that no man should punish when angry and 
nothing should be lawful in anger because then everything would be lawful. 
He chooses the examples of Plato and Socrates as renowned philosophers 
as authorities for his arguments. 
 
Anger as a motivation for punishment is not useful in ascribing fair 
punishment because while it may satisfy the initial desire for vengeance, it 
does not produce improvement in either the person responsible for the injury 
nor the angry person. Seneca proposes an alternative: he quotes Socrates’ 
decision not to beat his slave until his anger has passed (1.15.3) as an 
example of how a punisher who acts appropriately is not angry, thus 
reinforcing how ira is not useful (1.9.4). This is because anger is 
unbalanced, capricious, does not listen to defences, is inflexible once it has 
made a judgement and does not admit when it is wrong (1.17.7. Cf. 1.19.1, 
2.6.4). As a result, punishment issued in anger is unfair, with people 
receiving different punishments for the same crimes, without taking into 
consideration the motivation for the crime (1.17.7. Cf. 1.19.6). Anger 
conflicts with reason which makes judgements that are balanced and fair. 
Consequently, it is particularly important for anger to be absent when capital 
punishment is involved (1.19.8). In most cases, external punishment is 
superfluous because remorse is the heaviest punishment, so even when a 
man is unpunished by the injured, he does not escape reprimand (3.26.2). 
A Stoic outlook, and one which Seneca appears to be advocating, 
emphasises the importance of rationality guiding both present and future 
conduct, so that all situations can be responded to consistently and 
correctly. Seneca explicitly states that injuries should not be repaid with 
injury (‘repensare…iniurias iniuriis’ 2.32.1) nor wrongs be met with wrongs 
(‘vitia vitiis opponere’ 3.27.1). This shows how Seneca is promoting and 
encouraging humanitas, a genuine concern for other people’s well-being, 
independent of social and cultural refinement and personal gain (2.32.1. Cf. 
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Ep. 88.30).398 Stoic concern for humanity was such that they wished to 
share their wisdom to help everyone flourish and become virtuous (Ep. 
48.8ff.).  
 
In a similar vein, Seneca cites the conservative senator and statesman and 
the most famous Stoic in the Late Republic, Marcus Porcius Cato (b95BC) 
being hit while in the public baths by a man who did not know who he was. 
When he apologised, Cato denied the incident, thinking it better to ignore 
than resent it (2.32.2) and when the man asked if he were to receive a 
punishment, instead he benefited from getting to know Cato. Seneca 
concludes that: ‘It’s the mark of a great spirit to regard wrongs as beneath 
contempt — Magni animi est iniurias despicere’ (2.32.3). Similarly, 
Cleanthes was applauded for being unmoved when he was publicly 
ridiculed by the poet Sositheus (Diog. Laert. 7.173) and ignored mockery for 
his comparative slowness in learning (Plut. Mor. 47E. Cf. Diog. Laert. 
7.170). To reinforce his argument, Seneca quotes Plato (Resp. 1.335D): ‘“A 
good man,” he says, “causes no harm” — “Vir bonus” inquit “non laedit”’ and 
concludes that as punishment injures, it is not consistent with good but with 
anger, making anger contrary to nature (1.6.5). As well as being a corrective 
remedy for the offender, punishment can benefit the punisher: it should be 
used as an opportunity for self-reflection of one’s actions, so that previous 
behaviour can be fairly and honestly judged (2.27.4). Clementia is 
particularly relevant to exacting punishment which is carried out to avenge 
oneself or someone else (Clem. 1.20.1), for correction, improvement or to 
remove the wicked for greater good (ibid. 1.22.1). Seneca is not proposing 
that punishment should be removed: rather that a different sort of 
conception of what punishment seeks to achieve is required. 
 
Anger’s use for virtue 
In addition to considering the impact of anger and its role in punishment, 
Seneca’s discussion about whether anger is useful includes ethical 
considerations because his concern is whether it has use for virtue. He 
argues that anger is not present in great souls (cf. 1.20.2, 1.20.4-7, 1.21.1) 
                                                          
398 Cf. Pratt (1983) pp. 69-70. 
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because virtue (on which greatness depends) cannot co-exist with vice 
because the former is the only good (1.8.3).399 It is not possible to be angry 
and clement, because the latter is wholly rational and incorruptible by 
passion.400 Seneca confirms this when he states that anger is the source of 
cruelty and that recurrent and excessive anger ignores mercy and human 
compassion (2.5.3). The argument is reinforced through rhetorical 
questions to persuade that passions should be eradicated by directing his 
reader to believe that nothing is more tranquil than a peaceful mind nor more 
relaxed than mercy, but cruelty is the most taxing (2.13.2. Cf. 2.12.6). To 
illustrate his point and to make it more accessible to his readers, Seneca 
cites examples where great leaders demonstrate clementia in the face of 
anger: he praises Alexander because he was prone to anger and as self-
control is rare in kings it is more praiseworthy (2.23.3). Praise is also offered 
to Julius Caesar, who used his victory in civil war mercifully by burning 
inflammatory letters to Gnaeus Pompeius and although he indulged in 
anger, he preferred not being so and believed the most gracious form of 
pardon was ignorance of the offence (2.23.4. Cf. 2.10.4). Seneca comments 
on the nobility of clementia and its value in a palace when it is directly 
compared with anger in order to persuade his readers of the value of an 
alternative response (Clem. 1.5.4).  
 
Seneca presents how ira is deceptive in its conviction by exposing it as 
being the opposite to what it may first appear. While anger gives the 
impression of greatness in its speech and outward display (1.20.8), it 
consists of nothing great or noble (1.21.1). Its physical manifestation 
demonstrates a lack of decorum, a threat to an individual’s dignity and 
respect for self and other people.401 It is ‘puny and petty/pusilla est et 
angusta’ (3.5.7) and ‘pinched, wretched and base/angusta sunt, misera 
depressa’ (1.21.4). Its inefficacy demonstrates how anger is not suited to a 
                                                          
399 Cf. 1.4.9, 1.9.1, 1.10.1, 2.12.2, 1.13.4-5, 1.21.3, 2.6.1-2, 2.12.2. 
400 In contrast, Aristotelian anger is connected to greatness of mind. Aristotle promotes a 
refusal to tolerate insult as an indication of a man’s excellence. He uses Achilles as an 
example of a man who depends on and demands recognition of his greatness from his 
peers (cf. An. post. 97b15-26).  
401 Cf. 1.19.4, 2.26.2, 2.27.1-2; Clem. 1.17.1.  
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king because it precludes his superiority to his subjects and those to whom 
his anger is directed (Clem. 1.5.6). Anger is unhelpful because it makes a 
king’s behaviour reflect the brawls of the plebs (ibid. 1.7.4) demonstrating 
that he is not governing with the virtue expected of him. This reference to 
people of low status is part of a discussion about the differences between 
private individuals and rulers’ retribution and Seneca’s attempt to show that 
clementia is a strength not a weakness.  
 
III Anger in Senecan tragedy 
Anger is a common theme in tragedies since these often tell the story of 
how individuals’ emotional struggles and moral failings destroy lives. By 
comparing Seneca’s vision of ira outlined in his prose with its presentation 
in his tragedies, a fuller picture of anger can be explored both from 
philosophical considerations and how he responds to non-philosophical 
attitudes towards it. The causes of anger listed in De Ira are largely 
consistent with Medea and Thyestes. In Thyestes, the progress of ira can 
be tracked in Atreus; even though he admits his disposition to anger (he is 
an angry tyrant (Thy. lines 176ff.)), he becomes aware of the pre-passions 
(cf. 2.4.1) in the form of stirrings in his heart ‘tumultus pectora... quatit’ as 
his anger grows stronger (lines 260-2. Cf. ‘tumet’ lines 268). Evidence of the 
formation of passions Seneca details in De Ira is less clear in Medea 
because the play opens with a woman in rage whose anger grows across 
the course of the acts. However, for this situation to have arisen, according 
to Seneca’s understanding of the formation of passions, she must have 
assented to a false opinion to become angry, i.e. that Jason’s behaviour has 
caused her harm – when from a Stoic outlook it could not – and that this 
warrants vengeful action (cf. 2.3.5; 2.31.1).402 She complains how she is 
dragged in different directions by a ‘changing swelling/anceps aestus’ (Med. 
line 939) which can be interpreted to be indicating the effect of passions 
changing the tension of her soul as many Stoics believe (cf. Diog. Laert. 
7.114.). Seneca reveals little about Medea’s education to indicate who and 
what experiences have shaped her opinions other than her belief that a ruler 
                                                          
402 For Seneca’s understanding of the formation of passions, see pp. 79-81. 
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should be just, as she demonstrates in her pleading for a fair hearing to 
Creon (lines 199f.). Her angry disposition and propensity to violence is 
revealed by herself in the recounting of previous crimes (cf. lines 129-36, 
483-9) and her desire for greater penalties in her future actions (cf. lines 44-
55, 423-4, 976ff.). The susceptibly to anger indicated by her personality 
makes Medea a particularly dangerous individual, for she is presented as 
someone with a temperament such that it would be harder for her to 
overcome the passion. 
 
In both plays, anger is the result of a disappointment of the expectations of 
family members (cf. 3.6.4; Cic. Tusc. 4.77), because of the injury the 
protagonists experienced from them (cf. 2.1.3-4; 2.3.1ff.; 2.31.1-3) and the 
fear of potential harm in the future (cf. 1.3.1; 2.26.1). Medea and Atreus are 
governed by passion because of the slights they have received. For Medea, 
this was the separation from and the proposed remarriage of Jason: for 
Atreus, the infidelity of his wife with his brother, the question over the 
paternity of his sons Agamemnon and Menelaus (Thy. line 240) and his 
subsequent usurpation. The shame that this has caused them and also their 
(arguably) mistaken perceptions about how these things will in fact influence 
them, leads to distorted and disproportionate responses to the initial ‘crimes’ 
against them (cf. 2.2.2).403  
 
Prior to meeting Jason, as an innocent virgo, Medea was a powerful, 
respected Colchian princess of divine heritage with many suitors (Med. lines 
217-8. Cf. lines 206ff.). Consequently, she does not believe that she 
deserves the humiliation and persecution from Jason’s remarriage and this 
has sparked her rage, a cause of anger which is confirmed in De Ira where 
Seneca argues that arrogance or ignorance produces an inclination to anger 
(2.31.4). Heroic sentiments reminiscent of military morale and shame 
culture communicated by the old Greek heroic maxim ‘harm thy enemies’ 
and the Aristotelian stance which Seneca rebukes underlie Medea’s 
revenge: she believes that she should commit evil and it would be wrong 
                                                          
403 Cf. Littlewood (2004) p. 180. 
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not to.404 She aspires to resolve her status through aggressive ‘masculine’ 
violence typical of ancient heroes (cf. Med. lines 42-3). (She is also 
merciless and deceptive (cf. lines 266-8, 285f., 553f.)). It is reasonable to 
assume this transgender move is because a woman’s stereotypical softness 
prevents her from carrying out violent acts. Perhaps unsurprisingly, as it is 
addressed to a man, there are no exempla of women’s rage in De Ira, even 
though anger is referred to as being a ‘womanish vice/muliebre … uitium 
est’ which men are prone to, a description which seeks to belittle ira’s power 
(1.20.3).  
 
Medea and Atreus presume that through acts carried out in anger they can 
recover their status because of the catastrophic consequences of this 
passion.405 They believe that it is imperative to their self and public image 
that, in response to being slighted, they regain public acknowledgement of 
their strength.406 Medea is seeking innovation in her punishment (‘haut 
usitatum’ Med. line 899) and strives for recognition and immortality through 
her crimes, threatening to ‘blast the gods// And shake the world — Inuadam 
deos// et cuncta quatiam’ (lines 423-4. Cf. lines 45ff.),407 where the military 
connotations of ‘inuadam’ can be seen in the alternative translations of it as 
‘attack’ and ‘assault’.408 Atreus seeks to restore his political and social 
standing believing that security in power would mean that his revenge has 
been successful (lines 887-8. Cf. lines 911-2, 971-2). Consequently, he 
devises a revenge plot to ensure that his name will be remembered by future 
generations for its innovation (lines 56-57. Cf. lines 192ff., 256-7, 266ff.) and 
his success is confirmed by the Messenger’s declaration that this is the case 
(line 754).409  
                                                          
404 Cf. 1.3.2, 1.5.3; Arist. Eth. Nic. 1111a32ff., 1125b30ff. 
405 Cf. 1.2.1-3, 1.19.2, 2.9.2; Mattern-Parkes (2001) pp. 178-80. 
406 Cf. Littlewood (2004) pp. 180-3. 
407 Cf. Benton (2003) p. 278. 
408 Cf. Sall. Iug. 32.4, 35.  
409 Atreus is not entirely innovative. He was inspired by the myth of Procne (wife of the 
Thracian king Tereus) who killed and cooked her son Itys in revenge for the king’s outrage 
upon her sister Philomela (Thy. lines 274ff. Cf. lines 56-7). This story is recalled by Ovid in 
Met. 6.412-674. Seneca also reports the King of Persia who serves Harpagus’ sons at a 
banquet in Ir. 3.4. 
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Having their vengeful deeds witnessed adds gravitas to the ‘achievement’ 
of successful retribution and an audience for their criminality is paralleled in 
athletic games and war, which were a means to obtain recognition.410 Atreus 
and Medea’s priorities conflict with a Stoic perspective which argues that 
recognition and fame should not be prime motivators. Atreus orders his 
slaves to open the doors for more people to see Thyestes’ horror at what 
he has eaten when he unknowingly consumed his sons (Thy. lines 901ff.). 
Atreus is delighted that the gods have fled so that he will not become subject 
to any punitive intervention, but he wishes they were present to have seen 
the horror of the banquet to add importance to his deed (lines 893-6). This 
is reminiscent of Medea’s disappointment that Jason did not see the murder 
of the first child and her belief that her crime was wasted because of his 
absence, making her determined that he will see the second son die (Med. 
lines 992ff.). The desire for an audience is reinforced by Medea’s assertion 
that deeds should be applauded ‘approba populo manum’ (line 977), 
showing the need for other people’s acknowledgement of her actions to 
enhance her self-importance. Even though anger is by nature irrational and 
provokes impulsive reactions, Medea and Atreus apply perverted reason to 
plan their revenges to ensure a sense of visibility but this is not reason in 
the Stoic sense of true reason aiming at good.  
 
Seneca has demonstrated how unreasonable punishments are carried out 
in anger, (cf. 1.1.2) confirming how ira is unsuited to punishment,411 not only 
because of the errors in the initial judgement of a situation which causes 
passions, but also because wickedness should not cause anger (1.6). 
However, in a dramatic context, the extremity of unreasonable punishment 
is exacerbated and goes beyond ‘an eye for an eye’: Medea and Atreus 
seek revenge by planning long-term punishment by killing their enemies’ 
children which will have a permanent impact on Jason and Thyestes 
                                                          
410 Cf. Braden (1970) for a discussion of the importance of competition, games and trophies 
alluded to in Thy. lines 54-6, 407-10, 659-62, 1097 (pp. 31-3). Stocker and Hegeman (1996) 
discuss the ‘social relations’ and ‘social ordering’ implied by Aristotle’s definition of anger 
which is also applicable to Atreus: ‘Aristotle’s depiction of anger and those who get angry 
shows us men who are concerned with their importance, dignity, and with the honor and 
respect all or some others owe them’ (p. 267). 
411 Cf. 1.9.4, 1.10.1, 1.14-6, 1.17.7, 1.19.5ff., 2.6.4, 2.31.8. 
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respectively. The protagonists’ actions are contrary to fair punishment, 
which, guided by reason, seeks to reform the individual.412 There is no 
desire to allow the offenders to redeem themselves in the plays, even when 
they acknowledge their guilt (cf. Jason in Med. lines 1004ff.; Thyestes in 
Thy. lines 512ff.). This illustrates how anger breeds cruelty and when it is 
persistent, it ignores compassion (2.5.3), which is contrary to the intrinsic 
quality of humans who pardon those who err (2.10.2). Anger escalates 
quickly and can start off being directed at one individual but magnifies to 
encompass ill-feeling towards many innocent people (3.28.1) as both the 
Corinthians in Medea and Argives in Thyestes suffer from the loss of heirs 
and the extensive destruction which is caused by Medea and Atreus’ 
revenge. Ira in the plays is as vile in its social impact as it is in its 
physicality.413 Medea’s ira destroys her family and instils fear across 
Corinth, leaving the physical damage of burnt buildings with the political 
problem of the deaths of the royal family and the killing of innocent children.  
 
The protagonists murder the people closest to them, destroying everything 
they would be expected to cry for, validating Seneca’s arguments about the 
danger that anger can cause to children whose limbs are scattered by 
befouled hands (3.41.3). Such behaviour evidences Seneca’s argument 
that anger is heartless (cf. 3.3.3) and contrary to the natural state of man, 
who is calm, loving and helpful (cf. 1.5.2, 3.5.6), thus proving that it is 
unnatural (1.5.1ff.). Ira lasts longer than the initial hurt (3.27.1) and is self-
perpetuating, with ‘victims’ seeking retribution after every instance of ‘injury’. 
References to ‘hereditary crime/alterna vice’ (Thy. line 25. Cf. lines 18-9, 
22, 28ff., 40ff., 133) and alternate rule by the brothers ‘to shed each other’s 
blood/alternis dare sanguinem’ (line 340. Cf. lines 37f., 139f.) are voiced 
from the outset of Thyestes. This reflects the lack of closure in the play, with 
the anticipation of Thyestes’ future retaliation (line 1112. Cf. line 311). 
Similar sentiments can be found in Medea’s opening soliloquy which ends 
with the comment that a house born in crime should remain so suggesting 
a life of turmoil for the royal family is deserved (Med. line 55).  
                                                          
412 Cf. 1.6, 1.15, 1.16.2, 1.18, 1.19.7, 2.27.4, 2.31.8. 
413 Cf. 1.2.1-3, 2.9, 2.36.5, 3.2, 3.20.1ff.; Clem. 1.25.2-5, 1.26.1-2. 
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The protagonists’ actions confirm that anger is sadistic and gains pleasure 
from inflicting suffering and death as Seneca presents in his prose 
(2.32.1).414 Medea claims that her retribution brings her great joy (‘pars 
ultionis ista, qua gaudes, quota est’ Med. line 896) and delights (‘iuuat, 
iuuat’) in her old crimes (lines 911ff. Cf. ‘voluptas magna me invitam subit’ 
lines 991-2). Atreus punishes for pleasure, not necessity (cf. Thy. lines 903-
7, 1097-8) and defines himself by harming other people.415 Atreus is 
delighted by the sight of his brother’s distress (lines 903ff.) and remains 
unhappy until he sees Thyestes suffer (lines 889ff. Cf. lines 1053, 
1067ff.).416 He takes this misery as confirmation of the accomplishment of 
his vengeance (lines 906ff.).417 When he is convinced his sons are his, 
which secures the regal line (lines 1097-8), Atreus feels Thyestes’ original 
crimes have now been erased (lines 1099), in the same way that Medea 
believes that killing her sons has restored her previous regal status and 
declares that her virginity has returned (‘rediere regna, rapta virginitas redit’ 
Med. line 984. Cf. lines 982ff.).418 This pleasure from punishing others in 
these plays is similarly present in De Ira: the Persian King Cambyses was 
pleased to have taken a new form of punishment by severing the noses of 
a whole population in Syria (3.20.1). 
 
The physicality of the mad and angry man described as visually grotesque 
in De Ira surfaces in descriptions of the characters in Seneca’s plays.419 
Medea’s frenzied movements reflect her agitated state of mind as is 
apparent from the Nurse’s report that Medea wildly dashes around, with a 
frenzied and furious expression, flaming cheeks, howling with tears and 
smiles evidencing every passion and: ‘She falters, threatens, seethes, 
laments, moans — haeret minatur aestuat queritur gemit’ (Med. lines 385-
                                                          
414 Cf. 2.5.2ff., 3.5.5, 3.43.4; Clem. 1.10.3; Littlewood (2004) pp. 191-4. 
415 Cf. Tobin (1966) pp. 68, 70; Dodson-Robinson (2010) p. 65; Staley (2010) pp. 21-2.  
416 Cf. Mader (2010). 
417 Rose (1986-1987) interprets Atreus’ ‘success’ as a cynical expression of mankind: 
‘Atreus' unqualified victory over Thyestes offers a pessimistic view of a world in which the 
only valid form of government is cruel despotism, where the voices of reason favoring a 
more humane use of power are either ignored or suppressed, and where even 
philosophical indifference is not left untroubled’ (p. 128).  
418 Cf. Littlewood (2004) pp. 201-3. 
419 Cf. 1.1.4ff.; 2.35.5, 3.4.1-2, 3.5.1-2; Evans (1950) pp. 175-7. 
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90).420 Medea’s superhuman powers and divination are physically illustrated 
by loose hair and bare feet akin to a witch (line 752), reflecting the unkempt 
appearance of the angry man in De Ira (2.35.3). Medea is aware of the 
connection between anger and madness when she motivates herself to be 
armed with wrath in preparation to kill in full frenzy (lines 51-2). Like Aristotle 
and the Epicureans, Medea sees anger as a motivation for action.421 
However, anger imprisons men as its slave, as can be seen by Medea’s 
obsession with it (cf. 1.7.3, 3.4.4).  
 
The characters’ rational responses are impeded by anger (cf. 2.26.3). 
Medea complains that she is thrown in all directions ‘Restless, crazed, 
demented — incerta uecors mente non sana’ (Med. lines 123-4).422 She 
announces the ‘full frenzy/furore toto’ of her anger (line 52), describes her 
‘mad soul/furiose’ (line 897. Cf. lines 990ff.) and shows that anger causes 
self-harm, both physically (cf. 2.36.5-6) and mentally (cf. 3.4.4) when she 
slashes her wrists at the altar to win Hecate’s support (lines 806ff.).423 In 
these respects, Medea illustrates Seneca’s warning that the angry person 
is afraid (cf. 2.11.3-4), showing that the retaliator is harmed by ira as much 
as the victims.424 This is reinforced by the Chorus’ recognition that anger is 
a ‘blind fire/caecus…ignis’ which seeks death rather than fearing it (lines 
591-4). While Medea questions whether she should kill her sons, she 
recognises that she is out of control with ‘mad rage/demens furor!’ (line 930) 
implying her understanding that what she is planning to do is morally wrong 
and illustrates the inconsistencies in thought and action caused by anger.425  
 
                                                          
420 For further discussion of Medea and Atreus’ insanity, see pp. 211-2. 
421 Cf. 1.7.1, 1.9.2; Arist. Eth. Nic. 1116b23-1117a9; Phld. Ir. 31.24-34.6. 
422 Writing in reference to the ‘disease’ of passion and the ‘moral-mortal combat’, Pratt 
(1983) notes that: ‘This combat is the scene on which the drama is played. All the dramatic 
events and experiences result from various stages of moral disease and health. Even an 
initial or temporary passion may be morally fatal, for destructiveness of passion is 
progressive’ (p. 68).  
423 For the association of witchcraft and Hecate in ancient Greece and Rome, see Bailey 
(2006) p. 31. For the overlap of religious ritual, incantation and witchcraft in Medea, see 
Byville (2011) pp. 4-9; Stratton (2015) pp. 95-6. 
424 Cf. 1.1.1, 2.36.4-5, 3.1.5, 3.4.4, 3.27-8. 
425 Cf. 1.19.4, 2.26.2ff., 2.27.1-2, 3.35; Gill (2004) pp. 231-2. 
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Other references to Medea’s ‘insanity’ include the Nurse’s reference to 
Medea’s bestial and crazed behaviour (cf. Med. ‘furialem impetum’ line 157; 
‘demens’ line 174; ‘lymphatus’ line 386; ‘vesano gradu’ line 738) as well as 
her facial expression: ‘Face of Fury/uultum Furoris’ line 396). Jason 
describes Medea in similar terms, with emphasis on the facial expressions 
that accompany different states of mind (lines 445-6). The Chorus show that 
anger is uncontrollable (cf. 1.9.3) when they recognise that Medea is unable 
to control her feelings because her hate is as infinite as her love (lines 866f.). 
Atreus admits he is struggling to control his feelings which are directed 
towards revenge (‘vix tempero animo’, Thy. line 496), a state which is 
substantiated by the Chorus’ description of a man who is fierce, wild and 
out of control with anger (‘ferus ille et acer// nec potens mentis truculentus 
Atreus’, Thy. lines 546-7). The Chorus’ use of the term ‘ferus/beast’ as an 
adjective confirms that Atreus is inhumane and unhuman in his behaviour 
and attitude as a result of his anger. 
 
The plays also illustrate how anger is not ultimately satisfying nor does it 
resolve conflict. Despite claiming a sated appetite previously (Thy. line 913), 
on reflection Atreus later claims he has not done enough (line 1053) and 
regrets not having drained the boys’ blood into Thyestes’ mouth (lines 1054-
6). He complains that his haste rebuffed his rage (lines 1056-7), showing 
that ira has an even greater capability for malevolence. As a descendant of 
Tantalus, his great-grandfather, it is not surprising that Atreus can never 
really be sated. This demonstrates how, in the same way anger is not useful 
in warfare because it creates rash, disordered thinking rather than a 
strategic attack necessary for successful assault, even though Jason and 
Thyestes are harmed as Medea and Atreus had intended, ira does not 
provide a wholly satisfactory result for Atreus, even when the vengeance is 
carried out (line 1053).426 Both Medea and Thyestes end inconclusively with 
no resolution to the conflict between the characters: instead there is a sense 
of awaiting a response from the victims as reported in the myths. This 
                                                          
426 For anger’s ineffectiveness in war, see 1.9.1ff., 1.10.1, 1.11, 1.12.5, 1.13.3, 1.17.1ff., 
3.3.1. For a savage man never being satisfied, see the example of Caligula 3.19.5; Clem. 
1.26.4.  
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implies that revenge is not the answer to injury and acting from anger does 
not bring conflict to an adequate conclusion. 
 
*** 
Seneca defines anger as a subsidiary of desire, that is, the desire to inflict 
pain in vengeance for a perceived wrong that has been inflicted. The 
vileness of this passion is evident from its physical manifestation which 
makes men aesthetically displeasing. It is comparable with insanity because 
it is a disturbance to reasoning and provokes uncontrollable, erratic 
behaviour. If Seneca’s plausible arguments are accepted, anger has no use 
(neither in justice, warfare nor in personal relationships) and it is not noble 
(because it is a vice and therefore cannot co-exist with virtue). Ira is not 
natural because it is contrary to nature’s goal of harmony and causes 
destruction. Despite its widespread consequences, anger is not powerful: it 
can be both resisted and extirpated. Passions cannot be moderated as 
Aristotle assumes and should be extirpated, as Seneca believes, and 
constantiae should be sought, to live a wholesome life.  
 
The similarities of the presentation of anger in Seneca’s prose and drama 
indicate that it is appropriate to read the texts alongside each other when 
attempting to comprehend the nature of this intolerable passion. Anger in 
Medea and Thyestes is caused by disappointment by and injuries from 
family members and the determination of the protagonists to seek revenge 
and to reinstate their ‘honour’ by becoming immortalised for the way in 
which their vengeance was carried out. This concurs with the definition of 
anger involving the desire to return a slight (cf. 1.3.3, 1.5.3). The extremes 
to which Medea and Atreus go to punish Jason and Thyestes respectively 
confirm how anger is unsuited to punishment as well as demonstrating how 
the obsession with it is sadistic and destroys the angry person as much as 
it does its subject. The physical descriptions of the protagonists and the 
animal metaphors used to communicate them emphasise how passions are 
unnatural, unsightly aesthetically and far removed from reason’s calm 
countenance.  
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It is possible to identify instances of perceived inconsistency in the 
presentation of anger in Seneca’s prose and tragedies. For example, in De 
Ira Seneca claims that children and women’s anger is sharper than grievous 
and is trivial (2.19.4). Nothing can be further from the truth for Medea’s 
anger, despite the fact she is female. This may be explained by her adoption 
of a masculine role and that she is living up to her mythological tradition 
which is an unconventional presentation of women. Seneca could not 
present women in their traditional way as in so doing the plot would fail. 
Elsewhere De Ira claims that ‘Anger-madness/ira insana’ is the result of 
attaching high value to minor things (3.34.2). Medea and Thyestes confirm 
the close relation between anger and insanity. Yet in Medea’s and Atreus’ 
cases, their frustration is based on significant events, involving their 
relationships with other people, which have overturned their lives and it is 
questionable whether their anger can be dismissed as being caused by 
minor or trivial things.  
 
For the non-philosopher in particular, or for those in the early stages of their 
philosophical journey, personal relationships are the most emotional part of 
being human and one which provokes the strongest reactions. It comes as 
little surprise that Medea and Atreus are passionate about their situations, 
though their reactions are undoubtedly inhumane and unacceptable. This 
problem can be resolved if a Stoic world-view is taken in which even familial 
interactions are considered to be indifferents which, by definition, do not 
truly impact on an individual’s well-being or pursuit of virtue. A Stoic would 
argue that these are comparably trivial in the sense that the passions are 
generated by indifferents rather than anything else. In this respect, 
according to Seneca, disagreements with people are ‘trivial’ in the grand 
scheme of things and taking this interpretation of his comments aligns the 
views of his different texts. Across the genres, Seneca demonstrates how 
adfectus have a significant impact on human life, hence their resolution is 
of foremost importance to Seneca. For this reason, he promotes a variety 
of techniques for curing anger which will be discussed in Chapter Three.  
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Chapter Three 
Curing anger 
 
Seneca proposes varied methods in his moral essays and Epistles to 
prevent anger from arising. I will address the philosophy-based cures first, 
bearing in mind the earlier discussion of Seneca’s theory of passions before 
moving on to practical solutions, which while reasonable, do not depend 
entirely on Stoicism. Some of the techniques Seneca encourages were 
inherited by Stoics from previous philosophical schools, particularly the 
Pythagoreans, and Seneca develops them further to meet his needs for 
ethical instruction. To explain his approach, I will consider early Stoic 
methods for managing passions and consider how Seneca advances these 
in order to establish which are practical as opposed to philosophical and 
which operate on more than one level, as well as critiquing the viability of 
the methods Seneca proposes as successful remedies. In the fifth chapter, 
I will return to a discussion of these methods considering whether, if the 
protagonists in Medea and Thyestes were real people, they could have 
benefited from Seneca’s advice. In this chapter, I conclude that in general, 
the subjectivity of anger means that there is no universal method for curing 
it. However, it is still possible to apply a combination of practical and 
philosophical techniques of the sort which Seneca proposes for the 
individual to help him overcome passions so long as he is willing.  
 
Seneca’s anger management 
Seneca responds to Novatus’ inquiry about how to remove, rein in or cure 
anger (3.3.1) by devoting the third book of his treatise to this subject, 
continuing his earlier claims that this is one of his intentions in De Ira. He 
identifies two aims: not to fall into anger and not to do wrong when angry. 
In order to achieve this ira should be resisted and restrained (2.18.1). The 
methods Seneca proposes to cure anger can be divided into changes in 
attitude and in behaviour. Some are preventative, such as effective 
education in childhood and avoiding provocation: others are reactive, such 
as delaying responses. Seneca complements practical advice with 
philosophical guidance offering a range of ‘cures’ to address the universal 
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problem of anger.427 This, together with his recognition that individuals have 
different requirements, makes his work appealing to non-philosophers.428 
The distinction between philosophical and practical solutions for anger 
management has become blurred over time and many of the techniques 
Seneca proposes may be used without reference to or belief in Stoic 
doctrines even though they may have philosophical origins. For example, 
reactions could be delayed without considering that assent is being 
withheld. For the purpose of this discussion, the techniques Seneca is 
offering to his contemporary audience will be placed in a Stoic framework, 
where appropriate, to capture the philosophical context of their origin, 
though references will also be made to how these cures could be 
implemented without a belief in Stoicism or other ancient philosophies. I 
argue that some techniques which have a philosophical origin could also be 
applied, both in antiquity and in modern times, by those who are unaware 
of Stoicism. The attitudes of the patient are an important consideration for 
the philosophers: even Chrysippus was prepared to assist those who did 
not share the Stoic sentiments as he recognised that they share the 
universal problems of passions (cf. Origen, C. Cels. 1.64, 8.51). 
 
The cures for anger are found in the ability to prevent it from arising or to 
stop it from developing from its initial stages because, while reason cannot 
overcome pre-passions they are lessened with awareness and vigilance 
(2.4.2).429 Sometimes Seneca expects his methods to be applied openly in 
instances where anger is mild. At other times, it needs to be controlled 
secretly when anger is becoming increasingly powerful (3.1.1). Depending 
on the strength of the feeling, it should either be forced into retreat or given 
into until the first stage has passed to prevent it from becoming carried away 
because the mind would have relaxed (3.1.1). Successful anger 
management, according to Seneca, involves a series of ongoing practices; 
                                                          
427 Cf. Nussbaum (1994) esp. pp. 316-402; Hadot (1995, 2003); Sorabji (1997b) and (2000) 
esp. pp. 159-252. 
428 Different cures are required for different passions and a decision must be made 
regarding whether to direct attention to passions in general or to each separately (cf. Cic. 
Tusc. 4.59). Here, I will focus on methods to cure anger, though acknowledge that in some 
instances, they are applicable to many other passions too.  
429 For pre-passions, see pp. 60-2. 
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admittedly, this brings challenges and requires effort to achieve. These 
include education; the spiritual exercises of praemeditatio malorum, acting 
‘fate permitting’, recognitio and taking the ‘view from above’; changing 
habits, values, behaviour and modifying attitudes towards other people. The 
more practical approaches, which include not inviting anger, resisting it at 
its first stages and delaying actions, will all be explained in turn.  
 
Education  
Education, both as a child and in adulthood, is an important way of 
assimilating Stoic doctrines, thereby improving thought processes and 
behaviours to preclude becoming victims to passions. Lifelong rules are 
necessary to avoid anger, with different rules applied at different stages of 
life (2.18.1). Seneca addresses the absence of advice to train children for 
which Galen and Posidonius criticised Chrysippus (Gal. PHP 5.5.2ff.). He 
believes that the rules applied during the period of education are most 
profitable because it is easier to train a tender mind than to curb long-
standing vices (2.18.2). Anger prevention can begin in childhood, when as 
non-rational beings, children are not capable of experiencing passions. 
Guidance at this time requires delicacy because it is difficult to avoid 
developing anger or blunting children’s natural spirit (2.21.1) and things 
which should be encouraged and those which are checked are fuelled by 
similar things (2.21.2). A two-pronged approach of curbing and spurring a 
child is required to guide them through the extremes of self-esteem and high 
standards versus insolence and temper, all of which can arise from 
excessive praise (2.21.3). A child should be trained to respond in a 
particular way in potentially passion-provoking situations. For example, in 
play fights he should not be allowed to be beaten or to become angry. 
Instead he must be friendly toward his peers so that he wants to win rather 
than desiring to hurt his opponent (2.21.5).  
 
Children must not be pampered because a soft upbringing breeds hot-
tempered men prone to anger (2.21.6. Cf. 2.25.3). A child should receive 
nothing if requested in anger and when quiet be offered what he was refused 
when he cried, to teach him that emotional behaviour does not produce the 
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desired outcome (2.21.8). Wrong behaviour warrants criticism and as 
people emulate what is closest to them, it is desirable to have quiet tutors 
(2.21.9). This is reinforced by an example of a boy who had been brought 
up with Plato, who, on his return to his parents’ house, when he saw his 
father in a rage, claimed never to have seen such a thing at the 
philosopher’s home (2.21.10). This story can be read as encouraging the 
reader to emulate the calm environment of Plato’s household because of 
the philosopher’s impeccable reputation. The success of early education 
depends on how receptive the individual is to teaching, both in terms of his 
personality and the methods of teaching received, whether it is appropriate 
and reinforced by good parenting.430 This reinforces the importance of the 
collective role in helping people, particularly children, and how an 
individual’s behaviour may influence their character formation.  
 
After formal education, Stoics expect lifelong learning to develop the mind 
and improve conduct by training the intellect to perfect reason and to be 
governed by this principle (cf. Ep. 90.46). Precepts help youths who have 
become more aware of the need for self-control and require guidance to 
understand how this can be achieved because they reinforce learning and 
internalisation of lessons.431 With age, Seneca advises progression by 
thinking for oneself and forming opinions as opposed to simply following and 
memorising great men’s words to produce mental independence (Ep. 33). 
The expectation is mature people will engage in conversation with like-
minded people (Ep. 38.1); follow good examples and keep the company of 
wise men; emulate the Stoic paradigm of virtue, the Sage; meditate on the 
Stoic lessons, internalising them, and then appropriately apply them to daily 
life; learn true definitions; correctly interpret impressions, recognise and 
dismiss the false and embrace the true, remove passions and channel 
personal wishes effectively. This self-therapy also comprises spiritual 
exercises, which are voluntary and subjective, to promote inner 
                                                          
430 Environmental effect is important, though Cleanthes believed that the soul’s 
characteristics were in part hereditary suggesting the roles of both nature and nurture on 
character formation cf. Diog. Laert. 7.158-9.  
431 Cf. Ep. 94.17, 32, 48, 51. 
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transformation and ensure the moral freedom of one’s soul, allowing the 
attainment of true wisdom of self and natural order (see below). By 
adulthood, the advice Seneca offers is largely based in philosophical 
doctrines, predominantly Stoic but even these have been developed from 
other traditions. 
 
The comments about rules for adults are confusing because Seneca claims 
that for older people lot and education no longer constitute a form of 
corruption or instruction (2.22.1). However, earlier he claimed the opposite 
was true – anger is associated with the fortune of birth (2.19) and children 
can be moulded by corrective education (2.21). To reconcile these 
differences, it could be assumed that Seneca is proposing that the 
consequences of birth are regulated, and sound education has been 
acquired to avoid becoming angry to the extent that rational adults have no 
excuse for not addressing their deficiencies. This can be done by cognitive 
measures such as assenting correctly to impressions (2.22.2), checking 
feelings prior to responding to anger-provoking scenarios (2.22-7), as well 
as following the laws and precepts described above. Fault should not be 
found in others (2.28); any feelings of unfair treatment may be because it 
was unexpected but in all instances, retribution is unacceptable, and 
forgiveness is preferable (2.31). The educative measures are preventative 
in that through growth, combined with learning to become aware of personal 
feelings, the development into passions can be prevented. Moral education 
is necessary from a Stoic perspective throughout a person’s life because 
teaching removes false opinions, substituting correct doctrines about life 
and happiness, the most significant being freedom from passions.  
 
Spiritual exercises  
Taking a philosophical approach to anger is a constructive preventative 
measure to protect passions: by comprehending and internalising principles 
about the psychology of action and causes of passions, individuals will be 
in a stronger position to identify signs of these feelings, leading to a 
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rebalance of thinking.432 Consequently, Seneca insists on the need for men 
to pay more attention to improve their perceptions so that the real 
importance of things can be grasped. This includes people understanding 
their true place in the cosmos so that they can identify what is virtuous and 
act accordingly (1.31.4).433 Seneca encourages spiritual exercises, which is 
an active discipline that considers the relationship between thoughts, 
especially value judgements and feelings, in particular anger and distress. 
This involves the vigilant attention for habit formation and desensitisation 
from challenging situations, requiring recognition and non-judgmental 
acceptance of thoughts and feelings. These techniques increase self-
awareness and grant a greater understanding of how the mind operates and 
what riles it, leading to a greater comprehension of the world and the 
strength of the ‘disease’ before it spreads (3.10.4).434  
 
The spiritual exercises involve observing physical reactions to cognitions 
and character, which increases awareness of intentions and in so-doing 
facilitates virtuous living, even though as an exercise they are not virtue 
itself. Seneca advises reflection is carried out daily ‘cotidiana meditatione’ 
for the greatest chance of self-improvement as learning comes through 
practice (Ep. 16.1).435 Stoics recommend specific practices to be carried out 
at the start and close of the day – ‘preparation for adversity/praemeditatio 
malorum’ and ‘self-reflection/recognitio’ – which are self-training therapies 
where time alone is used to develop self-knowledge and how to manage 
responses so that reactions are appropriate in all situations. Taking the 
‘view from above’ helps people to consider different perceptions by realising 
                                                          
432 Cf. Gal. PHP 4.7.21-2, 5.6.1-6, 14, 23-6. 
433 Wildberger (2006) identifies the key terms Seneca uses to convey this repeated idea: 
‘attendere’ (Ep. 1.1; 20.1-3; 22.10; 24.2, 12-4; 50.3-4; 59.14; 76.27-9; 83.1-2; 98.4); 
‘observare…senties’ (Ep. 99.7); ‘respice… cogita… observa’ (Ep. 99.10); ‘propone... 
complectere… compara… videbis’ (Ep. 99.13); ‘aspice… manfestum erit’ (Ep. 110.3-12); 
‘oculos intendere… iam apparebit’ (Ep.110.11) and ‘ut tecum ipse dispicias’ (Ep. 114.2-7; 
119.8) (p. 87 n. 29). 
434 Cf. Nussbaum (1994) who accurately summarises that: ‘The Stoic idea of learning is an 
idea of increasing vigilance and wakefulness, as the mind, increasingly rapid and alive, 
learns to repossess its own experiences from the fog of habit, convention, and 
forgetfulness’ (p. 340). Cf. Williams (2015) p. 136.  
435 Cf. Ep. 50.1; 71.31; 107.3. Cf. Newman (1989).  
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their relative place in the cosmos and to place the causes of anger into 
perspective so that the passion either does not arise or does not grow.  
 
Preparation for adversity/praemeditatio malorum or dwelling in 
advance/ proendemein 
Cicero promoted a technique of considering future events (praemeditatio 
futuri mali) to prevent passions from arising, which he ascribed to the 
Cyrenaics who believed that distress does not arise from every misfortune, 
only those which are unexpected (Cic. Tusc. 3.28-31). When things happen 
suddenly they can be perceived as being more serious because there has 
been no time to reflect and guilt may be felt if something could have been 
done in advance to prevent the circumstances from arising (Cic. Tusc. 3.52). 
To address this problem, Cyrenaics proposed the continuous pre-rehearsal 
of future evils because ‘foresight and mental preparation can do a great deal 
to lessen the pain —quoniam multum potest provisio animi et praeparatio 
ad minuendum dolorem’ (Cic. Tusc. 3.30). Indeed, self-examination, 
comprehending human life, being unsurprised by occurrences and not 
assuming that something will not happen because it has not before is 
‘praestans et divina sapientia’, the most noble and god-like form of wisdom 
(Cic. Tusc. 3.30).  
 
Stoicism developed the Cyrenaics’ approach of anticipating future evil by 
making it a more active process, encouraging education about that which is 
beyond man’s sphere of control and rehearsing for the event.436 Cicero 
reported that Chrysippus believed people are struck by greater force by that 
which is unforeseen (Cic. Tusc. 3.52) which indicates that early Stoics 
adopted this tradition of preparing for their future. Likewise, Posidonius 
argued that people who are unused to something are more greatly affected 
in situations of fear, distress, desire or pleasure but ‘what is given an 
                                                          
436 Cf. Newman (1989) p. 1478. Newman argues that the purpose of meditatio for Stoics is 
to remove false opinions and reinforce virtue as the goal, as opposed to considering 
approaching evils (p. 1478). It is true that virtue is the focus but preparing mankind for how 
to deal with adversity and apply virtue in such circumstances remains an important purpose 
of the exercise. I share Newman’s belief that meditatio was used to ‘correct a sick soul with 
false judgement’ as the ultimate purpose of these spiritual exercises is to realign thinking 
so that it accords with reason (p. 1482). Cf. Veyne (2003) pp. 75-7; Setaioli (2014b) pp. 
246-51. 
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opposite evaluation is seized only when its habituation is changed in the 
course of time’ (Gal. PHP 4.5.34-5). Posidonius later argued that something 
which is unprepared for, or something strange which arises suddenly, 
causes confusion and changes in judgements; however, if it is prepared for 
and made familiar, the event will either not affect movements or, if it does, 
this will be to a limited extent (Gal. PHP 4.7.7).  
 
Avoiding the unexpected is possible, according to Posidonius, by 
considering (potential) future events in a particular way. He advised people 
to ‘dwell in advance/proendēmein’ by which he meant that individuals 
should create an ‘image’ about what may happen, ‘to behave toward things 
not yet present as though they were present’ and habituate themselves to 
them as if they had already occurred (Gal. PHP 4.7.7-8).437 This practical 
process of visualisation and habituation is a variation on Chrysippus’ belief 
that people should change their beliefs but produces the same result.438 
Galen reported Posidonius citing examples of the success of those who 
have done this, for example Anaxagoras’ coping with the loss of his son and 
Euripides’ Theseus (Gal. PHP 4.7.9-11), examples which are also found in 
Cicero who mentioned Telamon’s acceptance of his son’s mortality and 
quotes Ennius’ Theseus ‘“I pondered in my heart the miseries to come” — 
‘“Futuras mecum commentabar miserias”’ (Cic. Tusc. 3.58. Cf. Cic. Tusc. 
3.28).  
 
Seneca continues the tradition of recommending preparation and explains 
how a Stoic begins his day imagining potential scenarios and what is 
troubling him and what bad things may happen in the future by considering 
the sort of people we may encounter, such as drunks, lustful, ungrateful, 
greedy and overly ambitious men (2.10.7. Cf. 2.31.2, 3.36).439 When the 
Sage encounters such men, he will see them as objectively as a physician 
views the sick and acts as a reformer for sinners (2.10.7). He knows that 
other people and their behaviours do not truly affect his well-being because 
                                                          
437 Cf. Gill (1998) pp. 129-30. 
438 Cf. Graver (2002) p. 219. 
439 Cf. Ep. 16.1. 
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humans have no control over them.440 Seneca resorts to military metaphors 
to explain how being prepared like a soldier anticipating attack offers 
protection like that of a city from an enemy (Helv. 5.3). This metaphor is a 
reminder of the challenges which may be faced and the need for strategic 
attack to conquer personal problems, particularly anger. If events and other 
people’s vicious actions are interpreted as ‘indifferent’ like the weather, any 
ill-feeling would not cause any harm even when it appears to thwart one’s 
goals. By adopting this view, people can gain a greater sense of control, 
realising that humans are a cause of a chain of events not a victim of them 
which improves resilience and efficiency. Consequently, there is no need to 
depend on or fear fate and as a result of this exercise, any eventuality will 
be prepared for (Ep. 91.4). It is possible to choose to be objective and calm, 
or at the very least attempt to use difficult situations to practise virtue by the 
way the problem is tackled or avoided. A Stoic also considers what he hopes 
to achieve, in line with his philosophical principles and how by the end of 
the day, he can be a step closer to tranquillitas and becoming the virtuous 
person he wants to be. Praemeditatio malorum serves as a reminder that 
individuals are an important part of a whole, linked by cosmic order, and 
behaviour throughout the day should reflect this relationship. The purpose 
of such preparation is so that the world can be accepted and embraced as 
it is, despite the problems it may present, in the knowledge that the outcome 
is indifferent because it does not affect virtue.  
 
The planning which accompanies praemeditatio malorum aims to avoid 
surprises which are stimuli to irrational behaviour, as well as considering 
how the unexpected may be dealt with in a rational way. This provokes a 
response to any eventuality, to alleviate anxieties and avoid passions, as 
well as increasing awareness of alternative stances that may be a more 
accurate assessment of the situation, in addition to highlighting potential 
danger points throughout the day. Holding these beliefs improves a person’s 
resilience, making him mentally stronger and more rational in his thinking: 
‘The mind faces bravely the things it’s prepared to encounter — Fortis est 
                                                          
440 For man’s sphere of control, see p. 64.  
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animus ad quae praeparatus uenit’ (3.37.3). Seneca’s other works reinforce 
what he argues in De Ira. For instance, he believes that difficulties are an 
opportunity for personal growth and to gain strength from knowing what is 
within man’s power to change. Seneca argues that: ‘disaster is virtue’s 
opportunity/calamitas virtutis occasio est’ (Prov. 4.6) because it offers an 
occasion to display virtues, such as courage and wisdom and to avoid 
succumbing to passions such as anger (Prov. 3.3). Life’s challenges should 
be used as training exercises, like those of a champion wrestler (Prov. 2.3). 
They provide an occasion to demonstrate inner strength and realise that 
difficulties are necessary to reinforce this, in the same way as fighting colds 
is necessary to build the immune system.  
 
Anxiety and the fear of the future remain a major obstacle to tranquillitas so 
this problem needs to be tackled urgently.441 Praemeditatio malorum 
reveals the impermanence of life and is humbling in that it forces the 
realisation that no one is immune from misfortune and facing difficulties is 
part of what it is to be human, for example, by imagining responses to loss 
of something or someone which is valued and remembering that everything 
is on loan from God and fortune (cf. Ep. 87.7).442 After all, adversity is only 
so when it is thought to be and the individual is as wretched as he believes 
himself to be (Ep. 78.13). By interpreting impressions differently and from 
questioning the basis on which they are found to be negative, concerns will 
be put into perspective. The situation can be viewed from a distant, non-
egotistical stance, aware that negative outcomes are only a possible 
outcome of the challenge and solutions can be considered in advance of 
needing them.  
 
Rehearsing the future enables people to accept events that would have 
previously disturbed them and to realise that while bad things could happen, 
they are not inherently bad but are as nature ordained, which emphasises 
the importance of believing in a providential world order.443 This resignation 
                                                          
441 Cf. Ep. 13.4ff.; 26.7; 78.14; 98.6ff.; 108.8. 
442 Cf. Beat. 21.2; Ep. 120.19; Marc. 10.3; Epict. Ench. 11. 
443 For Stoic theology, see pp. 97-9.  
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involves acceptance of the unchangeable (for example, something which 
happened in the past) and a wish to achieve certain things in the future if 
circumstances allow it. Cleanthes declared ‘Lead me Zeus and Destiny, 
wherever you have ordained for me’ and he would follow willingly (Stob. Ecl. 
1.1.12 (SVF 1.537)444 and, according to Epictetus, Chrysippus argued that 
‘if I really knew that it was ordained for me to be ill at this present moment, I 
would even seek illness’ (Epict. Dissert. 2.6.9-10 (SVF 3.191)).445 In a similar 
vein, Seneca emphasises the importance of perfecting the ability to endure 
adversity with a ‘glad mind/ laeto animo’ as if it were something that had 
been willed because all situations accord with God’s will because ‘Crying, 
complaining and moaning are rebellion — flere, queri et gemere desciscere 
est’ (QNat. 3. Pr. 12).446  
 
Learning how to behave correctly in every situation takes practice and 
failures are inevitable. Nonetheless, it remains an individual’s duty to act 
virtuously when undertaking the tasks because it is in this that true worth 
lies and actions should be undertaken without attachment to the outcome 
(Beat. 20.2). Seneca argues that progress can be measured by the 
commitment to self-improvement and the desire to progress (Ep. 71.35-6). 
Thus, mistakes should be a motivation rather than a deterrent (Prov. 5.9), 
because they teach humility in relation to human limitations and make 
people more tolerant of themselves and of other people. Awareness of 
obstacles and knowledge of personal weaknesses, even when shaken by 
very serious and sudden happenings, ensures anger will not develop and 
creates an understanding that it is possible to hide such feelings and not 
acknowledge hurt (3.13.6).  
 
For its success, praemeditatio malorum must be carried out for a fixed 
period of time, focusing on specific and plausible obstacles to achieve goals, 
including perfect reason and tranquillitas, rather than heightened anxiety 
                                                          
444 Translated by LS (1987) 62B p. 386. Cf. Ep. 107.10-1. 
445 Translated by Oldfather (1925) p. 243. 
446 Hence, the Sage remains ‘happy’ even while being tortured on the rack cf. Ep. 66.18ff.; 
Cic. Tusc. 5.73; Diog. Laert. 10.118. 
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about problems which are unlikely to arise. The purpose of the technique is 
not to scare but to reveal the origins of personal anxiety, to train people to 
be calm and to defuse irrational beliefs and fears before they are 
encountered in stressful situations which might allow irrationality to take 
control.  
 
A Stoic perspective could be accused of being pessimistic for encouraging 
the belief that the worst will happen and in this way, Stoics could be 
perceived as promoting negative thinking. For instance, Epicureans are 
reported to attack praemeditatio malorum for making men sad (Cic. Tusc. 
3.34). This criticism of the praemeditatio is mistaken because, from a Stoic 
perspective, everyone has the potential to acquire virtue because of man’s 
innate capacity of reason. Praemeditatio malorum is not designed to train 
people to expect the worst, but to make them become more rational and 
accepting, to abandon the passions of hope and fear because they involve 
external factors which are beyond man’s control and to offer an opportunity 
to spot irrationality before it has a chance to affect his daily life. Instead, 
Stoics invite consideration of worst-case scenarios to rehearse responses, 
without being emotionally attached to the outcome and without assuming 
that the event will arise in the same way it is envisaged. Realising that it is 
tolerable to have little control over the future brings people closer to 
becoming a Sage who is unconcerned about the future. It is reassuring to 
remember these conclusions throughout the day.  
 
This practice is also beneficial not only in that preparing for any eventuality 
lessens suffering but also because it assists in understanding what it is to 
be human, that endurance is part of mortality and that the only true evil is 
personal wrongdoing (cf. Cic. Tusc. 3.34, 3.60, 4.64). A related way of 
managing complex feelings is through the contemplation of human mortality 
which Seneca encourages.447 This aims to alleviate fear of death and to 
teach the true value of objects to avoid obsessions with externals or being 
angered when they are taken away (cf. 2.28.4; 3.42.2-3.43.1).448 Seneca 
                                                          
447 Cf. Olberding (2008) p. 130; Ker (2009a) pp. 77-85, 92-6.  
448 Cf. Beat. 3.3; Ep. 30.18; 63; 69.6; 70.18; 77.18ff.; 114.27; Helv.; Marc. 
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advises that loved ones are appreciated, accepting that people, like ‘things’, 
are only temporarily present. Family members should be kissed at night, 
remembering that it may be for the last time (Ep. 63.15) and men should 
‘greedily enjoy our friends/amicis avide fruamur’ for the same reasons (Ep. 
63.8). The prospect of loss should not cause sadness because it is 
preferable to have experienced other people’s company, even for a short 
time, than not at all (Marc. 12.3).449 Taking this view would prevent grief and 
its associated anger from taking hold. 
 
Personal circumstances should be appreciated with neither desire nor hope 
for anything, as these are beyond human control; people should have 
realistic expectations of the future and live one day at a time because the 
past cannot be changed, the future can only be prepared for and death may 
occur at any time (cf. Ep. 101.10). This view is a particularly helpful way of 
controlling anger because it puts the situation into perspective (3.42.2). To 
emphasise his point, through a series of rhetorical questions, Seneca 
questions why people act as though they will live forever, why lives are 
wasted with anger and inflicting pain on others as this detracts from 
pursuing reason. Instead, Seneca advises spiritual exercises and becoming 
dedicated to virtuous actions, when, as mortals, fate allows no time to waste 
because of human mortality (3.42.1).450 It is better to live a short human life 
in peace with oneself and others, to be loved while alive and missed after 
death (3.43.1); to be grateful for the present situation, as to be otherwise 
will cause unnecessary strife (3.30.3); to be patient for the future, 
remembering there are many people less fortunate (3.31.1ff.); not to 
become angered by trifling matters, such as others being promoted (3.37.4) 
and to realise that death is a leveller (3.43.1. Cf. 2.28.4).451 Preparing for 
death alleviates the fear of it and thus enables the adoption of rational 
                                                          
449 Ker (2009a) pp. 92-6. 
450 The length of his life is of no significance to the Sage (cf. Brev. 1; Ep. 1.2; 70.5; 73.13; 
77.20; 85.22ff.; 93.2) because virtue does not depend on the length of a man’s life (Ep. 
78.27; 93.4-7). What is important is living the best life in the present and to accept divine 
order and use time alive wisely (Brev. 1-2). Consequently, man should offer himself to fate 
without resistance (Prov. 5.8).  
451 Indeed, ‘it is a wonderful thing to learn thoroughly how to die — egregia res est mortem 
condiscere’ (Ep. 26.9. Cf. Tranq. 3.4) and being prepared is vital because death can arise 
at any time (Ep. 26.7). 
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responses to the unexpected thereby preventing anger from arising (cf. Ep. 
4.4-5).452  
 
The ‘reserve clause/exceptio’ or ‘fate permitting/deo volente’ 
An extension of the mental rehearsal involves planning with a certain 
reservation, by the ‘reserve clause/exceptio’. That is, being prepared for the 
fact that things can change unexpectedly, and men should act ‘fate 
permitting’ (Ben. 4.34.4).453 This means agreeing to act in a certain way, 
correctly and virtuously, aiming to succeed, unless prevented by 
circumstances. This Stoic view is not implying superstition from the 
references to fate. It is part of a theory of physics (or natural philosophy) 
referring to the sequence of causation which exists in the universe (cf. Cic. 
Div. 1.125-6). Thus acting with ‘reservation’ involves the knowledge that the 
outcome is beyond control (cf. Tranq. 13.2-3) since the sphere of control is 
restricted to mental activities and actions. A Stoic would accept Providential 
order as a perfect design because ‘Heaven decreed better/di melius’ (Ep. 
98.5).454 If the order of events is viewed in this way, there would be no cause 
for anger in cases where the outcome is not as anticipated, because any 
eventuality would be regarded as being in accordance with nature and thus 
should be accepted. 
 
Although success is preferable, the possibility of plans not transpiring as 
had been intended should be expected and these should be met with 
changes in approach according to personal abilities and with learning from 
mistakes. A Stoic approach offers reassurance that striving for a goal is 
more important than achieving it. As long as actions are carried out correctly 
(i.e. virtuously, under the command of reason without interference from 
passions), success follows because it is intentions and conduct which really 
matter (cf. Ep.82.18).455 In this way, the reserve clause helps people to 
accept that they can continue living well whether or not they ‘succeed’ 
externally and that any perceived failure should not provoke anger at 
                                                          
452 Cf. Ep. 24.24; 30.18; 70.17; QNat. 2.59.3; Tranq. 3.4. 
453 Cf. Griffin (2013) p. 255. 
454 Cf. Cic. Nat. D. 2.73-153. 
455 Cf. Inwood (1986). 
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oneself or others. Stoicism is not about perfection per se but about the 
journey of progression (cf. Ep. 94.7; Diog. Laert. 7.128) with the goal of 
decreasing vices without the expectation of ever becoming a Sage (Beat. 
17.3).456 Cleanthes believed that individuals should be praised for their 
virtuous intentions and efforts, whether or not they actually achieve their 
goals (Ben. 6.10.2-11.2).457 This is regularly communicated through the use 
of a craft analogy to illustrate the best means by which to live, such as 
archery, farming, javelin throwing and playing instruments (cf. Ep. 71.3; 
94.3).458 Other craftsmen are guided by precepts too, suggesting the 
universal importance of precepts and the following of rules in order to be 
successful at an activity. This reference involves two levels: at the lowest 
level, it involves knowledge of what to do in general by following rules 
without knowing why. With greater expertise and experience and the use of 
reason to internalise the principles, comes the knowledge about why certain 
actions are required to complete the skill. Even with this knowledge, goals 
may still not be achieved: for example, an archer may miss a target despite 
his satisfactory knowledge of the craft because of external factors beyond 
his control. Meeting failure in this way is less upsetting when there is no 
regret for things beyond personal control and removes the use of excuses 
after the event for failing. The reserve clause does not encourage 
demotivation: it serves as a reminder of the limits of what is within man’s 
control and that which is within his power must be used wisely, virtuously 
and to the best possible end: to do this the issue of anger should be 
addressed and focus placed on its removal.  
 
Self-reflection/recognitio 
After preparation for the day’s events, in the evening conduct throughout 
the day needs to be reflected upon. Self-awareness is an important part of 
practising Stoicism. Nocturnal self-examination and self-interrogation were 
standard spiritual practice in the ancient world (cf. Hor. Sat.1.4.133-8), 
originating with the Pythagoreans and continuing the Greek motto ‘Know 
                                                          
456 For the journey of the proficiens, see p. 20. For the rarity of the Sage, see p. 16.  
457 Cf. Cic. Parad. Stoic. 3.20. 
458 Cf. Cic. Fin. 3.22ff., 3.32; Stob. Ecl. 2.5ff. 
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Thyself, captured by Socrates’ maxim ‘an unexamined life is not worth living 
for men’ (Pl. Ap. 38A5-6).459 In the Golden Verses, the Pythagoreans 
advised methodically reliving each thought, feeling and event of the day, 
critiquing behaviour and addressing areas for improvement by asking: 
‘“Where have I transgressed? What have I accomplished? What duty have 
I neglected?”’, holding that worthless acts should be reprimanded, and good 
acts should be praised by being ‘glad’ (Pythag. Carm. aur. 40-4).460 The aim 
is to ‘Work hard at this, meditate on this’ and ‘passionately desire this’ as 
this is following ‘divine virtue’ and worshipping the gods (Pythag. Carm. aur. 
45). This practice is a way of understanding the ‘essence’ of the gods and 
men which provides protection from the unexpected (Pythag. Carm. aur. 
49ff.). According to Cicero, Cato admitted that he followed the ‘practice of 
the Pythagoreans/Pythagoreorumque more’ each night by analysing what 
he had said, heard, or done during the day and that this practice was 
‘intellectual gymnastics/exercitationes ingeni’ in order to exercise his 
memory (Cic. Sen. 38).461 The practice was adopted by Roman 
philosophical schools, such as the Sextii for moral self-examination: Sextius 
is reported to have reflected on his day by asking himself as series of short 
questions. He asked which of his ills he had healed, noted the vices he had 
resisted and how he was ‘better/melior’ in the sense of making 
improvements in his character and sickness of mind (3.36.1). 
 
Seneca adopts this practice himself but extends Sextius’ practice by not 
only asking questions but also using self-directed commands to prevent and 
control passions such as not acting in anger (3.36-7), offering alternative 
responses such as laughter (3.36.4) and preparing himself for future 
obstacles (‘Fortis est animus ad quae praeparatus uenit’).462 When it is dark 
and his wife, Paulina, is silent (aware of her husband’s task), he retraces all 
his actions and words during that day, concealing and omitting nothing, as 
he sees no need to recoil from his mistakes: ‘every day I plead my case 
                                                          
459 Cf. Iambl. VP 165; Porph. VP 40; Ker (2009b) pp. 169-70. 
460 Translated by Thom (1995) p. 97. 
461 Translated by Falconer (1964) p. 47. 
462 Cf. Ker (2009b) pp. 160-87; Star (2012) p. 48; Wilson (2014) pp. 105-8. 
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before myself — cotidie apud me causam dico’ (3.36.3).463 His use of 
juridical metaphors reflects the importance of correct judgement to prevent 
passions and the need to be accountable for what is within man’s control, 
i.e. thoughts and actions, in line with Stoic expectations of right human 
conduct. Seneca is honest with himself, with sufficient self-awareness to 
identify his strengths and weaknesses and how he needs to improve 
himself. He admits his mistakes, such as speaking too offensively in a 
dispute or criticising someone too bluntly, thus causing offence instead of 
improving the man (3.36.4). He forgives himself, on the understanding that 
he will not repeat the mistake (3.36.3). In future, he will consider whether 
that person can accept the truth about himself, knowing that a good man 
accepts reproof gladly but the worse a man is, the more bitterly he resents 
it (3.36.4). Hasty anger can be avoided by considering the occasions when 
undeserved suspicion is experienced or when good acts were misconstrued 
to be injury by realising that hate should be replaced with love, by being 
reminded that all have been guilty of the same offence in the past and by 
concluding therefore that it is not an appropriate reaction (2.28.6) to be quick 
to notice the vices of others but not of oneself (2.28.8).  
 
Even though this practice is not primarily intended to aid relaxation, 
lessening of physical and mental tension is a positive result of becoming 
aware of personal thoughts. For example, Seneca reassures his readers 
that nothing is more perfectly suited to self-improvement, and deep, 
untroubled sleep follows praise or admonishment of the soul (3.36.2). The 
implication is that Seneca intends this nightly experience of tranquillitas to 
continue into the next day. By detailing his experience, Seneca shows how 
his advice is implemented and the benefits which arise from doing this, 
making it more appealing to emulate. It is reasonable to assume that 
                                                          
463 While there is no reference in De Ira to Paulina performing recognitio, her respectful 
support is indicative of the partnership of spouses in pursuing virtue cf. Gloyn (2017) p. 
101. Seneca is interpreted to see husband and wife as being equal in marriage as they 
provide the opportunity for perfect virtue: ‘the ideal marriage as a state of stability that 
reciprocally leads to virtue’ (Gloyn (2017) p. 79). Cf. Sen. De Matrimonio; Ker (2009b) p. 
171. From a personal stance, Seneca explains the concern for the physical and mental 
wellbeing of spouses because they are connected ‘ut illi consulam, mihi consulere’ (Ep. 
104.2, 5). Thus, Seneca’s self-improvement is as much for his wife’s benefit as his own: a 
lesson which should be absorbed by his readers to ensure responsibility for their actions. 
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Seneca deliberately used self-apostrophe to communicate his meditatio in 
order to persuade his contemporaries of the value of the technique because 
they would be familiar with such language from their exposure to 
declamation and other genres.464 In this way, Seneca demonstrates his 
ability to write convincingly from a philosophical perspective at the same 
time as producing ideas and practices which are applicable to the non-
philosopher. 
 
By illustrating his arguments with a living example, Seneca demonstrates 
that self-scrutiny is an important part of personal development and advises 
his readers to carry out this practice too so that they become aware of their 
strengths and limitations, fulfil their natural potential and live in accordance 
with their true nature (cf. Brev. 2.5; Ep. 16.2; 28.10; 65.15; 83.2; 118.2; 
Tranq. 6.2). He summarises Epicurus (fr. 522 Usener Epicurea) to confirm 
the need to analyse behaviour, to desire correction and facilitate reformation 
(Ep. 28.10). Being aware of mistakes facilitates learning and consequent 
improvement of moral character and in choices. Recognitio is necessary 
because no one is free from fault (2.28.1) and no one can claim to be 
innocent of every law (2.28.2). With self-awareness comes the necessary 
understanding of personal irritations so that they can be dismissed rather 
than reacted to: ‘We become more self-controlled when we take a look at 
ourselves — Faciet nos moderatiores respectus nostri’ (2.28.8). Part of 
recognitio involves humility (recognising, sometimes addressing and at 
other times accepting, personal faults and weaknesses) as well as showing 
appropriate concern for other people through humanitas.465 It is important 
to consider if the questioner has erred in the same way as others, as this is 
a means of increasing tolerance (2.28.8). Exposing personal vices for 
examination is particularly important for ira. This is because the likelihood 
of becoming angry will be reduced through regular reminders of its faults by 
charging and convicting it: uncovering its evils means it can be seen for what 
it is and compared with all that is bad (3.5.3). Anger will cease and be more 
                                                          
464 Cf. Star (2012). 
465 For humanitas, see pp. 90, 117-8, 160, 170-3. 
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controllable, leading to greater accountability, when it is known that conduct 
will be analysed (3.36.2).  
 
Seneca develops his predecessors’ practices by incorporating an additional 
element into recognitio. He advocates that it also involves imagining the 
conduct of wise men and comparing personal conduct with this ideal, to the 
extent of holding imaginary conversations with great men such as Cato, 
Laelius or Scipio (cf. Ep. 6.6-7; 11.8-10). Through this there is an 
aspirational example and a set of principles by which to live. Recognitio can 
be carried out in solitude, when thinking, or by writing a journal or poem to 
express what the philosophical principles mean to the individual and how 
they affect his life so that he can measure his improvement writing (Hor. Sat. 
1.4.138-9). A critic of recognitio may argue that it is possible to become so 
disengaged that no personal value is attached to the opinions of other 
people, even to the extent of overlooking compliments. However, for Stoics, 
the way in which other people consider another man’s actions is of no 
concern because their praise is an indifferent. It is only important whether 
the individual finds his actions to be the sort he considers genuinely 
praiseworthy according to reason and by the standards of a Sage.466 
 
It is possible to display virtue by responding in a just manner to other 
people’s anger. If the anger of other people is seen to be born from the 
ignorance of the truth and such men are dealt with patiently, they can be 
responded to more positively. Compassion should be directed towards 
those who are rarely angry and those in whom anger is commonplace 
should either be avoided or ignored. This is because vices can spread in 
the undisciplined person and anger tries to command attention. Anger is 
manipulative, but it does not need to influence people in the way it intends. 
Appropriate responses to anger lead to respect from other people not 
                                                          
466 Cicero captured this important consideration when he discussed the distinction between 
popular acclaim and ‘real glory’ (Cic. Fin. 2.48-9. Cf. Cic. Off. 1.65; Cic. Tusc. 1.109-10, 
2.63-4, 3.3-4). He reflected a Stoic sentiment that ‘real glory’ should be the only concern 
and that this takes the form of ‘unanimous praise of good persons — consentiens laus 
bonorum’ who can judge excellence of character (Cic. Tusc. 3.3). These comments 
reinforce Stoic notions about externals being indifferent and the importance of cultivating 
characters to perfect excellence rather than depending on other people’s opinions. 
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mockery, as Seneca demonstrates when he argues that a king does not 
receive glory from savage punishment but from restraint, saving victims 
from angry men and concealing his own anger (Clem. 1.17.3). It is not the 
individual’s responsibility to control other people, because ultimately as 
externals they are indifferent to his genuine well-being. From a Stoic 
perspective, as citizens of the universe, human beings have a social and 
moral responsibility to be part of the community according to nature which 
should provide other people with such positive exempla of behaviour and 
attitude that guide and indirectly influence the people who err, for instance 
by challenging the angry person with kindness (2.34.5). At Seneca’s death, 
he is reported to have said that the ‘image of his life/imaginem vitae suae’ 
was the most valuable possession he could offer to his friends, marking the 
importance of providing a good example for other people (Tac. Ann. 
15.62).467  
 
Clementia is also expedient for self-improvement in that it produces more 
wholesome individuals who can hold themselves accountable to God 
fearlessly (Clem. 1.1.4). De Clementia also encourages the introspection 
and increased self-knowledge which is heavily promoted in De Ira in order 
to manage responses and avoid becoming impassioned. Seneca claims to 
be acting as a mirror to Nero so that he may see himself as he is and the 
person he could become – someone who will attain the highest pleasure 
according to the Stoic vision of virtue (ibid 1.1.1). He advises Nero that great 
satisfaction comes from behaving well as God ordains and the greatest 
reward derives from excellence but also that there is pleasure, in the sense 
of an intrinsic and lasting contentment, from examining a ‘good 
conscience/bonam conscientiam’ (ibid 1.1.1).  
 
Reflection should be carried out constructively and not for self-attack but for 
a set period of time, to avoid it from becoming procrastination. It should be 
a positive experience of celebrating the day and making the most of 
opportunities for improvement in the future. This exercise increases self-
                                                          
467 Cf. Griffin (1974, repr. 2008); Ker (2009a) pp. 281ff.  
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awareness, in particular questioning why specific thought processes and 
responses have occurred, providing the opportunity to act and think 
differently. Greater awareness of thought processes better equips the 
individual to cope with unexpected feelings because he has control over the 
way in which he thinks, is able to identify pre-passions to prevent them from 
developing into anger and make better choices which are based on reason, 
not irrational passions. The knowledge that comes from self-awareness can 
be translated into correct behaviour i.e. to be motivated to take a certain 
course of action, in accordance with nature, based in reason and have the 
will to change so that the goal of replacing anger with tranquillitas is actively 
pursued. 
 
The ‘view from above’ 
As part of increased self-awareness, Seneca recommends taking the ‘view 
from above’ in which the current situation is imagined from an aerial view.468 
Cicero described this approach in his dream to Scipio who is advised to 
consider the heavens as opposed to earthly considerations to understand 
the rewards of heaven and freedom in death (cf. Cic. Rep. 6.17.1-2, 20.1-
3). Seneca’s stance is to improve a man’s experience when he is alive, 
freeing him from the trappings of earth and assisting self-improvement.469 
He invites focus on noble and lofty things as opposed to pleasure as this 
results in enlightenment with nature’s secrets disclosed and the 
accompanying clarity of mind. Stars and the sky are particularly appropriate 
subjects for reflection and consolation because they are consistent in that 
they can be viewed wherever an individual is located on earth, constantly 
enabling him to commune with God (Helv. 8.6). Consequently, Seneca 
encourages his readers to ‘picture to yourself/imaginare tecum’ shining 
stars in a clear sky with evenly shining heaven. By focusing on the wider 
world and that which is greater than the individual, previous errors and 
darkness can be disclosed compared to the newly found perfect light (Ep. 
102.28). Studies of nature reveal knowledge about non-earthly phenomena 
which are enlightening by removing the ‘fog’ from man’s eyes (caliginem, 
                                                          
468 Cf. Wilson (2014) pp. 178-80. 
469 Cf. Williams (2012) p. 29; Gunderson (2015) pp. 68-9.  
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tenebris) (QNat. 1 Praef. 2). Expanding the perception of the world to 
contemplate the nature of God, his powers of creation and relation to fate 
provides similar comfort (QNat. 1 Praef. 3).470 The habit of looking upwards, 
literally and metaphorically, was commonly practised by philosophers and 
was one through which they appreciated their true nature and that of the 
universe, making them better citizens of the universe as a result (cf. Philo 
Leg. 2.44-8, 3.1-6).471 
 
The subsequent distance provides an opportunity for the contemplation of 
comparative place in the cosmic order. The time can be used to reflect upon 
nature’s great variations and the totality of time, then return to the present. 
This technique enables things to be seen from many perspectives, 
prompting changes in values and reduced attachment to challenges, 
knowing that people before and since have faced and will continue to face 
and overcome similar situations which will help with the recognition that a 
given situation is not necessarily as bad as was initially perceived (cf. Cic. 
Tusc. 4.79).472 It is also a helpful technique to cope with bereavement; by 
considering man’s existence within the universe’s infinity, there is no reason 
to pray for or desire a long life (Ep. 99.10). This exercise identifies the 
triviality of many things, to the extent that the world is a ‘pinprick/punctum’ 
in the universe making lavish displays of wealth and warfare futile (cf. QNat. 
1 Praef. 7-11).473 Applying this knowledge will minimise the risk of being 
angry at the petty things which Seneca refers to as causes of anger (3.34.2-
3. Cf. 2.25-6). 
 
The exercise is helpful in dealing with anger because it puts feelings into a 
wider context, forcing recognition that current feelings are minute in the 
grand scheme of things, that there are alternative views about the same 
issue and that humans are a part of a greater whole (2.28.4). Taking this 
view eliminates passions enabling greater focus on what can be controlled, 
                                                          
470 Cf. Ep. 49.2-3; Cic. Nat. D. 2.4-5, 153. 
471 Cf. Hadot (1995, 2003) pp. 242-8.  
472 Williams (2012) refers to the reassurance of ‘solace’ through the recognition of an 
individual’s place in ‘the providence of cosmic reason’ (p. 48). 
473 Cf. Hine (2006) pp. 45-6. 
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thus assisting in the acquisition of virtue and achieving tranquillitas. This 
awareness brings social benefits: a greater understanding of place within 
the universe leads to improved inter-personal relations and increased 
tolerance and compassion.474 This exercise complements the reserve 
clause and awareness of the sphere of control, aiding the realisation that 
individual achievements and failures are insignificant. However, because all 
people are part of a whole and all actions have cosmic consequences, so 
roles must be performed as prescribed and actions must be correct. It could 
be argued against Stoicism that taking the ‘view from above’ could lead to 
nihilism and the belief that because an individual is not as important as he 
had previously assumed, he could become depressed and/or reckless with 
total disregard for the consequences of his behaviour. A defence for 
Stoicism is that viewing the universe as a whole and remembering 
mankind’s comparatively small part in it, actually reinforces the duty to care 
for other people. Stoics would acknowledge that this practice is to be limited 
– there needs to be a balance between living existentially and being self-
absorbed and meeting the demands of interacting with society.475  
 
Changing behaviours and attitudes 
Changing life-style habits 
Character and habits affect the likelihood of the success of cures and the 
ease with which passions can be removed. Posidonius acknowledged that 
even the irrational part of the soul, that which is considered most unruly, can 
be tamed as it ‘gradually conforms to habits in which it is nurtured’, hence 
the importance of self-reflection, discipline and habituation to manage 
extreme feelings (Gal. PHP 4.7.41). Galen argued that for those who are 
‘agreeable and easy’ rectifying passions is easy because their ‘affective 
motions are not strong and their reasoning part is not by nature weak and 
uncomprehending’, making ignorance and bad habits responsible for the 
decline into passion which are comparatively easy to correct when the agent 
is willing (Gal. PHP 5.5.28). However, for other people, cures are more 
                                                          
474 Hadot (1995, 2003) considers that mental exercises of this nature ‘raise up Mankind 
from individuality and particularity to universality and objectivity’ (p.242).  
475 Cf. Reydams-Schils (2005) pp. 83-113. For the brotherhood of mankind, see pp. 97-8. 
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difficult: for instance, in those whose constitution produces necessary 
affective motions which are ‘great and violent’ and which has a ‘weak and 
uncomprehending’ reasoning part. Here, for character improvement, the 
reasoning part requires ‘knowledge of the truth, and the affective 
movements must be blunted by habituation to good practices’ (Gal. PHP 
5.5.28). These views partly correspond to Seneca’s argument about the 
importance of education in young children and moulding their spirit and 
personalities as they are forming. While he may disagree with the idea of 
different ‘parts’ of the mind, Seneca too holds that with a heightened self-
awareness from practising the spiritual exercises, men can amend their 
habits. This practice will offer long-term solutions to the problem of ira 
because self-knowledge breaks the cycle of becoming angry.  
 
Many philosophers were interested in how physiognomy affects an 
individual’s temperament and by extension, the extent to which inclinations 
towards anger can be changed and the efforts required to do this.476 
Posidonius believed that those with broad chests (animals and men) are 
warmer and thus more prone to anger, while those with wide hips are colder 
and more cowardly (Gal. PHP 5.5.22).477 Comparably, Seneca draws 
attention to blonde-haired and ruddy people who are extremely hot-
tempered because their blood is active and restless (2.19.5). The 
combination of elements that have been prescribed at birth cannot be 
changed (particularly in those prone to anger) but there are practical ways 
to control character through awareness of limitations.478 Seneca is 
convinced that hot-tempered people can minimise their likelihood of 
passionate outbursts by avoiding alcohol which fuels passions by increasing 
heat (cf. 2.19.5, 2.20.2). Such people should tire themselves through 
exercise to reduce their heat and cause their excessive fever to subside 
(2.20.3). However, everyone must avoid carrying out onerous tasks or 
engaging the mind by too many interests (2.20.3). The mind should be 
                                                          
476 Cf. Evans (1950) pp. 169-73. 
477 Cf. Gal. PHP 5.5.23-4. 
478 Aristotle apparently defined an individual’s character according to the mixture of 
elements (Gal. PHP 5.5.27).  
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restricted to pleasurable arts, being soothed by poetry and gripped by 
history to avoid becoming roused into passionate responses (3.9.1. Cf. 
3.6.6, 3.7.1-2, 3.9.3).479  
 
Posidonius had proposed that aesthetic activities be used to manage 
destructive passions as they cannot be cured by reason. Instead, they must 
be exhausted and persuaded until they are sufficiently calm to listen to 
reason (Gal. PHP 5.6.29-32. Cf. Ep. 94.5-6). He recommended the uplifting 
pleasures of music, drama and poetry in combination with changes in diet 
and exercise (cf. Gal. PHP 5.5.29-35, 5.6.19-22). These views were 
influenced by Pythagoras who is accredited with discovering the harmonic 
principles governing lyre strings (cf. Cic. Tusc. 4.1.3; Plut. Mor. 441E).480 
Seneca draws upon this theory when he cites Pythagoras’ use of music to 
soothe and avert anger (3.9.2) and he admits the inspiration he received 
from Pythagoras (Ep. 108.17).481 He also notes that green objects are 
soothing and pleasant pursuits ease a troubled mind and prevent people 
from becoming angry (3.9.2). The corporeal nature of Posidonius’ strategies 
might suggest that he believed that extirpation of passions is impossible, 
making the aim to keep them under control. In contrast, Seneca combines 
physical and behavioural habits with spiritual exercises to assist in 
maintaining or reinstating reason and for the complete removal of anger. 
 
Here, as elsewhere, Seneca follows Sextius, a Roman philosopher who 
fused Pythagoreanism with Stoicism and apparently founded a (short-lived) 
school during Augustus’ reign.482 Part of the practices involved daily self-
                                                          
479 Cf. Staley (2010) pp. 36-41. Similarly, the Epicureans are reported to have proposed 
that the mind is distracted from thoughts about suffering, grievances and revenge and 
contemplates pleasures instead (cf. Cic. Tusc. 3.33, 35, 76). They recommended learning 
Epicurus’ texts to the extent that one would automatically consider anything external to be 
of no importance (Phld. Ir. 47.39-41; Diog. Laert. 10.12). Cf. Procopé (1998) p. 185; Tsouna 
(2007a) pp. 217-8.  
480 Cf. Kalimtzis (2012) pp. 28-9. 
481 Cf. Staley (2010) pp. 76-7. 
482 Seneca regularly drew from Sextius’ work and provides many biographical details, for 
example, his vegetarianism (Ep. 108.18) and that despite being well-bred he refused the 
position of Senator offered by Julius Caesar (Ep. 44.2; 98.13). Cf. 2.36.5, 3.36.1; Ep. 59.7; 
64.2-5; 73.12-5; QNat. 7.32.2; Griffin (1976, 1992) pp. 37-42; Morford (2002) pp. 133-4; 
Sellars (2014) p.100. 
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examination and abstinence from meat, both of which Seneca adopted at 
points in his life (Ep. 108.17-22). Sextius proposed that it is helpful for an 
angry person to view himself in the mirror because ira’s ugliness makes him 
unrecognisable even to himself and by extension demonstrates the vileness 
of the passion’s consequences (2.36.1). This simple technique is one from 
which even non-philosophers can benefit and demonstrates Seneca’s 
attempt to be inclusive in his advice, but it has not escaped censure for its 
bizarre nature. In the midst of rage, it is unlikely that someone would 
remember to do this, and he may be impressed by how menacing he 
appears and be satisfied by his frightening appearance.483 The impossibility 
of this technique may be true in certain cases, but this does not rule out its 
potential success in others. 
 
Changing behaviour 
Alongside amending habits is changing actions and the choice of company 
is one way to develop a more suitable approach to meeting Seneca’s 
requirements. He recommends avoidance of scenarios which are likely to 
cause irritation, such as public places and crowds (cf. 3.9.3, 3.37.1).484 In 
the same way that physical diseases spread from person to person, so the 
mind spreads its faults (3.8.1). Thus, it is important to keep good company 
of those who neither worry nor are petty (3.8.1) and to associate with frank, 
temperate people, who will not provoke anger. Even more beneficial are 
those who are yielding, kind and polite (3.8.5). The company of such men 
also provides an opportunity to discourse on virtue, practise it and in doing 
so, perfect one’s character (cf. 3.8.1ff.).485 Nature has provided humans with 
the ‘seeds/semina’ for knowledge, though this is acquired by the individual 
through observing exemplary behaviour and learning from this what 
constitutes excellence in character and actions (Ep. 120.4-5). Associating 
with like-minded and wise men offers a positive and supportive influence. 
Such men remove the temptation to become angry because they inspire 
care for other people appropriately, reinforce the sphere of influence and 
                                                          
483 Cf. Williams (1997) p. 212. 
484 Cf. Ep. 5.2-3; 7; 25.7; 123.6-9; Gunderson (2015) pp. 77-8. 
485 Cf. Ep. 6.6; 7.8-10; 62.3; 85.41; 94.40ff. 
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provide guidance for the appropriate selection of externals, so long as this 
advice is offered constructively and is positively received. Just as animals 
can be tamed, when living with tranquil people individuals can be improved 
by accepting the advice of wise men and by emulating their positive 
examples so that personal weaknesses will not be indulged (3.8.3. Cf. Ep. 
94.40ff.).  
 
Changing behaviour does not necessarily depend on holding philosophical 
views. Seneca’s practical advice to avoid confrontational scenarios, in 
particular abrasive individuals, can be applied by non-philosophers to 
enable everyone to avoid becoming angry. However, his encouragement of 
keeping good company extends beyond practical behavioural measures by 
encouraging reflection on virtue with good men. In addition, he turns to the 
Stoic theory of assent by suggesting that people recognise behavioural 
cues, such as pre-passions and correctly interpreting (and assenting) to 
impressions will enable rational responses to initial reactions, even in 
emotionally charged environments. Then anxiety and anger can be replaced 
with measured reasoning, so that all adversity can be handled with impunity. 
This is easier to do within a community with shared interests in pursuing 
virtue, than as an individual among others not aiming for the same goal. 
Greater empowerment regarding correct choices in areas which can be 
controlled and an acceptance of what can realistically be achieved means 
not using others as an excuse for errors in judgement and incorrect 
responses. This leads to the development and understanding of the 
responsibility to act in the correct manner, taking care to keep the mind 
healthy in the same way as the body (Ep. 92.33ff.).  
 
Seneca also advises humour in response to a provocative situation: ‘Stand 
back a bit farther and laugh! — Recede longius et ride!’ (3.37.3). He recalls 
how, after being hit in the ear, Socrates exclaimed, in jest, that it was a 
shame that men did not realise they needed a helmet when they were 
walking outside (3.11.2).486 In a similar vein, following his tutor Sotion 
                                                          
486 Cf. Diog. Laert. 6.41, 54; Plut. Mor. 10C. 
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(reported by Stob. Flor. 3.20.53), Seneca links Heraclitus of Ephesus with 
the atomist Democritus of Abdera because they provide alternative 
responses to anger – crying and laughter accordingly – both of which are 
preferable to rage. Democritus was known for constantly laughing and not 
taking other people’s affairs seriously (2.10.5. Cf. 3.6.3) though modern 
scholars question the validity of this.487 Discarding the question of historical 
accuracy and focusing on Seneca’s purposes, these examples show there 
is no room for anger, but laughter or tears instead (2.10.5). Later in De Ira, 
Seneca refers to Democritus’ ‘sound doctrine/salutare praeceptum’ (3.6.3. 
Cf. Democritus fr. 68B3 DK), that tranquillity is only achievable by avoiding 
most public activities, particularly those which require strength greater than 
one’s own as a busy man is exposed daily to people and things which create 
anger (3.9.3. Cf. 3.37.1; Ep. 7).  
 
Changing values and rejecting externals 
Anger can be avoided with changes in value systems and readdressing 
what holds personal importance to avoid over-reacting to trivial issues. 
Indeed, it is attaching incorrect value to petty things that causes anger and 
madness (3.34.2-3. Cf. 2.25-6). This is sensible, practical advice, but in 
philosophical terms for Stoics this change involves being prudent in the 
pursuit of externals. Decisions about what to select should be based on 
considering what is truly ‘healthy’ or beneficial and those which are 
genuinely ‘praiseworthy’. That is, only ‘goods’ and ‘preferred’ indifferents 
which promote well-being and secure basic needs such as food and good 
health should be chosen. 488 In this respect, according to Stoic theory, 
everyone needs to learn to treat the circumstances from which passions 
arise, and learn what really constitutes good and evil and, most usefully, 
eliminate the false beliefs about them (Cic. Tusc. 4.60). Admittedly, this is a 
difficult task which is rarely achieved and not readily accessible to those 
                                                          
487 Cooper and Procopé (1995) raise concerns that although Democritus wrote about 
attaining ‘good spirits’ and joy, the extant fragments do not provide evidence of his laughing 
at people or their misfortunes (p. 50 n. 17). Kaster (2010) quotes Democritus saying 
something contrary to the legend, that men should weep, not laugh at human misfortunes 
(pp. 112-3 n. 156 Cf. Democr. fr. 68B107a DK). 
488 For Zeno’s division of ‘things’, see p. 14 n. 22. 
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who are not educated in philosophy because this advice will neither seem 
appealing nor well-grounded (Cic. Tusc. 4.60). 
 
To avoid anger that arises from dependence on externals and the frustration 
from losing them, it is important to exercise discipline without them. For 
example, enduring physical hardship, eating plain food, only drinking water 
and living modestly.489 Seneca complains that luxury feeds anger and to 
avoid this, the mind should be treated roughly so that it only feels serious 
blows (2.25.4). Seneca argues that pleasure should be avoided because 
pursuing it is like chasing a wild beast (Beat. 14.2). By abstaining from 
relatively harmless pleasures men can learn and practise self-control to 
avoid becoming its slave, a view which sensibly challenges an Epicurean 
lifestyle. This restraint will prevent allowing pleasure to overrule reason and 
satisfaction can be gained from successes in achieving this.490 Simple living 
hardens people against misfortune and perceived pleasure from and 
dependence on externals and secures confidence to know that if minor 
discomforts can be overcome, it is possible to deal with the worst things that 
can happen (cf. Ep. 5; 87.3; 90).  
 
The impermanence of material things, including people, should be accepted 
as well as the transitory nature of feelings such as pleasure, pain and the 
like. Unsurprisingly, many people would refuse to ‘deprive’ themselves, 
under the misconception that a life of materialism offers them security. They 
forget that these things can be taken away as quickly as they were achieved 
(Cf. Ep. 36.6; 66.44). This is certainly applicable to the many people who 
prefer material gains and public success in political and business matters 
(which is acceptable to Stoicism only if these ‘things’ are acknowledged to 
be ‘preferred indifferents’, not ascribed any true value and are correctly 
used) to the exclusion of personal restraint. Appropriately valuing externals 
means that people are not disadvantaged by not having many ‘things’ as 
                                                          
489 Cf. Ep. 15.3; 18.5ff.; 51; 84.11ff.; 87; 104.34ff. Simple living was common practice 
among early Stoics. Renowned for his poverty and industry, such as working at night 
drawing water, Cleanthes dedicated himself to philosophy and self-improvement (Diog. 
Laert. 7.168-71). Cf. Plut. Mor. 830D.  
490 For a philosopher’s versus a fool’s pleasure, see Beat. 10.3.  
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the non-philosopher may fear or become angered by. Rather it means that 
an individual is selective in where he places value, which in the long term 
allows him to live a more fulfilling life and most significantly reduces the 
causes of anger due to comparatively unimportant things which are beyond 
his sphere of control.  
 
A more acceptable criticism of Stoicism might be that there are challenges 
in the correct selection of things. Decisions relating to choosing externals 
are overwhelming, particularly due to the complexity of the large realm of 
externals. This issue would not be problematic for a dedicated Stoic who 
knows the true value of externals and will select them accordingly. Such 
problems arise either due to a misunderstanding of Stoic philosophy, or, 
among those who are not committed to living a Stoic life, may often be due 
to a fear that they are disadvantaged and deprived by not selecting 
conventional things of value. Making rational decisions while simultaneously 
nullifying basic instincts is difficult and it is frustrating when things do not 
work out as expected or are impossible to control. It is also challenging to 
separate the actual event from opinion and even after reflection, some men 
may already have acted incorrectly. It is hard to choose the right thing at all 
times and there is the problem of seeing things as indifferent (when the term 
is not interpreted in the true Stoic meaning of not affecting an individual’s 
well-being). Making this mistake may result in people becoming ‘indifferent’ 
in the common sense of the word i.e. not caring about anything. 
 
An obstacle to this approach is that it is easy to get it ‘wrong’. Careful 
management is needed to fulfil social responsibilities by recognising 
indifferents correctly, by understanding that they are things which in 
essence have no moral value, even if they appear to have value in 
themselves (such as shelter and food) and that they can be pursued only 
by using a virtuous means. Reactions may be too slow when the situation 
demands a fast response if the Stoic principles have not been properly 
internalised. This is a problem particularly when initial responses and 
feelings are confusing, which means it is not possible to recognise them 
quickly enough in the initial stages to prevent them from progressing. 
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Changing attitudes towards other people 
Although, according to Stoicism, other people are considered to be 
externals and thus personal flourishing does not depend upon relationships 
with them, nonetheless, as preferred indifferents, personal relationships are 
a great concern for Stoics, with the caveat of not becoming over-reliant on 
other people. As individuals are all parts of one great body, mutual affection 
and being disposed to friendship is natural to man (cf. 2.32.1, 3.43.5).491 
Seneca connects clementia with humanitas suggesting this is part of being 
virtuous to improve interpersonal relations as well as to promote Stoicism 
as a ‘caring’ School (cf. 1.20.1).492 While Stoics recognise that friends are, 
to a certain extent, instrumental, their focus is on friendship’s intrinsic value 
and that it is choiceworthy for its own sake (Ep. 9.12).493 However, orthodox 
Stoic attitudes to other people are complex.494 For instance, honouring 
parents and brothers is regarded ‘second place next after the gods’ (Diog. 
Laert. 7.120), yet, in his Republic, Zeno is reported to have argued that only 
the Sage demonstrates appropriate familial concern because ordinary 
people are ‘enemies’, leading each other towards false views rather than 
towards virtue (Diog. Laert. 7.33).  
 
Seneca too urges caution against accepting (wrong) advice from loved ones 
which is based on philosophical ignorance about what is truly good. He 
advises deafness/surdum against loved ones who ‘pray for evils with good 
intentions — bono animo mala precantur’, by which he means those who 
encourage political glory and honour believing this to equate with happiness 
(Ep. 31.2).495 These concerns emphasise the importance of keeping the 
company of good men, knowledgeable of virtue, as opposed to blindly 
following parental advice. The problems arise with men who are not yet wise 
because friendship ‘exists only between the wise and good, by reason of 
their likeness to one another’, which is why Zeno defined a friend as 
‘Another I’ with whom lives are shared and they are treated as a man would 
                                                          
491 Cf. Clem. 2.5.3; Ep. 88.30; Ep. 95.52. 
492 Cf. Clem. 1.5.3-5, 20.3; Constant. 2.32.2; 3.5.7; 32.3. 
493 Cf. Cic. Fin. 3.70-1; Cic. Leg. 1.49. 
494 Cf. Graver (2007) pp. 175-85; Long (2013).  
495 Cf. Gloyn (2017) p. 172. 
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himself (Diog. Laert. 7.124).496 Friendship is restricted to the wise because 
only such men have ‘concord regarding the matters of life’, that being the 
knowledge of goods and true friendship depends on ‘trust and firmness’ 
which the ordinary man is not capable of possessing because of his 
contradictory beliefs: the tie between fools is simply ‘their needs and 
opinions’ (Stob. Ecl. 2.7.11m).497 For Seneca, and many Stoics, friendship 
is a relationship bringing reciprocal benefits (Ep. 35; 81.12) by providing 
opportunities to display virtue and share excellence of character (Ep. 
34.2).498  
 
For Seneca, all men have the capacity to form close relationships with other 
people. Friendship is an important part of being human because the 
sociability provided to man by God makes him dominant over animals (Ben. 
4.18.1) and philosophy provides ‘fellow-feeling/sensum communem’ i.e. 
‘sympathy and sociability/humanitatem et congregationem’ (Ep. 5.4). 
Furthermore, true friendship is a form of non-egoistic self-love because 
oikeiosis and sociability are normal to man.499 Seneca argues that while it 
is possible to live without friends (as they are externals), life is enhanced by 
their presence (cf. Ep. 9; 48).500 Self-sufficiency is compatible with ideal 
friendship: despite being content when alone, company is preferable, a 
preferred indifferent in accordance with nature. A Sage remains self-
sufficient (se contentus est) even with the loss of a limb and could manage 
with the other parts yet would prefer (‘maluit’) not to lose the limb (Ep. 9.4). 
Maintaining and gaining new friends brings joy (Ep. 9.6; 109.9-11) and 
friends should be sought for the purpose of practising friendship (exerceat 
amicitiam) and displaying virtue, not for the sake of utility (Ep. 94.8-9). 
Seneca goes as far as to argue that it is unvirtuous to live solely for yourself 
because humans are designed for social union (Ep. 48.2f. Cf. Ep. 95.52; 
Cic. Fin. 3.60-70). Thus, anger is unnatural because it prohibits appropriate 
                                                          
496 Cf. Gunderson (2015) pp. 78-9. 
497 Translated by Pomeroy (1999) p. 89. Cf. Ep. 81.10; Cic. Amic. 20; Long (2013) p. 219. 
498 Cf. Gill (2013) p. 145; Long (2013) pp. 230-1. 
499 Cf. Long (2013) p. 224. 
500 The wise man Stilpo lost his family when his country was seized but remained 
eudaemonic when talking to the enemy Demetrius, affirming that he had lost nothing and 
retains all his goods i.e. everything he needed was within him (Ep. 9.18-9).  
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concern for and engagement with other people or offering them assistance 
when they are in need to protect them from themselves (Ep. 10.2).  
 
Above all, Seneca encourages increased compassion, greater tolerance 
and consideration of other people’s perspectives and acceptance of them 
as erroneous rather than malicious. This enables the suspension of anger, 
rather than jumping to conclusions over suspicions and becoming angry 
with innocent men (2.22.4. Cf. 3.12.3). Seneca provides practical 
considerations on which judgements should be based. For instance, when 
judging perceived offences, the character and purpose of the offender 
should be considered.501 A child is excused by his age and that he does not 
know what is wrong (2.30.1) or the adult may be repaying a previous injury 
that has been caused (2.28.5. Cf. 3.26.5). The limits of human nature ought 
to be remembered to ensure fair judgements because it is unjust to blame 
the individual for a universal fault (3.26.3. Cf. 2.28.1). Seneca advises being 
more just to transgressors, being more heedful to those who rebuke and not 
to become angry with the gods, as it is humans not divine power that 
produce mortal suffering (2.28.4). Through explaining the causes of events, 
Seneca seeks to demonstrate that there are alternatives to angry responses 
and that these should be implemented to prevent the passion from arising. 
 
Seneca adopts the sensible advice of changing attitudes towards other 
people as a cure for anger by incorporating Stoic attitudes towards how 
people ought to be treated. Those who make mistakes should not cause 
anger because it is part of unrefined human nature (2.10.6. Cf. Clem. 1.6.3). 
Such men do not realise that it is this which is making them behave the way 
they do: ‘errors shouldn’t make us angry — non esse irascendum erroribus’ 
because they are caused in people who are stumbling about in the darkness 
of ignorance (2.10.1). These arguments confirm the appropriate care for 
mankind that Stoicism propounds. A man has no reason to hate or be angry 
with someone whom he is trying to save, in the same way he would not hate 
a part of his body he has cut off (1.15.2). He is driven to heal in whatever 
                                                          
501 Cf. 2.10.1, 2.30.1-2, 3.12.2, 3.24.3. 
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way is necessary, in the same way as mad dogs, savage oxen, sick sheep 
and babies who are weak or abnormal are destroyed, not through anger but 
reason, to end their pain (1.15.2. Cf. 2.10.7). 
 
Seneca promotes forgiveness through understanding the pain of the injurer 
and excusing him and this should be extended to mankind (2.10.2. Cf. 
2.34.2).502 Choosing forgiveness over anger would mean that the faults 
which would cause anger become, instead, symptoms of the other person’s 
underlying sickness and thus give the impetus to treatment. This is a way of 
replacing anger and its pain by looking towards future reconciliation and 
preventing ira from harming innocent victims, such as those who were not 
involved in the initial injury. It is also a means through which, by taking a 
different attitude towards other people’s behaviour, anger can be avoided 
entirely. Seneca’s references to forgiveness in De Ira are confusing when 
compared with De Clementia, which focuses on the judicial context of this 
response; here he stresses that clementia does not involve forgiveness 
(Clem. 2.7.1ff.). Seneca uses ‘forgiveness’ in De Ira as being synonymous 
with clementia or as a part of temperance in that it involves restraining 
impulses such as angry responses and is thus part of virtue. Forgiveness in 
this sense involves compassionate understanding of other people’s 
perspective and understanding how the errors in their judgements cause 
problems. It is the realisation that ignorance is the origin of personal flaws 
and it reinforces the need for self-examination to address mistakes and for 
self-improvement.  
 
In the same way that a commander may be stern with an individual soldier 
but must refrain when an army deserts, the Sage does not become angry 
because he understands the injustice and danger of such a response to 
universal problems (2.10.4). Indeed, the Stoic never feels harm in the first 
place because he does not allow other people’s actions to impact on his 
well-being. He accepts things as they are and moves on. These are 
examples that can be followed by everyone, especially when it is 
                                                          
502 For Seneca’s deviation from the orthodox Stoic view about forgiveness, see p. 90. 
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remembered that everyone is guilty of errors at some point (3.24.4) and it is 
more profitable to make and keep friends than enemies (3.28.2). With this 
approach comes kindness, which Seneca believes can break the cycle of 
injury and can defuse aggressive situations. Animosity dies if it is ended by 
one side (2.34.5) and using discernment instead of anger acquits many of 
the ‘offenders’ (3.29.2). Seneca’s examples illustrate how, by changing 
attitudes towards other people’s perceived failings, men can resolve to 
assist instead of becoming angry with them. This demonstrates the 
widespread benefits of removing anger beyond improving personal mental 
well-being and meets a Stoic expectation of living as a citizen of the 
universe. 
 
Personal sacrifices need to be made without resentment, but this can cause 
challenges and can provoke frustration to the point of anger. For example, 
for non-philosophers and people during the early stages of practising 
philosophy, it is difficult to separate what is ‘good for me’ if it conflicts with 
what is ‘good for others’. Part of resolving such conflict comes from 
implementing Stoic ideals of oikeiosis/conciliatio/appropriatio, a natural 
progression for individuals as they mature which involves demonstrating an 
increased concern for and extending obligations to people beyond the 
immediate family (cf. Ep. 121.11-2).503 Using this concept as a benchmark 
for judgements, particularly in relation to other people, can help direct 
behaviour away from anger and its destructive consequences by focusing 
on ways in which the individual can contribute to the greater good and 
accept that it is his responsibility to do this. It could be argued that living by 
Stoic doctrines makes it difficult to advance socially, politically and 
economically because of the personal sacrifices required for self-
improvement. However, the Stoic attitude towards what is in man’s control 
does not lead to passivity or limit an individuals’ power. This is because 
Stoicism advocates personal independence, freedom, self-sufficiency and 
                                                          
503 Cf. Cic. Fin. 3.16ff., 62-3, 76; Cic. Nat. D. 2.133ff.; Diog. Laert. 7.85ff.; Plut. De Stoic. 
rep. 1038b; Hierocles apud Stob. 4.67.1-673.11 (LS 57G); Pembroke (1971); Striker 
(1983); Engberg-Pedersen (1986) and (1990); Sellars (2006) pp. 107-9; Gloyn (2017) pp. 
16-9.  
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free speech.504 The possibility of fulfilling one’s potential and being socially 
successful through understanding man’s sphere of control is demonstrated 
by the fact that many ancient Stoics were wealthy, well-educated and of 
great political standing. Indeed, some progressed to rule or advise leaders 
(Seneca was Nero’s advisor and tutor and Marcus Aurelius was Emperor).  
 
Critics have argued against treating loved ones as indifferents as they 
believe that intimate affection is part of being human.505 Viewing everything 
apart from virtue, including other people, as ‘indifferents’ has sparked 
criticism of Stoicism as not being ‘either intelligible or tolerable’.506 The Stoic 
doctrine of indifferents need not be seen in such a negative light if it is 
interpreted to be arguing that a degree of detachment makes it possible to 
best serve friends and family as this protects men from being governed by 
unruly passions which are known to damage relationships. Some critics go 
so far as to argue that the family’s welfare should be cared for because it is 
more than just a preferred indifferent and that it is difficult to reconcile a 
doctrine of indifference with one of ‘fellow-feeling.’507 I interpret Stoicism to 
be advising caution against excessive love towards other people, not that 
no concern should be shown and I hold that their doctrine encourages acting 
for the overall good by showing equal concern for everyone as a means to 
facilitate harmony across mankind. It is also a form of self-preservation from 
pain resulting from loss; it seeks to restore a personal sense of agency by 
helping people to recognise their sphere of control and that character is 
what is important, all of which are positive lessons.  
 
By focusing attention on their choices, individuals can be seen to be 
disregarding other people’s feelings and being selfish. Stoics focus on the 
individual’s responsibility to change himself so that he can benefit other 
people, as well as cultivating the best possible life for himself. This is why 
Seneca believes that the company kept is so important to moral 
                                                          
504 Cf. Littlewood (2004) pp. 25-6. 
505 Cf. Sorabji (2000) pp. 181-4; Nussbaum (2001) pp. 359-60.  
506 Cf. Williams (1997) p. 213. 
507 Cf. Sorabji (2000) pp. 173-5.  
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improvement508 and wisdom should be shared, as does Seneca (Ep. 6.1). 
Their attitudes towards the removal of passions may expose Stoics to an 
accusation of being uncaring and unmoved by other people. For instance, 
they may be perceived as cold and unemotional because the cerebral 
approach to life could be too analytical by over-valuing the rational side and 
ignoring or neglecting the emotional. This may have a detrimental effect on 
inter-personal relationships, as not engaging emotionally with other 
people’s difficulties may cause tension, making the other person more 
emotional to the point of becoming confrontational. Practising constantiae 
as opposed to passions can resolve this complaint: through rational, 
measured responses which these feelings provide it is possible to relate to 
other people and meet their needs in a reasoned way, and feel both wishing 
and joy without being manipulated by passions.509 
 
Stoics could also be interpreted as being aloof, self-righteous and 
narcissistic because they can appear to be rebelling against the prevailing 
views of the masses and ignoring popular opinion in favour of seeing virtue 
as the only good (a view which may not be widely shared or well-regarded). 
These philosophers may seem to be arrogant revolutionaries, which can 
lead to alienation, even persecution, by those who do not understand, feel 
threatened, are suspicious of or bewildered by the Stoic value system. In 
reality, while there is the danger of neglecting the external world if an 
individual withdraws too far by becoming too self-focused, Stoics believe it 
is possible to balance private and public life. They argue that contributions 
can be made to society beyond the holding of political positions, such as by 
helping people improve themselves through philosophy and through 
appropriate punishments for wrongdoing (cf. Tranq. 3.1; Diog. Laert. 
7.121).510 Practising Stoicism in the community reduces feelings of isolation 
                                                          
508 Cf. Ep. 3.8.1ff.; 7.8-10; 62.3; 85.41; 94.40ff. 
509 For constantiae, see pp. 84-5. 
510 There was a positive response to Stoicism from some rulers. For example, the 
Macedonian king, Antigonus Gonatas, summoned Zeno to his court: Zeno refused but sent 
Philonides and Persaeus, who later became governor of Corinth (Diog. Laert. 7.6-9). 
Stoicism was particularly influential during the Julio-Claudian era (from Augustus to Nero) 
where Stoics were appointed to key political roles as well as being moral advisors to the 
Emperor and resident tutors for wealthy families. For appropriate choices about 
involvement in public life, see Gill (2003, 2006) p. 37; Schofield (2015) pp. 78-80. 
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and the temptation to become over-engaged in one’s inner world. Indeed, 
perfecting character through Stoic exercises, cultivating social virtues such 
as justice etc., makes people better and therefore more useful to society. 
Benefitting other people is crucially important to a Stoic’s philanthropy: 
imparting wisdom and virtue is more important than generosity with material 
goods. 
 
Preventative measures 
Do not invite anger 
Seneca does not restrict his advice on dealing with anger to applying 
philosophical techniques: he offers common-sense and practical guidance 
which does not depend on having a philosophical outlook or understanding 
Stoic doctrines. For example, it is important not to invite anger but to ignore 
injury and rumours as it is easy to believe immediately what is heard and 
then become angry before forming a judgement about it (2.22.3-4).511 The 
spirit should be subdued in provocative situations, in the same way athletes 
accept blows and pain to exhaust their opponent before striking victoriously, 
not through anger, but when prompted by advantage (2.14.2). Seneca cites 
the example of the famous trainer, Pyrrhus, who taught his pupils not to 
become angry, to support these claims (2.14.3). If all these approaches 
have failed and anger prevails, it must be relinquished as soon as possible. 
Seneca encourages restraint as the issue is not the affront itself, but how it 
is responded to. This is possible and even proud despots have repressed 
their habitual cruelty (3.11.3. Cf. 3.22). If an individual is insulted, he should 
ask if it is worse than that suffered in the second century BC by the head of 
the Stoa, Diogenes of Babylon, when a youth spat on him during his lectures 
about anger. In true Stoic fashion, Diogenes bore the injury calmly and 
wisely, admitting that he was not angry and that he was unsure whether he 
should be cross (3.38.1). The purpose of this story is to show appropriate 
behaviour in the case of being assaulted as opposed to resorting to 
anger.512 
 
Resisting anger at its first stages and delaying responses 
                                                          
511 Cf. 2.24.1-2., 2.29.2-4, 3.11.1, 3.12.1; 3.25.3; Clem. 1.7.3. 
512 Cf. Kaster (2010) p. 128 n. 365. 
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Anger can be halted by resisting it at its first stages (cf. 1.8.1, 3.30.1) and it 
is easier to stop vices when they start (Ep. 85.9; 116.2-3). The first 
involuntary physiological effects need to be identified to prevent them from 
progressing to real passions. The onset of passions can be recognised, like 
sickness which occurs after initial symptoms and how there are signs before 
a storm and rain (3.10.2). Seneca uses the example of how epileptics take 
measures to prevent a fit and if it is unavoidable, remove themselves to 
somewhere private to illustrate how one should behave when feeling pre-
passions (3.10.3). The disorder should be identified, comprehended, and its 
power stopped before it spreads, by understanding personal irritations 
(3.10.4), just as swollen eyes or inflamed parts of the body are not touched 
(3.39.2). Passions are subjective because people are affected differently, 
even by the same things, making it particularly important to identify and 
protect personal weak points, which is possible through recognitio as well 
as taking rational sensible steps without considering them in a philosophical 
context.  
 
Novatus challenges the value of a cure that calms anger when it is already 
beginning to calm itself, which Seneca defends by arguing that it hastens 
the subsidence of anger, prevents its recurrence and confuses even the 
initial stage which it had not attempted to soothe because it removes all the 
weapons of revenge (3.39.3). Self-restraint and avoiding anger are also 
discussed in De Clementia where the value of control is placed over glory 
from revenge (Clem. 1.17.3). In all cases of anger Seneca insists that: ‘The 
inclination to rage should be stopped before its provocation — voluntas 
oportet ante saeuiendi quam causa deficiat’ (ibid 1.8.7). This is because 
anger in rulers results in death and creates a cycle of violence, in the same 
way excessive pruning of trees encourages regrowth (ibid 1.8.7).  
 
Delaying a response to the alleged ‘injury’ is the most constructive way of 
dealing with unavoidable anger-provoking situations. Initial impressions 
should not automatically be assented to without considering their meaning 
because inaccurate assessments of the situation are based on passions 
and not reason. Seneca believes delay to be the greatest cure for anger – 
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‘Maximum remedium irae mora est’ – and proposes deliberation as opposed 
to forgiveness because the initial response causes damage but withdrawal 
will make it cease (2.29.1). In the case of insults, questions should be asked 
about the validity of the insult, the reliability of the insulter and the fact that 
it is the judgement that causes distress, not the insult itself. Delay allows the 
opportunity not for pardoning, but for the reasoned assessment of the 
situation because this is where errors most frequently occur (3.32.2). 
Results will be more effective from suspending judgement (3.40.1). The first 
stages of anger should be resisted because its causes are the belief of being 
wronged which may, on reflection, be an incorrect assessment because 
time reveals the truth (2.22.2). Consequently, it is advisable to act in the 
same way as a judge does, casting his sentence only after hearing all the 
evidence because there may be no proof to support the initial impression 
(cf. 2.29.3, 3.12.4).513 Anger’s immediate responses are heavy, such as 
resorting to the sword, capital punishment, chains, prison or starvation, 
when Seneca proposes that light flogging is more appropriate which is why 
anger should be absent when administering punishments (3.32.2). 
 
Anger will be lessened with delay and it will be completely destroyed if it is 
attacked bit by bit, making it more manageable to overcome (2.29.1). It is 
difficult to withhold a reaction, but Seneca insists postponement to be 
anger’s greatest remedy, because, through delay, the initial strength of 
feeling lessens thus removing or lessening the ‘darkness that overwhelms 
the mind — caligo quae premit mentem’’ (3.12.4). He continues to say that 
some of the offences which caused the anger will decrease in an hour, 
certainly in a day and others will disappear completely (3.12.4). In this 
respect, delaying a response is empowering, not demeaning, because it is 
better to wait to issue orders based on reasoning rather than speak under 
the dictation of anger: thus, control over the situation can be retained. 
Seneca uses the example of Quintus Fabius Maximus, who became known 
as ‘The Delayer/Cunctator’ for his tactics after Hannibal’s victory at Cannae, 
to prove that delaying responses enables appropriate reactions and 
                                                          
513 Cf. Nussbaum (1993b) pp. 99-105. 
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planning in warfare, neither of which is possible in anger (1.11.5). Seneca 
introduces another interlocutor, Hieronymus of Rhodes, a Peripatetic 
philosopher who inquires about the purpose of biting one’s lips prior to 
beating a man to conceal and control one’s feelings (1.19.3. Cf. Hieronymus 
(fr. 21 Wehrli)). Seneca shows it is necessary not to act in anger by asking 
rhetorical questions about how people would react to the sight of 
inappropriate behaviour by officials.  
 
Delaying reactions objectifies the issue, so its importance and relevance 
can be truly understood in the context of a bigger picture, so that a more 
effective course of action can be chosen. There is the danger of extensive 
procrastination when a timescale to react or deliberate is not set. A Stoic 
does not suffer from this as he sets a time to address the thought and rather 
than avoiding it, distances himself and delays his reaction. He uses the 
delay to consider the outcome of his actions prior to acting and is led by the 
demands of virtue. This may be challenging at first but again, with practice, 
the habit will arise instinctively and Seneca offers reassurance that this is 
possible with hard work and divine support stressing the importance of 
continual active philosophical engagement (2.13.1-2). 
 
Curing other people 
As well as being accountable for personal feelings, individuals have a social 
responsibility to help other people improve themselves because humanitas 
is at the heart of Stoicism (cf. 1.14.2-3, 3.39ff.). This goal is significant when 
considering the need to extirpate passions and if not remove, then at least 
control anger. Part of this task involves re-education to help prevent 
passions arising in the future. Seneca reports Posidonius’ recommendation 
of precepts, ‘persuasion, consolation, and encouragement — suasionem et 
consolationem et exhortationem’ and, most importantly, the ‘investigation of 
causes/causarum inquisitionem’ which clarifies the distinction between 
virtue and vice (Ep. 95.65). Posidonius’ practical advice supported self-
improvement by reinforcing the need to understand the cause of the feelings 
from which changes can be learnt. Similarly, Chrysippus believed distress 
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to be the dissolution of a man but that it can be entirely rooted out when the 
cause is identified (Cic. Tusc. 3.61). 
 
In the context of assisting mourners to come to terms with their situation and 
to cease grieving, Cicero compared the views about curing passions offered 
by Cleanthes and Chrysippus. The former ‘teaches the sufferer that what 
has happened was not an evil — putent malum illud omnino non esse’ and 
in doing so aimed to change the agent’s belief that the object at which the 
passion was directed has any genuine value or disvalue in reference to the 
theory of indifferents (Cic. Tusc. 3.76). Cleanthes could be criticised 
because his method is directed at the wise man, as only he understands the 
nature of indifferents and would not require consolation. The method may 
educate the individual in terms of the value of ‘things’, yet it does not soothe 
the distress because the person may still perceive the cause of distress to 
be legitimately evil and distress is not always caused by a failure to 
understand the nature of indifferents but can also be the result of poor 
character, as is demonstrated by the example of Alcibiades and Socrates 
(Cic. Tusc. 3.77).514 This is an acceptable concern for Cleanthes’ method, 
but it is also valid to argue that once it is understood that externals are 
neither good nor evil in nature, disturbances will be removed (cf. Sext. Math. 
11.130. Cf. Sext. Math. 130-40). If this advice is applied to anger and the 
individual is taught that the perceived injury is not an evil but is indifferent 
as well as encouraged to acknowledge the disturbances which cause 
aggravation and distress, it is less likely for such comparatively slight 
annoyances to develop into full-blown anger. On the other hand, Chrysippus 
sought to address the passion by teaching that the passion itself is wrong 
and that the belief about the appropriateness to act is false (Cic. Tusc. 3.76). 
The practical difficulty associated with Chrysippus’ approach is that it is 
difficult to convince someone that passions are not appropriate or the object 
they are directed at has no value (Cic. Tusc. 3.79).515  
 
                                                          
514 Cf. Sorabji (2000) pp. 175-6.  
515 Cf. Graver (2002) pp. 171-3.  
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A Stoic tends to believe that there exists a natural affection and mutual 
empathy among mankind, with consideration of other people’s perspectives 
to try to understand their motivations. Such tolerance enables concessions 
for other people’s faults, even in the case of perceived injuries, so that the 
person does not become an enemy. Instead, efforts could be made to 
reform them whenever possible or the person could be avoided if 
improvement is unachievable. Whereas anger, selfishness and cruelty 
against other people turn men into beasts (Clem. 1.25.1), Seneca 
encourages patience (2.35.2), checking impulses (3.10.1), demonstrating 
forgiveness (cf. 2.10.2, 34.2) and showing compassion (cf. 2.25.3-4, 3.35.3-
4) all of which are possible when not under the direction of passions. It is 
better to heal than avenge an injury (3.27.1), it is right to judge other people 
by personal standards and more humane to recognise weaknesses and be 
kind-hearted (1.14.2). Seneca presents a series of measures to deal with 
anger in others as an extension of how it can be checked in the self and by 
practising these, the individual is equally improved because he is practising 
the virtue he seeks to perfect. The first stage involves chiding the man in 
the initial stages of anger in private and later in public. Then, if he cannot be 
corrected by words, he will be checked by public disgrace. Banishment to 
unknown regions will be the consequence of more serious faults, with 
imprisonment as a last resort (1.16.2). If none of these measures work, for 
those whose badness has become inherent and in the case of serial 
criminals, the kindest response is to kill the man through pity, not anger, to 
release him from his madness (1.16.3). Despite the suggestion of such 
extreme measures, Seneca is clear that with the right guidance, difficulties, 
in particular those caused by anger, can be overcome by moderating 
thoughts and views. 
 
Part of healing other people involves intervention either to remove the 
victims from the situation to protect them or to calm the impassioned person 
and help them delay their reaction until anger has passed (Cic. Tusc. 4.78). 
While this approach is sensible and helpful, it is not always effective 
because arguably someone cannot be helped mid-passion because such a 
man would reject advice and chastisement and refuse to surrender the 
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passion (cf. Gal. PHP 4.6.24-34). The person is also not in a rational state 
capable of taking on any advice which might be given to them while they 
are in the grip of irrationality. This problem emphasises the importance of 
recognising the right moment for treatment (Cf. Helv. 1.2; Cic. Tusc. 4.76). 
Chrysippus noted that once the ‘inflammation of the passion’ has subsided, 
reason can return, and in doing so ‘expose the irrationality of the passion’ 
(Gal. PHP 4.7.27). Seneca also acknowledges that first signs of anger 
should not be softened by words, as ira ‘is deaf and mindless/surda est et 
amens’ and requires space (3.39.2). Instead, ‘Remedies are effective when 
the malady subsides — Remedia in remissionibus prosunt’ and ‘Rest is the 
cure for the first stages of disease — initia morborum quies curat’ (3.39.2). 
 
There are also practical steps which can be taken to minimise the eruption 
of anger. By acknowledging personal weaknesses and enlisting the help of 
friends, people who are likely to lose control can be managed before anger 
takes hold. For instance, those who cannot tolerate wine and fear they may 
become rash and insolent on becoming drunk, rely on their friends to 
remove them from parties. Other men, who have realised that in illness they 
are unreasonable, warn their friends to ignore their orders when they are 
sick (3.13.5). Exempla illustrate how these methods are successful. For 
instance, Seneca cites Socrates’ friends who began to recognise that he 
concealed his anger by lowering his voice and speaking little, which was 
proof he was struggling with himself (3.13.3).516 Seneca believes that the 
Greek philosopher’s iconic status will persuade others to follow Socrates’ 
example and allow friends to speak freely and not tolerate anger, seeking 
help while sane (3.13.3-4). Evidently, changes in environment and the offer 
and acceptance of help, while they may not prevent anger, can certainly 
manage the potential effect of the individual’s actions and improve 
conditions for those around him. 
 
*** 
                                                          
516 Cf. van Hoof (2007) pp. 79-80. 
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Philosophical ethics can offer the principles by which to act, but there is no 
universal advice about what to do in specific situations. Anger is a 
particularly subjective experience and manifests itself in diverse ways, with 
variations in intensity, display, duration and awareness, with different 
understandings of the passion depending on the culture and time. 
Consequently, there is no single way to ‘fix’ the problem, which is something 
Seneca acknowledges when he notes that the individual has different needs 
and prescriptions: ‘Our strategy must be based on each person’s character 
— Consilium pro moribus cuiusque capiendum erit’ (3.1.2. Cf. 1.6.4). This 
requires realistic goal-setting to cater for individual abilities and awareness 
of personal triggers for anger. There is no ‘right’ way other than to have full 
awareness of thoughts and actions according to one’s personal nature, 
rather than adhering to rigid commandments. To be successful in achieving 
goals requires strategic planning, adaptability, steadfastness, not making 
rash decisions, following good advisors and reason’s guidance.  
 
Through adaptations, one could argue that Seneca’s therapeutic techniques 
may be used in non-philosophical contexts and they can be useful to those 
who do not share the conviction of ancient doctrines or their world view. For 
example, it is sensible to educate children in alternative responses to anger, 
to avoid confrontational situations and delay responses when provoked. To 
a certain extent, even variations of the spiritual exercises could be practised 
by non-philosophers if they are used to focus attention on improving how 
life is lived. This is because they are a way of helping alleviate anxieties 
about the future and come to terms with the suffering in the past at the same 
time as giving direction for the present and guiding decisions for the future. 
However, without the Stoic context, there is a risk that the spiritual exercises 
could result in procrastination rather than self-improvement. Many of the 
techniques have the greatest success when applied within a Stoic 
framework because they encourage questioning about impetuses and world 
view. Making changes to habits is most effective when it is based on an 
understanding of the motivation, which can be learned through increased 
self-awareness, and the rejection of externals depends on understanding 
the true value of things, knowledge of which Stoicism provides.  
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Philosophy assists in preventing passions from arising because it enables 
comprehension of the nature and causes of adfectus so that it can be 
resisted at its first stages and by understanding mankind’s role in the cosmic 
order, humanitas can be developed, which helps guide and cure other 
people. Ultimately, the individual can choose whether to become subject to 
passions and whether to take the preventive measures offered by Seneca 
and Stoicism. If appropriately applied, with continuous practice, then the 
methods Seneca proposes for preventing anger arising and for curing it 
when it does, will have positive effects. In this way, with an understanding 
of the doctrines, Stoicism is a successful means to manage and remove 
passions. A ‘cure’ can be effective but only with a willingness to make the 
necessary difficult changes. I progress in Chapter Four to consider the Stoic 
elements relating to passions in Seneca’s tragedies Medea and Thyestes 
to consider why Seneca incorporates philosophy in a dramatic context and 
how this affects his theory of passions.  
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Chapter Four 
Stoic sentiments in Seneca’s Medea and Thyestes 
 
Debate over Seneca’s intentions for incorporating philosophical ideas in 
dramatic contexts has given rise to scholarly disputes about whether, rather 
than proposing Stoicism, he is in fact taking an anti-Stoic stance. These 
interpretations will be analysed before exploring the extent to which 
characters’ attitudes and behaviours in Medea and Thyestes reflect Stoic 
ideas concerning power, externals, exile, death, fate, divinities, nature and 
insanity in relation to passions. The aim from identifying Stoic elements 
extending beyond the immediate focus of anger is to formulate a picture of 
the way in which the socio-political environment in which the characters 
exist moulds their attitudes and behaviours, in preparation for a return to the 
subject of the protagonists’ anger and whether they could be cured in 
Chapter Five. The discussion of these themes here illustrates how, in these 
plays, Seneca exposes common and non-philosophical assumptions about 
the world as being obstacles to individuals’ well-being through characters 
who demonstrate errors in evaluative judgements and implies how by 
adopting Stoic attitudes instead, the problems of passions can be mitigated. 
I conclude that Seneca uses philosophy in line with generic expectations of 
tragedy and any perceived Stoicism in the characters is short-lived and self-
serving because they appear to be unaware of what Stoicism would expect 
of them. However, the theatre provides a perfect forum to demonstrate the 
need for managing reactions to challenging situations. 
 
Relationship of Senecan drama to philosophy 
Scholars dispute over interpretations of Seneca’s intentions in his plays, 
ranging from arguing that he promotes Stoicism to claiming that his plays 
are literary or rhetorical ‘showpieces’ without philosophical intentions or that 
they are nihilistic or anti-Stoic. I do not concur that there is no philosophical 
intent in Seneca’s work and that his purpose was to solely create innovative 
rhetorical masterpieces. Although it is not possible to accurately determine 
an author’s intentions, in my view, Seneca includes philosophical ideas in 
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his plays to help educate his audience about virtue and vice as well as to 
establish himself in a tradition of great writers. This is because Stoics 
regarded philosophy as the supreme subject and also, in more general 
terms, great literature can be characterised as being thought-provoking and 
encouraging greater understanding of the psychology of human nature, 
which Seneca’s works seek to achieve in his readers and audience.517 
 
Scholarship supporting the ‘anti-Stoic’ stance argues that the non-Stoic 
elements found within the plays conflict with the School’s doctrines to such 
an extent that it would be incorrect to interpret Seneca as promoting 
Stoicism in his drama.518 Such elements include, among other things, the 
triumph of evil, death and suffering; the powerlessness of reason to 
overcome passions; the hopelessness of the characters and inherited 
curses or evil family traits.519 In addition, there is the problem of malevolent 
divine machinery – furies, ghosts, envious and injurious deities and a 
punishing underworld – all of which challenge Stoic notions about God and 
natural laws and are examples of traditional falsehoods propagated by 
poets, about which Seneca complains.520 This difficulty is seen particularly 
in the opening scene of Thyestes (Thy. lines 1-121), where, in accordance 
with mythology, a dialogue between the Fury Megaera and the ghost of 
Tantalus occurs on stage with the former ordering the ghost to cause 
continued turmoil among the household (line 28) and the vain attempts by 
Tantalus to stop the ensuing disasters that occur in the play (lines 86ff., 
100ff.).521  
 
                                                          
517 Cf. Motto and Clark (1982) p. 127.  
518 For analysis of these interpretations, see Hine (2004) discussing Leo (1878, 1963) p. 
158; Dingel (1974); Colakis (1982) and Armisen-Marchetti (1992). Cf. Sandbach (1975) pp. 
160-1; Pratt (1983) pp. 73-131; Curley (1986) pp. 187ff.; Mayer (1988) p. 152 and (1994) 
esp. pp. 151-2; Rosenmeyer (1989); Littlewood (2004) pp. 16-7.  
519 Cf. Hine (2004) pp. 201-5.  
520 Cf. Beat. 26.6; Brev. 16.5; Ep. 115.12-5; Marc. 19.4. For the anti-Stoic argument that 
moral evil creates external events which prevent a world created for individuals’ benefit, 
see Hine (2004) p. 203.  
521 Curley (1986) argues that the universe in Thyestes does not conform to the Stoic 
cosmos, because Atreus’ crime is divinely determined and ‘represents the satisfaction of a 
natural impulse’ (p. 178). 
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Rather than considering this scene to be indicative of Seneca dismissing 
Stoicism, although it portrays a dark, un-Stoic universe, I interpret it to be 
showing how dramatic constraints arising from following a mythological 
story impinge on the presentation of philosophical ideas within a play. I 
suggest that the scene could be reconciled with the Stoic suggestions 
elsewhere in the play by considering how a Stoic view of fate is considered 
to be a combination of two elements. On the one hand, events are 
predetermined by Providence and many Stoics believe that all events are 
causally connected and determined by fate, marking the need for secundum 
naturam (Ep. 41.9).522 This involves adjusting to circumstances, while not 
becoming attached to objects and accepting they can be taken away at 
short notice.  
 
On the other hand, events are brought about by the agent’s decisions and 
actions based on judgements, either born from correct reason or distortions 
from passions: the individual chooses the action that follows assent, 
behaviour for which he is accountable (cf. QNat. 2.38.3).523 Arguably, 
Seneca is echoing Chrysippus’ understanding of fate through which action 
arises from two forces, whereby Tantalus and the Fury are the external 
cause working together with the internal cause, which is Atreus’ 
personality.524 Tantalus and the Fury can be interpreted to be a divine cause 
but, because of the constraints of the myth, this is not benevolent. Atreus is 
‘maddened/rabidus’ (Thy. line 254) and ‘frenzied/attonitus’ (line 260) 
because of the Fury’s curse combined with his anger that prevents him from 
making rational assessments. In this respect, Seneca can present 
traditional concerns (such as that divine forces engineer actions) and Stoic 
attitudes about man’s sense of agency within the same play without 
compromising his perceived world view.  
                                                          
522 Cf. Beat. 3.3; Ep. 45.9; Diog. Laert. 7.149. Chrysippus in On Providence Book 4 defined 
fate as: ‘“an orderly series, established by nature, of all events, following one another and 
joined together from eternity, and their unalterable interdependence”’ (Gell. NA 7.2.3). 
Translated by Rolfe (1927-1928) p. 95.  
523 Cf. Setaioli (2014a). For the process of assent, see pp. 57-8. 
524 Cf. Gell. NA 7.2.7-11; Plut. De Stoic. rep. 1056b-57c. 
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Another argument raised against Seneca’s promotion of Stoicism is that his 
dramas could arguably be open to other philosophical interpretations, such 
as Epicurean, Academic or Peripatetic provoking ethical reflection from 
different angles.525 To overlook these suggestions would be to take a too 
narrow view and one which fails to appreciate the texts as a whole.526 It is 
correctly noted that to form an accurate assessment of the plays, it is 
necessary to recognise instances where words and phrases can be non-
Stoic too, when ideas can be both Stoic and non-Stoic and the inaccuracy 
of an assessment which ignores elements that do not meet a Stoic 
interpretation.527 However, for my purposes, I have chosen to focus on Stoic 
ideas within particular plays which are included in and derived from the 
characters’ attitudes and behaviours to compare them with those Seneca 
communicates in his prose.  
 
I am arguing that there are multiple purposes for philosophy’s inclusion, 
particular attention should be paid to its educative role because of Seneca’s 
expressed interest in the human struggle with vices and the need to seek 
virtuous living and how in his prose, he presents himself as a teacher, guide 
and doctor to educate his readers in correct values (cf. 1.16.4).528 
Consequently, I interpret his plays as being designed to encourage or at the 
very least ‘invite’ reflection in the audience with a view to prompting self-
improvement and challenge traditional perceptions of the world.529 Seneca 
appears to be making philosophy accessible to those who are not or have 
                                                          
525 For this suggestion being more probable if the plays were anonymous, see Hine (2004) 
pp. 176-7 and pp. 208-9.  
526 For complaints about Stoic interpretations being reductive, assuming tragedies are 
‘single-issue’ dramas and that Stoic readings are an ‘over-simplification’ and often tenuous, 
see Hine (2004) p. 194. For dramas containing a ‘plurality of competing voices’, see 
Croisille (1964) p. 277 cited in Hine (2004) p. 194. 
527 Cf. Hine (2004) p. 201. I agree that the most constructive way of viewing Seneca’s plays 
would be to take a diagnostic approach which analyses philosophical ethics from the 
character’s perspective and beliefs and human nature and the world without making claims 
that plays are designed solely to promote a philosophical school, nor to prove an author’s 
intention and to recognise that interpretations from different philosophical stances can 
prove similar, largely because the ideas communicated are moral commonplaces (cf. Hine 
(2004) pp. 186ff.). 
528 Cf. Ep. 8.2-3; Helv. 1.2, 2.1ff.; Marc. 1.8. 
529 A view correctly defended by Hine (2004) pp. 210-1. 
180 
 
not previously been interested in Stoicism by inspiring contemplation about 
different perspectives such as those relating to fate, gods and determinism.  
 
Philosophical themes 
Part of an education in virtue and vice from Seneca requires challenges to 
traditional perceptions of the world that do not accord with the philosophical 
understanding of the subject, which he believes should be accepted to be 
true. It is my contention that in part, Seneca’s characters’ responses and 
behaviours can be interpreted to be communicating philosophical themes 
devised to provoke revision of mistaken opinions and consider a Stoic 
perspective instead.530 These topics include power (in terms of kingship 
versus tyranny), externals, exile, death (often of innocent people such as 
Medea’s and Thyestes’ children), fate, divinities, nature and madness from 
‘possession’ by an external force or passions. The Choruses communicate 
these topics in greatest detail.531 Where they are naive in their views and 
observations they create dramatic irony, such as in Medea, where the 
Chorus indiscriminately follow tradition, particularly towards the royal family 
evidenced by the epithalamium (Med. lines 56ff.) and in the third ode, they 
take a traditional, but un-Stoic view, by believing that the suffering of the 
Argonauts is divine punishment (lines 595-669). Characters are presented 
according to the dramatist’s views and expectations for them.  
 
Power, kingship and tyranny 
Undoubtedly reflecting Seneca’s personal experience and those of his 
peers, power and the horrors caused by its abuse are particularly common 
subjects in his tragedies.532 This reflects his explanations in his prose works 
that a king and a tyrant are distinguished by their attitude towards 
punishments.533 The tyrant is epitomised by cruelty, takes delight in brutality 
(Clem. 1.12.1)534 and inspires fear and resentment (ibid 1.12.3-13.3). In 
contrast, the good king embraces clementia (ibid 1.12.3) only killing if it is in 
                                                          
530 Whether Seneca’s characters ‘know’ about Stoicism is an important consideration for 
the analysis of their behaviour, which will be addressed in Chapter Five passim. 
531 Cf. Pratt (1948) p. 6. 
532 Cf. Steele (1922a) p. 81; Herington (1966) pp. 430-1; Boyle (2014) p. 190. 
533 Cf. Clem. 1.11.4, 1.12.1, 1.13.1; Ep. 114.24. 
534 Cf. Clem. 1.7.3, 1.25.1-2. 
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the best interest of the state (ibid 1.12.1) or to benefit the punished and 
inspires love because he works towards common safety (ibid 1.13.4-5). 
Methods of exerting power are influenced by a ruler’s state of mind, 
especially when he is driven to turmoil by adfectus, as is the case in the 
kings of Medea and Thyestes. These plays discuss different styles of 
kingship, the abuse of position (by Atreus and in Medea’s opinion Creon) 
and the loss of and struggle to regain control as a consequence of their 
passions and actions carried out in anger.535 These are subjects which 
provoke philosophical discussion about alternative attitudes towards 
existing situations, rather than relying on emotional responses. They assist 
Seneca in his aim to educate his audience in virtue and vice and persuade 
them of the need to remove anger.536  
 
Kingship in Medea 
The ruler’s attitude towards kingship is significant in Medea because it 
influences how the protagonist behaves. She presents Creon, the King of 
Corinth, as a tyrant complaining about his arrogance (‘Pelasgo tumidus 
imperio’, Med. line 178), which is supported by the Chorus’ complaint about 
the rarity of free speech (line 109) and Jason’s concern over the danger of 
a king’s wrath (line 494).537 She entirely blames Creon for the situation (line 
143) in the same way he blames her (lines 266-8). Creon himself demands 
that his position is recognised, particularly by Medea, demonstrating how 
kings do not always have citizens’ well-being at the heart of their actions 
and that in Creon’s case, he values status and power above fairness (cf. 
Med. lines 188-90, 195).538 Creon’s arrogance leads him to fail in his duty 
to protect his country and prevents him from taking a Stoic view to 
leadership by which he would replace his authoritarian approach with a 
humanitarian one, seeing men as a brotherhood. Nonetheless, he insists 
                                                          
535 Cf. Buckley (2013) pp. 216-7.  
536 Cf. Tarrant (2006) pp. 14ff. Presenting these issues also meets literary expectations 
where, for three centuries before Seneca, the temptation of great men to wickedness was 
a constant philosophical and satirical theme cf. Henry and Henry (1985) pp. 68-9.  
537 Indeed, Seneca’s Creon does not even express concern for his daughter’s well-being, 
which is an important worry in Euripides’ play (cf. Eur. Med. lines 282-3, 287-8, 329): 
instead, he focuses on himself (Sen. Med. lines 187ff.). Cf. Boyle (2014) p. 180.  
538 Cf. Littlewood (2004) pp. 39-40. 
182 
 
that he is ‘no vicious, sceptred tyrant — non… sceptra violentus geram’ (line 
252), nor is he a proud ruler who tramples over the unfortunate (line 253) 
and cites the marriage of his daughter to a refugee as proof of his concern 
for other people (lines 254-6). While Creon’s decision to adopt Jason’s sons 
and raise them as his own (line 284) was in keeping with the ancient Roman 
tradition of divorced children remaining with their father, it has fatal 
consequences in a dramatic setting because it provokes Medea’s wrath as 
she no longer feels a mother (line 171).539 These comments raise questions 
about the accuracy of Medea’s opinion of him which can be perceived as 
being biased because of her anger and also there is the issue that Creon is 
mistaken in how to create social and political stability.  
 
Despite the views about Creon she vocalises, Medea still appeals to him to 
hear her case as a judge would and his claim to grant her a fair hearing 
suggests that this may be a possibility (Med. lines 202). However, after 
judging the story of Medea and Jason, Creon absolves Jason of guilt for 
Medea’s crimes and wants to protect him (lines 262-5). When he concedes 
to Medea’s plea to extend her stay in Corinth, he threatens her with death if 
she does not leave the next day (lines 297-9. Cf. lines 183-6, 490-1).540 This 
is because he is conscious of the danger Medea poses to the state following 
the murder of Pelias (line 201): her plotting and historic craftiness lead him 
to question who she will spare or leave in peace (lines 181-2). He refers to 
her as ‘vile ferocious fiend/monstrum saevum horribile’ (line 191) and views 
her as a ‘disease/luem’ which needs removing before it infects his city, 
metaphorically illustrating the calamitous results of passions (lines 183-4). 
Even when he believes that he is being reasonable, Creon’s actions are 
arguably driven by passion, particularly fear of Medea. This raises the 
question of justice, fair trial, and the moral force of Creon’s decisions, all of 
which a ‘good’ king would consider important and practise because he 
exercises reason (cf. Clem. 1.12-3). Medea also reveals her view of regal 
                                                          
539 Cf. Abrahamsen (1999) p. 116.  
540 Creon also refuses Medea asylum in Corinth or on any land he rules (Med. lines 269ff.) 
largely to prevent war with the Thessalian king, Acastus, who was seeking revenge against 
Jason and Medea for arranging the murder of his father, Pelias (lines 256ff. Cf. line 516). 
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responsibility to use his extensive resources to help the suffering, protect 
and not punish those seeking mercy, which she believes Creon fails to 
demonstrate towards her thus evidencing his failure as being a true king in 
the Stoic sense (lines 221-5). 
 
Tyranny in Thyestes 
An extension of the discussion of kingship in De Clementia is found in 
Thyestes, which depicts a tyrant’s cruelty, rage and ruthlessness, providing 
compelling, though disturbing, entertainment.541 The audience’s first 
experience of Atreus is when he describes himself as an angry tyrannus 
(Thy. lines 177-80) which reinforces the connection between anger and 
tyranny which Seneca has established in other works. Atreus arrogantly 
believes that a ruler’s power is by complete freedom of action, proposes 
autocratic monarchy and sees no position for virtues in royal life, suggesting 
that he places no value on virtue and reason (lines 214-8). He governs by 
brutality542 and believes his subjects should defend his honour by waging 
war against his enemy (lines 180ff.). Despite warnings from the Satelles 
about the dangers of power established through terror (lines 207ff. Cf. Clem. 
1.12.3-4), Atreus expects subjects’ praise based on their fear, not their 
admiration or respect (lines 211ff. Cf. lines 205ff.) and this dread is 
confirmed by the Chorus (lines 561-72, 600). These are flaws in tyrants 
which Seneca repeats in his prose work543 and an argument which he 
rejects when proposed by the unnamed interlocutor (2.11.1).  
 
While Davis (2003) recognises Atreus is not the ‘ideal’ king, he still makes 
a favourable comparison of Atreus with the Stoic Sage because he believes 
that the Stoic thinking about kingship in the play is ‘inadequate to deal with 
these circumstances’ (p. 66). In my view, however, there are no elements 
                                                          
541 Cf. Littlewood (2004) pp. 29-30. Rose (1986-7) identifies that rex and regnum have three 
meanings in the play. For Atreus (in line with the late Republic and early Principate writers) 
rex refers to a tyrant: ‘a leader who arrogates excessive and unlawful powers without 
respect for the rights and freedoms of his fellow citizens.’ The second meaning is that of 
an enlightened ruler (as described by the Satelles in Thy. line 213. For the philosopher king 
of the Chorus see lines 344-403). The third meaning of rex relates to the criminal ambition 
for power which characterises this type of ruler (lines 336-403) (p. 119).  
542 Cf. Thy. lines 201-4; 288-9; 312ff.; Clem. 1.7.3, 1.12-13, 1.25.1-2. 
543 Cf. Clem. 1.3.4ff., 1.10.2, 1.11.41, 1.12.3-4, 1.19.8. 
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of a Stoic Sage found in Atreus and any attempts to find these are the result 
of a grave misapplication of Stoicism. Davis connects Atreus with Stoicism 
because of his indifference towards the material aspect of kingship and 
focus on power itself (Thy. lines 211ff.) but in doing so, fails to acknowledge 
that, to a Stoic, the interest in power would be a dependence on externals 
as much as valuing objects and would therefore be unacceptable. Davis 
also notes that Atreus is unconcerned with his life and safety because he 
values it solely in terms of his capacity to take revenge on his brother (lines 
190ff.). This interpretation overlooks the fact that a Stoic would 
acknowledge health and self-preservation as preferred indifferents, and 
while he would not pursue this over virtue itself, would see living as a means 
to acquire it and protect himself accordingly. Atreus may declare that he is 
unconcerned with his subjects’ favour (lines 351ff.) because he does not 
value their judgements (lines 205-12) but these views are not the result of 
Stoic attitudes. While a Stoic does not depend on or define himself 
according to public perception, he is dedicated to perfecting his character 
because this facilitates consistent reason, he is aware that wise men 
recognise excellence of character (cf. Cic. Tusc. 3.3) and a proficiens looks 
to emulate men of such greatness (cf. Ep. 6.6-7; 11.8-10). Atreus 
demonstrates none of these motives for the way in which he thinks or views 
other people.  
 
In addition, Davis is incorrect in assuming that because Atreus walks high 
among the stars (Thy. line 885) this equates with the Sage for whom 
everything is beneath him (line 366). Atreus’ arrogance, for example that he 
is a God (lines 911-2), stems from beliefs that are based on his over-inflated 
self-worth (lines 205ff. Cf. lines 351ff.; Clem. 1.7; 1.8). These views are not 
those of a true ruler who should be god-like (Clem. 1.5.7), whereas the wise 
man is above the ‘fool’ because he has perfected reason, something which 
Atreus indisputably lacks. I dispute that because Atreus shows no fear when 
he kills his nephews this is the equivalent of a sage’s constancy (lines 703ff.) 
despite the Chorus’ perception of Atreus’ consistency because he remained 
unmoved ‘immotus Atreus constat’ (lines 703-4). I also reject the conclusion 
that because by the end of the play Atreus fears and desires nothing (since 
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he considers himself to have conquered his brother), this makes him a Stoic. 
That he still feels unsated, despite his apparent satisfaction at the start of 
Act Five (lines 888-91) is evidence that he remains confused about his 
actual status because of the complexity of thinking which has arisen from 
him being governed by anger: a problem from which a Sage is exempt. The 
Stoic Sage harms no one and fears nothing, not because he has ‘removed’ 
the problem through violent actions, but because he never allows external 
circumstances to impact on his well-being. In contrast to Davis, I regard 
Atreus as offering a distorted image of the Sage. In addition to his tyrannical 
rule, Atreus is not affected by other people’s view of him as result of his 
arrogance not because externals do not form a part of his cultivation of virtue 
as is the case for a Stoic. Furthermore, his desire to manipulate his citizens 
to his will is exactly the opposite of the Stoic desire to cultivate a good 
community. 
 
Successful tragedy requires audience engagement with the characters and 
their circumstances which is best facilitated by topics to which the audience 
can relate their personal experience, such as threats to familiarity and 
stability. Accordingly, Thyestes demonstrates the vulnerability of social and 
religious institutions, which are torn apart by the conduct of individuals and 
tyrants, who act out of anger and in doing so challenge the Roman virtues 
of ‘courage/virtus’ and ‘duty/pietas’.544 The cannibalism in Thyestes inverts 
the institutions on which civilisation depends, by making a festive banquet 
which is usually a hospitable occasion to foster harmony, into something 
vile and torturous.545 Atreus’ crimes attack traditional religious practices by 
confusing god, man and beast, as he sacrifices his nephews according to 
ritual (cf. Thy. lines 93ff., 684ff.).546 In many respects, this play is more of a 
‘training manual’ against tyranny for Nero than De Clementia, in that it 
provides constant illustrations of the catastrophic consequences of unjust 
                                                          
544 Cf. Buckley (2013) p. 205. Pietas is often translated as ‘duty’, ’religious behaviour’, 
‘loyalty’ and ‘devotion.’ For Cicero it is: ‘that which admonishes us to do our duty to our 
country or our parents or other blood relations — pietatem, quae erga patriam aut parentes 
aut alios sanguine coniunctos officium conservare moneat’ (Cic. Inv. rhet. 2.22.66, quoted 
by Wagenvoort (1980) p. 7). Cf. Boyle (2014) p. 199. 
545 Cf. Boyle (1997) p. 47.  
546 Cf. Boyle (1997) pp. 47-8.  
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and egotistical rule, one which is prompted by anger and obsession with 
taking violent vengeance.547 The play includes extensive discussions about 
alternatives which are more fitting to creating a harmonious state i.e. ruling 
without being influenced by passions such as ira which prevents fair 
judgements. 
 
A true king 
Despite the presentation of Atreus, or maybe because of it, Seneca can 
convince his audience to take a different view. Thyestes allows for the 
possibility of more humane leadership with Stoic-esque approaches to 
ruling proposed by the Chorus (Thy. lines 336-401). The Chorus discuss the 
appropriate governing qualities celebrated in De Clementia, such as justice, 
peace, security and honour all of which should be embodied in good living 
and possible through the absence of passions in decision-making (cf. Clem. 
1.12.3-4, 1.19.8, 2.1.4).548 Their vision of kingship is diametrically opposed 
to the reality of Atreus’ rule, reflecting contemporary Rome’s experience of 
rulers, and their ideal has philosophical qualities. They explain that a true 
king is not made by extensive wealth, elaborate clothes and crowns or lavish 
decorations (lines 344-7). Rather, the ruler does not fear, scorns greed, 
does not seek popularity (lines 348-52) but becomes ‘rich’, not through his 
property and land, but through his excellent state of mind shown in his ability 
to ‘weather the storm’ metaphorically and literally (lines 353ff.). Most 
importantly, the good king courageously embraces death (lines 365-8), 
requires no military defences (lines 381ff.) and is free from adfectus in the 
sense that fear and desire are absent in him (lines 388-90). The Chorus 
conclude that they will leave ambition to others and seek a life of quiet 
contemplation and reflection, preparing to welcome death, all of which are 
key Stoic goals (lines 391-403).549  
 
It is difficult to assess the extent to which Choruses put philosophical 
ideology into practice because they are characters of a different kind in that 
                                                          
547 Cf. Wilson (2014) pp. 158-62. 
548 Cf. Schiesaro (2003) pp. 159-60.  
549 Cf. 2.28.4, 3.42.1-43.1; Beat. 3.3; Ep. 63; 69.6; 77.18f.; Helv.; Marc. For preparation of 
death and praemeditatio malorum, see pp. 136-43. 
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their action is so restricted and their discussions are not always consistent 
with their loyalties: they appear Stoic only in their words and not in their 
actions.550 Nonetheless, their detachment and reflection here, which 
appears to reflect Stoic sentiments about how one should rule and 
contradicts the ideas and motivations of the main characters, provokes 
audience reflection to understand the relevance of their philosophical ideas 
to the plays’ purposes and to someone with a Stoic inclination, leads him to 
think about the impact of passions. Thus, the Chorus educate the audience 
in the requirement to apply philosophy rather than to simply intellectualise it 
and serve as a reminder of the need to fully understand the doctrines, as 
opposed to just preaching them. 
 
Externals 
These plays emphasise the importance of correct selection/deselection by 
demonstrating how externals can be detrimental as this is where many of 
the tragic characters in Medea and Thyestes err.551 Their desire for material 
possessions, power and public acknowledgement over the general welfare 
of other people has grave consequences as they lose family members, 
including their children. Seeing externals as being indifferent offers 
protection against materialistic trappings and from avarice and jealousy 
which regularly accompany multiple possessions, as is seen by Atreus’ 
obsession with wealth and power in Thyestes and Creon’s similar mistaken 
values in Medea. The dependency on other people and the belief that they 
can be controlled also causes problems within the plays.  
 
Medea’s dependence 
Seneca argues the main cause of passions is false evaluations of external 
objects and situations. Creusa accentuates Medea’s insecurities and 
highlights her isolation because her royal status appears to provide the 
power, influence, wealth and friends which as a foreigner she lacks and 
mistakenly values over reason: it is this error which is causing her distress. 
                                                          
550 Trinacty (2015) astutely observes that: ‘The choral odes often applaud Stoic 
commonplaces, but these are usually revealed to be flimsy dreams in the dramatic context’ 
(p. 36). This is particularly true of the Chorus’ view of an ideal ruler in Thyestes. 
551 For the importance of rejecting externals pp. 157-9. 
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More significantly, Medea’s love, grief and anger are the result of her 
assigning too high a value on her marriage to Jason. She has unrealistic 
expectations of Jason’s reciprocity in terms of devotion to the extent that 
her feelings know no moderation (cf. Med. lines 207ff., 397-8, 671-2).552 
Medea’s dependence on her marriage demonstrates how a dramatic world 
has different expectations of marital unions than society in the ‘real’ world.  
 
For Jason, his new marriage was motivated by the need to secure his 
family’s safety rather than romantic love. He never names Creusa and his 
only positive reference to her is through his suggestion that his sons would 
be better raised by: ‘A great queen for needy sons of exile — Regina natis 
exulum, afflictis potens’ (line 509). Seen in this context, Jason’s marriage 
would be accepted in the real world for the political and social advantages 
and mutual security.553 In Jason’s case this would be to reinstate his Greek 
citizenship, status and wealth; for Creusa to secure the regal line. In a 
dramatic context, where feelings and responses are exaggerated, it opens 
the opportunity for strong passions such as jealousy, anger and rage to 
govern actions, with inevitably disastrous consequences. Medea is aware 
of Jason’s devotion to his children – they are the reason he lives (lines 
545ff.) – she decides to kill them because their deaths will cause him the 
greatest pain.554  
 
In comparison, a Stoic would not idolise other people and would be cautious 
about the company he keeps. His concern for other people does not entail 
loving indiscriminately; nor does love demand romantic or sexual unions. 
This is because such relationships involve being taken over by passions, 
particularly anger, when expectations of other people are not met. 
                                                          
552 Cf. Ohlander (1989) pp. 215-6. 
553 Cf. Gloyn (2017) p. 77.  
554 Jason’s love of his sons is why he agrees to meet their mother (Med. line 444) and in 
response to Medea’s request that he remembers the happy times of the marriage, he 
claims to forgive her (line 557). Jason rejects Medea’s request for their children to join her 
in exile showing the importance of fatherly responsibility and the tradition in the ancient 
world for children to remain with their father and refuses to allow the boys to leave. After 
the death of his first child, Jason offers in vain to sacrifice himself to protect his second son 
(lines 1002-5). 
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Nonetheless, Stoicism promotes natural affection as one of the moral 
virtues which affirm an individual’s connectedness to other people. The 
Sage feels affection towards young people whose appearance reveals a 
nature well-disposed to virtue (Diog. Laert. 7.129).555 He will marry and have 
children because he can form close relationships without being 
overwhelmed by passions.556 He acts according to constantiae and 
demonstrates good will, willing good for the other person’s sake (cf. Zeno 
Resp. apud Diog. Laert. 7.121, 7.131).557  
 
Thyestes’ materialism 
Thyestes is the most complicated case of Stoicism found in Senecan tragic 
characters. He first appears as shabbily dressed, presumably unshaven, a 
trait of ancient philosophers (Thy. lines 446ff. Cf. Ep. 48.7). His attitude 
towards exile is Stoic in the sense that he bears hardship with a positive 
attitude: like a Sage in troubled times, he was ‘brave and happy/fortis… 
laetusque’ (lines 418).558 Thyestes professes the benefits of simple living 
and acknowledges the trappings of the throne in his argument against his 
son Tantalus, who is persuading him of the benefits of power (lines 423ff.). 
He reassures his son that a simple life is not to be feared – rather it is to be 
embraced as he has and living in such a way alleviates anxieties (lines 
446ff. Cf. lines 453ff.). Thyestes’ attitude reinforces how externals should 
not be depended upon because they can be lost as quickly as they can be 
gained, which is an important lesson in selection/deselection. He responds 
to his brother’s suggestion that everyone would accept fortune’s gifts by 
acknowledging the need for self-sufficiency and not rely on externals 
because they are transient (lines 536-7). There are occasions where 
Thyestes meets some of the requirements for a true king laid out by the 
                                                          
555 Diogenes Laertius reported discussion of these views by Zeno (Resp.), Chrysippus (On 
Modes of Life) and Apollodorus (Ethics) cf. Diog. Laert. 7.129. 
556 Cf. Cic. Fin. 3.68; Cic. Tusc. 4.72; Stob. Ecl. 2.7.11m; Reydams-Schils (2005) pp. 55-9; 
Long (2013) p. 151. 
557 Zeno’s views about common wives in an ideal state (Diog. Laert. 7.33) were not picked 
up by later Stoics though the topic of marriage was often discussed by Stoics, such as by 
Cleanthes (Diog. Laert. 7.175): these texts do not survive. Cf. Schofield (1991) pp. 19-27; 
Reydams-Schils (2005) pp. 43-76; Vogt (2008) pp. 20-64; Gloyn (2017) p. 78. From a Stoic 
perspective, marriage was a ‘duty that fits within a range of correct actions that the wise 
man should perform’ (Gloyn (2017) p. 81). 
558 Cf. Ep. 30.3; 54.3; Prov. 5.8; Rosivach (1995). 
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Chorus (lines 336-401), for example, he claims he is secure without 
weapons (line 468. Cf. lines 363ff.) and is indifferent to death (line 442. Cf. 
line 368). He recognises the transience of power, seeing no need to be 
swept away by the bright, but false, glory of regality (lines 414-5. Cf. Ep. 
94.74). Here Thyestes has a realistic understanding of power. 
 
While Thyestes begins the play holding Stoic-esque views, his attitude 
toward externals is not consistent. His son recognises a change in his 
father’s attitude but assures him that Atreus will restore him to himself if 
Thyestes accepts the offer of joint kingship (Thy. line 433), suggesting he is 
not convinced by his father’s declarations of satisfaction from simple living. 
Atreus is correctly confident that he will overcome his brother’s resolution, 
because, while Thyestes’ misfortunes and poverty have toughened his 
resistance, this is not sustainable (line 307). A true Stoic does not have 
attachments to externals, yet Thyestes proves that he is not as indifferent 
to wealth and power as he first appears. His first words refer to the wishes 
for the wealth of Argos (line 404), he alludes to former (ill-gotten) glories by 
his father’s chariot (lines 409-10. Cf. lines 660ff.) and imagines the glory of 
being greeted by a crowd of citizens (line 411).559 He also expresses 
‘hope/optata’ at seeing his home (line 404), a feeling in which a Sage would 
not indulge. Later in the play, Thyestes is presented in an undignified 
fashion at the banquet, epitomising the degradation of luxurious living (lines 
909-10). From his attitudes and his experiences of passions, it can be 
concluded that Thyestes is not a sapiens but a rambling pontificating 
inebriate, whose circumstances force Stoic-esque values.560 With great 
generosity, Thyestes could be viewed as a proficiens, though this is slightly 
                                                          
559 Cf. Davis (2003) pp. 46-7. 
560 Davis (2003) notices that even when he talks about a life of poverty, Thyestes states 
that ‘it is possible to prefer/praeferre licet’ bad to good fortune, not ‘I prefer’ and that 
whereas Thyestes sees poverty as bad fortune, a Stoic would be indifferent to it (or may 
see it as good because he would be free from external trappings). In addition, Thyestes’ 
regal life was excessively extravagant and when he says it is possible ‘to manage/pati’ 
without a kingdom (Thy. line 470), he does not say he would want to. Thus, ‘There is then 
a discrepancy between Thyestes’ professed and his actual values. At an intellectual level, 
Thyestes holds values akin to those prescribed by Stoic philosophy. At a more visceral 
level, he holds the same values as other members of his family’ (Davis (2003) p. 47). In 
this respect, Thyestes can be interpreted as struggling with a Stoic concept of preferred 
indifferents. 
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unrealistic because he shows minimal commitment to making permanent 
changes to his lifestyle and values. Instead, Seneca is presenting a 
character that misattributes philosophical ideas and misuses them for 
personal ends with disastrous consequences because passions have 
replaced reason.  
 
Exile 
In Senecan drama, the precarious nature of power (and the desperation to 
maintain it) is evidenced through the presentation of exile (both literal and 
metaphorical) of people who threaten the ruler who may punish in anger. 
Seneca incorporates this theme not only for dramatic effect, but also as a 
reflection of his personal experience and how responses to situations 
depend on whether a traditional or a Stoic perspective is adopted and how 
these attitudes affect personal circumstances. Seneca’s experience 
undoubtedly influenced his plays and the dominance of exile emphasises 
contemporary concern for such a fate. In his consolation to his mother, 
Seneca argues that the common view of exile as being ‘gloomy and 
accursed/triste et execrabile’ is incorrect (Helv. 5.6) and considers exile 
merely to be ‘a change of place/loci commutatio’ (Helv. 6.1).561 He believes 
that every place of exile has redeeming features (Helv. 6.4) and agrees with 
Marcus Brutus that a man can take his virtues into exile with him (Helv. 8.1-
2. Cf. Helv. 11.5).562 These views are shared by Stoics who accept their fate 
and do not see exile in terms of losses but a change in circumstances to 
which adaptation is required. 563 
 
Medea the foreigner 
Exile has a psychological impact on those affected by it. People who are 
banished often mourn what they have lost (such as their home and loved 
ones) and are anxious and fearful about what their future location may bring. 
Exile in Medea is entirely negative, reflecting contemporary assumptions 
about foreigners being considered barbarians who should be mistrusted. In 
her first monologue, Medea reasonably prays that Jason becomes a 
                                                          
561 Cf. Ker (2009b) pp. 97-105; Gunderson (2015) pp. 96-7. 
562 Cf. Helv.; Gloyn (2017) pp. 33-40. 
563 Cf. Reydams-Schils (2005) pp. 103-13. 
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refugee, so he can suffer in the same way she has (Med. lines 19-26).564 
She made many sacrifices for love and was exiled because of committing 
crimes for Jason.565 She portrays herself as an innocent victim, claiming 
Jason had robbed her of her family, homeland and deserted her overseas 
(lines 118-20).566 Apart from the support of her loyal Nurse and Jason’s 
efforts to save her from death (Creon agrees to her exile in lines 185-6; 490-
1), Medea is completely isolated and has nowhere to go (cf. lines 119-20; 
207-10) which is confirmed by the Nurse’s reference to her faithless 
husband (lines 164-5). She cannot reclaim her dowry (lines 487-9) and 
without resources, she raises further suspicion, with the perception of her 
as a barbarian making prospects for a new home difficult.567  
 
Medea’s concerns would be legitimate in a real social context because for 
Romans at the time of Seneca’s writing, Augustan marriage laws remained 
applicable: for instance, women were penalised for not remarrying within a 
set time.568 In addition, at a time where adultery was a public crime and 
morality a state concern, Jason’s perceived unfaithfulness would have been 
punished with banishment and the confiscation of property and within this 
context, Medea’s anger with her husband might perhaps be socially 
acceptable. In the dramatic context, however, her exaggerated response 
surpasses what is socially tolerable and would not be accepted as 
appropriate for Stoics. The characters’ counterreaction could be met by 
greater audience sympathy for Jason as revealed by the Chorus’ loyalty to 
him (cf. Med. lines 56-115, 595-6, 668-9). The fact that men too were 
expected to marry for procreation purposes in accordance with social 
expectations and because it was natural to do so may also account for the 
acceptance of Jason’s remarriage (Gell. NA 1.6.2). 
                                                          
564 Cf. Wilson (2014) pp. 96-9. 
565 Cf. Med. lines 129ff., 134-6, 207ff., 451ff., 458; 483ff. 
566 Cf. Benton (2003) p. 273.  
567 Cf. Cic. Top. 23; Benton (2003) p. 274.  
568 The Lex Iulis de maritandis ordinibus (18BC) decreed widows were to be remarried 
within ten months and divorcees within six to avoid penalties. From 9AD, the Lex Papia 
Poppaea revised the timescale to two years and eighteen months accordingly. Cf. Gloyn 
(2017) pp. 77, 138 n. 14. 
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On a practical level, Jason’s abandonment has disturbing consequences for 
Medea: she has lost her identity as her divorce removes her status as a 
mother and wife, roles which socially defined women.569 Jason is Medea’s 
sole social contact and his departure marks the end of the tie with human 
society.570 She is hated, feared and unwanted by the Chorus who mock and 
desire to silence her by significantly not mentioning her name in an attempt 
to diminish her power (Med. line 114).571 She justifiably feels threatened and 
is conscious of the need for self-protection. Medea’s isolation is 
communicated through a series of dramatic devices, such as her constant 
presence on stage (often alone) and her identity monopolises the play in the 
minds of others and herself – she speaks over half the lines and the tragedy 
takes her name, marking the irony of other people’s attempt to quieten a 
woman whose words dominate the play.572  
 
Seneca highlights her ‘otherness’ by presenting Medea as ungovernable by 
reason or custom, while other characters, such as the Chorus, behave in a 
respectable, obedient and conventional fashion. The Chorus support Jason 
and present him as an innocent victim who ought to be aware of Medea’s 
capabilities which reinforces Medea’s isolation (Med. lines 102-4). They 
represent civilisation and order in the play, as demonstrated by their loyalty 
to the royal family and their following of traditions such as their epithalamium 
in celebration of Jason and Creusa’s wedding (lines 56-115). The Chorus 
describe Jason to be trembling and unwilling at the proposition of marrying 
Medea (lines 102-4) which could suggest that they did not believe their 
wedlock was legitimate: to be so, consent and will to marry was expected 
(Quint. Inst. 5.2.32). Instead, they encourage marrying Creusa because it 
                                                          
569 Cf. Curley (1986) pp. 195-9; Guastella (2001) pp. 199-200; Chapter Five passim.  
570 Fyfe (1983) emphasises the problems that Jason’s rejection of Medea causes. She 
argues that Jason’s departure leaves Medea in a ‘moral vacuum, an existential void’ (p. 
82) and that his absence means that Medea is alone: ‘with no human contact around which 
a moral framework may be rebuilt’ (p. 85). This is another reason why Jason can be held 
accountable in part for Medea’s behaviour.  
571 The characters appear frustrated by their inability to silence Medea (cf. Med. Chorus in 
lines 114-5; Nurse in lines 150ff.; Creon in lines 188ff. and Jason in line 530) and her refusal 
to calm down and listen to reason (cf. Nurse lines 150-4, 157-8, 381, 425-6; Jason lines 
506-7, 537-9, 557-9). 
572 Boyle (2014) notes that: ‘Seneca’s Medea is a brilliant rhetorician, whose control of the 
play’s language will mirror her mastery of its action’ (p. 196).  
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had her father’s blessing (lines 105-6), implying the presence of Roman 
legal requirements in the marriage.573 The princess’ Greek citizenship will 
provide Jason with status and wealth (even though he is foreign to Corinth 
which furthers the irony of the union (line 115)) and will produce legitimate 
children which was an important motivation in the institution of marriage in 
the ancient world. This highlights the differences between perceptions about 
civilisation and foreignness which are continued by the dramatic irony that 
the Chorus (representing civilisation) appeal to the same gods as Medea 
(the barbarian), reflecting a battle between good (reason) versus evil 
(irrationality).574  
 
Facing exile in Thyestes 
Banishment and its effect on an individual’s mental state are equally 
significant in Thyestes. At the opening of the play, Thyestes returns from 
exile (which was enforced by his angry brother following their struggle for 
power) in an unkempt fashion but initially praises the benefits of simple living 
(cf. Thy. lines 412ff.; 446-52), largely because of his fear when he was in 
power (lines 447-9). Here a Senecan character is found expressing a more 
positive view of exile which could alleviate fears about relocation, making a 
life away from hectic public life and its obligations an endearing alternative 
because it facilitates focusing on self-improvement and philosophical 
reflections. Thyestes describes how it is harder to fall from high status and 
riches than poverty itself, he is proud of his adjustment to changed 
circumstances (cf. lines 926ff.) and that he was able to ‘hold his head 
high/non inflexa//cervice’ (line 931). This is how a Stoic would respond and 
by showing Thyestes in a positive light, Seneca is encouraging his audience 
to emulate this aspect of his attitude towards acceptance, adaptation and 
rejecting externals. However, Thyestes is greedy and egocentric expecting 
a grand welcoming on his return (line 411), devoid of consideration for the 
events prior to his departure and their impact on his former subjects.  
                                                          
573 Cf. Treggiari (1991) pp. 37-80; Abrahamsen (1999) pp. 108-9; Cantarella (2002); Boyle 
(2014) pp. 148-9. 
574 Berry (1996) aptly notes that: ‘The person of Medea is more than a metaphor for evil or 
cruelty... She is, because she is barbarian, a human window on man’s mordant, animal 
past’ (p. 12). Cf. Lawall (1979). 
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Furthermore, as the play progresses, Thyestes serves as an example of 
debauched luxurious living rather than an example to follow and in this way, 
he reinforces the appropriateness of a simple life. Once dining in the palace, 
while rallying himself to be happy, Thyestes rejects wholesome simple living 
and now considers banishment and poverty the result of ill-fortune (Thy. 
lines 920ff.), causing shame (lines 924-5), which is a more common view of 
exile. Though it is little discussed, it is reasonable to assume that Atreus’ 
exile following usurpation prior to the play is a negative experience. Atreus 
complains about his fear when he was wandering (lines 237-8), laments 
over ‘gloomy poverty/tristis egestas’ (line 303) which echoes when Thyestes 
alludes to the shame of being poor (line 924). This explains Atreus’ desire 
to maintain his control and punish those who threaten his power which is 
unfortunately (but possibly understandably for the genre) violent.  
 
Death and suicide 
Stoicism, like other ancient philosophies, recognises that dying is a cause 
of common fear in mankind and tries to offer reassurance.575 However, in 
Medea and Thyestes, Seneca introduces ghosts who manipulate the action 
because they are victim to human passions, particularly anger and desire 
for revenge, for example, Tantalus takes responsibility for governing Atreus’ 
action (Thy. lines 1-121). As well as desires for the death of other people 
and carrying this out, there are death wishes for the self among tragic 
characters. Medea expresses a wish and acceptance of death twice in the 
play, firstly in her bravery against Creon (Med. line 170) and again later 
when she is seeking justice from Jupiter for her and Jason’s crimes (lines 
                                                          
575 Within Stoicism, there is debate about what happens to the soul after death. As the soul 
was material, some Stoics argue that it died with the body; others believe that the anima 
and divine element meant that it survived with the heavenly bodies (cf. Cic. Tusc. 1.18). 
Cleanthes believed souls survived until conflagration (Diog. Laert 7.157), whereas 
Chrysippus believed only the Sage’s soul survived: for the rest of men, the souls existed 
temporarily before being destroyed or reabsorbed into the cosmic pneuma and animals’ 
souls were destroyed with their body cf. Motto (1955a) pp. 188-9. Seneca offers conflicting 
views. At times, he claims that ‘death is non-existence/mors est non esse’ (Ep. 54.4-5). 
Elsewhere he proposes that death is an eternal existence (Ep. 102.29). On occasion, he 
considers that death may be a return to God (cf. Ep. 36.10; 93.10) and discusses the 
possibility that souls are happier when they are released from the body (Ep. 76.25). His 
ambiguity is pronounced when he admits that he is unsure if the soul at death moves to a 
better life and dwells with the deity or returns to the universe (Ep. 71.16). Cf. Gould (1965) 
pp. 22-3; Scott Smith (2014) pp. 357-60. 
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531ff.).576 She appears to adopt a Stoic attitude, considering death to be the 
only way for freedom from suffering when she states that a shameful life 
should not be endured (line 505). Although Medea does not consistently 
express Stoic views, her attitude towards death may be considered that of 
a Stoic heroine, akin to a Sage and a true king who ‘gladly/libens’ meets 
death (Thy. lines 367-8) and in whom there is an absence of fear even at 
the point of dying (cf. Ep. 61; 82).577 These attitudes provide a further 
opportunity for Seneca to communicate Stoic attitudes towards states of 
mind. He presents suicide in his prose works as ‘freedom/libertas’, claiming 
that it is better to die well than risk the dangers of living badly (Ep. 70.6).578  
 
Death alone tests true Stoicism as it is a test of character (cf. Ep. 26.5; 
30.8).579 Seneca demonstrated this in his own life when in 65AD, charged 
with alleged involvement in Piso's conspiracy to kill Nero, he was sentenced 
to commit suicide.580 His noble attitude in the face of death is hailed by his 
followers as being comparable to Socrates’, with both being given hemlock 
(cf. Tac. Ann. 15.60-4). Seneca acclaims individuals who faced death 
bravely for example Bassus (Ep. 30.9) and Cato (Ep. 24.6-7), in order to 
persuade his reader that these examples should be emulated and to 
reassure him that death should not be feared (Ep. 24.11) and that it is the 
‘best invention of nature/optimum inventum naturae’ because of the 
freedom it provides (Ep. 20.1). However, Seneca insists that desiring to die 
is not appropriate and such lust for death, a common weakness in man, 
must be avoided (Ep. 24.24-5). Thus, he would not tolerate Medea’s 
yearning nor Jason’s offer of himself as a substitute to their son’s death 
(Med. line 1005) nor Thyestes’ wish to end his life after consuming his 
                                                          
576 The Nurse warns of the king’s power and his armies, advising Medea to escape, but 
Medea issues a reminder that she is from royal stock, is not afraid and refuses to run (Med. 
line 169). However, Medea’s absence of fear of Creon is not because she believes his 
behaviour cannot affect her flourishing in the Stoic sense, but because she arrogantly over-
values herself and for this reason believes she is invincible. 
577 Cf. Boyle (2014) p. 173.  
578 Cf. Ep. 12.10; 22.5; 26.10; 58.32-4; 66.13; 70.14-16, 24ff.; 77; 78.2; Prov. 6.7; Cic. Fin. 
3.60-1; Diog. Laert. 7.130; Ker (2009b) pp. 247ff. 
579 Cf. Veyne (2003) pp. 112-4; Tarrant (2006) pp. 16-7; Olberding (2008) p. 138; Romm 
(2014) p. 152. 
580 Cf. Ker (2009b) pp. 17ff.; Romm (2014) pp. 190-4; Wilson (2014) pp. 205-12. 
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children (Thy. lines 1043ff.) as acceptable outcomes. This is because the 
characters’ decision to die originates from passion not a rational decision, 
which a ‘brave/fortis’ and ‘wise man/sapiens’ would make (cf. Ep. 24.25ff.). 
 
Man’s agency 
Fate  
Following on from the theme of death, it is appropriate to consider how the 
characters’ perceptions of fate’s role in propelling events demonstrate the 
mental struggle due to their lack of a proper understanding of nature which 
would enable tolerance of ever-changing circumstances. The absence of a 
Stoic view can induce anxiety about what might happen in the future and for 
those who are unable to foresee where fate will lead, anger can arise. This 
response often results in feelings of life being fatalistic rather than 
understanding the extent of the human sphere of control and consequent 
accountability for circumstances.581  
 
Fate’s role in the action of Medea 
Medea accepts some responsibility for her actions, for instance, when she 
confesses her guilt to Creon (Med. line 246. Cf. lines 279-80). Determined 
not to be governed by external affairs or surrender her autonomy, she 
recognises the violence, fickleness and speed of fortune (lines 219-20) and 
that fate can remove wealth but not her spirit (line 176. Cf. Ep. 36.6; 66.44). 
She goes as far as to claim to be above fortune (line 520) as a Sage does.582 
She implies that she is fearless of fate and subverts the traditional idea that 
fortune favours the brave (line 159), reinforcing the argument that fear of 
fortune is groundless (cf. Ep. 13.1ff.; 18.6ff.; 98). The difference is that 
Medea believes that she has power over fortune and yet she is unable to 
adjust to changes, showing her inconsistency and self-denial, whereas the 
Sage accepts the outcome graciously and because he has made correct 
decisions: he is not victim to misfortunes in the same way as a fool.  
 
                                                          
581 Cf. Thy. lines 33-6, 536-7, 615ff., 938ff.; 3.6.5. 
582 Cf. Beat. 5.3; Ben. 7.3.2; Constant. 5.6ff.; Ep. 71.30; 84.13; 85.38; Littlewood (2004) p. 
39. For ancient concepts of fortuna, see Boyle (2014) pp.188-9.  
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Fate in Thyestes  
In addition to the questions raised by the opening of the play about Seneca’s 
commitment to presenting Stoicism in his tragedies, there are elements of 
Thyestes which could be considered to reflect Stoic ideas about fate. The 
Fury acknowledges the unpredictability of fate and how man is victim to its 
whims (Thy. lines 32-6). In a moment of temporary clarity during the 
banquet, Thyestes makes some comments about the unreliability of fate 
which, while being common-sense, can also be seen to reflect the workings 
of the universe according to Stoic theory, even though, within the play, he 
may not be aware of the philosophical implications of his thinking (lines 938-
41). The Chorus also adopt a Stoic stance to the cycle of life of constant 
change (lines 596-7) and warn against complacency in times of good 
fortune (lines 615-22), indirectly supporting a Stoic view of not attaching 
value to externals. For Thyestes, pleasure is confused with ‘dolor/pain’ 
(lines 968-9) and the transience of this adfectus is accurately identified by 
the Chorus in their comments on how situations are not lasting: pleasure 
and pain vacillate with the former being briefer (lines 596-7). The Chorus’ 
concerns reflect the Stoic theory of ‘conflagration/ekpyrôsis’, where floods 
or fire destroy the universe periodically to allow for a new cycle (cf. lines 
812ff.; 829ff.).583 They fear for mankind (lines 875ff.) but conclude by 
accepting death, which is typical of Stoicism (lines 881-3).584  
 
God and the gods 
Combined with the interest in fate in Senecan drama is the consideration of 
divinities, in particular questions about the existence of gods, their relevance 
if they do not reward virtue and punish evil, the role of human agency, the 
creation of adfectus and their consequences. These subjects all emphasise 
the need for men to take responsibility for their thoughts and actions, instead 
                                                          
583 Cf. Ep. 7.8; 9.16; 14.10; 71.13-4; 91.13; Marc. 21.2, 26.6; Poly. 1.2; QNat. 3.13.1-2, 
3.27, 3.28.7, 3.29.9, 3.30; Cic. Nat. D. 2.118; Diog. Laert. 7.134; Philo Aet. 90 (SVF 1.511 
part); Plut. Comm. not. 1075D (SVF 1.510); Littlewood (2004) pp. 18-20. In Ep. 9.16 Jupiter 
withdraws during the dissolution of the world and the Sage does the same. Cf. Berry (1996) 
p. 6; Belliotti (2009) p. 185. During this period of contemplation, the individual assesses his 
lot and tries to establish or re-establish his sense of self, which he will assert to others when 
it is formed/revised.  
584 In response to the Nurse’s attempts to placate her, Medea responds by claiming that 
calm will come when the world has died with her (Med. lines 426-8) which is illustrated by 
the fire in Corinth that is fuelled by water (lines 879ff.).  
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of being driven by irrational forces.585 Gods’ roles in Medea and Thyestes 
are confusing. This is largely because the desperation of the characters 
leads them to appeal to the Olympian gods through prayers and sacrifice to 
acknowledge the gods’ power and existence in fear that the divinities would 
display anger if they were ignored.586 This traditional concept of gods 
offered no coherent reasons for behaving in a moral fashion: action was 
motivated by desire for protection from divine wrath. An alternative Stoic 
stance considers the traditional Greek gods as elements of their single 
divinity who was called by different names according to his various powers 
and Zeno unifies the attributes of God to declare him ‘the whole world and 
heaven’ (Diog. Laert. 7.148).587 
 
Seneca is proposing a revision of religious priorities and beliefs to 
emphasise accountability, believing in the benefits from guidance about how 
best to conduct oneself, and Stoicism seems an appropriate source of 
support. Instead of the Olympian gods, a different divinity exists, one that is 
identical with reason, that does not intervene directly in human lives (other 
than to reside within), who should be honoured, not through prayers and 
sacrifices, but by protecting the innate divine element through perfecting 
reason (cf. Ep. 41.1). He attempts this at the same time as remaining true 
to dramatic tradition which follows the practice of his predecessors to 
address the myths about divinities proposed by poets.588 Seneca’s attempts 
were ambitious: their reception and success are unclear due to the lack of 
ancient reference to Seneca’s playwriting. Nonetheless they ought to be 
acknowledged as a noble effort at reformation of attitudes.  
 
Medea’s divinities 
Gods are found in their positive and negative forms in Medea and structure 
the play with the first word being ‘di/gods’ and the last ‘deos/gods.’ Medea 
                                                          
585 Cf. Slavitt (1992) pp. viii-ix. 
586 Cf. Davis (1993) p. 184.  
587 Diogenes Laertius cites the names of Dia, Zeus, Athena, Hera, Hephaestus, Poseidon 
and Demeter to define God’s power as the cause of life, the ruler of the elements, sea and 
earth (Diog. Laert. 7.147). Cf. Sandbach (1975) p. 12; Sharples (1996) p. 48. 
588 Cf. Cic. Nat. D. 2.24.63, 3.24.62-4. 
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invokes the gods of marriage (including Jupiter, Juno, Hymenaeus, Lucina) 
and those of the Underworld to avenge Jason’s pending marriage to Creusa 
because betrayal of love has motivated her revenge (Med. lines 1-36). 
Medea also appeals to the divinities involved in punishing the Argonauts 
(such as Jupiter lines 2-3). In anger, she asks the Furies to curse the 
Corinthian royal family, to exile Jason and avenge the murdered Absyrtus 
(lines 13-26. Cf. lines 958ff. Similarly, Atreus calls on the Furies for 
assistance (Thy. lines 250ff.)). The Furies are an appropriate source for 
assistance because they were present at Medea’s wedding. She also seeks 
support from her grandfather the Sun god, Sol, for his chariot to destroy 
Corinth with fire (Med. lines 26ff.). However, Medea’s appeal is 
unconventional because Roman rituals were carried out with ‘well-omened 
words/fauete linguis’ and spectator silence, whereas she prays with 
inauspicious words (line 12).589  
 
The Chorus in Medea appeal to the gods on several occasions. Initially, 
through the epithalamium and sacrificial offerings they request the royal 
marriage is blessed (Med. lines 56-115). Later they request protection from 
Medea’s unruly passions as they fear that she will cause violent destruction 
wherever she goes (lines 866ff.). This illustrates the problem of reliance on 
the gods to intervene in mortal life to resolve human problems and shows 
the misunderstanding of man’s sphere of influence. Such dependence leads 
to confusion as to whether ‘dutiful’ behaviour will be acknowledged in the 
way it is hoped. The gods in Seneca’s Medea ignore the requests of the 
‘civilised’ citizens of the Chorus, possibly because of the challenge made to 
natural order by the Argonaut voyage, which would anger the Olympian 
gods if they felt their power was being threatened. Within the play, there 
may be other reasons for these gods’ resistance to supporting the 
Corinthians. While the Chorus recognise the penalties suffered by the 
Argonauts may have been deserved for disrupting natural order, they can 
be perceived to have offended the gods by criticising the punishment when 
they are trying to protect Jason from divine retribution following the Argonaut 
                                                          
589 Cf. Hine (1989) pp. 414-5 and (2000) p. 114.  
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expedition (cf. lines 595-6; 668-9). A more evident offence, even though it 
is a traditional part of the wedding song, is the Chorus’ declaration that the 
wedding couple are more beautiful than the gods (cf. lines 75ff., 82ff., 93-
8).590 To the Olympian gods, this would be considered pride and defiance 
(hubris), punishable potentially with death. As it is these gods to whom they 
are appealing, it is unsurprising that the gods do not answer the Chorus’ 
prayers.  
 
The irony of appealing to the same marriage gods in Medea’s initial 
soliloquy and the Choral epithalamium recurs when the Chorus pray to 
Phoebus to drive his chariot on to end the day (Med. lines 874-5). Sol 
provides one for Medea to depart (lines 1022ff.) showing the divinities’ 
loyalty, not to the ordinary man, but to Medea as she had requested in the 
prologue (lines 32-6). Medea has been interpreted as acting as Neptune’s 
agent to punish Jason for his role in the sailing expedition.591 She is 
convinced Hecate is present during her incantations (lines 740-842) and 
requests that Creusa’s gifts are poisoned and have fire concealed in them 
(lines 817-39). This prayer seems to be answered when the poison is 
prepared (lines 840-3) and Corinth is destroyed by flames (lines 879-80).592  
 
Knowing that a Stoic sees God as a rational agent, are Medea’s atrocities 
supposed to be accepted as part of divine order? Surely Seneca’s Stoic 
sympathies would prevent him from wanting his audience to accept the 
alternative, which would confirm Jason’s belief at the end of the play that 
there are no gods? Jason’s conclusion is reached because Medea’s triumph 
is incompatible with the divine order in which he believes, because there is 
no direct punishment for her actions, which would be expected from the old 
                                                          
590 Cf. Hine (1989) pp. 416-9. 
591 Cf. Pratt (1983) p. 87. Mythological evidence may explain the gods’ loyalty to Medea: 
Corinth was founded by Corinthos, a descendent of the Sun God Sol. According to 
Pausanias, there was a debate between Poseidon/Neptune and Helios/Sol over the 
ownership of Corinth. The mediator, Briareus, concluded the Isthmus of Corinth belonged 
to Poseidon and the Acropolis to Helios (Paus. 2.1.5ff.). Cf. Ohlander (1989) pp. 19-30. 
592 Medea may be imagining the goddess in the same way she hallucinates her brother’s 
ghost and the Furies (Med. lines 958-71) but the reference to trembling cauldrons was an 
indication to ancient men that a god was present (line 785). Cf. Boyle (2014) pp. 326-7.  
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order of Olympian divinities.593 Or maybe he means that there are no gods 
where she goes (Med. line 1027)? This is mistaken, as Medea departs on 
Sol’s chariot into the sky suggesting her change into a divinity (line 1025). 
Medea’s exit further confuses the portrayal of divinities, contradicts 
everything Stoics believe and suggests evil is rewarded, which cannot be 
accepted in a world governed by reason. In the non-dramatic world, there 
may be no gods of the Olympian order who reward and punish capriciously 
and to whom Jason refers (although they exist in Medea because the notion 
of divine punishment permeates the play). But a God synonymous with 
reason must exist for Stoicism to be viable. This God does not appear in 
Seneca’s tragedies, but his absence is poignant. It prompts consideration 
of alternative religious stances to the archaic Olympians showing that there 
are no gods in the sense the characters believe and that the world of Medea 
really is a dramatic construct.  
 
Absent gods in Thyestes 
Thyestes presents gods in a complex manner as there is confusion over the 
responsibility for the bizarre events which occur within the play. The 
characters hold different views about the existence of gods. The Chorus and 
Thyestes appeal to the Olympian deities for assistance out of desperation 
and fear, despite the fact the gods have fled (Thy. line 1021).594 The 
absence of heavenly divinities in the play is highlighted by the pervading 
presence of the Fury and references to the Underworld gods.595 When the 
Chorus request assistance to end the cycle of crime, they do not address a 
particular deity other than asking if any god loves Argos (lines 122ff.). They 
hold traditional views about the gods as anthropomorphic beings that 
experience the whims and passions of men as they are portrayed in Homer 
and are convinced that divine inspiration is involved in the brothers’ 
reconciliation even though they are unsure which of the gods has helped 
                                                          
593 Before he appeals to the gods, Jason doubts their existence, but his desperation 
prompts an appeal nonetheless (Med. lines 439-40).  
594 Cf. Thy. lines 407; 776ff., 789ff., 842-3, 892ff., 1069ff. 
595 Shelton (1975) argues that: ‘Seneca used the Hercules and Thyestes myths to show 
that men, not gods, are responsible for human misfortunes because they allow themselves 
to be controlled by irrational passions’ (p. 266). This is a way in which Seneca uses his 
plays to communicate philosophical ideas to persuade his audience of truths about the 
world. 
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(lines 560-1). They believe Jupiter has authority over rulers (lines 607ff.) but 
they do not have a sufficiently satisfactory comprehension of how the world 
works to be taken seriously in their views, particularly as their opinions are 
shaped by the adfectus, fear. This compounds the dramatic irony of their 
interpretation of the event.  
 
On his arrival in Argos, Thyestes questions the presence of gods (Thy. lines 
406-7) which may explain his attitudes and behaviour.596 He will not pray for 
a saviour but believes in ‘divine vengeance/vindices aderunt dei’ (line 1110). 
He requests that the state of darkness continues and with it further chaos 
and destruction (lines 1077ff.). Nevertheless, Thyestes places his trust in 
the Earth and the rivers of the underworld and surrenders responsibility to 
them to punish Atreus (lines 1007ff.). He may think that Atreus’ crime is too 
great for him or any human to punish or be challenging Atreus’ belief that 
the brothers have the same capacity for vengeance.597 Poe’s proposal that 
Thyestes has greater power than his brother is highly inaccurate.598 
Thyestes appeals to the (absent) gods to punish Atreus suggesting he does 
not have the power to inflict appropriate revenge unaided, which explains 
why the punishment never occurs and the cycle of violence continues after 
the play. This could be regarded as alluding to how anger is ill-suited to 
punishment and consequently does not provide permanent resolution to 
conflict.  
 
Atreus acts when there are no divine witnesses (‘dum caelum vacat’, Thy. 
line 892) and soon dismisses the gods above from their duties as he has 
carried them out himself: ‘dimitto superos’ (line 888). Yet he meticulously 
                                                          
596 Tarrant (1985) believes that: ‘In Stoic terms Thyestes’ lack of faith could be linked to his 
failure to abide by his principles’ (p. 149) cf. Ep. 73.16. Curley (1986) notes that Thyestes’ 
impiety and not saluting the local gods on his return is a ‘violation of this norm’ in ancient 
theatre (pp. 147-8). This is an example of where Seneca deviates from dramatic custom 
and is an illustration of his originality as a dramatist. 
597 The Chorus indicate that either brother could be responsible for the children’s murder 
(‘non quaero quis sit, sed uter’, Thy. lines 640) and Atreus believes it to be worthy (‘dignum’) 
of them both which is why they should perform it together (‘uterque faciat’) (lines 271-2). 
While Seneca opens the opportunity to consider that both brothers have potential for 
violence, it is Atreus who realises and manipulates Thyestes’ involvement. Cf. Curley 
(1986) pp. 141ff.  
598 Cf. Poe (1969) p. 376.  
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prepares the killing of his nephews as one would in a sacrificial ritual (cf. 
lines 545, 685-706), in the same way as Medea’s murders are sacrificial 
offerings (Med. line 970).599 This is inconsistent with Atreus’ claims of divine 
status (Thy. lines 885-6) and the Stoic belief that God is wholly reasonable 
and does not suffer passions, proving that he is not a god. However, his 
claim demonstrates the irony of deluded importance in rulers who are 
governed by passions. These challenges to the traditional religious belief of 
the gods’ influence are disruptive, particularly when humans replace animal 
sacrifices and gods are absent or dragged from the stars only to be replaced 
by men in the play. The gods’ absence in Thyestes could be because 
Seneca does not believe that gods exist in this form and he is trying to 
persuade his audience that this is the case, rather than the result of the 
play’s events.  
 
Nature and its forces in Medea and Thyestes 
The plays present individuals and the universe in ways which run counter to 
a Stoic belief that nature is wholly rational, passions are a perversion of 
nature and nature provides everything man needs to live well. Strong 
feelings are communicated through carefully selected language, such as 
metaphors from natural phenomena to indicate the power and 
destructiveness of adfectus.  
 
Forces of nature in Medea 
In Medea, the sea is both a powerful force disrupted by sailing and a punitive 
element avenging the Argo sailors for disturbing the calm sea (Med. lines 
579ff.). The Chorus communicate the problems of challenging nature, 
without perhaps understanding the need for secundum naturam, by citing 
the problems which arose from human daring (cf. lines 301ff., 363),600 
challenging nature through travel (lines 603-6) by trying to control it and 
imposing man’s law on the sea (cf. QNat. 5.18.9-10). The Chorus recount 
                                                          
599 Cf. Med. lines 37ff., 905, 967-71, 976, 1005, 1019-22. 
600 Bishop (1965) argues the use of ‘audacia’ leads to punishment, for example, Phaethon 
who was destroyed by the Sun for violating him (Med. line 597). This echoes Jason’s 
destruction by Sol’s descendant, Medea (pp. 314-5). Cf. Ohlander (1989) p. 231; Berry 
(1996) p. 16; Romm (2014) pp. 34-6. 
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how greed destroyed the purity of the Golden Age which respected nature 
and valued virtue over material acquisitions in a manner akin to Stoic views 
(lines 329ff.). The creation of a new world order dominated by materialism 
and vice (lines 364ff.) breaks down previous boundaries prescribed by 
nature (lines 374ff.).601 In principle, a Stoic may support travel when it 
occurs for the right reasons, as this brings people closer to a community of 
gods and men (lines 375-9). In reality, desire for expansion, motivated by 
passions, is often the cause of travel, prompted by lust for power and greed 
(and in some rulers’ opinion to create stability), which a Stoic would 
condemn because of the risk of social and moral degradation as can be 
seen in Medea.602 Journeying is an important motif in Medea, both literally 
in providing the background to the play and symbolically for the self-
improvement Seneca seeks to evoke in his audience.603  
 
Medea’s indulgence in witchcraft (through which she is inviting the irrational 
and unnatural into her world) is evidenced by her incantations (Med. lines 
680ff.) to which the ‘world shivers/mundus… tremit’ in response (line 739) 
and, prior to the play, her rejuvenation of Aeson and the bewitching of the 
dragon who guarded the Golden Fleece.604 The Nurse refers to Medea as 
‘This artist of crime/haec scelerum artifex’ (line 734) and reports that she is 
alone preparing murderous herbal concoctions (lines 670ff.), while evoking 
the gods of the Underworld (lines 9ff. Cf. lines 740ff.).605 A dramatic world 
of chaotic challenges to natural order is central to tragedy. For example, 
Medea uses the enduring order of nature as a guarantee of her hatred (lines 
401-7) and declares that she will only rest when she and the universe are 
destroyed together (lines 426-8). The audience could become unsettled in 
anticipation of witnessing the impossible becoming a reality because Medea 
                                                          
601 Cf. Bishop (1965) p. 313; Nussbaum (1994) pp. 464-71.  
602 Cf. Berry (1996) p. 15; Benton (2003) p. 284. Boyle (2014) argues that Medea’s use of 
herbs from the Far East for her spells is an example of the dangers of travel (p.309). 
603 For the travelling metaphor communicating the proficiens’ voyage towards reason cf. 
Beat. 1.1-3; Brev. 9.5; Ep. 44.7; 99.7; 102.24; 107.2; Poly. 11.2. 
604 Cf. Henry and Henry (1985) pp. 31-5. 
605 Hine (2000) recognises that through her spells, Medea is breaking the C5thBC Roman 
law code of the Twelve Tables, which prohibited chanting to harm neighbours’ crops, 
showing that she transgresses all institutional demands (p. 176). This confirms Medea’s 
otherness and her challenge to convention. 
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asserts she will snatch daylight from heaven (lines 28). She boasts that her 
anger surpasses all mythical characters, citing sea monsters Scylla and 
Charybdis as examples (lines 407ff.) and the Chorus claim her to be a 
greater evil than the sea (line 362). Medea states that fierce waters could 
not calm or rival her, and she has obtained power to reverse natural order.606 
This challenge to nature is reflected in the inversion of social stereotypes 
with a woman causing lamentation rather than displaying it.  
 
The creation (and disruption) of order as a result of reason (or lack of it) in 
Seneca’s tragedies is plagued with dramatic irony and creates tension. 
References to forces of nature are also used by characters to communicate 
Medea’s mental state. The Nurse describes Medea’s confusion through a 
wave image (‘exundat furor’, Med. line 392), suggesting supernatural 
powers at the same time as acknowledging her mistress’s vulnerability to 
powerful passions. Medea describes her emotional turmoil through sea and 
wind metaphors to show the unpredictability and power of adfectus and how 
she is dragged in different directions (lines 937ff.). Her actions are 
underpinned by the desire to set things in order: she believes that her power 
and authority are restored when vengeance is planned (lines 982-4). She 
departs with the comment: ‘Good it’s done — bene est, peractum est’ (line 
1019) suggesting that she is satisfied with her actions and there is no 
expectation of retaliation. This compares with earlier times in the play when 
she is assessing whether the punishment is enough (cf. lines 896ff., 954ff., 
1009-13).607 However, no challenge to nature will be successful. Being 
driven by adfectus leads to disintegration of the rational self because 
passions are contrary to reason. This fragmentation is particularly ironic for 
Seneca’s protagonists, who were especially concerned with their identity for 
personal and public affirmation.608  
 
Unnatural occurrences in Thyestes 
                                                          
606 Cf. Med. lines 411-4, 424, 673-5, 739, 755ff., 887-90. 
607 Cf. Boyle (2014) p. 158.  
608 Cf. Henry and Henry (1985) p. 113. For the protagonists’ loss of identity, see pp. 224-9. 
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Similar disruption of natural order because of anger occurs in Thyestes, with 
the bestial nature of the characters, the cannibalism and perpetual 
darkness. The Chorus worry the stars will fall from the sky (Thy. lines 842ff.) 
which is significant considering the ancient Greeks and Romans saw stars 
as gods.609 The Messenger describes the reversal of nature with darkness 
falling at noon (lines 776-7). Similarly, the Chorus appeal to Phoebus to 
explain the same problem. They ask whether the order of the universe is 
plunged into chaos because of the evidence of unnatural signs and violent 
reactions in the physical world due to human immorality.610 In the final 
dialogue between the brothers, Thyestes is unable to hold a glass of ‘wine’ 
(which is actually his sons’ blood) because it becomes impossibly heavy 
(lines 986ff.). He reports a series of unusual events with rocking tables, 
shaking floors and heavenly disturbances (lines 989-94). The theme of 
causal connection is also evident from the physiological responses of 
Thyestes prior to the horrific revelations, when he complains that he is 
crying without knowing why (lines 950-1, 966-7. Cf. Ep. 99.15) and that he 
is suffering stomach pains just before Atreus presents the heads of his sons 
(lines 973, 999ff., 1041ff.).611 That Thyestes’ feelings and state of mind are 
described through physical sensations and bodily symptoms is indicative of 
how passions involve the apparent loss of dignity and composure and that 
they are base and unnatural.612 
 
The baseness of ira: bestiality in the angry tragic characters 
Nature, including animals, also functions as a key source of metaphors in 
Seneca’s plays to communicate the baseness of anger by emphasising the 
non-human behaviour it produces.613 These ideas are vividly expressed in 
Medea and Thyestes where the protagonists’ rage is regularly likened to 
                                                          
609 Cf. Davis (2003) p. 68.  
610 Cf. Thy. lines 48ff., 103ff., 262ff., 665ff., 698ff., 700-2; 767ff., 789-826, 989ff. 
611 Tarrant (1985) concludes: ‘The scene is a harrowing portrayal of psychological 
disintegration, unique in ancient literature and for all its grotesque exaggeration, 
uncomfortably real’ (p. 221) cf. Thy. lines 920-69. Here Seneca uses shock techniques in 
his anti-exempla to persuade his audience of the horrors of not following reason. 
612 Cf. Zanobi (2014) p. 93.  
613 Cf. 2.5.1-2, 3.4.2-3.  
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bestial behaviour, further distancing them from humanity to confirm anger is 
not in accord with human nature.  
 
Medea the animal 
Medea’s anger is conveyed by physical descriptions expressed in terms of 
evil and dark imagery including comparisons with nature’s destructive 
elements, such as fire and sea metaphors and animals, for instance, her 
association with and likening to snakes.614 The Corinthians’ fear at the sight 
of Medea is reflected in their comparison of her with an animal capable of 
killing man, a pacing lioness bereft of her cubs (Med. lines 862ff. Cf. lines 
853-5.). Creon uses ‘ferox’ suggesting a ‘wild animal/fera’ when he 
describes her approach (lines 186-7).615 The Nurse recognises that: 
‘Something great looms, wild, monstrous, unnatural — magnum aliquid 
instat, efferum immane impium’ (line 395), preparing the audience for the 
play’s barbarities. All these descriptions show Medea’s detachment from 
rational humans who are distinguished from animals because of their 
capacity to reason (1.3.4ff.) and the depths she has sunk to through ira. 
 
The beasts of Thyestes 
In Thyestes, the characters are referred to in bestial terms from the outset, 
preparing the audience for the domination of adfectus and the brothers’ 
inhumanity. The ghost of Tantalus in the Prologue is ordered to infect the 
‘beast-hearts/ferum pectus’ of his descendants (Thy. lines 85ff.), who are to 
suffer from the animal impulses of hunger and thirst in the perpetual way of 
Tantalus’ mythological punishment.616 This metaphorical deprivation is 
reflected in the lust for power, the sacrifice and devouring of children and 
furor, all characteristics of people dominated by passions, and in the images 
and motifs of the play.617 The Chorus pray for the end of the ‘bestial 
impulses/feros impetus’ of Tantalus’ descendants (line 136), who himself 
had enjoyed a ‘bestial feast/dapibus feris’ (line 150). Even in decadent 
dress, the way Thyestes is eating is boorish, described by the Messenger 
                                                          
614 Cf. Med. lines 14, 653, 686ff., 773ff., 800-1, 819, 961-2; Nussbaum (1994) pp. 458-64. 
615 Cf. Boyle (2014) p. 180.  
616 Cf. Thy. lines 2-6, 97ff., 103, 119, 149ff. 
617 Cf. Boyle (1997) pp. 43-8.  
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using the terms ‘ripping flesh/lancinat’ (line 778) and ‘gnaws/mandit’ (line 
779), supporting Atreus’ earlier description of his brother as a ‘wild 
beast/fera’ (line 491).  
 
Animal metaphors are developed to describe the characters. When he has 
lured Thyestes back to the kingdom, Atreus equates his anger with an 
Umbrian hunting dog in his lust for Thyestes’ blood and governed by 
passions, he is unable to rein in his feelings (cf. Thy. line 496ff., 546-7).618 
The Messenger describes Atreus as a ‘beast/ferus’ when reporting the 
murder of Thyestes’ sons (line 721) and prior to their slaughter, compares 
his scowling eyes with those of an Indian tiger (lines 706ff.) and an Armenian 
lion, who even when his hunger has been sated, continues killing (lines 
732ff.). Atreus’ seeks rage to gratify his desire for greater horror than he 
currently experiences where ‘nullum est satis’ (lines 256) and later has an 
insatiable appetite for it (cf. lines 249ff., 267ff.).619 This raises the question 
of whether Atreus is truly satisfied, particularly because he continuously 
questions this.620 He suffers from the passion of desire or appetite/libido, 
which prompts him to seek inappropriate things, that by their very nature (as 
well as the methods used to acquire them), will never gratify him (cf. line 
1053). This is because he is depending on externals which are ultimately 
beyond his control, have no connection to virtue and by extension, are not 
constituents of true happiness. This animal instinct, natural as it may be in 
beasts, when it roams uncontrolled in humans as it does in Thyestes, 
causes extensive destruction such as lust for death and torture proving 
there is nothing natural about adfectus.  
 
Passions as ‘madness’ 
Part of Seneca’s definition of anger is its insanity.621 Madness in the ancient 
world was commonly interpreted as (a) loss of reason or (b) possession by 
a ‘spirit/daemon’ (3.3.3). Despite the references to their insanity and 
possession, the protagonists remain responsible for their actions. The 
                                                          
618 Cf. 1.7.4, 1.9.3. 
619 Cf. Poe (1969) p. 366; Boyle (1997) pp. 43-6.  
620 Cf. Thy. lines 252ff., 273ff., 889-90, 893-5, 899-90, 912, 919, 1053, 1056-68. 
621 Cf. 1.1.2-4, 1.7.4, 3.3.3, 3.4.4, 3.28.1. 
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sickness of passions remains evident even when those who act under the 
influence of anger have responses which are not necessarily manifested in 
frenzy: they may appear to be rational even though they are mentally sick. 
What is most terrifying about Medea is that she does not lose control – her 
murders are carried out in a thoroughly reasoned and cruelly calm state.622 
Similarly, Atreus’ calculated crime, conducted in solemn religious rites (cf. 
Thy. lines 545, 685ff.) is particularly terrifying and shocking, largely because 
of the absence of frenzied anger and the fact that he does not appear to 
display moral struggle (lines 192-5),623 apart from momentary hesitation, to 
which he responds by urging courage (cf. lines 283-4, 324-30). He 
demonstrates a well-reasoned response to his situation that is incompatible 
with the suggestion that anger is caused by possession and madness and 
indicates that a Stoic view of madness, in this sense, is very different to a 
mainstream view of madness and how it is conventionally understood.  
 
The apparent inconsistencies in Seneca’s presentation of the lack of 
reasoning in anger in De Ira and the calculation behind Medea and 
Thyestes’ revenge is explainable and still compatible with Stoicism if 
Seneca’s dramatic intent is considered. Seneca established the role of 
judgement and voluntas in the formation of passions in the sense that an 
individual would ‘wish’ to behave in a particular way and for anger, this is 
the wish to take revenge (2.1.4, 3.4).624 From a Stoic perspective, men 
would rather choose not to decline into anger and would prefer to remove 
it: in a tragic context, it is not unexpected to witness characters who would 
realise anger as opposed to stopping it at the point of pre-passions. It is 
precisely this misapplication or inversion of Stoic ideals through which 
Seneca illustrates the necessity of correcting thinking, that it is an 
                                                          
622 The extent of reason and its role in Medea’s decision-making is debatable. Durham 
(1984) argues: ‘She is a pure frenzy of passion whose hesitations and abrupt changes of 
mood bear witness to her almost total loss of self-control’ (p. 56). While Berry (1996) notes 
that: ‘Medea is fully conscious. She gives passion license and, in return, gains power’ (p. 
12) and Guastella (2001) when discussing Medea’s rage observes that: ‘… this ira is also 
subject to a precise and perverted ratio, a reckoning which is extraordinarily accurate in all 
its calculations’ (p. 201). Cf. Tobin (1966) p. 66; Littlewood (2004) pp. 85-6. 
623 Cf. Thy. lines 241-3, 249-54, 703-5; Tobin (1966) p. 68; Davis (2003) p. 55.  
624 For the role of will in passions, see pp. 80-1. 
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individual’s responsibility to do this and that it is within his sphere of control 
to do so.625  
 
Medea’s sickness 
Rather than blaming her for her actions, the Nurse ascribes Medea’s 
‘madness/insanit’ to divine possession comparing her to a Maenad, a 
woman possessed by a god (usually Bacchus) resulting in superhuman 
strength (Med. lines 382ff.).626 The Chorus make the same allusion to 
Bacchus (lines 849ff.), as does Medea herself (line 806). Medea recognises 
that she is out of control and battles with her conscience. She wishes that 
Creusa had children to kill and as this is not the case, she sadly concludes 
that her sons are ‘my one-time children/liberi quondam mei’ (line 924) and 
she accepts that Creusa would be the one who raises them. Yet, she is only 
childless because she chooses to kill her children, not because of the legal 
system, which merely separates her from them.627 Her mental confusion is 
reflected in her physical sensations – she complains of a beating heart, 
frozen limbs and a trembling breast compared with the heat of ira which has 
momentarily left her – showing the extensive impact of passions (lines 926-
7). She is too engulfed in passion to recede, though some scholars over-
generously emphasise the role of the Furies and her brother’s ghost in her 
decision to punish Jason, claiming that it is they who force her to kill her 
sons.628  
 
Atreus’s possession 
Initially, Atreus evokes inspiration from his ancestor Pelops and grandfather 
Tantalus to assert himself (Thy. lines 242-3).629 This is significant because 
Thyestes opens with the Fury Megaera telling the ghost of Tantalus that the 
family feud is not only to be continued but will be accelerated (lines 25ff.). 
Atreus is described by the Messenger as being like a man overcome by 
                                                          
625 Cf. Star (2012) pp. 62-5. 
626 Cf. Ohlander (1989) pp. 268-70. 
627 Cf. Treggiari (1991) pp. 466-71. 
628 Cf. Motto (1973) p. 86.  
629 Cf. Braden (1970) pp. 16-7. Davis (2003) identifies that the obsession with heredity is 
also clear from the repeated question of paternity in Thy. lines 240, 324-33, 1099ff. (p. 43). 
Sideri-Tolia (2004) suggests that the Claudian heritage of violent rule has influenced Nero 
and that this may be reflected in the cycle of terror in Thy. (p. 180).  
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madness/furens (line 683). Unknowingly, he is possessed by the ghost of 
Tantalus who was instructed by the Fury to create disorder (Cf. lines 83ff., 
101ff.). Despite his early concern that: ‘The rage that burns my heart// needs 
to become more savage. I want to be filled// with greater horror — Non satis 
magno meum ardet furore pectus, impleri iuuat maiore monstro’ (lines 252-
4), his wish for impetus is soon fulfilled: ‘Yes, I agree. A trembling frenzy 
shakes my heart// and stirs it deep inside; I am swept away – to where// I 
do not know, but I am — Fateor. Tumultus pectora attonitus 
quatit penitusque uoluit; rapior et quo nescio, sed rapior’ (lines 260-2).630 
On first reading, the idea of possession may be perceived as an attempt to 
absolve Atreus from responsibility and encourage audience support for him. 
However, within the context of the rest of the play, Atreus desires 
recognition for his vengeance and is proud of the atrocities he causes, long 
before he realises that any ‘possession’ occurs.  
 
*** 
Through the violence of the dramas, Seneca demonstrates the requirement 
of reason and virtue and through negative exempla invites his audience to 
recognise this need. However, in Medea and Thyestes, due to generic 
constraints, the nature of the plot and for entertainment purposes, this 
conflict is not resolved. The characters of Medea and Thyestes may 
demonstrate Stoic tendencies but there are marked inconsistences 
between the characters’ proclaimed attitudes and their behaviours. The 
individuals are self-serving, manipulating people for personal gain without 
concern for universal good and express various degrees of anger and the 
desire to take revenge for the injuries caused to them. In Medea, attitudes 
towards fate are contentious, with Medea blaming it for her demise (Med. 
lines 207-8, 219-20), at the same time as she claims to be above it (line 
520). Atreus arrogantly lacks interest in other people’s opinions, but this is 
not because he is unaffected by them as is a Sage and his desires are sated 
by revenge not self-sufficiency. Although the Chorus in Thyestes proclaim 
Stoic ideals (such as their views about ruling in Thy. lines 336-401), they 
                                                          
630 Cf. Poe (1969) p. 362; Dodson-Robinson (2010) pp. 51-2; Staley (2010) pp. 43-4. 
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still succumb to the adfectus fear, to which a Stoic would not be victim (lines 
875ff.). While Jason orders Medea to control her passions, he does not 
apply the same wisdom to his own life which is governed by ‘fear/timor’ 
(Med. line 103).631 Fear and subsequent anger is prominent in tragedies and 
is felt by all the characters at various stages. It appears to cease in the main 
characters, not because of Stoic acceptance of circumstances, or by its 
replacement with the constantia caution, which would make them aware of 
any potential danger and respond in a reasonable way by avoiding or 
accepting its impact but because the individuals believe that they have 
conquered the cause of their fear, invariably a person, by carrying out 
malicious revenge. The characters in Medea and Thyestes complain about 
their situations because they do not take responsibility for the 
consequences of their actions and endure what they could have changed: 
instead, they blame fate and the gods for events.632 A Stoic on the other 
hand sees true liberation as being fearless, without base desires and having 
supreme control, which can be gained through philosophy and its 
application to remove passions.633  
 
  
                                                          
631 Cf. Med. lines 255ff., 415-6, 434ff., 519, 529. 
632 Cf. Med. lines 207-8, 219-20, 431-4, 519; Thy. lines 604-6.  
633 Cf. Ep. 8.7; 75.16-8. 
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Chapter Five 
Seneca’s tragic characters as anti-exempla  
 
Analysing how an audience may respond to the characters’ plights, I argue 
that the presence of Stoic ideas within the plays can provoke consideration 
of an alternative way of living to how the characters behave and in doing so 
improve an audience’s outlook. By considering the responses which the 
plays invoke in their audience, this chapter inquires into whether the tragic 
characters in Medea and Thyestes could be cured by applying Seneca’s 
techniques and provides scope to consider the likelihood of successful 
therapy for people who suffer from anger in its most extreme form. By 
considering the characters as if they were ‘real people’, plagued by 
emotional problems, as has been revealed through material discussed in 
previous chapters, I will be able to consider how their attitudes could be 
improved by employing Stoic methodology so that their mental stability is 
retained. I identify evidence of these techniques in the plays, asking which 
of these methods would be useful for Medea and Atreus to have adopted. 
This is to demonstrate how, if the characters were real people, they could 
take measures to improve their attitudes and conduct. I conclude that, while 
practising philosophy would have avoided the disasters of the tragedies, the 
genre will not permit such self-improvement in the characters but may serve 
to do so in an audience. 
 
Audience reactions 
The Epistles are specific in modes and instructions of technical Stoicism as 
are the moral essays that aim at a broader audience who may or may not 
take the advice offered. In comparison, the audience of the tragedies is left 
to infer philosophical requirements by responding to the negative examples 
in the plays. It would be inappropriate to preach doctrines explicitly in a play 
because it would disrupt the flow of the action. However, by assimilating 
philosophical themes in a dramatic context, Seneca invites his audience to 
question their value system and compare their behaviour with that of the 
characters with a view to revising existing beliefs about the world. Such 
reflection is likely to continue after leaving the theatre as the plays are 
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inconclusive – the action falls in the middle of a mythological story and the 
character’s anger has not been resolved leading to the suggestion that there 
may be further vengeance taken by Jason and Thyestes. Such 
philosophical contemplation is at the heart of Stoicism and is a fitting 
conclusion to observing or reading Seneca’s plays.634 There are several 
possible reactions that may be had towards individuals within the plays and 
I focus primarily on those towards Medea and Atreus because these 
characters are most affected by anger in its extreme form, though I refer to 
other characters where appropriate.  
 
Audience responses can also depend on whether the plays are read or 
viewed as a performance. If a play is witnessed, audience members can 
obtain an overall view of the characters as they develop, and judgments and 
feelings could vacillate as the actions unfold and in response to how 
characters behave towards one another. These opinions may also be 
influenced by other audience reactions. Such an experience would produce 
a more natural reflection of how people in real-life scenarios may be viewed; 
however, only after the play can feelings towards it be adequately 
consolidated and reflected upon to draw conclusions about how the 
characters are interpreted. By considering what Medea should have done, 
for example, moral views and feelings are likely to be revised for the better. 
There may also be a different reaction depending on whether the 
performance is seen or heard. Visual experiences invariably stimulate more 
evocative responses and bring the action to life: hearing a play allows the 
listener to develop his own picture of events in his mind which can produce 
even more subjective understandings.  
 
If, however, plays are read different reactions can arise which are also 
affected by whether the plays are read in one sitting or over time. In the first 
instance, responses are likely to be more similar to if the plays were 
witnessed on stage because here too, the reader becomes involved in the 
action at a fast pace. If the plays are read act by act with a time lapse 
                                                          
634 For spiritual exercises, see Chapter Three passim. 
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between them, there is an opportunity for on-going reflection of events and 
behaviours. Loyalties towards characters may last longer as future events 
are anticipated and outcomes are imagined which may or may not be 
realised. Opinions can swing more dramatically as the acts are gone 
through if they are being watched but it is harder to maintain an overall 
picture. On the other hand, if plays are being read, there is the opportunity 
to re-read sections which were not understood, making this form of 
engagement more helpful in drawing conclusions from the plays and using 
these to improve one’s outlook. In addition, the era in which the audience 
experiences the plays will affect the audience as people are shaped by their 
cultural and political environment. For instance, Medea and Atreus’ 
reactions would be less surprising to Seneca’s contemporary audience, 
based on their cultural expectations of vengeance and their knowledge of 
the myths from which the plots originate. 
 
Responses towards Medea 
Reactions towards the characters can affect whether it is plausible that they 
can be reformed through philosophy. Medea provokes mixed feelings in the 
audience as she can be seen as a character in a play but also may be 
compared with real people, such as the plight of an abandoned woman with 
small children who suffers emotionally. On the one hand, the audience is 
guided by other characters’ united fear of a woman they present as 
ferocious, barbaric and noxious, which is supported by her wild appearance 
and atrocious criminality. The vehemence of Medea’s words compels other 
characters to demand her silence.635 The degree to which Medea is mortal 
also affects how the audience relates to her. She embraces sorcery (Med. 
lines 680ff.), evokes the Underworld gods (lines 9ff.; 740ff.) and this 
association with magic may explain her behaviour – no ordinary, sane 
woman would kill her children.636 Medea contrasts with the anticipated role 
of a mother in Seneca’s Rome, where a mother was regarded a ‘figure of 
moral authority.’637 She has savagely dismembered her brother and 
                                                          
635 Cf. Chorus (Med. lines 114-5); Nurse (lines 150ff.); Creon (lines 188ff.) and Jason (line 
530). 
636 Cf. Roisman (2005) p. 82. 
637 Cf. Gloyn (2017) p. 15. 
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threatens to attack the gods (line 424). In addition, she boasts of her divine 
heritage as the granddaughter of Sol, the Sun god (lines 28ff. Cf. line 210) 
and according to mythology, her mother is Idyia, an Ocean nymph and her 
aunt is Circe.638 By making a semi-divinity ‘human’ in her responses as has 
been the practice since Euripides, Seneca invites sympathy – only to add 
the dramatic twist of Medea’s inhumane behaviour. Once again, the 
difference between human cruelty and the responsive traditional Olympian 
divinities or the indifference of the Stoic God (because divine order is not 
affected by prayer) is apparent. Medea cannot be a divinity according to 
Stoicism, not just because of her violence, but also because God does not 
experience passions, by which Medea is unashamedly driven. 
 
Condemnation of Medea is the most common response to the play, as her 
vengeance appears unjust because it is disproportionate to the initial 
offence. However, Medea still suffers from the human struggles of love, 
children, loyalty and betrayal, showing the dilemmas of morality and the 
battle with passions, especially anger. The Nurse confirms Medea’s 
isolation in a way which commands audience sympathy by emphasising the 
absence of native supporters, having a faithless husband and her loss of 
wealth: initially this suffering is at the heart of the presentation of Medea’s 
circumstances rather than the witchcraft which is introduced later when she 
is preparing her revenge (Med. lines 164-5). Medea’s identity as a wife has 
been threatened by her replacement Creusa. The audience can share 
Medea’s desperation by imagining their feelings in similar circumstances 
when her exile is seen in terms of loss and there being a risk to her life. 
Viewing her sacrifices as the loss of a family, it may be considered fitting for 
Jason’s loved ones to be taken. However, by taking a philosophical view, 
such as that which Seneca advocates, that exile is just a change of place, 
it could be accepted and tolerated with greater ease by not becoming angry 
at the loss of material things and of people. Similarly, Medea could have 
changed her situation and alleviated her anxieties if she had accepted the 
loss of Jason and been resigned to the idea that exile could have offered 
                                                          
638 For Medea’s mythological background and the myth before Seneca, see Boyle (2014) 
pp. lxi-lxxviii.  
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her a secure future. Acceptance of her circumstances and realising Jason’s 
betrayal does not really impact on her overall well-being would have 
prevented her anger from growing. 
 
The Senecan and Stoic proposal that people are citizens of the universe is 
particularly relevant to Medea whose ‘otherness’ as being a foreigner and 
her differences from other people in the way she responds have alienated 
her. Jason blames Medea’s temper and attitude on her exile: had she 
submitted to sovereign power she would have been able to stay in Corinth 
and Creon reinforces this (Med. lines 189-90). Jason encourages the 
audience to believe that Medea is responsible for her situation and that her 
departure from Corinth would be the best outcome for all concerned. The 
latter assumption cannot be disagreed with but other people’s role in 
Medea’s plight can be recognised because she misunderstands what is 
actually under her control and her reaction can be understood, if not 
condoned, despite its extreme nature. Although the Stoics permit killing, in 
instances where the individual is not saveable by punishment and re-
education (cf. Clem. 1.21.1), Medea’s acts would not have been condoned 
by Stoicism, despite the reasoning that Jason could not acknowledge or 
amend his mistakes. 
 
Tragic characters are assumed to live up to their reputation or exceed the 
expectations of them and to do this from a Stoic perspective, they would 
have to forego reason and act according to the demands of adfectus. 
Mythologically, Medea has a propensity to violence and the audience could 
make allowances for her if they believe that some people are prone to anger 
and it is in her nature to be so (cf. 2.15, 19-20). Having witnessed the 
consequences of her actions carried out in anger, the Nurse recognises its 
signs (Med. line 394) predicting she will exceed her heinous crimes (line 
393. Cf. lines 670ff.). Medea considers her former crimes to be training for 
a greater one (lines 906ff.). When as a virgin they were ‘too 
trivial/levia…nimis’, she commands herself to: ‘Let heavier pain surge// 
Greater crimes become me as a mother — gravior exurgat dolor;// maiora 
iam me scelera post partus decent’ (lines 49-50. Cf. lines 45ff.). While 
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‘gravior’ emphasises Medea’s strength, her vulnerability is implied with 
‘pain/dolor’, as it is her anguish and sadness which is causing her to wish 
to inflict it on others. ‘Dolor’ commonly occurs in the play to denote the 
anguish the characters are feeling as a consequence and cause of anger, 
showing how passions confuse reactions.639 The reference to motherhood 
and the implications of pregnancy from ‘heavier/gravior’ contribute to the 
metaphor of Medea giving birth to vengeance and her later obsession with 
infanticide.640 By admitting that her previous crimes were only carried out in 
love, where ‘tragic love raged/saevit infelix amor’ (line 136), she appears to 
have been motivated by amor, not ira.641 Despite it being another 
complicated passion, Medea’s love makes the audience more supportive of 
her plight, as many people compromise themselves when they are devoted 
to someone. In this respect, Medea is dramatising an intimate family 
relationship so that the audience can most closely relate to her difficulties 
from recalling personal intimate relationships. 
 
If the audience views Medea’s state as an illness and assigns her anger to 
external forces, they could be more sympathetic towards her (Med. lines 
382ff., 806, 849ff.).642 Yet while she uses these external forces as an excuse 
for her behaviour, she has made the decision to kill long before their 
presence in the play. However she is viewed, Seneca’s presentation of 
Medea as an exaggerated and extreme character invites self-reflection in 
his audience of their own dark sides and shameful traits, prompting 
questions about whether they too are at risk of decline into similar evil. This 
reflects the moral role in Senecan drama of offering instruction in virtue and 
vice should a comparable situation to hers arise in the real world.643 After 
                                                          
639 Cf. Med. lines 137-40, 151, 155, 446, 554, 907-15, 944, 951, 1011, 1016, 1019. Boyle 
(2014) identifies fourteen occurrences of the term ‘dolor’ in the play, eleven of which are 
used by Med. (five apostrophised in lines 139-40, 914, 944, 1016, 1019) to focus on her 
psychological state of mind (p. 127). 
640 Cf. Boyle (2014) p. 127. Atreus also gives ‘birth’ to revenge (Thy. lines 1096ff.). 
641 For the connection between ira/amor, see Med. lines 849-51; 866-9; 937-44. The 
suggestion of ‘saevit’ accompanying ‘amor’ suggests a Stoic view about the unruliness of 
passions. Cf. Gill (2013). 
642 For Medea’s madness, see p. 211. 
643 For drama offering moral instruction, see pp. 20, 29-33, 46-7; Slavitt (1992) p. ix; 
Nussbaum (1994) p. 445.  
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checking their behaviour, the audience may be inspired by the Stoic ideal 
of controlling passions to avoid becoming like Medea. Even without 
knowledge of philosophical doctrines, the presentation of Medea is such 
that the audience can recognise that they would not want to follow her 
worldview.644  
 
When seeking ways to take revenge, she wishes that Jason had a brother 
whom she could kill (Med. line 125). Now that Creusa has gone, Medea 
believes that the balance is restored: as a wife who was banished by her 
husband, she has now banished a wife and she becomes a mother again in 
the absence of her sons’ stepmother (line 928). Medea’s reasoning is 
tainted by ira which is why her logic is so disturbing and illustrates her 
irrationality caused by disturbances in the soul resulting from anger. Again, 
Seneca toys with his audience: they may understand Medea’s feelings of 
being bereft, but sympathy prevents them from condoning her actions. 
Medea momentarily regains a degree of humanity when, having decided on 
her method of vengeance, her anger wavers. Her maternal instinct emerges 
so that she proceeds to vacillate over whether to kill her children.645 This 
tension creates optimism in the audience with the hope that she will not 
carry out her proposal to murder her sons. The viewer is relieved when 
Medea’s anger subsides, resulting in a temporary conclusion that ira is 
‘controllable’. However, Medea’s indecision causes confusion: she 
vacillates between desiring revenge and reconciliation (lines 893ff.).646 Her 
                                                          
644 Schiesaro (2003) critiques the argument proposed by Nussbaum (1993b) that Stoicism 
promotes ‘critical spectatorship’ so that the audience observes tragedy with a ‘concerned 
but critical detachment.’ This suggests that the audience is vigilant without being 
impressionable and judge and question the characters rather than accepting them. This 
view may be an accurate assessment of the dramatist’s goal but may be an unrealistic 
expectation of the audience’s response, particularly when many men are at best 
proficientes. Schiesaro correctly points out that the ‘repellent nature’ of the central 
characters does not necessarily discourage audience ‘emotional identification’ or mean that 
‘we could consider the chorus’s moralizing orthodoxy as “a guide for the spectator’s 
response”’ (p. 244) cf. Nussbaum (1993b) p. 137. The audience can and perhaps should 
identify emotionally even with the ‘repellent’ characters as these negative exempla reflect 
the worst in man and that which requires the greatest attention to change, which I believe 
is Seneca’s purpose for their inclusion in the manner they are presented. Cf. Littlewood 
(2004) pp. 172-3; Staley (2010) pp. 32-4; Trinacty (2015) p. 37.  
645 Cf. Gill (1987) pp. 31-6. 
646 Atreus’ indecision arises when he considers the question of paternity and whether, if the 
children are not Thyestes’, they should be saved (Thy. line 324).  
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inability to remain constant in her thinking is indicative of her irrationality 
caused by her feelings of loss and anger. On the one hand, the audience 
may be repelled by the ‘villain’. On the other hand, they can sympathise with 
her plight and to an extent identify with the ethical dilemmas which are 
contorted by passions, as Stoicism proposes, particularly with the 
suggestion of the individual’s insanity and sickness of ira as is demonstrated 
in these plays. An alternative response, in keeping with a Stoic interpretation 
of the play, would be to consider Medea as a proficiens, still suffering from 
passions but, based on her attitudes and behaviours, she appears to 
demonstrate little, if any, commitment to philosophy. In the case of Medea, 
Seneca is more likely to be presenting a character in need of therapeutic 
intervention and philosophical guidance than one who has begun their 
journey and by demonstrating the extent of the problems with untamed 
passions, encouraging his audience to see the necessity of extirpating ira. 
 
Medea’s lack of accountability and denial of her sphere of control makes it 
harder to wholeheartedly support her actions. She holds conflicting attitudes 
towards fate – blaming it for her situation (Med. lines 218-22) but claiming 
to be above it (line 520) – claiming other people are responsible for her 
misfortunes (Creon in line 143 and the consequences of her liaison with 
Jason in lines 207-10) and, at times, being morally conscious of her 
behaviour (lines 923-35). Nevertheless, she is still prepared to commit the 
‘ultimate crime/ultimum scelus’ of killing her children, showing her 
awareness of right and wrong but she justifies her decision by the conviction 
that they are being punished for their father’s wrongs which is an indication 
of her perversion of moral responsibility (line 925). The murder of her sons 
terminates her active role as a mother and releases her from an emotional 
connection with Jason on which she had depended. Seneca wishes his 
audience to see Medea succumbing to passion but still in control and any 
wavering is to arouse sympathy and to create dramatic tension, rather than 
to suggest cowardice in carrying out her plan. 
 
While Medea’s arguments for saving her children may be reasonable, in that 
they are innocent of their father’s ‘crimes’ against her, Medea’s calculations 
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are not driven by reason but are based on love, with ‘amor’ referring to 
sexual and conjugal love (Med. lines 937-9) which she associates with 
‘pietas’, perhaps associated with maternal love (lines 943-4) with one 
passion being replaced by another and with this confusion for Medea, hence 
why her sons do not survive.647 After embracing her children, Medea 
realises that she will lose them when she is exiled and so Jason deserves 
to have them taken from him now (lines 945-51). Medea’s spirit is renewed 
with anger when she considers the impact of her impending exile which 
takes over any rationality she may have started to regain: she refers to the 
Fury who avenges wrongs done to family members and despite a certain 
reluctance, she agrees to follow anger’s lead (lines 951-3). She goes so far 
as to wish that she had borne more children to punish Jason more, citing 
the Theban princess Niobe who had seven sons (lines 954-7). At this point 
the audience knows that her ira will win and her sons are doomed.  
 
Arguably, Seneca could be seen to be leading his audience to believe that 
it is right for the characters to fear Medea. The danger she poses is very 
real in the play: the Nurse expresses her fears about her mistress’ violent 
temperament (cf. Med. lines 394-6, 670ff.), Creon shows that he is anxious 
about the safety of his state in Medea’s presence (cf. lines 179ff., 269f.) and 
Jason is afraid of her reaction because of his knowledge of her previous 
behaviour (lines 431ff.). Seneca’s Stoic proposals for caution and a realistic 
response to imminent threat, can be consolidated if pre-passions such as 
trembling (which is common in threatening situations) are acknowledged to 
prevent full blown adfectus (here fear). Following Stoic advice by viewing 
Medea as an ‘indifferent’ in that she cannot affect genuine well-being, would 
lead to neither the characters on stage nor the audience fearing Medea.  
 
While she carries out her crimes singlehandedly, Medea is not self-sufficient 
like a Sage: her resourcefulness depends on her magical powers and she 
calls for support from the Underworld gods, amongst others.648 The closest 
Medea comes to a Stoic approach is her pragmatic attitude towards kingly 
                                                          
647 Cf. Boyle (2014) p. 362 
648 For Stoic self-sufficiency and the completeness of virtue, see pp. 15, 25, 113. 
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wealth which she claims to despise, as one would expect of a Stoic (Med. 
lines 540-1). While Medea may not understand them to have similarities with 
philosophical doctrines, her attitudes towards virtue may be read as 
indicating a Stoic outlook. When she seeks an audience within the play for 
her revenge, she also warns us: ‘Don’t hide and squander// Virtue — non in 
occulto tibi est perdenda uirtus’ (lines 976-7), suggesting that it is important 
to display good qualities, even though she may be referring to ‘virtus’ in the 
sense of ‘courage’, rather than living well or excellence of character.649 
Similarly, in a feisty debate with the Nurse, who claims that virtue is praised 
if timed well (line 160), Medea insists that virtue should be neither hidden or 
squandered (line 161). Even though Medea’s references to virtue are used 
to serve her own needs and they can be perceived as a distortion of Stoic 
sentiments, their presence still highlights the important value of philosophy 
and she is correct in thinking that virtue should be demonstrated in all 
circumstances.  
 
Reacting to Atreus 
In some respects, Atreus’s attitudes are shaped by personal experience – 
anger has torn apart the house of Atreus with civil war and usurpation650 – 
as well as the assumption that Thyestes is again seeking to take over the 
throne.651 Nonetheless, he remains thoroughly despicable and at no point 
does he invite audience pity towards him for the historic treatment by his 
brother. He is a tyrant who instils fear and his vile murder of innocent 
children is appalling, worsened by his serving of the boys at a banquet to 
their father. While anger motivates Atreus’ initial action and he complains 
about external powers moving him (Thy. lines 260-2), by the time he carries 
out his nephews’ murders his actions are cruel and callous. The Messenger 
describes how Atreus kills a boy using language which indicates the brutality 
of ira and its control over its subject. Atreus’ rages and swells with anger 
(‘saevit atque ira tumet’ line 737) and he is oblivious to whom he is raging 
against (‘oblitus in quem fureret’ line 739). The Chorus reinforce the 
                                                          
649 Cf. Boyle (2014) pp. 169, 379.  
650 Cf. Thy. lines 4, 18ff., 28ff., 40ff., 133. 
651 Cf. Thy. lines 201-4; 289; 302ff.; 314-6. 
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murder’s cruelty by declaring it a ‘savage crime/saevum scelus’ (line 744). 
Atreus is determined his revenge will inflict great pain and death is ruled out 
as too kind (line 257), which is savage and conflicts fundamentally with 
philosophical views about justice.  
 
Atreus’ conduct raises the issue of human capacity for, and if there are any 
limits to, evil. Although he never directly offers moral condemnation, the 
Satelles declares that the king’s response is: ‘Too much! Even for your rage 
— maius hoc ira est malum’ (line 259). This is because Atreus’ actions are 
calculated, rather than spontaneous, as one might initially expect from an 
irrational movement of the soul demonstrating how the agent can be 
manipulated by passions to the extent they direct their thinking. Atreus’ 
behaviour encourages sympathy to lie with Thyestes and judging Atreus as 
behaving inappropriately. One could conclude that Thyestes’ punishment is 
neither deserved nor appropriate (particularly after he admits his 
responsibility for the injuries he has caused and expresses remorse (lines 
513-4. Cf. lines 532-3) and appeals to Jupiter for a combined punishment 
with Atreus believing shared guilt is appropriate for the brothers (lines 
1087ff.) 
 
Stoic consistency and the complexity of the tragic characters 
Recognition is one of the ways that a dramatic character’s identity is publicly 
acknowledged and to achieve this, characters must be consistent, almost to 
the extent of being predictable. Consistency in personality and attitudes is 
also important in Stoicism as it reflects moral consistency because ‘mental 
health/sanitas’ depended on a ‘serene and consistent temper/in 
tranquillitate quadam constantiaque’ (Cic. Tusc. 3.9).652 The harmonious 
condition of the mind present in a consistent man was often conveyed in a 
music metaphor to demonstrate the necessity of being in agreement with 
oneself (cf. Ep. 74.30).653 This is not possible when under the influence of 
anger which is responsible for psychological fluctuation (fluctuatio animi) 
that occurs when the anima is no longer governed by reason. In his advice 
                                                          
652 Cf. 2.7.1; Ep. 20.2-5; 31.8; Cic. Tusc. 3.31, 4.39; Stob. Ecl. 2.7.5b1 (60.7-8W). 
653 Cf. Cic. Fin. 3.21. 
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to Lucilius, Seneca believes it is important to uphold a constant 
‘character/persona’ or at least be ‘recognised/adgnosci’ by other people 
because playing the role of one man is most excellent but only a Sage can 
do this consistently (though evidence of this can be found in a proficiens 
‘Istud sapienti perfecto contingit, aliquatenus et proficienti provectoque’ Ep. 
35.4). This is because it requires consistency/constantia and 
concord/concordia of psychology and action (Ep. 120.22).654  
 
In his prose, Seneca encourages self-command to maintain concord within 
the soul, such as through the political metaphor of a strong animus as a king 
commanding what is proper versus the weak animus, the tyrant, who is 
taken over by adfectus (‘excipiunt et instant’, Ep. 114.24).655 In the 
tragedies, self-address is used by the characters to ‘fashion themselves’ 
and command the soul to maintain passions.656 The characters achieve 
consistency in the sense that they are recognizable figures, self-defined 
through self-address and self-command but in a non-Stoic manner.657 
Attempts to achieve consistency of mind and action are to rouse destructive 
behaviour, as opposed to concord for positive ends as a Stoic would 
seek.658 In a dramatic context this indicates the characters’ struggle with 
psychological fluctuation/fluctuatio animi and that the individual has power 
over his soul but the advice in Seneca’s prose to use self-command to stop 
passions is inverted. For example, Medea uses self-naming to fuel deluded 
omnipotence, when she equates herself with the forces of nature, such as 
thunderbolts, reflecting her loudness in the play and her implied fiery 
destruction like lightning (Med. lines 166-7). This is an example of the 
metatheatricality of the play through which the characters acknowledge their 
mythical reputation.659  
                                                          
654 Cf. Ep. 77; 109.6; Star (2012) pp. 65-9. 
655 Cf. Star (2012) p. 39. 
656 Cf. Star (2012) p. 62. 
657 Cf. Star (2012) pp. 68-9. 
658 Cf. Star (2012) ‘Their performance of their crimes of revenge is the result of a controlled 
and consistent process of self-monitoring and self-shaping’ (pp. 62-3). 
659 Self-naming is frequently used in Seneca for self-construction to show self-awareness 
and pride in one’s deeds. Medea names herself eight times in Seneca (Med. lines 8, 166, 
171, 517, 524, 567, 910, 934) but only once in Euripides (Med. line 402). Cf. Fitch and 
McElduff (2008) p. 163. 
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If the characters held consistent and constructive attitudes and their 
behaviour was predictable, not only would the outcome of their actions be 
positive but their relationship with other people would be beneficial. Such 
virtuous consistency includes keeping the same expression despite the 
circumstances, as great men are reported to have done, for example 
Socrates (cf. 2.7.1)660 and Cato (Ep. 104.30).661 Medea is, at the very least, 
perverting the Stoic sentiment of consistency and possibly parodying it, in 
the sense that she is largely aggressive, manipulative and scheming, traits 
of which the other characters in the play are aware and draw attention to, 
for Seneca to show the extent of her misguided self-opinion and her 
erroneous conduct which is driven by anger.662 Atreus’ constancy too is a 
mark of the inverted Stoic sentiments in the play, as he too has self-created 
the persona of an angry tyrant (‘tyranno… iratus Atreus’, Thy. lines 177-80) 
who rules by brutality and fear (lines 201-4; 288-9; 312ff.). The continued 
commitment to an irrational motivator which Seneca’s characters display is 
because they are governed by passions. Medea and Atreus are playing the 
one role ‘unum hominem agere’ which Seneca advises for Lucilius (Ep. 
120.22) but in a negative way. Through seeking consistency in wickedness 
and being driven by passions, their failures show the importance of 
perfecting a rational self so that errors in judgements that have the kind of 
disastrous consequences that are seen in the plays are no longer made.663  
 
For Seneca, role-playing and identity (in the form of self-dramatisation) are 
of great concern to affirm his characters’ status and their reputation, threats 
to which are met with explosive reactions.664 Consequently, Senecan figures 
(mis)identify themselves through a specific social persona which causes 
problems when these constructs are threatened, as is the case in the 
tragedies, for it is this which creates dramatic material. Medea’s revenge is 
                                                          
660 Cf. Ep. 104.28; Helv. 13.4.4; Cic. Tusc. 3.31. 
661 Cf. Bartsch (2015) pp. 194ff.  
662 Cf. Med. lines 179-82, 393-5, 670ff. 
663 Gill (2009) also notes the perceived unified and consistent character of Medea who is 
‘single-mindedly focused on hatred revenge and violence and revelling in the evil of her 
own motivation’ and indicates Atreus shares similar qualities (p. 66). Cf. Med. lines 1-55, 
129-36, 893-925. 
664 Cf. Littlewood (1997) pp. 72-3.  
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motivated by the fact that her function as wife has not been appropriately 
acknowledged by Jason. At the time of her perceived ‘triumph’ after killing 
her second son, she remarks: ‘Ungrateful Jason. Recognise your wife? — 
ingrate Iason. coniugem agnoscis tuam?’ (Med. line 1021). This phrase can 
be interpreted in many ways. Medea may be asking ‘Do you give me now 
the recognition which I deserve?’ or ‘Do you recognise your true wife? Not 
Creusa?’ or ‘Do you recognise the particular character of your wife?’.665 I 
interpret this phrase to mean that Medea is asking whether Jason 
recognises her power, strength and the abilities she had repeatedly 
displayed during their marriage, such as the theft of the Golden Fleece i.e. 
does he recognise and remember the characteristics by which Medea 
defines herself and by which she wishes to be defined? 
 
The appeal to be recognised echoes Medea questioning whether Jason will 
underestimate her (Med. line 122), which is significant when she refers to 
fire and sea indicating her influence over the elements (line 121. Cf. lines 
166-7). This is Jason’s problem. He does not know his former wife and 
incorrectly believes she would prioritise her children over her failed marriage 
(lines 442-3). In a Stoic sense this would be having appropriate concern for 
other people and considering the children to be preferred indifferents. 
Whichever interpretation of ‘coniugem agnoscis tuam’ is chosen, evidently 
Medea is seeking acknowledgement of her strength both internally and 
externally, possibly with due cause based on her experience of being 
belittled and threatened. The desire for acknowledgement evidenced by the 
notion of recognition is also present in Thyestes. On seeing his sons’ 
severed heads and being asked if he knows them, Thyestes admits that he 
recognises his brother (Thy. line 1006) to confirm that he knows his 
brother’s vicious capabilities and that he was right to fear them. The 
consequence of the individual’s anger becomes proof of their identity and in 
the plays Seneca presents characters who are challenging sound 
philosophical principles of consistency to illustrate the need to remove 
                                                          
665 Cf. Fitch and McElduff (2008) p. 158.  
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obstacles, such as anger, to the perfection of a steadfast anima and 
coherent virtuous action. 
 
As well as her powerful persona, Medea demonstrates vulnerability through 
her introversion, making her a character to whom the audience can easily 
relate because, as non-philosophers, people commonly turn inwards when 
they are feeling threatened and are unable to view their circumstances 
rationally. This trait is evident when she refers to herself in the third person, 
addresses body parts, such as her mind and hand,666 her self-naming667 or 
by using the third person pronoun,668 through which she distances herself 
from her situation. The self-reference in the third person demonstrates a 
psychological disintegration compared with her initial perceived consistency 
in being focused on vengeance, demonstrating how anger destroys the 
angry as much, if not more, than the objects at which it is directed.669 In 
places, self-address is a motivational tool, such as when Medea urges 
herself into action with a military metaphor telling herself to arm herself with 
wrath in preparation to kill in total frenzy (Med. lines 51-2) and ‘rumpe iam 
segnes moras’ (line 54) (the urgency of which is conveyed by the literal 
translation ‘Act now, break off sluggish delays’).670 
 
In their dramatic context, both Atreus and Medea are conspicuously self-
conscious of their place in their families’ legends and are determined to 
have a substantial role in future story-telling. Medea’s progression to 
fulfilling her mythological status occurs in three instances of self-address, 
which arise as her crime develops: ‘Medea is left/Medea superest’ (line 
166), ‘I’ll become Medea/Medea fiam’ (line 171) and ‘Now I am 
Medea/Medea nunc sum’ (line 910).671 This self-identification is as 
important for Medea as it is for the characters and for the audience to see 
that she is carrying out what is expected of her according to the tradition of 
                                                          
666 Cf. Med. lines 895ff., 976-7, 987ff., 1012. 
667 Cf. Med. lines 8, 517, 522, 910, 934. 
668 Cf. Med. lines 129ff., 397ff., 562ff., 902ff. 
669 Cf. Gill (2009) pp. 66-8. 
670 Cf. Boyle (2014) p. 130.  
671 Cf. Johnson (1988) pp. 93-6; Littlewood (2004) pp. 103-6. 
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her name. It also confirms how Seneca is fulfilling the generic requirements 
of the play Medea. Horace insists that Medea’s character is portrayed as 
‘fierce and indomitable/ferox invictaque’ (Hor. Ars P. line 123) and Seneca’s 
Medea certainly captures these characteristics. She is restoring the sense 
of identity which she lost through Jason’s abandonment and ironically the 
very passion which first made her a victim, by succumbing to anger and 
accomplishing her vengeance; passion creates, not destroys her in the 
sense she feels she is ‘Medea’ again.672 The irony is that, because a 
passion, ira, is responsible, Medea is not unified in a Stoic sense, but one 
that is corrupted and unsustainable, that will fluctuate with her false 
judgements, illustrating to the audience how dependence on passions is 
superficial and threatening to the soul. 
 
The introversion of the protagonist is also evident in Thyestes. Like Medea, 
Atreus regularly addresses himself, at times referring to himself in the third 
person to demonstrate his distress and for other reasons too, such as to 
urge infamous action and for self-characterisation: ‘An angry Atreus/iratus 
Atreus’ (Thy. line 180).673 Atreus defines himself as a tyrant and his 
monstrous crimes must fit with this self-presentation (lines 176ff.). 
Characters’ engagement with violence and their evil within makes them as 
tragic as the plots and this internal conflict is more enthralling than details 
of daily life. Seneca draws his audience into the plays through the 
presentation of complex and unpredictable characters, leaving the viewer 
with torn loyalties and confusion as to where sympathies should lie. The 
linguistic ingenuity demonstrated in the protagonists’ eloquent and 
persuasive speeches is captivating and manipulates feelings towards them.  
 
Curing the tragic characters in Medea and Thyestes 
While De Ira has a lengthy explanation of the cures of anger, there are few 
if any, detailed ways communicated through the tragic characters of how 
the protagonists can release themselves from this passion. Perhaps this is 
too much to expect in a tragic context where lessons on Stoic doctrine would 
                                                          
672 Cf. Curley (1986) p. 196. 
673 Cf. Thy. lines 176ff., 192ff., 266ff., 270. 
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not be natural to include. Nevertheless, the absence of philosophical 
behaviour in plays where philosophical themes are communicated is an 
indication of the need for the audience to consider alternative responses. 
For instance, any comments or advice to Medea are restricted to 
behavioural changes, such as being silent or leaving Corinth. They are not 
based on the recommendation that impression of injury is challenged as 
appearances can be deceptive (cf. 2.22.2). The main characters in the 
tragedies, if they existed in reality, may appear to be the worst kind of 
people, the sort whose reformation is not possible and those whom the 
Stoics would believe appropriate to kill as the only reasonable way to deal 
with them on the grounds that death would save them from themselves and 
protect other people if it had been demonstrated that they were 
irredeemable after failing to reform.674  
 
While this interpretation on the surface may appear to conflict with Seneca’s 
ideal that everyone can be improved and that all vices are removable 
(2.12.1-13.2. Cf. 3.8.7), the characters’ errors and outrages serve to prompt 
alternative ways in thinking and living showing the requirement of self-
improvement. In my view, this is one of the major reasons why Seneca 
employs philosophical attitudes in his dramas. While Seneca’s complicated 
characters may show evidence of Stoic traits, they also demonstrate the 
need for philosophical training, and this maintains dramatic tension as the 
audience is unsure how they will behave next. In terms of educational value, 
such erratic behaviour forces the audience to engage with the characters 
and prompts ongoing reflection throughout and after the play. The most 
obvious need is assistance in removing passions as it is these which cause 
the greatest damage to themselves and to other people. Akin to this is the 
overreliance on other people and depending on fate and the gods to answer 
their problems. In addition, there is the problem of their desiring of external 
goods in the belief that this will empower them and provide tangible 
evidence of their status, as they attempt to meet conventional expectations 
                                                          
674 Cf. 1.14-1.15; 1.16.3-4; 1.19.7. 2.31.8; Clem. 1.12.1. For how Stoics proposed to deal 
with irredeemable people, see pp. 116, 218. 
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which prove to be contrary to the philosophical demands of Stoicism and 
which Seneca believes are common causes of anger. If Seneca has 
achieved his goal of inspiring Stoic attitudes, his audience would take the 
School’s attitude that everyone is deserving of correction and people have 
a social responsibility to help. In this light, I consider how the characters are 
or should have been assisted with their passions by highlighting the 
occasions when the Stoic solutions to passions are offered by minor 
characters and examining how this advice is responded to and if it is 
accepted by the protagonists. Thus, I will show whether if it had been 
implemented, the character’s anger would have either never arisen or have 
quickly abated. 
 
Saving Medea 
It could be asked at what point Medea could have been saved from herself 
and how this could have been achieved. Medea’s self-awareness is ironic. 
She demonstrates profound knowledge about her feelings and 
circumstances and her place in the tradition of Medeas before her, for 
example, when she boasts of the strength of her anger which could not be 
restrained by the forces of nature (Med. lines 411-4). Applied appropriately, 
she could use this potential for carrying out the Stoic spiritual exercises: 
however, she does not use this information to improve herself in the Stoic 
sense. Instead, she employs it to enhance her villainy and any 
praemeditatio malorum is to ascertain the obstacles she may face to fulfilling 
her vengeance. There is no evidence of recognitio, partly because the play 
is set in one day and because, having seen her character develop across 
the acts, the audience can recognise that she would not rationally examine 
her conduct to improve her behaviour or to control her anger. Medea shows 
no interest in the challenges which she has to overcome to reinstate reason 
as a governing force and demonstrates no obvious desire to be restored to 
mental equilibrium. 
 
So many of Medea’s habits and values need to be changed; most 
significantly her emotional reactions which plague her life. She has an over-
inflated sense of self-importance which makes her convinced that she does 
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not deserve to be treated the way she is and that it is right for her to respond 
as she does (Med. line 120). Her feelings of persecution prevent her from 
trying to live harmoniously with the Corinthians. They never accept her, for 
example, they wish to silence her (line 114) but she makes no effort towards 
friendship. Instead, she destroys their royal family by killing Creusa and 
burning Corinth (lines 879-80) as she strives to fulfil her mythological status 
and secure the reputation which has made everyone fear her (cf. lines 45-
50, 423-4, 976ff.). Medea seeks out anger rather than avoiding it and there 
are repeated instances of the destruction caused by her ira before and 
during the play. She is aware of the sensations of anger arising but 
succumbs to them rather than challenging the involuntary pre-passion 
responses (lines 926-7).675  
 
During their decision to be or become villains, Seneca’s characters have 
moments of hesitation before their crimes are committed when they are 
considering potential responses demonstrating the extent of their control 
over their actions or possible demonstration of potential for redemption. For 
example, Medea’s desire for revenge alternates between a longing for a 
reunion with Jason and a desire for his destruction (Med. lines 893ff.), while 
Atreus wavers over the killing of the children which he worries may be his 
(Thy. line 324). This, combined with a loss of nerve (Thy. lines 283-4; Med. 
lines 895, 927-8, 988-9), is evidence that even though initially ira had roused 
both characters into action, its force is short-lived (1.17.4) and unsubstantial 
(1.20.2). The instances of indecision in Medea are momentary, possibly to 
keep the action of the play flowing or to create dramatic tension through 
building suspense in the plot, leaving the audience unsure how she will 
choose to act.676 Either way, they demonstrate how in drama, the 
conventional techniques of anger management are not constructively 
utilised. Such hesitation was also a feature in Seneca’s prose writings 
                                                          
675 Nussbaum (1994) astutely notes that: ‘Philosophy’s job is to prompt a searching self-
examination of culture and belief… – that would have enabled Medea – to take charge of 
her own thinking, considering duly the available alternatives and selecting, from them, the 
one that is best’ therefore suspending her habitual response (p. 328). This interpretation of 
Seneca’s intention to invite his audience to self-reflect accords with my view of his purpose. 
676 Cf. Med. lines 895ff., 926ff., 937ff., 988-9. 
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mainly used in the meditatio of the proficiens (cf. Ep. 31.8; 123.10) but also 
to indicate conflict and instability (pugnam et inconstantiam) and the discord 
which accompanies vices (dissident vitia) compared with the state of a 
harmonious soul (Vit. beat. 8.6).677  
 
Medea is impulsive in the murder of her brother as she kills him and scatters 
his limbs across the sea as she sails away from Colchis without considering 
alternative actions (Med. lines 911ff.). In comparison, the murders of her 
children were more considered, with moments of hesitation before carrying 
out the deed (lines 893-977). Medea has the opportunity to consider how 
she could respond to the ‘injuries’ Jason causes. Her self-apostrophe 
advising herself to follow her ‘fertile impulse/felicem impetum’ (line 895) 
echoes Stoic sentiments expressed elsewhere in Seneca, such as 
encouraging men to follow their mind’s impulse (Ep. 31.1).678 The difference 
is that in the Epistles, Lucilius is advised to follow his impulse towards 
goodness (i.e. pursuing reason). Medea lacks a good counsellor to channel 
her impulse away from what she perceives to be good (i.e. revenge), which 
is actually contrary to reason. Reason fails to prevail in Medea, raising 
questions over whether the technique of delay has universal success. Its 
failure is not in the method itself, but the individual not receiving guidance 
and not applying delay to achieve a positive outcome in terms of resolving 
a confrontational situation. Medea had no genuine intention to extirpate ira, 
particularly when she discovered Jason has no wish for reconciliation. 
Indeed, his rejection serves to increase her rage and prompts her to 
accelerate and magnify her revenge plans and any moments of hesitation 
are used to plot revenge.  
 
Evidently Medea is incapable of helping herself, but the social responsibility 
expected of Stoicism raises the issue of who in the play could and should 
                                                          
677 In addition, there are stylistic reasons why Medea is presented in this way. Self-
questioning and sudden hesitation prior to action is a common theme in Senecan and 
Republican tragedy which may suggest that Seneca was using these devices to conform 
with contemporary style cf. Ag. line 228; HF line 996; HO. lines 307-11; Oct. lines 73-4, 
960; Oed. lines 926, 952, 1024; Phaed. line 425; Phoen. line 30; Boyle (2014) pp. 352-3. 
Cf. Littlewood (2004) pp. 214-5. 
678 Cf. Boyle (2014) p. 353.  
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have helped her. The most obvious person is her confidante the Nurse, as 
well as Creon who as ruler has a responsibility to all his citizens. In addition, 
Jason should have been supportive because of their previous intimacy and 
should have supported her during their relationship, for example with her 
previous outburst of irrationality which led to the murder of her brother. It is 
also reasonable to assume that the Corinthians, if they were Stoics, would 
be seeking to reform Medea. While the Nurse has dutifully listened to her 
mistress’ plight (Med. lines 568-9), Medea is offered empty advice in that 
she is simply told to ‘calm down’ but this is to allow her vengeance to be 
more successful and not to alleviate her angry feelings (lines 150-5). The 
Nurse repeats similar sentiments (cf. lines 157-8, 381, 425-6) and Jason 
orders her to be calm (cf. lines 506-7, 557-9), as well as encouraging 
rational thought (lines 537-8).679 Nowhere is Medea told exactly how to do 
this. The closest detailed advice is offered by the Nurse when she 
recommends acceptance and adaptation (lines 174-5).  
 
Although she fails to provide helpful details about how her mistress should 
change and serves only to fuel Medea’s criminality, the Nurse’s intentions 
are honourable. Like all the characters in the play, the Nurse is terrified of 
Medea: ‘My soul quivers with fear; great disaster looms — Pauet animus, 
horret: magna pernicies adest’ (Med. line 670). As it is a passion caused by 
the incorrect ascription of value to externals and the mistaken belief that 
other people can cause them harm, Stoics do not permit fear which means 
that they would not consider the Nurse to be following their philosophical 
belief system because anything the protagonist says or does is ultimately 
irrelevant to the other characters’ living well. The Stoics advise the 
constantia, caution instead, which Medea captures in her sententia: ‘Who 
can hope for nothing should despair of nothing — Qui nil potest sperare, 
desperet nihil’ (line 163).680 Seneca confirms this view elsewhere when he 
quotes the Stoic Hecato: ‘Cease to hope and you will cease to fear — 
                                                          
679 Cf. Boyle (1997) p. 157. While Jason does not behave in a particularly Stoic fashion, his 
advice here is reminiscent of Stoic guidance to extirpate passion and act according to 
reason rather than emotive impulse.  
680 For Seneca’s sententiae, see p. 45.  
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desines timere si sperare desieris’ (Ep. 5.7). However, none of the 
characters in Medea adopt this sensible advice or recognise the existence 
of or positive implications from constantiae over passions. 
 
Medea’s greatest problem is her passions and attempts to manage them 
with Stoic techniques would be the most beneficial application of 
philosophy. If she could analyse her feelings correctly by establishing their 
causes she would not be carried away by adfectus. Rather than living 
impulsively, she could delay her response and use the time to reflect on the 
most constructive way of responding. By practising spiritual exercises and 
with the community to help her in this reflection, she would realise that, while 
Jason’s abandonment was a negative experience, with appropriate 
planning she could rebuild her life without him. Many people before and 
afterwards, when they have limited their mourning period for the loss of their 
partner, have moved on to meet someone new or to re-establish themselves 
without other people. Medea could consider the various motives for Jason’s 
departure and she ought to have taken responsibility for some of the 
causes, rather than blaming other people, such as Creon and later fortune 
(cf. Med. lines 143, 219ff.). She could have learnt that she has control only 
of her mental activities, but not events, which would alleviate the frustration 
of not being able to create the desired outcome every time.  
 
If Medea saw God as an embodiment of reason, rather than appealing to 
the Olympian divinities, she would realise she has a degree of influence 
over her fated life through the decisions she makes. By letting go of the past 
and relinquishing her focus on her mythological status, Medea could 
appreciate and live in the present for a more fulfilling life. Instead of defining 
herself as a wife, which is no longer a role she can fulfil, she could focus on 
being a good, protective mother. With a lower self-opinion and greater 
humility, she could hold a more realistic value system. This would make her 
a better person and one who is less disposed to disappointment and 
therefore anger. She could improve her relationships with other people by 
becoming less self-centred and by recognising that she is a small part of the 
greater cosmos. By being more receptive to assistance and advice, Medea 
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could benefit from guidance and support from other people to help her deal 
with her difficult situation. The problem in any anger therapy is that anger is 
self-righteous in the belief it is right to avenge injury and desires satisfaction, 
not treatment. This is why Medea does not accept any advice given to 
placate her as is the fact that the irrationality of anger is such that it is deaf 
to rational persuasion (3.39.2). 
 
She is suffering great loss from a variety of sources and it is no wonder her 
grief is so raw (cf. Med. lines 116-22).681 She has little left for which to be 
grateful and she is too emotional to be able to reason about her misfortune. 
However, Medea would struggle to follow the advice that Seneca offers for 
loss (Cf. Ep. 63; 99; Helv.; Marc.) because the after-life haunts her when 
she has hallucinatory visions of her brother’s ghost (lines 963-5). For any 
therapy to work, an individual must want to improve. Medea definitely wants 
to change her situation; however, she refuses to accept advice and does 
not want therapy to improve her internal disposition. She is determined to 
seek revenge with disastrous consequences, without having the restoration 
of her mental stability as her primary goal.  
 
Medea is conscious of her foreignness. Having come from an inhospitable 
land after the attack by the Argonauts, she transfers this to hostility towards 
the Corinthians (Med. lines 42-3) and can be characterised by her 
confrontation and criminality. Had she been able to see that individuals are 
part of a whole, she may have felt less threatened and have behaved less 
aggressively. Similarly, had the other characters in the play taken a 
brotherhood view rather than a narrow polis-interest (which is often 
characterised by fear of people outside their immediate network who are 
perceived as posing a threat to their well-being), they may have been more 
                                                          
681 Nussbaum (1994) draws attention to the times in the play where ‘grief’ and ‘anger’ are 
used synonymously to show the closeness of passions, citing as examples Med. lines 445-
6, where Jason comments about the grief on Medea’s face and lines 943-4 where there is 
an interchange of the terms (p. 451). The connection between the two terms is made 
evident when ‘dolor’ is translated as ‘being wounded’ capturing the sense of a feeling of 
resentment which leads to anger (p. 451 n. 16). Here, Seneca is indicating the close relation 
between different feelings and their manifestation according to the nature of the perceived 
injury. 
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supportive and tolerant towards Medea. Based on her treatment by other 
people, she can be seen as a vulnerable, naïve, impressionable maiden, 
who was attracted to an ostentatious and crafty man from whom she 
anticipated special treatment in reward for her efforts. The banishment of 
Jason proposed in her first monologue seems fitting and acceptable (lines 
19ff.). If the audience adopts this compassionate interpretation and perhaps 
one which is not wholly Stoic in the sense that more sympathy is applied 
than the appropriate concern for others that the School demands, the justice 
in Medea’s anger can be seen, despite its horror, and may go as far as 
believing that love and loyalty (or rather loss of it) makes women criminals.682 
Taking a Stoic view of Medea’s situation an audience could recognise the 
need and their responsibility to assist her by redirecting her energies 
towards assuming reason as a guide and correcting her mistaken evaluation 
of her situation. 
 
Saving Atreus 
Moving on to Atreus, evidence of him practising Stoic methods and whether 
he could be ‘saved’ by philosophy can be considered. He shares many of 
the flaws of Medea. Seneca presents his characters in Roman terms and 
gives Atreus the kind of eloquence and wit which Roman youths of high 
status acquired from attending rhetoric classes.683 Atreus shows no 
evidence of practising spiritual exercises, nor any interest in introspection 
for positive ends, although he is to some degree self-aware, as his self-
identification as a tyrant (Thy. line 177) and his rejoicing in his own 
excessive anger shows.684 When he addresses himself or refers to himself 
in the third person, it is to motivate destructive action, not for self-analysis 
                                                          
682 Benton (2003) recognises that Medea’s use of the passive voice suggests that ‘being a 
criminal is not in her nature; it is something Jason has taught her’ (p. 277 evidenced in her 
defence to Creon, Med. lines 276-80). This arguably over-generous view overlooks 
Medea’s famed propensity for violence for which it is questionable whether Jason can be 
held accountable. 
683 The mockery of Thyestes can arouse mixed responses in the audience. Seneca 
proposes that provocative situations are responded to with laughter (3.37.3. Cf. 2.10.5, 
3.6.3, 3.11.2) and wit can be used to cope with a tyrant (3.15.3). However, Thyestes is 
incapable of this because he does not grasp Atreus’ regular double-entendres and 
cannibalistic innuendo, particularly during the ‘festive banquet’ of cannibalism (cf. Thy. lines 
919ff.): these serve only to make Thyestes’ plight comic cf. Meltzer (1988) pp. 311, 323-4. 
For dramatic irony and dark humour in Thyestes, see Mader (1998), (2002) and (2003). 
684 For Atreus’ attitude to ruling, see p. 183. 
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(cf. lines 176ff., 192ff., 280ff.). To be a humane leader, let alone a Stoic one, 
Atreus’ value system requires immediate modification, yet there is neither 
the inclination nor likelihood of this happening in the ruler. Far from not 
inviting anger, Atreus pursues it, wanting to become more savage when he 
first feels stirrings in his heart (lines 252-4), a craving that is soon satisfied 
when his fury intensifies (lines 260-2).685 According to mythology, initially 
Atreus responded to the betrayal of his brother by usurping his power after 
summoning a civil war and he has a strong propensity towards aggression.  
 
A considerable amount of time has elapsed during Thyestes’ exile; however, 
the ensuing events of the play imply that this time was not spent defusing 
Atreus’ anger. Instead it exacerbated his grievances, making him 
increasingly determined to complete his revenge on his brother’s return 
(Thy. lines 176ff.). Atreus is not carried away by passions in the 
conventional sense because the murders of his nephews are calculated 
(lines 192-5. Cf. lines 241-3, 249-54, 324-30) apart from a fleeting delay 
which he responds to by urging courage (lines 283-4). Such delays and 
abrupt loss of nerve can be linked with the Stoic views about the fluctuation 
of adfectus where passion fades quickly compared with reason which is 
‘well-balanced/aequalis est’ (1.17.4. Cf. lines 283-4).686 However, Atreus’ 
anger exists for the duration of the play, with little evidence of its abatement. 
Initially, Atreus is afraid of his brother’s capabilities because he is nervous 
about his regal position (lines 201ff.), in the same way Thyestes fears 
Atreus’ intentions (cf. lines 412ff., 434ff., 473ff.): both men suffer greater 
anxiety than the caution which the Stoics allow. If they were aware of and 
had reconsidered the real impact of other people’s behaviour on them, they 
would have realised that, according to a Stoic perspective, they could not 
be truly harmed. By the end of the play Atreus fears nothing (lines 703ff. Cf. 
line 888); this is not because he is a Sage or a true king (lines 388-90), but 
because of the change in circumstances, so that the threat to his rule has 
been removed. Similarly, at the play’s closure Atreus will desire nothing, not 
due to self-sufficiency but because his desires have been largely fulfilled by 
                                                          
685 For Atreus’ appetite, see p. 209. 
686 Cf. Tarrant (1985) p. 131.  
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successfully taking revenge (lines 888-9). Atreus is not rescuable from 
himself by other characters’ support, not only because the advice offered to 
him relates to kingship alone rather than managing his passions. He is 
dismissive of the Satelles’ challenge to his ruling style and rejects the 
alternative of being a good and fair king offered by the Minster in his attempt 
to apply Stoic therapy, indicating that Atreus would not be receptive to 
changing his values or personality (cf. lines 205ff.).  
 
Could Stoicism have helped Atreus? Atreus’ rage is his greatest flaw. If he 
could control his feelings, innocent people, such as his citizens and family, 
would have been saved from their anxiety, distress and pain. Introspection 
could improve him as a person, help him to understand the reality of his 
situation and teach him what is within his true sphere of control. He could 
then take responsibility for his role in his wife’s betrayal which may have 
mitigated his anger and its ensuing destruction. More widely, instead of 
trying to control his subjects and everything around him, Atreus would be a 
better ruler if he was not governed by passions such as anger and greed 
and instead sought to protect his state and act for the greater good, rather 
than solely for his ends, enabling him to fulfil his prescribed role correctly by 
following reason. He could benefit from listening to the advice of other 
people and understand the sort of ruler that they wish to have. Instead of 
arrogantly believing he has banished the deities, he should embrace the 
divine spirit within all men, adopt its reasoning power and see that the true 
God is an embodiment of reason which facilitates virtue. 
 
*** 
Evidently, Medea and Atreus are not responsive to treatment for their 
passions. This is not due to the defectiveness of the philosophical 
techniques. It serves to demonstrate the requirement from the individual to 
want to change. It could be considered unreasonable to expect tragic 
characters to want to change or wholly embrace philosophical ideals, even 
though they require it most. Despite hopes as the plays progress that the 
murders of children will not happen, even though dramatic plot knowledge 
means the audience knows they must, character improvement would be 
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contrary to the generic requirements of tragedies which depend on 
individuals making fundamental mistakes, to create the dramatic tension 
necessary for a successful play and to arouse a powerful response in the 
audience. However, any perceived allusions to Stoicism in the plays are not 
meaningless. The disastrous personalities are established not only for 
entertainment but also for the audience’s education in how to respond to 
confrontational situations and to people who cause injury and how to 
manage feelings to prevent them from developing into passions. Medea and 
Atreus represent the dark side of humanity, mirror universal human failings 
and perennial problems men face on an individual and social level. 
Seneca’s presentation of his characters brings the individuals alive and 
draws the audience into the play, making them relate to the characters as 
they would to real people. 
 
The audience leaves the plays emotionally and intellectually exhausted, 
having suffered with the characters and feeling sentiments such as regret 
that Stoic methods did not help the protagonists because they were not all 
tried or applied or properly implemented, at the same time as being 
revitalised by the inspired self-reflection. From the characters’ mistakes and 
atrocities, the importance of extirpating passions is learnt, and the audience 
becomes aware that there are alternative ways of thinking and living to 
prevent them from ‘becoming’ Medea or Atreus. Tragic characters will not 
change: real people can and according to Seneca, should strive to adopt a 
Stoic way of life. Adopted as a life-style rather than a quick-fix solution, the 
value of Stoicism is apparent, because if practised regularly an individual 
would not allow himself to become victim to the sort of scenarios in these 
plays. The plays also raise issues of the sort of environment one needs to 
be in so as to successfully implement these sorts of strategies, for instance 
being associated with good natured people who guide and support others 
in seeking virtue and perfecting reason. In this respect, tragedy provides 
much more than theatrical entertainment: plays can prompt life-changing 
self-realisation in the audience. Seneca is successful in creating compelling 
and lasting dramas which are as relevant now as they were at the time of 
their composition.  
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis sought to answer a series of questions relating to the nature and 
management of anger in relation to Seneca’s presentation of the passion 
across the genres in which he writes. The final chapter draws together 
conclusions about Seneca’s place in the Stoic tradition and the extent to 
which anger’s management depends on Stoic theory. It analyses his 
educative purpose in writing by considering how useful the selected texts 
are in teaching his reader and audience about anger. I end with the 
argument that the correct application of Stoic philosophy facilitates the 
ability to correct erroneous evaluative judgements, thus removing passions, 
and enables a virtuous life of tranquillitas which ought to be pursued by 
mankind. 
 
How orthodox is Seneca? 
Having analysed the varied Stoic attitudes towards passions in Chapter 
One, I conclude that Seneca is largely orthodox in his thinking. This is 
because of his monism, his belief that the soul is corporeal and the 
agreement that there is an innate divine spirit in humans. He agrees that the 
summum bonum depends on pursuing virtue and following nature without 
dependence on externals or fate. He accepts the four primary passions as 
appetite, fear, distress and pleasure and follows Zeno’s temporal sequence 
of the formation of passions.  
 
In his division of the formation of anger into stages, Seneca can be 
interpreted to be resolving the conflict between Zeno and Chrysippus about 
the role of judgements in passions, by selecting parts of their respective 
arguments to formulate his own without contradicting either of his 
predecessors’ views.687 He agrees that assent is voluntary, that there are 
two causes for action in that for anger to arise there is the need for assent 
to the impression of injury and the desire to avenge. He also accepts from 
Chrysippus the extent of man’s sphere of control and that their lack of 
                                                          
687 For the role of judgement in passions, see pp. 57, 62, 66-70.  
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reasoning exempts animals from passions. Seneca agrees that passions 
are instances of insanity and like Chrysippus, among other thinkers, that 
philosophy is medicine for the soul. He shares Cleanthes’ view of the 
educative value of poetry but also shares the concern of other Stoics that it 
corrupts if there is no moral purpose. Seneca advocates the forms of Stoic 
lessons, such as decreta, praecepta, lectures, reading texts, letter-writing 
and keeping good company at the same time as agreeing with Posidonius 
about the importance of examining adfectus to understand good and evil. 
He takes a Stoic world view of men as citizens of the universe, favours a 
Stoic God who acts as creator, protector and ruler governed by reason and 
agrees with Chrysippus and Posidonius that only the Sage is a true king. 
These views illustrate how Seneca embraces many of the views of early 
Stoic thinkers.  
 
Posidonius’ influence is most evident in Seneca’s proposed therapies as 
both consider methods in terms of their educative and supervisory nature. 
They also agree about how the constitutive elements and environment 
affect character in a similar way to Chrysippus and Aristotle’s arguments. 
Indeed, Seneca is selective in his choice of Stoic doctrines, rejecting much 
of their logic and syllogisms, because he believes that man’s responsibility 
for self-improvement entails moulding his own opinion.688 This view provides 
opportunity for Seneca to contribute new ideas to the school’s doctrines. For 
instance, he is innovative in emphasising the role of voluntas in the 
formation of anger, he develops comprehensive concepts about pre-
passions from Chrysippus, Posidonius and the Epicureans and extends the 
concept of the proficiens also discussed in Posidonius. By separating the 
formation of passions into stages, he reconciles the apparent contradictions 
found in Zeno and Chrysippus, thus creating a more cohesive theory. I 
interpret these contributions not so much as a rejection of earlier Stoic 
theories but as a means to assimilate different ways of thinking. 
 
                                                          
688 For Seneca’s rejection of some Stoic doctrines, see pp. 26ff. 
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In De Ira, Seneca introduces Aristotelian and Epicurean ideas largely to 
refute them in favour of a Stoic perspective about the nature of anger, in 
which he is very persuasive. For instance, he rejects the other two schools’ 
beliefs that anger is necessary for self-preservation and involves pleasure 
because he prefers the Stoic explanation that injury should be seen as 
indifferent to man’s wellbeing and that pleasure and anger are separate 
passions. Seneca also rejects the idea that passions can be moderate, as 
argued by Posidonius and Aristotle, or that there are two types of anger as 
the Epicureans propose: instead he promotes the orthodox view that 
passions are absolute. However, he agrees with the other schools that there 
is a relation between injury and anger which is also proposed by the early 
Stoa. While there is evidence of Epicurean and other philosophical schools 
in his writing, Seneca’s views predominately represent a Stoic perspective, 
suggesting he believes that their way of thinking is most suited to his 
purpose of educating people in virtue and vice. This is based on his personal 
experience and the shared belief that the disruption to reason which vices 
such as anger cause is curable and adfectus can be replaced by 
constantiae.689  
 
How ‘Stoic’ are Seneca’s anger management techniques? 
The cognitive element of adfectus which Seneca accepts from Stoicism and 
the subjectivity of anger mean that it is possible to alleviate the troubles it 
causes, if evaluations are reconsidered and impressions are rationally and 
correctly judged. This proposed ‘solution’ is reasonable and achievable 
when the methods are known and correctly applied. Seneca’s aim in De Ira 
is to advise how not to become angry and not to do wrong if angry. He 
teaches that men can control whether they become angry by identifying pre-
passions and amending perceptions and attitudes through selecting 
methods which best suit their needs to prevent anger from arising.  
 
While a philosophically-based education would best prepare men for 
adulthood, in early education the measures which Seneca proposes such 
                                                          
689 For Seneca’s motivation for promoting Stoicism, see pp. 17-23.  
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as training children not to respond in provocative situations, teaching that 
emotional behaviour does not produce results, and following good examples 
are methods which non-philosophical parents and communities can 
provide.690 In adulthood, the role of philosophy is more apparent in Seneca’s 
advice, such as internalising Stoic principles to form one’s own principles by 
which to live.691 Yet even here, in keeping the company of wise men, even 
if the sole purpose is not to meditate on virtue and perfect reason, men can 
learn how to better behave simply by following good examples. The spiritual 
exercises Seneca recommends originate from philosophy but seen from a 
different angle, reflection on one’s behaviour and thoughts does not 
necessarily depend on having a philosophical inclination.692 For instance, 
while understanding the Stoic psychology of action and the cause and effect 
of anger makes sense of the exercises and is likely to produce more 
sustainable changes, with the basic inclination to improve one’s thinking and 
be accountable for one’s action, self-reflection in itself could be sufficient for 
worthier behaviour.  
 
Changing life-style habits and behaviour, which involves taking part in 
aesthetic activities which do not provoke passions, and the correct selection 
of company can also be successful in non-philosophers because they are 
methods which are comparatively easy to carry out.693 Making changes to 
what is valued and rejecting externals on a simple non-philosophical level 
could be interpreted to mean rejecting materialism. However, understanding 
a Stoic categorisation of externals and recognising indifferents makes 
valuing things simpler because it provides guidance relating to correct 
selection and an understanding of why it is beneficial and necessary to the 
summum bonum.694 Perhaps the most complicated technique for curing 
passions is changing attitudes towards other people when a Stoic 
perspective is taken. The notions of true friendship being restricted to the 
wise and accepting the loss of people as indifferents would be hard for a 
                                                          
690 For childhood education, see pp. 132-3. 
691 For adult education, see pp. 133-4. 
692 For spiritual exercises, see pp. 134-52. 
693 For changes in life-style habits and behaviour, see pp. 152-7. 
694 For appropriate attitudes towards externals, see pp. 157-9. 
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non-philosopher to comprehend and accept. Nevertheless, the appeal to 
humanitas, compassion, forgiveness and tolerance which Seneca and 
Stoicism advocate can be universally applied, and improved social relations 
can follow without dependency on a Stoic valuation of indifferents. 
 
Seneca’s practical guidance which does not depend on understanding Stoic 
doctrines can be seen in the advice not to invite anger, resist it at its first 
stages and delay responses. Avoiding provocative scenarios, such as 
crowds, and ignoring rumours are straightforward and delaying a reaction 
can be accepted as sensible, even if the concept of withholding assent is 
not appreciated as the means. The first stage of preventing anger is to 
prevent it from arising or to stop it from developing by acknowledging and 
halting feelings when involuntary pre-passions are experienced. While this 
method is philosophically based, it could be applied from a non-
philosophical basis if understood, not in terms of fluctuations of the soul but 
as changes in sensations which, with practice, can be identified as warning 
signs for future more disruptive responses. For example, one might realise 
that an increased sensation of heat in the chest may be an indication of 
angry feelings brewing without interpreting that sensation in Stoic terms. 
Helping to cure other people’s anger can be accepted as a communal 
responsibility and understanding the need to remove anger for social benefit 
can be accepted without a philosophical context as the negative 
consequences of ira are easily identifiable.695 Supporting one’s friends by 
removing them from inflammatory situations and knowing them sufficiently 
well to identify the signs of anger as they arise are practical means which 
do not require a knowledge of Stoicism. However, efforts such as re-
education in terms of ascribing value would require philosophical input in 
terms of explaining the reasons for reactions and facilitating changes. 
 
This analysis of Seneca’s cures has demonstrated that they are sufficiently 
universal and varied that methods can be selected which are appropriate to 
an individual’s circumstances whether he takes a Stoic outlook or not and 
                                                          
695 For curing other people, see pp. 170-3. 
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even without philosophical inclinations, anger can be prevented. However, 
a Stoic perspective yields better and more sustainable results because it 
facilitates an understanding of the world, of what to do and why. For 
example, men with a tendency to jump to conclusions would benefit from 
delaying their reaction and reflecting on the initial impression. People who 
are hyper-sensitive to any criticism by other people would profit from 
remembering what is in their control and that other people’s opinions do not 
really affect their well-being. Thoroughly ‘knowing ourselves’ through the 
spiritual exercises, is a successful way of learning one’s vulnerabilities and 
how to address these.  
 
The educational value of Senecan philosophy 
Having acknowledged that Seneca has varied reasons for incorporating 
Stoic themes in his writing, because this research has focused on his moral 
purpose of encouraging self-improvement, I now consider the educative role 
of Seneca’s works in teaching his readers and audiences about virtue and 
vice and reason versus passion by drawing on what appear to be the 
intended responses to his lessons. Conscious of the need to address 
human vice and the importance of promoting virtuous living, Seneca 
presents himself as man’s teacher, guide and doctor to motivate self-
improvement and to persuade his readers and audience to change their 
opinions. The selected texts all communicate important details about the 
problems of passions and in doing so contribute to the understanding of 
their nature. De Ira most obviously reveals Seneca’s views about anger, 
which are reinforced through references to ira in De Clementia and his 
dramas illustrate the catastrophic consequences of anger. In his prose, 
Seneca dispels the common myths surrounding anger and uses exempla 
and descriptions to illustrate the wide-spread destruction it causes 
confirming the requirement to remove ira. He teaches that man can control 
whether he becomes angry through a variety of techniques, which when 
properly applied can remove it altogether.696 
 
                                                          
696 Cf. Chapter Three passim. 
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By placing his argument in a philosophical framework that is largely Stoic, 
Seneca presents explanations of why and how anger can be removed. 
However, the genres in which he writes may affect the ease with which this 
can be achieved. The Epistles and moral essays offer sensible advice for 
moral improvement and clear directions for executing Stoicism, to the extent 
that they include rhetorical questions and interlocutors who raise concerns 
his reader may wish to voice.697 The references to humanitas which 
permeate each page of De Ira and De Clementia evoke thoughtfulness 
about how one should respond to slights, the ethical considerations behind 
punishment, what it is to be human, how to be humane and how to cultivate 
a perfect soul. These texts promote Stoic living as a means of obtaining 
virtue, the highest and only true good. The wide influence across the 
centuries confirms the value of De Ira and De Clementia, not only as pieces 
of literature but as moral essays providing guidance for rulers and 
individuals designed to have a positive influence on the way humans co-
exist.698  
 
In comparison with the prose works, Medea and Thyestes do not directly 
sermonise, nor should they be expected to do so, though there are 
philosophical themes implied in characters’ speeches and behaviours as 
has been identified in Chapter Four. In response to the anti-Stoic 
interpretation of Seneca’s drama, I argue that, while there are alternative 
ways of viewing his plays, evidence in the texts suggests that they should 
be read as inviting reflection in the audience. Seneca’s dramas demand 
that, alongside being entertained, through witnessing the disastrous 
consequences of not addressing passions, his audience appraise their 
behaviours to address personal weaknesses and avoid falling into the same 
problems as his disturbed characters. In this respect, the characters’ errors 
and outrages as mala exempla serve to prompt alternative ways in our 
thinking and living and this is one of the major reasons why Seneca employs 
philosophical attitudes in his dramas. By encouraging his audience to 
                                                          
697For the use of such declamatory devices, see pp. 42-7. 
698For the influence of De Ira, see Cooper and Procopé (1995) pp. xxxi-ii. For the impact of 
De Clementia on future authors, see Braund (2009) pp. 77-86.  
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change how they view the world and to have an increased self-awareness 
after reading or watching the plays, Seneca is promoting Stoicism and is 
correct to do so if his programme is to re-educate his readers and audience 
in virtue and vice because the school offers comprehensive ways to 
understand these concepts.  
 
*** 
The practical nature of Stoic philosophy is such that it provides guidance for 
behaviour when an individual assimilates the doctrines and applies them to 
his life. By focusing on the perfection of reason, which for Stoics is man’s 
telos, there is a clear goal to achieve. Attaining the summum bonum is 
facilitated by accepting doctrines such as secundum naturam, officia, 
oikeiosis and by emulating the paradigm of the Sage. These concepts make 
sense of why men should think and act in a particular way which makes 
Stoicism appealing. Stoic philosophy also offers us a form of therapy 
concerned with coping with, preparing for and avoiding pain, as well as 
learning to accept fate and commanding what is within human control.699 It 
provides man with a sense of purpose and identity in a world larger than the 
individual. While Stoicism may not be a cure for severe mental health 
problems, which require professional medical attention, it offers an excellent 
prescription for cognitive and emotional ailments and provides accessible 
advice for living well. In my view, Seneca is right to believe that Stoicism is 
an appropriate way to secure a virtuous life of tranquillitas and one which is 
devoid of anger.  
  
                                                          
699Cf. Sandbach (1975) p. 17; Collins (2009) pp. 46, 48. 
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